O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5 (2019)

Trial court did not err in dismissing a juvenile’s motion to set aside the adjudications of child molestation and aggravated child molestation because evidence that contradicted the victim’s testimony that the victim did not have sexual intercourse with any other man did not go to the issue of whether the juvenile was guilty and the juvenile had admitted the allegations. In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015). Victim’s testimony that it hurt when the defendant inserted a finger into the victim’s vagina was sufficient to prove the defendant caused injury to the victim for purposes of proving aggravated child molestation. Moon v. State, 335 Ga. App. 642, 782 S.E.2d 699 (2016). Showering and watching pornography together sufficient. - Victims’ testimony, which was consistent with their outcry statements and forensic interviews, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for child molestation. The jury could have inferred that when the defendant showered nude with one of the victims and forced the other to watch pornography the defendant did so for purposes of sexual arousal or satisfaction. Brown v. State, 324 Ga. App. 718, 751 S.E.2d 517 (2013). Testimony of the first victim that the defendant touched the victim’s body from the victim’s breasts to vagina with the defendant’s mouth, penis, and hands and, also, with a vibrator, and made the victim place the victim’s mouth on the defendant’s penis was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for child molestation. Wofford v. State, 329 Ga. App. 195, 764 S.E.2d 437 (2014). Testimony of the second victim that the defendant licked the victim’s vagina, rubbed the defendant’s penis against the victim, masturbated in front of the victim, and put the victim’s hands on the defendant’s penis was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Wofford v. State, 329 Ga. App. 195, 764 S.E.2d 437 (2014). Defendant’s conviction for child molestation was affirmed because the testimony of the victim was sufficient to show that the defendant had shown the victim a pornographic video, had touched the victim, and had engaged in sexual activity based on the victim’s description and use of dolls to demonstrate the acts the defendant took toward the victim. Chamblee v. State, 333 Ga. App. 749, 777 S.E.2d 41 (2015). Oral sex with 13 year old victim. - Victim’s testimony that the victim had oral sex with the defendant when the victim was 13 years old, standing alone, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation. Hill v. State, 331 Ga. App. 280, 769 S.E.2d 179 (2015). Victimized by stepparent. - Victim’s testimony that she had sex, including oral sex, with the defendant, her stepfather, beginning when she was 12 years old was corroborated by, among other things, the defendant’s admissions and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the statutory rape, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and incest convictions. Jackson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 313, 793 S.E.2d 201 (2016). Touching over clothes sufficient. - Evidence authorized the jury to infer that the defendant touched the victim child’s vagina over clothing and that the defendant intended to arouse the defendant’s sexual desires or those of the victim as there was evidence that the defendant specifically called the victim to the defendant, sat the victim on the defendant’s lap, placed a hand on the victim’s vagina over the victim’s clothes, and held a hand there for up to a minute. Latta v. State, 341 Ga. App. 696, 802 S.E.2d 264 (2017), cert. denied, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 1021 (Ga. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1582, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2291, 200 L. Ed. 2d 768 (U.S. 2018). Victim’s testimony that the defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim by, inter alia, having sexual intercourse and oral sex with the victim throughout the applicable period and that the defendant impregnated the victim, causing the victim to undergo an abortion, was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for child molestation, aggravated sexual battery, and statutory rape. Blackwell v. State, 346 Ga. App. 833, 815 S.E.2d 288 (2018). Recanting of child victim’s testimony. - Witnesses testified pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820) that the defendant’s stepchild, then 12, told them about being repeatedly raped and molested by the defendant. That the stepchild recanted these statements at trial did not render the hearsay inadmissible under former § 24-3-16, and as the stepchild’s credibility was for the jury to decide, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for rape, incest, and child molestation. Harvey v. State, 295 Ga. App. 458, 671 S.E.2d 924 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), and aggravated child molestation, § 16-6-4(c), because although the victim recanted prior statements concerning the defendant’s acts of sodomy, the recantation did not preclude a conviction since the victim’s prior inconsistent statements concerning the defendant’s acts of sodomy were allowed to serve as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Stepho v. State, 312 Ga. App. 495, 718 S.E.2d 852 (2011). Attempted child molestation. - Asportation of the child is not an essential element of attempted child molestation. Wittschen v. State, 189 Ga. App. 828, 377 S.E.2d 681 (1988), aff ’d, 259 Ga. 448, 383 S.E.2d 885 (1989). Defendant’s conviction of attempted child molestation was affirmed on evidence showing that defendant drove a van up to two young children who were roller-skating on a street, held up dollar bills and asked them if they would like to have the money, and when one girl responded affirmatively, said ‘‘let me stick my hand down your pants.’’ Wittschen v. State, 189 Ga. App. 828, 377 S.E.2d 681 (1988), aff ’d, 259 Ga. 448, 383 S.E.2d 885 (1989).

When there was undisputed evidence that defendant entered the 12-year old victim’s house with the intent to engage in sexual activity and that defendant sat nude on the victim’s bed while the victim was in the bed, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of criminal attempt to commit child molestation. Garmon v. State, 192 Ga. App. 250, 384 S.E.2d 278 (1989). Indictment for attempted child molestation was sufficient without alleging the specific intent of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 332, 503 S.E.2d 914 (1998). Indictment for attempted child molestation alleging that defendant took a substantial step toward commission of the crime of child molestation by: (1) engaging in sexually-explicit conversations over the internet; and (2) driving to an arranged meeting place was not fatally defective in that it failed to allege the commission of a crime. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000). Evidence that defendant undressed the defendant and a 14-year-old child and then climbed into bed with the child was more than sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of criminal attempt to commit child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1, 16-6-4(a). Colbert v. State, 255 Ga. App. 182, 564 S.E.2d 787 (2002). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for attempted child molestation under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and 16-6-4(a) where defendant: (1) wrapped defendant’s body around a child so as to restrain the child’s arms; (2) rubbed and kissed the child’s back, placing defendant’s feet in the child’s crotch; and (3) asked where the child had been all of defendant’s life. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003). Evidence supported defendant’s attempted child molestation conviction as defendant showered a 13-year-old victim with gifts and marijuana to induce the child to have sexual intercourse with the defendant. Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga. App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (2005). Defendant was properly ordered to register as sex offender because the convic- Application (Cont’d) tions constituted criminal offenses against a victim who was a minor, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) and because attempt convictions pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 were covered within the registration requirement; defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit child molestation and criminal attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4(a) and 16-6-5(a), respectively, as defendant communicated over the Internet with a police officer who was disguised as a 14-year-old child, and arranged to meet the alleged child, and the fact that an actual child was not involved did not negate the offense or the need for the registration, as there was no impossibility defense. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Because sufficient evidence was presented which showed that the defendant took substantial steps to arouse the defendant’s own sexual desires in soliciting both the defendant’s child and the child’s cousin, showing the cousin indecent photos, discussing masturbation with both, and trying to kiss the child between the legs, the defendant’s attempted child molestation convictions were upheld on appeal. Carey v. State, 281 Ga. App. 816, 637 S.E.2d 757 (2006). Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of attempted child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt because whether the defendant’s actions were immoral or indecent and done with the requisite intent were questions for the jury. Machado v. State, 300 Ga. App. 459, 685 S.E.2d 428 (2009). Evidence that the defendant, age 35, met a girl online whom the defendant believed was 15, that the defendant made numerous comments about how the defendant could get in trouble or go to jail, that the defendant engaged in sexually explicit conversations and directed the child to pornography sites showing black men having sex with white women, that the defendant drove to an arranged meeting place, and, that, when officers appeared, the defendant fled, was sufficient to convict defendant of violating O.C.G.A.

§§ 16-4-1 (attempt), 16-6-4 (child molestation), 16-6-5 (enticement of a child), and 16-10-24 (obstruction). Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 301, 702 S.E.2d 211 (2010). Contact initiated through Craigslist. - Law enforcement had probable cause to arrest the defendant for attempted enticement of a minor, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 and 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), when the defendant initiated contact with undercover officers after reading a Craig’s list post submitted by two girls, ages fourteen and fifteen, made telephone calls to the alleged girls, and rented a motel room to meet the girls. United States v. Slaughter, No. 4:10-CR-24-HLM-WEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37502 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2011). Evidence that the defendant raised the subject of masturbation with the child victim and asked her to perform that act upon him was sufficient to support his conviction of attempted child molestation. Pendley v. State, 308 Ga. App. 821, 709 S.E.2d 18 (2011). Communication with someone believed to be under 16 years of age. - Conviction of attempted child molestation is authorized when the evidence shows that the defendant communicated with an adult whom the defendant believed to be a child under sixteen years of age and took substantial steps to meet with that person to engage in sexual activity that would constitute child molestation. Lopez v. State, 326 Ga. App. 770, 757 S.E.2d 436 (2014). Substantial step taken towards child molestation. - Evidence that the defendant sent email communications to a person the defendant believed to be the mother of a 14-year-old girl, arranged to pay for a night of ‘‘companionship’’ with the girl, and traveled to the arranged meeting place was sufficient to show that the defendant took a substantial step toward committing the crime of child molestation and supported the conviction for attempted child molestation. Schlesselman v. State, 332 Ga. App. 453, 773 S.E.2d 413 (2015). Evidence that the defendant communicated with someone the defendant believed was a 15-year-old girl, asked the alleged child repeatedly for nude photos, told the child the defendant was a horny and dirty old man, and told the child they could play and get all worked up and be ready for fun before meeting, arranged a meeting, and traveled to the arranged meeting place was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit child molestation. Reid v. State, 349 Ga. App. 196, 825 S.E.2d 555 (2019). Admissibility of evidence of similar or connected offenses against children. - In child molestation cases, evidence of other similar or connected sexual offenses against children is admissible to corroborate testimony of victim as well as to show lustful disposition of defendant. Ballweg v. State, 158 Ga. App. 576, 281 S.E.2d 319 (1981); Walls v. State, 166 Ga. App. 503, 304 S.E.2d 547 (1983); Pittman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 693, 344 S.E.2d 511 (1986). Sexual molestation of young children, regardless of sex or type of act, is sufficient similarity to make evidence admissible. Phelps v. State, 158 Ga. App. 219, 279 S.E.2d 513 (1981). Testimony of two witnesses about defendant’s molestation of them when they were children, such incidents having occurred 11 and six years before trial, were properly admitted, where the prior incidents were extremely similar to the offenses for which defendant was tried and convicted. Childs v. State, 177 Ga. App. 257, 339 S.E.2d 311 (1985). Trial court did not err in admitting, as a similar transaction, testimony that the defendant raped the defendant’s sister-in-law when the sister-in-law was 15 years old and was not then in the protected age of minority. Ryan v. State, 226 Ga. App. 180, 486 S.E.2d 397 (1997). Evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for lewd and lascivious assault on a minor was admissible to prove the defendant’s ‘‘intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.’’ Blackwell v. State, 229 Ga. App. 452, 494 S.E.2d 269 (1997). In a prosecution of defendant for molestation of the defendant’s 12-year-old stepnephew, evidence that the defendant molested the defendant’s five- or six-year-old stepsister nine or ten years earlier when the defendant was a juvenile was admissible. Gilham v. State, 232 Ga. App. 237, 501 S.E.2d 586 (1998). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant’s federal conviction for receiving child pornography through the mail as well as evidence of molesting an 11-year-old child as similar transactions in defendant’s trial under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 for molesting a 13-year-old child. Hoffman v. State, 259 Ga. App. 131, 576 S.E.2d 102 (2003). When three prior incidents and the current child molestation charges against the defendant all involved the defendant going to locations frequented by children and exposing the defendant’s genitals to them, the prior incidents were sufficiently similar to be admitted as similar transaction evidence in defendant’s trial for child molestation; the fact that the prior incidents, unlike the current ones, did not involve touching the child victims did not mean that the prior incidents were not sufficiently similar to the current ones to be admitted as there was no requirement that the prior crime or transaction had to be absolutely identical in every respect. Hostetler v. State, 261 Ga. App. 237, 582 S.E.2d 197 (2003). Testimony of adult about abuse as child. - Testimony of a defendant’s adult stepdaughter regarding the defendant’s molestation of her when she was a child was admissible as a similar transaction in the defendant’s trial for molestation of his two granddaughters because both the present case and the similar transaction involved defendant molesting underage family members who were in his home. Downer v. State, 310 Ga. App. 136, 712 S.E.2d 571 (2011). Trial court did not err in admitting similar transaction evidence because certified copies of the defendant’s prior conviction were sufficient to prove not only the similarity between the crimes for which the defendant was convicted, aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sodomy, child molestation, and enticing a child for indecent purposes, and the former crimes but also to establish that the defendant was, in fact, convicted of those offenses; the certified copies the state submitted included an indictment charging the defendant with continuous sexual Application (Cont’d) abuse against a child to whom the defendant had recurring access and with whom the defendant engaged in three and more acts of lewd and lascivious conduct and with lewd and lascivious conduct upon the same child. Spradling v. State, 310 Ga. App. 337, 715 S.E.2d 672 (2011). Because the defendant’s prior convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2(d)(1) and (e)(1) and the defendant’s indictment for aggravated sexual battery, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation alleged crimes that were sexual in nature with minors and involved a lustful disposition, the independent offenses were admissible under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3(B). Butler v. State, 311 Ga. App. 873, 717 S.E.2d 649 (2011). Trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence during the defendant’s trial for aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual battery, and child molestation because despite the defendant’s age at the time, the evidence was relevant to show the defendant’s lustful disposition with regard to younger females, the conduct with which the defendant was charged; the trial court properly considered the defendant’s youth at the time of the similar transaction, along with the significant age difference between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s attempt to conceal the defendant’s behavior by acting in secluded locations, and the nature of the acts the defendant committed before concluding that the evidence was admissible. Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 721 S.E.2d 585 (2011). Admission of games played 15 years earlier. - When the defendant was convicted of child molestation, aggravated child molestation, statutory rape, and one count of rape, the testimony of the defendant’s sister regarding an incident that occurred when the sister was nine or 10 years old in which the defendant and a group of younger cousins played a game that involved sexual contact, including kissing on the mouth, and touching private parts, was properly admitted as the evidence tended to show the defendant’s lustful disposition toward young girls and inappropriate or questionable behavior, even though the prior conduct was not illegal; and the incident, which occurred about 15 years prior to the current crimes, was not too remote in time to the charged crimes. Taylor v. State, 339 Ga. App. 321, 793 S.E.2d 198 (2016). Trial court properly permitted the state to introduce evidence of the defendant’s two prior bad acts, a 2009 incident of exposure in front of underage girls and a 2012 incident of attempt to sexually assault a female neighbor, because those acts were not the faultless acts of an innocent child, but rather demonstrated evidence of the defendant’s lustful disposition and were relevant. Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 805 S.E.2d 103 (2017). Failure to hold Rule 31.3(B) hearing before admitting similar transaction evidence error. - In a child molestation case, the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3(B) before admitting similar transaction evidence concerning the defendant’s alleged abuse of other children was not harmless error. As the only direct testimony came from the victim, there was no physical evidence of abuse, and the defendant did not testify, it could not be said that the similar transaction evidence did not contribute to the verdict. Sheppard v. State, 294 Ga. App. 270, 669 S.E.2d 152 (2008). Admissibility of evidence of similar sex act against adult. - Admission of testimony of similar sex acts with a prior adult victim to indicate a likelihood a defendant performed the same sex acts that the child victim claimed was not error since the state made the three showings necessary for that similar transaction evidence: (1) proper purpose; (2) commission of a separate offense; and (3) similarity of the separate and charged offense. Kingsley v. State, 268 Ga. App. 729, 603 S.E.2d 78 (2004). Evidence of similar or connected sexual offenses against adults. - In a child molestation and aggravated sexual battery prosecution, evidence that before assaulting adult victims, defendant grabbed the victim by the back of the victim’s hair or held the victim’s neck, was properly admitted as ‘‘other transactions’’ evidence, since defendant used a similar method to control the child victim before sexually assaulting the victim; this evidence was relevant to show the defendant’s course of conduct and rebut the defendant’s defense of fabrication. That the prior acts involved adults did not preclude their admission as similar transactions. Helton v. State, 268 Ga. App. 430, 602 S.E.2d 198 (2004). Defendant was charged with, inter alia, child molestation and cruelty to children for touching a 15-year-old child’s genital area and breast, putting defendant’s mouth on the child’s breast, and calling the child sexually repulsive names. It was proper to admit similar transaction evidence showing that the defendant had inappropriately touched an 18-year-old’s bare leg and called that victim similar sexually repulsive names as it showed the defendant’s bent of mind to inappropriately touch young people of the opposite sex. Murray v. State, 293 Ga. App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (2008). In convictions of child molestation and aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 and of aggravated sexual battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b), evidence of two prior similar transactions was properly admitted because even though both victims were 18, they were substantially younger than defendant, who was 35 years old at that time, and both of the similar transaction incidents involved similar sexual deviancy as the instant case. Woods v. State, 304 Ga. App. 403, 696 S.E.2d 411 (2010). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in admitting the defendant’s prior sexual battery conviction during the defendant’s trial for child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), and aggravated child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), because the prior sexual battery and the molestation of the victim were similar; the defendant pled guilty to the sexual battery, establishing that the defendant had committed the separate offense, and both the prior sexual battery and the molestation involved the defendant’s acts of touching the female victims’ breasts and occurred within a three-month time frame. Stepho v. State, 312 Ga. App. 495, 718 S.E.2d 852 (2011).

Questioning defendant’s character witnesses as to knowledge of defendant’s other crimes allowed. - In a trial for child molestation the trial court did not err by allowing the state to ask witnesses who had testified as to defendant’s good reputation if they were aware that defendant had been convicted of child molestation in 1959. It is not error for the state to ask a character witness on cross-examination if the witness has heard, or is ‘‘aware,’’ that defendant had been convicted of certain crimes, particularly where evidence of such prior conviction is offered into evidence either at the time of, or subsequent to, cross-examination of the witness. Eubanks v. State, 180 Ga. App. 355, 349 S.E.2d 244 (1986). Exclusion of evidence of state’s witness’s mental illness could not be reviewed. - In the defendant’s appeal from convictions based on sex acts committed against the defendant’s step-daughter, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-70(b), 16-6-2, and 16-6-4, the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim’s grandmother, who lived with the family and insisted to the mother that the defendant was molesting the child, had been diagnosed with mental illness could not be reviewed because trial counsel did not proffer the evidence. Whitelock v. State, 349 Ga. App. 28, 825 S.E.2d 426 (2019). Questioning defendant as to later arrest reversible error. - Permitting the prosecutor to ask defendant if defendant had been arrested on a sex charge subsequent to the incident in question at defendant’s trial for child molestation and enticing a child for indecent purposes was reversible error, where the sole issue in the case was the credibility of defendant and the alleged victim. Thomas v. State, 178 Ga. App. 674, 344 S.E.2d 496 (1986). Failure to show ineffective assistance of counsel. - Despite the testimony of two witnesses improperly bolstering the testimony of the sex abuse victim, the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel as review of the record revealed that a reasonable lawyer might have decided not to object as sound trial strategy as one witness was an ex- Application (Cont’d) pert that may have hurt the defense if contradicted and the other was an emotional witness who cried and had no personal observations of anything testified to upon examination. Gilmer v. State, 339 Ga. App. 593, 794 S.E.2d 653 (2016). Evidence of victim’s age sufficient. - In a child molestation case, there was sufficient evidence that the victim was under 16 at the time of the incidents in question; the victim had testified that the victim was 14 or 15 when the defendant started touching the victim inappropriately and that the incidents happened when the victim was in the eighth grade, a time at which the victim said that the victim was 15. Boynton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 778, 653 S.E.2d 110 (2007). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s conviction for child molestation, although no one testified as to the child victim’s age at the bench trial, as the trier of fact was permitted to deduce that the victim was under the age of 16 by its observation of the victim’s childlike demeanor and prepubescent body in the videotaped interview, which took place only two days after the incident in question. Day v. State, 293 Ga. App. 543, 667 S.E.2d 392 (2008). Failure to present evidence of birthdate. - Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s special demurrer to two counts of incest with regard to the defendant’s younger daughter based on the daughter not being under the age of 16 because the defendant failed to present any evidence of the daughter’s birthdate. Blanton v. State, 324 Ga. App. 610, 751 S.E.2d 431 (2013). Evidence of victim’s reputation for nonchastity is inadmissible. - To extent that alleged evidence, sought to be introduced by defendant, concerning general reputation and character of victim, dealt with victim’s reputation for nonchastity, it was inadmissible at trial prosecution for child molestation. Lively v. State, 157 Ga. App. 419, 278 S.E.2d 67 (1981). Evidence of a prior molestation or previous sexual activity on the part of the victim is not relevant in a child molesta- tion case to show either the victim’s reputation for nonchastity or the victim’s preoccupation with sex. Hall v. State, 196 Ga. App. 523, 396 S.E.2d 271 (1990). Absent a showing of relevance, evidence of a child’s past sexual history, including acts committed by persons other than the accused, is inadmissible. This is true whether the evidence is contained in defendant’s admission or otherwise. Stancil v. State, 196 Ga. App. 530, 396 S.E.2d 299 (1990). Past sexual experience of child irrelevant as to defendant’s guilt. - Since knowledge of a crime gained through being a victim of that crime at the hands of others can have no relevance to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial, the past sexual experience of a child in a molestation case is irrelevant to the issue of whether the molestation was committed by the defendant on trial. Chastain v. State, 180 Ga. App. 312, 349 S.E.2d 6 (1986), aff ’d, 257 Ga. 54, 354 S.E.2d 421 (1987). Inquiry into victim’s past sexual experiences was properly refused, even where a physician testified that in examining the victim it was obvious the victim had been sexually active. Worth v. State, 183 Ga. App. 68, 358 S.E.2d 251 (1987). Evidence of prior unrelated sexual molestation admissible. - Evidence of a prior unrelated sexual molestation of the victim was admissible to establish other possible causes for the behavioral symptoms exhibited by the child, which were described as typical child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome and to explain the medical testimony regarding the victim’s injuries. Hall v. State, 196 Ga. App. 523, 396 S.E.2d 271 (1990). Evidence of another similar transaction involving defendant consisting of both words and actions, in the child’s presence, including touching of the child, was properly admitted, despite any dissimilarity from the act charged; the sexual abuse of young children, regardless of the sex of the victims or the nomenclature or type of acts or other conduct perpetrated upon them, was of sufficient similarity to make the evidence admissible. Joiner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 395, 593 S.E.2d 936 (2004). Trial court’s error in not permitting the defendant to show that the spouse’s minor child, whom the defendant was charged with molesting, made an allegation of molestation with respect to another individual that the child later denied, was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, including the facts that there was photographic evidence that the child was molested in the defendant’s bedroom, that the spouse and the child’s uncle both identified the child in the photographs, that a Polaroid camera like that used to take the photographs was found in defendant’s home, that the spouse had testified that the spouse had not left the child alone in the house with any person other than defendant, and that the photographs were found in a house owned by defendant in a file containing personal items. Holloway v. State, 278 Ga. App. 709, 629 S.E.2d 447 (2006). Evidence of child victim’s past boyfriends may be excluded. - Although the former rape shield statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412), did not require the exclusion of evidence of a child molestation victim’s past boyfriends and difficult past because the charge was not an aggravated charge, the trial court was authorized to evaluate the relevance of any evidence and exclude the evidence on that basis. Cantu v. State, 304 Ga. App. 655, 697 S.E.2d 310 (2010). Conflicts in victim’s statements pretrial and at trial. - When in a pretrial statement, the victim testified that the defendant fondled the victim, but at trial the victim testified that the story was made up, the jury was authorized to believe the victim’s pretrial statements rather than the in-court disavowal; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee v. State, 250 Ga. App. 110, 550 S.E.2d 696 (2001). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 was affirmed because the trial court did not err by admitting the victim’s prior out-of-court statement made in the initial interview with the police investigator, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820, that the victim believed that the bleeding from the victim’s vagina had been caused by the defendant. Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 805 S.E.2d 103 (2017). Evidence and victim’s statement later recanted. - Evidence in the form of a videotape of the defendant’s daughter playing with anatomically correct dolls following defendant’s arrest for sexually assaulting his girlfriend and daughter, together with the girlfriend’s testimony and statements the daughter made to investigators following defendant’s arrest, was sufficient to find defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the daughter later recanted her statements. Higgins v. State, 251 Ga. App. 175, 554 S.E.2d 212 (2001). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820) did not require the child to corroborate the hearsay testimony, and conflicts between the videotaped statement and the testimony of the child at trial did not necessarily render the former inadmissible but rather present a question of credibility of the witness to be resolved by the trier of fact; despite a child victim’s apparent recantation of the child’s accusations of molestation at trial, sufficient evidence supported convictions of child molestation and aggravated child molestation when the victim described the molestation in a pre-trial videotaped interview, when an expert witness testified that the children may recant testimony with regard to sexual abuse for reasons unrelated to falsity, including embarrassment and fear, and a doctor also testified that the doctor’s examination of the victim revealed ‘‘unusual’’ findings that would have caused the doctor to inquire regarding sexual abuse if those findings had appeared on a routine exam. Amerson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 855, 602 S.E.2d 857 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for child molestation of the victim, the defendant’s seven year old child, because a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s fear of punishment and the other parent’s disapproval caused the victim to recant. The jury was authorized to believe the victim’s videotaped testimony, corroborated by the victim’s statements to the doctor who examined the victim, that the victim’s par- Application (Cont’d) ent had, on numerous occasions, touched the victim’s genitals, rather than the victim’s in-court disavowal. King v. State, 268 Ga. App. 707, 603 S.E.2d 54 (2004). In addition to the substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt, provided by the victim’s prior inconsistent statements, evidence of women’s sexy clothing found in defendant’s hotel room, which the victim said that defendant had purchased, and information downloaded from an Internet site detailing the pimping lifestyle, was sufficient evidence to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated child molestation, statutory rape, and pimping. Lewis v. State, 278 Ga. App. 160, 628 S.E.2d 239 (2006). Trial court was within the court’s discretion in restricting crossexamination of the victim in a child molestation case regarding the fact that when she was five and nine years old she slept in a bed with an uncle when the conviction rested upon the testimony of the parties and did not involve expert testimony or the child abuse syndrome. Chastain v. State, 257 Ga. 54, 354 S.E.2d 421 (1987). When the trial court refused evidence of the child’s asserted unusual sexual proclivity, apparently offered to show the child initiated the sexual encounters and fabricated the evidence upon being rejected by the child’s step-grandfather, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its limitation of the defendant’s cross-examination on this point. Deyton v. State, 182 Ga. App. 73, 354 S.E.2d 625 (1987). No abuse of discretion resulted from the admission of testimony from the investigating officer, the child victim’s mother, and the child victim’s sister, about the alleged child molestation committed by the juvenile as: (1) the child was available to testify; (2) cross-examination of the child victim in the judge’s chambers was attempted, but proved unsuccessful; and

(3) the judge ruled that no further purpose would be served by having the child examined in the open courtroom. In the Interest of S.S., 281 Ga. App. 781, 637 S.E.2d 151 (2006).

Evidence of victim’s disciplinary problems in school is irrelevant. - Trial court did not err in granting state’s motion in limine, which sought to prevent defendant from introducing victim’s school records in attempt to show that the victim had disciplinary problems, since such evidence was absolutely irrelevant to any issue in prosecution for child molestation. Lively v. State, 157 Ga. App. 419, 278 S.E.2d 67 (1981). No Crawford violation. - In a delinquency proceeding on a charge of child molestation, even assuming that a police officer’s statements were wrongly admitted, that testimony was merely cumulative of other properly admitted testimony presented by both the child’s mother and the child’s sister, and the admission did not require reversal of the court’s adjudicatory findings. In the Interest of S.S., 281 Ga. App. 781, 637 S.E.2d 151 (2006). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial and upheld his conviction for child molestation because even if the trial court erred by admitting the child victim’s recorded interview and her statements to the police investigator, the forensic interviewer, her mother, and a relative, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming and cumulative in the nature of the testimony of the emergency room physician, the defendant’s written statement and recorded confession, and his admissions to others; plus, the child victim’s recantations were also admitted into evidence. Welch v. State, 318 Ga. App. 202, 733 S.E.2d 482 (2012). No ex post facto violation. - Defendant’s contention on appeal that a sentence of life imprisonment as a recidivist child molester under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b) rendered that statute an unconstitutional ex post facto law was rejected as the fact that the defendant’s prior conviction yielded an increased punishment did not convert the statute into an unconstitutional ex post facto law; rather, the statute punished offenders only for a future offense, which punishment was rationally enhanced by the prior conviction. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 255, 643 S.E.2d 749 (2007).

Admission of partial statement upheld. - Trial court did not err by allowing the state to introduce the defendant’s recorded interrogation into evidence with the defendant’s statements that the victim told the defendant that the victim was almost 18 years old and that the defendant would not have had sex with the victim if the defendant had known that the victim was younger redacted as the defendant’s belief as to the victim’s age was not relevant because it was not an essential element of either statutory rape or child molestation; mistake of fact regarding the victim’s age was not a defense to either crime; and any statement the victim might have given regarding the victim’s age was not admissible for impeachment purposes. West v. State, 344 Ga. App. 274, 808 S.E.2d 914 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 608 (Ga. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 783 (U.S. 2019). It was not error to admit a taped interview of the victim by the police almost one year after the alleged offense, where defendant’s counsel attacked the veracity of the victim, defendant had the opportunity to confront the victim and cross-examine the victim under oath about the victim’s out-of-court statement, and the out-of-court statement was cumulative to that of the victim on the witness stand. Lynn v. State, 181 Ga. App. 461, 352 S.E.2d 602 (1986). Victim’s testimony alone sufficient to sustain conviction. - Victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to sustain convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation when, inter alia, the victim testified that defendant had fondled and performed oral sex on the victim and had forced the victim to reciprocate in performing oral sex on the defendant. Spradlin v. State, 262 Ga. App. 897, 587 S.E.2d 155 (2003). Victim’s prior inconsistent statements. - Conviction for child molestation can rest upon prior inconsistent statements of the victim alone. Weeks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 307, 370 S.E.2d 344 (1988), aff ’d, 258 Ga. 662, 374 S.E.2d 532 (1988). Victim’s videotaped statement that the molestation ‘‘hurt’’ the victim was suffi- cient to support a conviction of aggravated child molestation involving injury to the child under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), even though at trial the victim could not remember whether the molestation hurt. It was permissible to introduce a forgetful witness’s prior consistent statement when the witness testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Waters v. State, 288 Ga. App. 260, 653 S.E.2d 849 (2007). Testimony of mother as to son’s complaint held admissible. Walls v. State, 166 Ga. App. 503, 304 S.E.2d 547 (1983). Testimony by mother of victim concerning allegations made by her child to her against defendant was properly admitted, where the court considered atmosphere, circumstances, spontaneity, and demeanor in judging the reliability of the statement. Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga. App. 532, 374 S.E.2d 92, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 374 S.E.2d 92 (1988). Conviction for child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1), was supported by evidence that, at a house party where the adults were drinking alcohol, the victim’s mother found the defendant in a closed room, sitting on the couch, leaning back, with his pants completely open and his arm around the victim’s waist, and that the victim stated the defendant asked the victim to touch the defendant’s penis. Matabarahona v. State, 335 Ga. App. 25, 780 S.E.2d 731 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0507, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2016). Testimony of defendant’s adult daughters. - Trial court properly allowed two of defendant’s adult daughters to testify that defendant had molested them when they were young girls. Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga. App. 532, 374 S.E.2d 92, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 374 S.E.2d 92 (1988). Testimony of defendant’s spouse. - Defendant failed to make a strong showing that the trial court improperly relied upon defendant spouse’s hearsay testimony in finding that defendant was a danger to the community and in sentencing defendant to 20 years to serve for defendant’s first child molestation offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b); defendant failed to rebut the presumption that a trial judge sitting without a jury sepa- Application (Cont’d) rated the legal evidence from facts not properly in evidence in reaching a decision. Ingram v. State, 262 Ga. App. 304, 585 S.E.2d 211 (2003). Spouse guilty of aiding and abetting in child molestation. - Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aiding and abetting, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the defendant’s spouse in enticing a minor child for indecent purposes, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5(a), and of child molestation. Evidence was presented that: (1) when the defendant’s spouse brought the victim back to their home, the spouse left the victim with the defendant who admitted to giving the victim thong panties; (2) the defendant gave the victim alcohol, and gave the victim pornographic materials to read before the defendant’s spouse came home; and (3) the defendant was close by on the couch when the defendant’s spouse pulled down the victim’s pants, tried to kiss the victim, pulled down the victim’s underwear, and offered the victim money to put on the thong. Dockery v. State, 309 Ga. App. 584, 711 S.E.2d 100 (2011). Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find a defendant guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt as it was within the jury’s province to reject the defendant’s defense denying the crime with regard to the victim as well as with regard to the witnesses who testified as to similar transactions with the defendant. The testimony of the victim was corroborated by an investigator and a forensic interviewer, who testified as to what the victim had told had occurred; the victim’s statements were corroborated by the sheriff ’s investigator; and the jury was entitled to consider the victim’s out-of-court statements as substantive evidence under the former Child Hearsay Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820). Lamb v. State, 293 Ga. App. 65, 666 S.E.2d 462 (2008). Trial court did not err in ruling that the state could compel the defendant’s wife to testify even though she was not a witness to the specific act charged, child molestation, because the wife testified that she did not know that the defendant had been applying ointment to the victim, and that evidence was sufficiently relevant to the molestation acts charged against the defendant so that the wife’s testimony was compellable under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-23(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-503). O’Neal v. State, 304 Ga. App. 548, 696 S.E.2d 490 (2010). Victimized by parent’s lover. - Evidence that the victim told the victim’s older brother and a forensic interviewer that the defendant made the victim massage the defendant’s penis to the point of ejaculation was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Maurer v. State, 320 Ga. App. 585, 740 S.E.2d 318 (2013). Evidence, which included a picture the victim drew showing the victim’s markings on the victim’s buttocks along with the victim’s written words ‘‘no, no, no’’ and a physical examination that revealed healed scars on the victim’s anus, which the examining expert opined was consistent with penetration by a penis, supported the defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation and child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1) and (c). Carter v. State, 321 Ga. App. 877, 743 S.E.2d 538 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency for acts of aggravated sodomy and child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence that showed that the juvenile not only had rubbed the juvenile’s penis against the victim’s buttocks, but also placed the penis inside the victim’s anus and that such contact hurt the victim. In the Interest of M.C., 322 Ga. App. 239, 744 S.E.2d 436 (2013). While the victim initially identified someone else as the assailant, evidence that that defendant’s DNA matched the seminal fluid found on the victim’s clothing, the defendant was seen near the house shortly after the rape, and the defendant’s shirt was found in the residence supported the defendant’s convictions for rape, child molestation, false imprisonment, and burglary. Couch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 207, 756 S.E.2d 291 (2014). Victim’s testimony that the defendant told the victim to remove the victim’s underwear and then placed the defen- dant’s private in the victim’s butt, testimony from the defendant’s friend that the defendant admitted masturbating behind the victim’s naked body, and the fact that fluid and sperm matching the defendant’s DNA were found on the victim’s bedsheet supported a conviction for child molestation. O’Rourke v. State, 327 Ga. App. 628, 760 S.E.2d 636 (2014). Evidence that the victim was under the age of 16, that the defendant had expressed a sexual interest in her, and that the defendant asked the victim about her sexual arousal and put his hand down her pants, touching her vagina, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of child molestation. Watson v. State, 329 Ga. App. 334, 765 S.E.2d 24 (2014), aff ’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (2015); vacated on other grounds, 335 Ga. App. 227, 780 S.E.2d 822 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to prove child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1) based on evidence that the defendant repeatedly asked the defendant’s 14-year old daughter to ‘‘massage’’ the defendant by rotating her clothed buttocks on the defendant’s crotch area, that she felt that the defendant’s penis was hard, and that the defendant left a white, gooey substance on the back of her shorts. Harris v. State, 333 Ga. App. 118, 775 S.E.2d 602 (2015). Victim’s testimony that the defendant asked the victim to undress in front of the defendant more times than the victim could count and that the defendant touched, kissed, and licked the victim’s breasts was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Reinhard v. State, 331 Ga. App. 235, 770 S.E.2d 314 (2015). Victim’s statements regarding the defendant’s actions, along with the recorded police interviews of the defendant in which the defendant admitted to driving the victim to school, that the victim touched the defendant’s penis on one occasion, and to laying down with the victim in the victim’s bedroom, and the testimony of the victim’s mother and the forensic investigator regarding what the victim revealed to them was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for child mo- lestation. Powell v. State, 335 Ga. App. 565, 782 S.E.2d 468 (2016). Victim’s testimony, the victim’s statements to the nurse who examined the victim, and the DNA evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Gaines v. State, 339 Ga. App. 527, 792 S.E.2d 466 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of rape and child molestation because the defendant lived in a home with various relatives, including the victim, the defendant’s 10-year-old cousin; one night, the victim awoke to find the defendant rubbing the victim’s vagina with the defendant’s hand; a few nights later, the victim awoke to find the defendant penetrating the victim’s vagina with the defendant’s penis; the penetration occurred against the victim’s will; and, after the victim’s 2009 outcry, some of the victim’s relatives confronted the defendant with the victim’s allegations and a journal entry stating that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim while the victim was in bed asleep. Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 568, 798 S.E.2d 87 (2017). Evidence showing that when the defendant’s niece was 11 years old, the defendant forcibly inserted the defendant’s penis into the niece’s vagina, placed the defendant’s penis on the niece’s lips, and ejaculated on the niece’s stomach was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of rape, aggravated child molestation by act of sodomy, and incest between uncle and niece. Jones v. State, 343 Ga. App. 180, 806 S.E.2d 631 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 319 (Ga. 2018). Evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery and child molestation because the defendant touched the victim’s vagina through and then underneath the victim’s clothing at the family home; the defendant took the victim’s hand and placed the victim’s hand on the defendant’s penis at the defendant’s apartment; and the defendant put the defendant’s hand on the victim’s vagina in the defendant’s taxi. Gonzales v. State, 345 Ga. App. 334, 812 S.E.2d 638 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 752 (Ga. 2018).

Application (Cont’d) Evidence of defendant’s sexual arousal. - Defendant’s argument that there was no evidence of her sexual arousal was rejected where she had participated in the sex acts themselves, continually and frequently invited the boy to come to her home and business, picked the boy up at his home, permitted the boy to spend the night at her house, had constant and lengthy telephone conversations when apart, bestowed gifts on the boy, and when asked, the boy said that two or three times the defendant ‘‘would say it feels good.’’ Branam v. State, 204 Ga. App. 205, 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992). Although sexual gratification is an element of the crime, it could be inferred from the fact that the defendant exposed himself to a child that he had the intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires. Andrew v. State, 216 Ga. App. 427, 454 S.E.2d 542 (1995). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the charge of aggravated child molestation, because the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that defendant had the requisite intent for aggravated child molestation, as the fact that defendant expected a drug dealer to give defendant and defendant’s child crack cocaine in exchange for their sexual favors did not exclude a finding that the defendant also intended the sexual acts to arouse or satisfy defendant or defendant’s sexual desires. Odom v. State, 267 Ga. App. 701, 600 S.E.2d 759 (2004). Admission of photographs depicting defendant and another male lying on bed kissing each other was harmless error since the admission did not contribute to the verdict in the case. Roose v. State, 182 Ga. App. 748, 356 S.E.2d 675 (1987). Sexually explicit magazines found at defendant’s home were admissible into evidence since the victim identified the magazines as the ones defendant showed the victim prior to molesting the victim. Henson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 617, 356 S.E.2d 556 (1987). Regardless of whether magazines and tapes found at defendant’s home corrobo- rated the victim’s testimony, they were admissible to show defendant’s ‘‘state of mind and lustful disposition.’’ Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 823, 499 S.E.2d 145 (1998). Sexually explicit material found in defendant’s possession was not admissible where it was offered for the purpose of showing defendant’s lustful disposition in general and was not linked to the crime charged, that is, sexual contact with a child. Frazier v. State, 241 Ga. App. 125, 524 S.E.2d 768 (1999). In a prosecution for a sexual offense, evidence of sexual paraphernalia found in defendant’s possession is inadmissible unless it shows defendant’s lustful disposition toward the sexual activity with which defendant is charged or defendant’s bent of mind to engage in that activity; a videotape showing defendant offering drugs to persons in exchange for oral sex was admissible in defendant prosecution for child molestation and aggravated child molestation where it was used to show defendant’s usual course of conduct in procuring sexual activity and where the victim testified that defendant had offered the victim drugs in exchange for oral sex. Mooney v. State, 266 Ga. App. 587, 597 S.E.2d 589 (2004), overruled on other grounds, White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 823 S.E.2d 794, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 66 (2019). Victim’s testimony regarding ‘‘hurt’’ did not require medical corroboration. - In a prosecution for aggravated child molestation, the victim’s testimony that it hurt when the defendant molested her with his finger was sufficient to prove physical injury. It was not necessary for her testimony to be corroborated by medical evidence. Baker v. State, 228 Ga. App. 32, 491 S.E.2d 78 (1997). Defendant’s conviction of aggravated child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4, was appropriate. The victim’s testimony indicating the molestation was painful sufficed to prove the element of physical injury; in such case, medical evidence was not required to corroborate the victim’s testimony. Mangham v. State, 291 Ga. App. 696, 662 S.E.2d 789 (2008). Evidence of uncharged crime properly admitted. - In a child molestation prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), it was not error to admit evidence that the defendant placed the defendant’s sexual organ ‘‘on’’ a child’s genitals - the act charged in the indictment - simply because that evidence also indicated that some penetration may have occurred or that the defendant also may have touched the child’s genitals, which were uncharged crimes as the evidence was relevant to prove the charged crime. Ortiz v. State, 295 Ga. App. 546, 672 S.E.2d 507 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0803, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 269 (Ga. 2009). Evidence of child molestation. - Evidence that the defendant had gotten on the bed with 13-year-old child, lifted her dress, placed his private parts directly against the skin of the child’s thighs and accomplished an orgasm amply supported the verdict that the defendant was guilty of child molestation. Van Pelt v. State, 87 Ga. App. 103, 73 S.E.2d 115 (1952). Evidence was sufficient to authorize a trier of fact to find proof of appellant’s guilt of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 257, 441 S.E.2d 414 (1994). When the seven-year-old victim testified to touching of her vaginal area on several occasions, other witnesses testified to her having told them of this contact, and the state played a video of the victim discussing the facts underlying the charges which corroborated her trial testimony, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated child molestation and child molestation. Chastain v. State, 236 Ga. App. 542, 512 S.E.2d 665 (1999). Eight-year-old girl’s testimony that defendant pulled her panties down and tried to put his penis inside her ‘‘private part’’ was sufficient to convict defendant of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), where the police officer who interviewed the girl testified that she specifically referred to her vagina as her ‘‘private part.’’ Hayes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 897, 557 S.E.2d 468 (2001). Child molestation conviction was affirmed upon evidence that defendant twice attempted to penetrate his daughter’s anus with his penis; furthermore, her testimony did not require corroboration. Knight v. State, 258 Ga. App. 480, 574 S.E.2d 606 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation, even if much of the evidence was hearsay repetition of the child’s out-of-court statements, as the defendant failed to argue that the evidence did not satisfy the reliability criteria set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820). Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 826, 600 S.E.2d 774 (2004). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation, attempted statutory rape, and burglary were supported because: (1) the defendant entered the 14-year-old victim’s room through a window, uninvited; (2) the defendant told the victim to push the victim’s bed against the door; (3) the defendant removed the victim’s underwear and the defendant’s own pants and laid on top of the victim, but the victim prevented the defendant from penetrating the victim; (4) the defendant fondled the victim’s breasts and touched the victim’s nipples; and (5) on a prior occasion, defendant made the victim touch the defendant’s genitals with the victim’s hand. Leaptrot v. State, 272 Ga. App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (2005). Jury could have inferred from defendant’s actions in rubbing the genitals of an eight-year-old victim and kissing the victim’s face that the defendant acted with intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant’s sexual desires; inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony did not render the evidence insufficient to support defendant’s conviction of child molestation. Duvall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 143, 614 S.E.2d 234 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation where the child testified that the defendant made the child perform oral sex and penetrated the child anally, and the record showed opportunity, consistent allegations by the victim to multiple parties, and deception by the defendant when asked about the charged offenses during a polygraph examination. Guzman v. State, 273 Ga. App. 819, 616 S.E.2d 142 (2005). Evidence from a defendant’s 12-year-old stepdaughter in the form of a statement to police that she felt the defendant pull down her pants and put his penis in her Application (Cont’d) rear end, then felt liquid on her buttocks, while she pretended to remain asleep, was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), although the stepdaughter did not testify to all the details at trial. Hines v. State, 307 Ga. App. 807, 706 S.E.2d 156 (2011). Because there was sufficient evidence, including the child victims’ testimonies, that a defendant had the requisite intent and that he performed oral sex on the child victims, and put his penis in their mouths and on their anuses, the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated child molestation and child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4. Sanders v. State, 308 Ga. App. 303, 707 S.E.2d 538 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011). There was competent evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), and child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1), because the victim’s step-uncle and one of the forensic interviewers proffered evidence that the defendant sexually molested the victim pursuant to the former Child Hearsay Act, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820); although the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim in a way that the victim did not like, the victim did not provide any details about those incidents, but both the step-uncle and the forensic interviewer testified that the victim disclosed that the defendant touched the victim’s privates with the defendant’s hand and the defendant’s own privates and forced the victim to place the victim’s mouth on the defendant’s privates, and the jury resolved any credibility or inconsistency issues against the defendant. Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 710 S.E.2d 594 (2011). Evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the defendant committed the crimes of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and cruelty to children because the state offered significant evidence connecting the defendant to the assault, including the defendant’s confession to police, the testimony of the victim’s uncle that the defendant was the only individual who fit the victim’s description, and evidence that both the defendant and the victim were treated for a sexually transmitted disease. Dunson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 484, 711 S.E.2d 53 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S15C1215, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 580 (Ga. 2015). Jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1) because the testimony of the defendant’s former wife regarding what she observed on the night in question, i.e., that the defendant and the victim were asleep together with their underwear pulled down and that she saw what appeared to be fecal matter smeared on the victim’s buttocks and the bed sheets, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the victim’s and the defendant’s otherwise inexplicable mutual exposure was for the purpose of satisfying the defendant’s own sexual desires. DeLong v. State, 310 Ga. App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (2011). Evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find that the defendant acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant’s own or the victim’s sexual desires and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child molestation because there was significant inferential evidence of the defendant’s intent to arouse the defendant’s sexual desires or the sexual desires of the victim. Burke v. State, 316 Ga. App. 386, 729 S.E.2d 531 (2012). Defendant’s admission that the defendant helped the defendant’s son hold down the victim as the son penetrated the victim, that the defendant rubbed the defendant’s own penis against the victim and ejaculated on the victim, that the defendant put the defendant’s hands over the son’s as the son choked the victim, that the defendant helped dump the victim’s body, and the testimony of the defendant’s wife that the defendant helped undress the victim, the defendant put the defendant’s mouth on the victim’s penis, and the defendant attempted to put the defendant’s penis in the victim’s anus was suf- ficient to support defendant’s convictions for murder, false imprisonment, two counts of aggravated child molestation, child molestation, cruelty to children in the first degree, concealing the death of another, and tampering with evidence. Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s two convictions for child molestation because the victim’s testimony alone could suffice to establish the elements of child molestation; and the victim testified that on one occasion the defendant started rubbing the victim’s stomach, and then the defendant moved the defendant’s hand down and touched the victim’s pubic hair, and that on two other occasions the defendant had touched the victim’s breasts, once while hugging the victim while alone in the defendant’s bedroom, and once while the defendant was applying suntan lotion to the victim’s body. Pratt v. State, 323 Ga. App. 890, 748 S.E.2d 692 (2013). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation because the victim testified that the defendant rubbed the defendant’s privates against the victim’s exposed sexual organ, and the victim’s testimony alone could suffice to establish the elements of child molestation. Lockhart v. State, 323 Ga. App. 887, 748 S.E.2d 694 (2013). Convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation were supported by sufficient evidence as the jury was entitled to rely on the victim’s prior inconsistent statements and the nurse’s observations from the physical examination, to disbelieve the victim’s recantation on the stand and the testimony of the victim’s mother and sisters, and find that the defendant had sexually abused the victim. Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 768 S.E.2d 773 (2015). Evidence part of res gestae. - Although the indictment alleged that the act of aggravated child molestation occurred when defendant ‘‘placed his mouth upon the genitalia of [the victim],’’ the other acts of sodomy were properly admitted as a part of the res gestae of defendant’s continued sexual exploitation of the victim. Burton v. State, 212 Ga. App. 100, 441 S.E.2d 470 (1994). In a child molestation case, because the victim, the defendant’s daughter, testified that the defendant had the victim perform oral sex on the defendant during the incident when the defendant exposed the defendant’s sexual organ to the victim, the evidence of the oral sex was admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime for which the defendant was charged, despite the fact that the defendant was not charged with the additional crime in the indictment. Goggins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (2014). Exposure to child constitutes child molestation. - When the evidence and all inferences therefrom demonstrated that the defendant exposed his penis on three separate occasions to three different female children under the age of 14 years in order to satisfy his own sexual desires, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of child molestation. Bentley v. State, 179 Ga. App. 287, 346 S.E.2d 98 (1986). Evidence that defendant exposed his penis to the child victim was alone sufficient for conviction. Bowman v. State, 227 Ga. App. 598, 490 S.E.2d 163 (1997). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for child molestation since the victim observed the defendant put the defendant’s hand on the defendant’s genitals and begin disrobing, and the defendant acknowledged that the defendant touched the defendant’s exposed genitals in the child’s presence, though the defendant asserted the defendant was merely adjusting the defendant after using the bathroom; although the evidence showed that the defendant was unsuccessful in an attempt to coax the child to look at the defendant’s exposed genitals, the defendant’s conduct was rendered no less culpable by the victim’s good judgment in turning the victim’s head away. Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 545 S.E.2d 312 (2001). Evidence from the four victims that the defendant on three separate occasions followed the victims home from school, talked to the victims about sex, and exposed himself to the victims, along with Application (Cont’d) evidence of prior similar transactions committed by the defendant in two different states for the limited purpose of showing the defendant’s intent, bent of mind, and course of conduct, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of four counts of child molestation. Damare v. State, 257 Ga. App. 508, 571 S.E.2d 507 (2002). Evidence that the 15-year-old victim was between 100 and 200 feet away from defendant’s house when the victim saw defendant stand at the window with the defendant’s hand on the defendant’s genitals and making a jerking motion was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Rainey v. State, 261 Ga. App. 888, 584 S.E.2d 13 (2003). Substantial evidence linked the defendant to a child molestation offense which occurred when a person entered a grocery store bathroom and inserted the person’s genital’s through a hole in a toilet stall partition while the eight-year-old victim was seated inside, including evidence that the victim, the victim’s cousin, and the victim’s parent saw the perpetrator leaving the store and heading towards a beer van, evidence that the defendant drove such a van with a beer logo, called at the store as part of the defendant’s job, and that the defendant knew about the hole in the bathroom partition, the victim’s description of the perpetrator as wearing an electronic device, and a detective’s testimony that the defendant wore such a device as part of the defendant’s job, the parent’s identification of the defendant’s shirt as that worn by the perpetrator, and the parent’s identification of the defendant at trial; additionally, knowledge of the victim’s age was not an element of the crime of child molestation, and the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence including the defendant’s admission that the defendant was near the restroom, although the defendant denied entering the restroom, the victim’s testimony that the perpetrator entered the bathroom after the victim went in, because the victim heard the door squeak as the door opened, heard footsteps, and this was the only time the victim heard the door open, and photographs showing the close proximity of the beer aisle to the restrooms, as well as photographs showing that the interior of the toilet stall was visible through the approximately 4-inch hole in the partition as well as under the partition, which was 16 or 18 inches from the floor. Bennett v. State, 279 Ga. App. 371, 631 S.E.2d 402 (2006). Jury could determine that the defendant’s genitalia was exposed to the victim, which was sufficient evidence of child molestation, because the victim described the defendant’s penis in the forensic interview. Lipscomb v. State, 315 Ga. App. 437, 727 S.E.2d 221 (2012). Kisses constituted an immoral or indecent act. - Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for child molestation based on the victim’s testimony and the defendant’s admission that the defendant kissed the victim several times because the jury was authorized to conclude that the kisses constituted an immoral or indecent act under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1). Thomas v. State, 324 Ga. App. 26, 748 S.E.2d 509 (2013). Underwear on backwards as evidence of molestation. - Jury could infer that the victim’s underwear had been removed by the defendant and hurriedly replaced, which was sufficient evidence of child molestation, because the victim’s parents testified that before the parents left to run a quick errand, the victim’s underwear was on properly, but it was on improperly when the parents returned; in a forensic interview, the victim explained to the interviewer that the defendant removed the victim’s underwear and then replaced the underwear. Lipscomb v. State, 315 Ga. App. 437, 727 S.E.2d 221 (2012). Engaging in sexually explicit conversation with child. - Crime of child molestation cannot be committed when the only contact between the accused and the alleged victim was by telephone. Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 499 S.E.2d 630 (1998). Officer lacked arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect because no officer could have believed that a passing comment to a little girl in a park about the color of her panties offended the public’s sense of pro- priety, or was morally and sexually indelicate, improper, and offensive as required for child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1). Benson v. Facemyer, 657 Fed. Appx. 828 (11th Cir. 2016) (Unpublished). Watching sexually explicit videotapes with child. - In a prosecution based on the defendant’s forcing a minor to watch sexually explicit videotapes with the defendant, the state was not required to prove that the tapes were ‘‘obscene’’ and ‘‘harmful to minors’’ under definitions pertaining to the distribution of harmful materials to children. Additionally, the defendant’s claimed First Amendment right to possess and view the tapes was not a defense. Stroeining v. State, 226 Ga. App. 410, 486 S.E.2d 670 (1997). An anatomically correct diagram representing the victim’s body was relevant evidence and properly admitted into evidence. Pittman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 693, 344 S.E.2d 511 (1986). Evidence sufficient to find a defendant guilty of child molestation. - Evidence, including that the defendant attempted to conceal the defendant’s behavior by ensuring the victim would be in the defendant’s bedroom and stopping when the defendant was interrupted, the defendant’s prior conduct, and the victim’s unheeded protests, was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for child molestation. Eubanks v. State, 332 Ga. App. 568, 774 S.E.2d 146 (2015). Evidence sufficient for conviction. - See Sprayberry v. State, 174 Ga. App. 574, 330 S.E.2d 731 (1985); Busby v. State, 174 Ga. App. 536, 330 S.E.2d 765 (1985); Kilgore v. State, 177 Ga. App. 656, 340 S.E.2d 640 (1986); Jones v. State, 178 Ga. App. 15, 342 S.E.2d 5 (1986); Beard v. State, 178 Ga. App. 265, 342 S.E.2d 751 (1986); Smith v. State, 178 Ga. App. 300, 342 S.E.2d 769 (1986); Castillo v. State, 178 Ga. App. 312, 342 S.E.2d 782 (1986); Grant v. State, 178 Ga. App. 398, 343 S.E.2d 422 (1986); Ezell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 400, 343 S.E.2d 792 (1986); Crawford v. State, 178 Ga. App. 739, 344 S.E.2d 533 (1986); Peavy v. State, 179 Ga. App. 397, 346 S.E.2d 584 (1986); Bell v. State, 180 Ga. App. 170, 348 S.E.2d 712 (1986); White v. State, 180 Ga. App. 185, 348 S.E.2d 728 (1986); Newsome v. State, 180 Ga. App. 243, 348 S.E.2d 759 (1986); Hall v. State, 181 Ga. App. 92, 351 S.E.2d 236 (1986); Johns v. State, 181 Ga. App. 510, 352 S.E.2d 826 (1987); Crump v. State, 183 Ga. App. 43, 357 S.E.2d 863 (1987); In re J.B., 183 Ga. App. 229, 358 S.E.2d 620 (1987); Patten v. State, 184 Ga. App. 152, 361 S.E.2d 203 (1987); Adams v. State, 186 Ga. App. 599, 367 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Westbrook v. State, 186 Ga. App. 493, 368 S.E.2d 131, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 368 S.E.2d 131 (1988); Ward v. State, 186 Ga. App. 503, 368 S.E.2d 139 (1988); Weeks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 307, 370 S.E.2d 344 (1988); Johncox v. State, 189 Ga. App. 188, 375 S.E.2d 139 (1988); Burgess v. State, 189 Ga. App. 790, 377 S.E.2d 543 (1989); Blanton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 454, 382 S.E.2d 133 (1989); Howard v. State, 191 Ga. App. 408, 382 S.E.2d 149 (1989); Gilbert v. State, 191 Ga. App. 574, 382 S.E.2d 630, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 922, 382 S.E.2d 630 (1989); McCormick v. State, 228 Ga. App. 467, 491 S.E.2d 903 (1997); Goss v. State, 228 Ga. App. 411, 491 S.E.2d 859 (1997); Watson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 79, 495 S.E.2d 305 (1998); Wilson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 195, 496 S.E.2d 746 (1998); Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460, 496 S.E.2d 771 (1998); Duncan v. State, 232 Ga. App. 157, 500 S.E.2d 603 (1998); Fields v. State, 233 Ga. App. 609, 504 S.E.2d 777 (1998); Burrage v. State, 234 Ga. App. 814, 508 S.E.2d 190 (1998); Osborne v. State, 239 Ga. App. 308, 521 S.E.2d 226 (1999), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007); Griffin v. State, 240 Ga. App. 494, 523 S.E.2d 910 (1999); Akins v. State, 241 Ga. App. 120, 526 S.E.2d 157 (1999); Vasquez v. State, 241 Ga. App. 512, 527 S.E.2d 235 (1999); Baker v. State, 241 Ga. App. 666, 527 S.E.2d 266 (1999); Brinson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 50, 530 S.E.2d 798 (2000); In the Interest of J.D., 243 Ga. App. 644, 534 S.E.2d 112 (2000); Wyatt v. State, 243 Ga. App. 882, 534 S.E.2d 431 (2000); Woods v. State, 244 Ga. App. 359, 535 S.E.2d 524 (2000); Sewell v. State, 244 Ga. App. 449, 536 S.E.2d 173 (2000); McCorkle v. State, 245 Ga. App. 505, 538 S.E.2d 161 (2000); Jones v. State, 247 Ga. App. 43, 543 S.E.2d 72 (2000); Millsap v. State, 247 Ga. App.

Application (Cont’d) 623, 544 S.E.2d 530 (2001); Brownlow v. State, 248 Ga. App. 366, 544 S.E.2d 474 (2001); In the Interest of J.R., 248 Ga. App. 333, 546 S.E.2d 67 (2001); Seidenfaden v. State, 249 Ga. App. 314, 547 S.E.2d 578 (2001); Frady v. State, 245 Ga. App. 832, 538 S.E.2d 893 (2000); Honeycutt v. State, 245 Ga. App. 819, 538 S.E.2d 870 (2000); Jowers v. State, 245 Ga. App. 773, 538 S.E.2d 853 (2000); Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 533 S.E.2d 718 (2000); Greulich v. State, 263 Ga. App. 552, 588 S.E.2d 450 (2003); McMillian v. State, 263 Ga. App. 782, 589 S.E.2d 335 (2003); Blevins v. State, 270 Ga. App. 388, 606 S.E.2d 624 (2004); Watson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 702, 683 S.E.2d 665 (2009); Bazin v. State, 299 Ga. App. 875, 683 S.E.2d 917 (2009). Victimized by stepparent. - There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had intercourse repeatedly with his 11-year-old stepdaughter (Count 1) and had committed an act of sodomy on her (Count 2) thereby authorizing a conviction of two counts of child molestation. Pegg v. State, 183 Ga. App. 668, 359 S.E.2d 678 (1987). Evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of the defendant for molestation of his 14 year old daughter given the number of incidents, the defendant’s act of soon thereafter masturbating, his warning to his daughter to keep the incidents quiet, and his statement to an investigator that he touched his daughter in order to determine if she had been the victim of sexual abuse by another man. McEntyre v. State, 247 Ga. App. 881, 545 S.E.2d 391 (2001). Evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of defendant for aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) and one count of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c). Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 238, 555 S.E.2d 899 (2001). Evidence that defendant masturbated in front of three victims, all under the age of 16, for defendant’s own sexual gratification and that defendant fondled them or forced them to perform sex acts on him was sufficient to support the convictions against defendant for child molestation. Goins v. State, 257 Ga. App. 406, 571 S.E.2d 195 (2002). Trial court’s admission of recall evidence that defendant threatened a witness, a neighbor of the victims, when defendant was leaving the stand was not error; even if the admission of the recall testimony was in error, it was harmless as the evidence was overwhelming to support a conviction for child molestation, burglary, and criminal trespass since: (1) two victims and one mother of a victim, all with a sufficient opportunity to observe defendant, identified defendant in a pre-trial photographic lineup and at trial;

(2) the neighbor also identified defendant;

(3) a victim and the neighbor knew defendant by first name preceding the incident;

(4) a victim and the neighbor noticed defendant wearing the clothes discovered in a victim’s home the night of the incident; and (5) the state presented evidence that defendant had committed similar acts previously. Rubi v. State, 258 Ga. App. 815, 575 S.E.2d 719 (2002). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction on two counts of aggravated child molestation, as it was enough for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having had the child victim perform sex acts on defendant’s genitals with the victim’s mouth and having performed sex acts on the child victim’s vagina with defendant’s mouth. Smith v. State, 259 Ga. App. 736, 578 S.E.2d 295 (2003). Evidence supported the jury’s decision rejecting defendant’s claims of accident or mistake and a lack of criminal intent and supported defendant’s child molestation conviction. Black v. State, 261 Ga. App. 263, 582 S.E.2d 213 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions on two counts of child molestation, where defendant engaged in sexual activity with a minor. Dowd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 306, 582 S.E.2d 235 (2003). Testimony by the detective and the child that the child had recounted occasions on which defendant put the defendant’s hands on the victim’s genitals and other private parts, and that defendant had woken the victim up once by poking the defendant’s private parts in the victim’s behind, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child molestation by inserting an unknown object in the victim’s rectum. Mayo v. State, 261 Ga. App. 314, 582 S.E.2d 482 (2003). Victim’s testimony that the victim had sexual intercourse with defendant, that the defendant placed the defendant’s finger in the victim’s genitals, placed the defendant’s hand on the victim’s genitals, placed the defendant’s mouth on the victim’s breast, and placed the defendant’s mouth on the victim’s mouth, established the offenses of aggravated sexual battery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2, incest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22, and child molestation. Falak v. State, 261 Ga. App. 404, 583 S.E.2d 146 (2003). Evidence that defendant touched the victim inappropriately showed that the jury could have concluded that defendant was guilty of child molestation. Frazier v. State, 261 Ga. App. 508, 583 S.E.2d 188 (2003). Conviction for child molestation by making a child touch defendant’s genitals was upheld where force was shown through the victim’s testimony that defendant was mean to the victim and the victim’s siblings, kicked them, hit them in the head, and yelled a lot. Branesky v. State, 262 Ga. App. 33, 584 S.E.2d 669 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to support a child molestation conviction when the defendant’s eight year old stepchild testified that the defendant ‘‘put his private in my private,’’ that the defendant moved the defendant’s body while inside the child, that the defendant hurt the victim’s ‘‘private,’’ where the victim circled the appropriate places on anatomically correct drawings which were admitted into evidence, testified that defendant put the defendant’s ‘‘private’’ in the victim’s mouth on more than one occasion, where eventually the victim told the victim’s parent, the victim’s babysitter, and the victim’s doctor about these events, and where a physical examination revealed redness and swelling around the victim’s genitals, which, the physician testified, could have been caused by trauma. Torres v. State, 262 Ga. App. 309, 585 S.E.2d 228 (2003). Although the defendant’s stepchild and the child’s friend had not reported the defendant’s sexual acts involving them during an earlier welfare investigation and the stepchild only told of the sexual acts after the child’s parent refused to let the child move in with the child’s other biological parent, such went to the childrens’ credibility, which was for the jury to determine, and the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for child molestation and statutory rape. Williams v. State, 263 Ga. App. 22, 587 S.E.2d 187 (2003). After a 12-year-old child told the child’s parent that defendant had just raped the child; hours after the alleged rape, a detective found defendant’s checkbook in the abandoned house where the victim said the rape occurred, and a check had been written from the checkbook earlier that day; and a doctor who examined the victim within hours of the incident found abrasions and tenderness consistent with the victim’s description of what had occurred, the appellate court found the evidence sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of rape, statutory rape, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation. Weathersby v. State, 263 Ga. App. 341, 587 S.E.2d 836 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of child molestation even when the evidence consisted primarily of the victim’s testimony and the statements of the victim’s sibling; the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the jury clearly resolved the conflicts against defendant. McGhee v. State, 263 Ga. App. 762, 589 S.E.2d 333 (2003). Trial court correctly allowed three adults to testify about out-of-court statements which a four-year-old child made to them even though the child was unresponsive when the child was asked questions in court, and the appellate court found that the child’s statements alleging that defendant placed the defendant’s finger inside the child’s genitals, when considered with evidence that the child had gonorrhea, and similar transaction evi- Application (Cont’d) dence that defendant molested the defendant’s own child, was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions for child molestation and aggravated sexual battery. Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 589 S.E.2d 653 (2003). Victim’s testimony, which was supported by statements the victim made to family, friends, and investigators regarding sexual acts the defendant committed upon the victim, together with the medical findings of the pediatrician who examined the victim were completely consistent with the victim’s allegation of abuse by sexual intercourse; therefore, the evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Wilkins v. State, 264 Ga. App. 524, 591 S.E.2d 445 (2003). Evidence was sufficient to overcome defendant’s assertion that the defendant had no sexual contact with the 15 year old victim where: (1) defendant offered the 15-year-old victim a ride to the victim’s house, but instead took the victim to the defendant’s own home; (2) the victim was able to describe certain peculiarities of defendant’s genitals and pubic area; (3) the jury was shown pictures that conformed to the victim’s description; and (4) similar transaction evidence was introduced where a previous victim testified that defendant had sexually assaulted the victim in the victim’s car after the victim gave the defendant a ride to the defendant’s house. Taylor v. State, 264 Ga. App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (2003). Defendant’s child’s testimony on retrial that defendant had repeatedly touched child’s breasts and genitals with defendant’s hands, and that on one occasion defendant had touched child’s genitals with defendant’s mouth, was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions. Putnam v. State, 264 Ga. App. 810, 592 S.E.2d 462 (2003). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) and (c), respectively, were upheld based upon the evidence presented from the victim that defendant placed the defendant’s finger into the victim’s genitals and moved it around, causing the victim physical harm, and by touching the defendant’s genitals on the victim’s genitals; evidence of prior false accusations made by the victim, and a later recantation by the victim, did not render the evidence insufficient. Cheek v. State, 265 Ga. App. 15, 593 S.E.2d 55 (2003). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions were upheld where the trial court properly denied a defense motion for a continuance, fashioned an alternative remedy allowing defendant access to an alleged similar transaction witness’ statement, and limited the state’s ability to challenge it, and defendant failed to prove that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective. Joiner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 395, 593 S.E.2d 936 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of sexual battery and child molestation, even though the defendant was acquitted of rape, where the 13-year old victim testified that the defendant pulled off the victim’s shorts and forced the defendant’s genitals into the victim’s genitals despite the victim’s protests. The jury was entitled to believe the victim’s testimony in whole or in part, and it could have concluded that the defendant placed the defendant’s genitals on the victim’s genitals (as alleged in the child molestation indictment), but that no penetration occurred, so there was no rape. Dorsey v. State, 265 Ga. App. 597, 595 S.E.2d 106 (2004). Evidence supporting the finding that defendant penetrated the victim’s genitals, causing physical injury, was sufficient to sustain convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Sailor v. State, 265 Ga. App. 645, 595 S.E.2d 335 (2004). Aggravated child molestation, child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and aggravated sodomy convictions were all supported by sufficient evidence provided by the victims detailing the inappropriate touching and anal penetration committed by defendant, and confirmed by the examining experts. Wilkerson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 585, 600 S.E.2d 677 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support de- fendant’s conviction of child molestation where: (1) the victim testified that defendant inappropriately touched the victim, and showed the victim rented and ‘‘homemade’’ pornographic movies to teach the victim about sex; (2) a social services worker testified that the child drew the body parts defendant touched on a ‘‘gingerbread drawing,’’ and said that defendant and defendant’s love interest acted out what was on the pornographic videos in front of the child; (3) a psychologist testified that the evaluation of the child was consistent with possible sexual abuse; and (4) an investigator testified that defendant, in a signed statement, admitted the inappropriate touching and showing of the pornographic movies to the child. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 826, 600 S.E.2d 774 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to sustain a child molestation conviction when the seven-year-old child of the defendant’s step-sibling testified that the defendant came into the victim’s room while the victim was sleeping, pulled down the victim’s underwear, and rubbed soap on the victim’s genitals, where the victim also told police in a prior statement that the victim thought that the defendant put the defendant’s finger inside the victim’s genitals, where the victim described the incident to the victim’s parent, the victim’s grandparent, and later a social worker in a taped interview, and where, when the parent first confronted the defendant, the defendant acted nonchalantly in the face of the accusations, rather than being surprised or defensive. Holloway v. State, 268 Ga. App. 300, 601 S.E.2d 753 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support child molestation convictions where the child’s parent found defendant, naked, with the child’s head in the defendant’s lap, and in testimony and taped interviews played at trial, the 10-year-old child victim said that defendant, inter alia, had the victim place the victim’s hand on the defendant’s genitals, tried to put the defendant’s genitals in the victim’s ‘‘privates’’ while they were clothed, held the victim and moved the victim up and down the defendant’s body between the defendant’s legs, and tried to put the defendant’s genitals in the victim’s mouth. Duncan v. State, 269 Ga. App. 4, 602 S.E.2d 908 (2004).

Convictions of child molestation and aggravated child molestation were affirmed where the four-year-old child victim told several people that defendant had touched or inserted defendant’s fingers in the child’s genitals, and a doctor’s examination found indications that someone inserted their fingers into the victim’s genitals. Howard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 558, 602 S.E.2d 295 (2004). Evidence that the defendant bathed a victim without the victim’s parent’s knowledge, photographed the victim in the nude without the parent’s knowledge, masturbated with a victim’s underwear, and placed nude photos of the victim between pages of a pornographic magazine was sufficient to support a child molestation conviction. Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (2004). When a victim testified that defendant locked the victim in the defendant’s bedroom, threw the victim onto the defendant’s bed, placed the defendant’s genitals on the victim’s ‘‘bottom,’’ and made ‘‘moving’’ motions, and told a police officer, who testified, that defendant grabbed the victim’s buttocks immediately before this incident, and a nurse testified that a medical examination of the victim revealed injuries consistent with the victim’s allegations, the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both aggravated child molestation, as to the first incident, and child molestation, as to grabbing the victim’s buttocks, and further allowed the jury to find that defendant committed these acts for the defendant’s own sexual arousal. Payne v. State, 269 Ga. App. 662, 605 S.E.2d 75 (2004). Sufficient evidence, including testimony from the child victim identifying defendant’s vehicle, evidence of defendant’s DNA matching that of the victim and expert testimony that the frequency of such occurrence was approximately one in two billion in the Caucasian population, and similar transaction evidence, supported defendant’s kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, and first-degree cruelty to children convictions. Morita v. State, 270 Ga. App. 372, 606 S.E.2d 595 (2004).

Application (Cont’d) Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation, which involved an act of sodomy, by placing the defendant’s genitals in the victim’s anus because the victim testified that the defendant ‘‘put the defendant’s private in [the victim’s] butt.’’ Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 609 S.E.2d 204 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for child molestation by touching the victim’s genitals with the defendant’s hand because the victim testified that defendant pulled down the victim’s underwear and touched the victim between the victim’s legs in the victim’s ‘‘private area’’ with the defendant’s mouth, genitals, and finger. Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 609 S.E.2d 204 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for child molestation by touching a child’s anus with defendant’s genitals because the child testified that defendant ‘‘put his private in [the child’s] butt.’’ Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 609 S.E.2d 204 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for child molestation by causing a child to touch the defendant’s genitals because the child testified that defendant told the child to touch the defendant’s genitals and placed the child’s hand on it. Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 609 S.E.2d 204 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for child molestation by causing a child to touch defendant’s genitals because a child testified that defendant made the child touch [defendant’s] ‘‘private.’’ Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 609 S.E.2d 204 (2005). Victim’s testimony that the defendant touched the victim’s genitals, alone, supported the defendant’s conviction for child molestation; further, the victim’s testimony was corroborated by the victim’s outcry and by physical evidence of molestation. Howse v. State, 273 Ga. App. 252, 614 S.E.2d 869 (2005). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, statutory rape, and incest, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4, 16-6-4(c), 16-6-3, and 16-6-22, respectively, because the defendant’s step-child gave detailed testimony as to the continuing sexual conduct that the defendant inflicted on the child over a period of years, as the testimony from just that witness was sufficient to support the convictions, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8); further, there was corroborative testimony from a friend of the step-child who witnessed at least one incident, and from an aunt who testified that the older step-child had sat in defendant’s lap and that the defendant rubbed the older step-child’s legs, which was properly admitted for purposes of corroboration, bent of mind, lustful disposition toward children, and motive. Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 41, 619 S.E.2d 699 (2005). Defendant’s conviction of child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), was supported by sufficient evidence, based on testimony by the child, who was under the age of 16 and was the defendant’s step-child, that the defendant had fondled the child’s breast, and other testimony offered at trial. Lugo v. State, 275 Ga. App. 354, 620 S.E.2d 591 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation and aggravated sexual battery because: (1) the 11-year-old victim testified that the defendant put the defendant’s hand on the victim’s private part, put the defendant’s finger in the victim’s private part, put the defendant’s mouth on the victim’s private part, and put the victim’s mouth on the defendant’s private part, and that when the victim put the victim’s mouth on the defendant’s private part, ‘‘he came, whatever you call it;’’ (2) when the prosecutor asked the victim whether by that the victim meant that ‘‘stuff came out of his private part,’’ the victim responded yes; and (3) in a videotaped pretrial interview, the victim explained that the victim was using the term ‘‘private part’’ to mean penis or vagina. Maddox v. State, 275 Ga. App. 869, 622 S.E.2d 80 (2005). Child victim’s testimony and corroboration testimony by ‘‘outcry’’ witnesses were sufficient to find defendant guilty of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a). Rosser v. State, 276 Ga. App. 261, 623 S.E.2d 142 (2005).

Evidence supported a conviction for child molestation where: (1) the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim’s genitals from the outside of the victim’s clothing while the victim sat in front of the defendant on a four-wheeler;

(2) another child testified that the defendant touched the child the same day; and

(3) the jury did not believe the defendant’s explanation that if the touching occurred, it was accidental. Collins v. State, 276 Ga. App. 358, 623 S.E.2d 192 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of child molestation and criminal attempt to commit child molestation because: (1) the nine-year-old victim testified that, on multiple occasions, the defendant fondled the victim’s breasts and private parts; (2) the victim further testified that the defendant attempted to have the victim touch the defendant’s genitals; and (3) the victim initially informed the victim’s parent of the defendant’s actions and shortly thereafter repeated the details of the incidents to a therapist and two child services agency case workers. Cook v. State, 276 Ga. App. 803, 625 S.E.2d 83 (2005). Thirteen-year-old victim’s testimony that when the victim was sleeping, defendant pulled down the victim’s pants and underwear and performed oral sex on the victim, and that testimony was corroborated by defendant’s love interest who observed the incident, was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), as there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed ‘‘sodomy,’’ as that term was defined under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a); accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1. Steverson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 876, 625 S.E.2d 476 (2005). Defendant’s kissing of the eight-year-old victim and performance of oral sex on the victim, which was observed by the victim’s parent upon the parent’s return to the defendant’s residence, was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for aggravated child molestation. Hines v. State, 277 Ga. App. 404, 626 S.E.2d 601 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated child molestation, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) and (c), which was based on an act of sodomy, as whether the defendant’s conduct in touching the victim’s genitals with the defendant’s mouth was an immoral or indecent act performed with the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant’s or the victim’s sexual desires was a question within the jury’s province. Lester v. State, 278 Ga. App. 247, 628 S.E.2d 674 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 because the three-year-old victim reported the abuse to numerous adults; testified at trial that the defendant touched the victim’s private area with the defendant’s finger, that the defendant would not stop when the victim asked the defendant to do so, and that the touching hurt; and the medical evidence showed that the victim had sustained an injury consistent with molestation. Iles v. State, 278 Ga. App. 895, 630 S.E.2d 148 (2006). Defendant’s conviction for child molestation was supported by sufficient evidence, including the testimony of the child victim, the defendant’s stepchild, who was in the seventh grade at the time of trial, that the defendant molested the child when the child was in the third, fourth and fifth grades, that in the most recent incident, the defendant called the child into the defendant’s bedroom and told the child they were going to have sex, that the child said they were not, and left the room, that the defendant went into the child’s bedroom and wrestled with the child until they fell onto the bed, that the defendant pulled the child’s clothing off and tried to insert the defendant’s genitals into the child’s genitals, but was only partially able to do so, and that there were other incidents in which the defendant had sex with the child or inserted the defendant’s finger into the child’s genitals; additionally, a doctor concluded that the child’s injuries were consistent with partial penetration of the genitals, the child reported the most recent incident to a teacher, a social worker, and a police officer, and the child’s videotaped statement was admitted into evidence. Harris v.

Application (Cont’d) State, 279 Ga. App. 241, 630 S.E.2d 853 (2006). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated child molestation since the child victim testified that when the child was five-years-old, defendant ‘‘put his private in my mouth and peed in it, and made me swallow it,’’ since, among other witnesses, the child’s father and stepmother testified about what the child told them about the incident, since a detective testified about an interview with the child about the incident, and since the state introduced a videotape of the interview into evidence and played it to the jury. Tyler v. State, 279 Ga. App. 809, 632 S.E.2d 716 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1818, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 810 (Ga. 2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007). Defendant’s child molestation convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) sufficient evidence presented by the victims and investigating witnesses, despite defendant’s contrary testimony, supported the convictions; (2) sufficient similarities in the two charges supported their joinder for trial; and (3) no abuse of discretion resulted from the admission of two videotaped interviews of both victims. Milton v. State, 280 Ga. App. 179, 633 S.E.2d 606 (2006). Evidence supported a defendant’s conviction for child molestation as: (1) the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim on the victim’s ‘‘private part’’; (2) the victim reported the abuse to the victim’s parent and the police; (3) any discrepancies in the victim’s statements or contradictions in the evidence presented credibility questions for the jury to resolve; (4) Georgia law did not require corroboration of a child molestation victim’s testimony; and (5) given that the allegations did not include penetration, the lack of medical evidence to corroborate the victim’s molestation was not exculpatory. Tadic v. State, 281 Ga. App. 58, 635 S.E.2d 356 (2006). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s convictions for rape, incest, statutory rape, and child molestation against one of the defendant’s children and a stepchild based on the defendant’s repeated engagement in sexual intercourse with the children at various times while one was 12 to 16 years old and the other was 16 to 19 years old, and evidence of a letter threatening suicide on the defendant’s part and apologizing for the actions against the children was also introduced against the defendant. However, the conviction on the charge of aggravated sexual battery against the stepchild was in error and required reversal since the state failed to introduce direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2 by penetrating that child’s sexual organ with a replica penis. Connelly v. State, 295 Ga. App. 765, 673 S.E.2d 274 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0892, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. 2009). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c) based on the 11-year-old victim’s testimony regarding the defendant’s actions while the victim was sleeping over at the victim’s aunt’s home; the defendant’s claim that the defendant did not molest the victim was within the jury’s credibility evaluation. Lucas v. State, 295 Ga. App. 831, 673 S.E.2d 309 (2009). Evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child molestation. A child testified at trial that the defendant touched the child ‘‘in the private’’ with the defendant’s hand and with a towel after the child told the defendant that the child was itching; the child told the defendant to stop, but the defendant refused. Pareja v. State, 295 Ga. App. 871, 673 S.E.2d 343, aff ’d, 286 Ga. 117, 686 S.E.2d 232 (2009). Sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) because a jury could infer that the defendant had open and intentional sexual intercourse with the minor victim’s father in the presence of the victim based on the testimony of the victim that, while the father, who was nude, was performing oral sex on the victim, the defendant, who was not wear- ing shorts or underwear, came into the bedroom, got on top of the father, and moved up and down. Mote v. State, 297 Ga. App. 13, 676 S.E.2d 379 (2009). Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant’s convictions for incest and child molestation with regard to actions the defendant took toward the defendant’s own children based on the children’s recorded police interviews that were played for the jury; the testimony from a licensed clinical social worker who was admitted as an expert in child sexual abuse and the abuse’s effect on children; and the testimony of the pediatric nurse practitioner who examined the victims and stated that, although the victims’ physical exams were normal, the results were consistent with their reports of sexual abuse. The victims’ testimony, standing alone, would have been sufficient to support the convictions; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Hubert v. State, 297 Ga. App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (2009). Sufficient evidence supported a defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c) and three counts of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) because the 13-year-old victim testified that, after repeatedly injecting the victim with methamphetamine, the defendant engaged in various sexual acts with the victim, including fondling the victim’s breasts and engaging in intercourse; the defendant’s roommate testified that the roommate saw the victim perform oral sex on the defendant. Moe v. State, 297 Ga. App. 270, 676 S.E.2d 887 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), aggravated child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), and sodomy, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2, because, in addition to the victim’s testimony that the defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse and sodomy with the victim, there was physical evidence that supported the victim’s testimony that the victim had been abused; the jury was authorized to believe the testimony of the victim as well as the expert witness who testified on behalf of the state. Roberts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 672, 678 S.E.2d 137 (2009).

Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion for a new trial and convicted the defendant on one count of child molestation with regard to the defendant’s conduct of allowing an adult to have sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old victim at the defendant’s home as the defendant failed to meet the burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. Carrie v. State, 298 Ga. App. 55, 679 S.E.2d 30 (2009). Convictions of aggravated child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), and child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), were supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which the nine-year-old victim testified that the defendant inserted the defendant’s penis into the victim’s vagina and bottom on more than one occasion, that the defendant also touched the victim’s vagina, bottom, and breasts with the defendant’s hands, the victim’s breasts with the defendant’s tongue, and, while in the victim’s presence, touched the defendant’s own penis with the defendant’s hands; the victim made similar allegations to the detective who investigated the case, describing sexual acts performed by the defendant and stating that the defendant ‘‘would shake’’ or ‘‘choke’’ the defendant’s penis in the victim’s presence. A medical examination of the victim’s anus revealed trauma consistent with recent penetration and the victim’s 13-year old brother testified that the brother caught the defendant unzipping the defendant’s pants near the victim, who was on hands and knees on the floor, naked from the waist down. Garduno v. State, 299 Ga. App. 32, 682 S.E.2d 145 (2009). Whether the defendant’s conduct in putting the defendant’s private part in a child’s face was an immoral or indecent act performed with the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant’s sexual desires was a question for the jury. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation. Hobbs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 521, 682 S.E.2d 697 (2009). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for child molestation based on the testimony of the 19-year-old victim, defendant’s daughter, that the de- Application (Cont’d) fendant entered the victim’s bedroom and touched the victim’s vagina as well as evidence that the defendant committed similar acts upon two stepdaughters. Riddick v. State, 320 Ga. App. 500, 740 S.E.2d 244 (2013). Stepdaughter’s testimony regarding the sexual abuse, the stepdaughter’s recorded forensic interview, and the testimony of the second grade teacher, the school counselor, and the child protective services investigator about the stepdaughter’s disclosures of abuse to them authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child molestation and related offenses. Ramirez v. State, 345 Ga. App. 611, 814 S.E.2d 751 (2018). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of child molestation because the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim in a way that the victim did not like and the victim and the defendant had a secret, the victim’s mother testified that the victim demonstrated to the mother what the defendant did and described in detail what the defendant looked like naked, and during a forensic interview the victim stated that the defendant laid on the victim and bounced up and down. Love v. State, 824 S.E.2d 745, No. A18A1818, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 146 (2019). Pregnancy supported conviction for aggravated child molestation. - Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation as the victim was physically injured by the molestation because a full-term pregnancy involved at least some impairment of the victim’s physical condition; and there was evidence that the victim experienced pain during the two-day labor and delivery process. Kendrick v. State, 331 Ga. App. 682, 769 S.E.2d 621 (2015). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of child molestation, two counts of aggravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery because the abuse included the defendant fondling the victim’s vagina and breasts, performing oral sex on the victim and forcing the victim to do the same to the defendant, and digitally penetrating the victim’s vagina; after the defendant’s wife and the victim’s mother began traveling with the state fair, leaving the defendant and the victim living alone together for months at a time, the defendant began regularly having sexual intercourse with the victim; the victim finally disclosed the defendant’s abuse to the victim’s legal guardian; and the victim testified about the abuse. Brown v. State, 336 Ga. App. 428, 785 S.E.2d 84 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of seven counts of child molestation because the victim testified that the defendant made the victim touch the defendant’s penis on multiple occasions and that the defendant touched the victim’s private parts in numerous ways on multiple occasions. Hunt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 821, 783 S.E.2d 456 (2016). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation, in which the defendant was alleged to have masturbated in front of the 13-year-old victim because, although the victim testified that the victim closed the victim’s eyes, it was not necessary for the victim to actually see the defendant masturbate so long as that act occurred in the victim’s presence; and there was evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant masturbated in the victim’s presence as the victim testified that, immediately before the victim closed the victim’s eyes, the defendant pulled the defendant’s pants down, took out the defendant’s sexual organ, and told the victim that the defendant would show the victim how to masturbate. Jackson v. State, 344 Ga. App. 618, 810 S.E.2d 672 (2018). Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction. - Defendant’s child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence taken from the victim’s testimony; the victim’s forensic interview and medical examination by a registered nurse; and similar transaction evidence showing defendant’s motive, intent, and bent of mind. Rodriguez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 129, 635 S.E.2d 402 (2006). Despite allegations that: (1) the victim’s testimony was contradicted by the victim’s parent; and (2) the victim had a motive to lie about the defendant, the appeals court refused to disturb the jury’s determination as to the evidence given the jury’s province to resolve the conflicts in the evidence; hence, the defendant’s cruelty to children and attempted aggravated and child molestation convictions were upheld on appeal. Chalker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 305, 635 S.E.2d 890 (2006). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation and sexual exploitation of children were supported by the evidence based on the testimony of two minor victims that they engaged in numerous acts of oral and anal sex with the defendant, their identification of themselves in numerous photographs and several videos taken from the defendant’s computer files, which depicted them engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and the sexually explicit photographs and video recordings. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported the convictions of enticing a child for indecent purposes under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5 and of three counts of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4; the victim and the victim’s younger sister specifically testified that the defendant committed the acts described in the indictment, and other testimony corroborated this testimony. Mikell v. State, 281 Ga. App. 739, 637 S.E.2d 142 (2006). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c), attempted aggravated sodomy under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 and 16-6-2(a), and statutory rape under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a); the victim testified that the defendant put the defendant’s privates inside the victim’s privates and attempted to put the defendant’s privates in the victim’s behind, and the nurse practitioner testified that the physical examination of the victim indicated injuries consistent with the victim’s testimony. Anderson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 58, 637 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of three separate counts of child molestation under O.C.G.A.

§ 16-6-4(a) as there was sufficient identification testimony to convict; the victim testified that the victim knew the defendant, the victim referred to the perpetrator of the offenses by the defendant’s first name, and the victim testified that the victim spent the summer with the defendant and others. Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App. 248, 638 S.E.2d 397 (2006). Sufficient identification evidence supported the defendant’s convictions of four counts of aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b), three counts of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a), and two counts of enticing a child for indecent purposes under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5; the victim testified that the victim knew the defendant, that the defendant and the victim’s mother lived together, and that the perpetrator’s name was the defendant’s first name. Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App. 248, 638 S.E.2d 397 (2006). Defendant’s child molestation conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) the defendant waived error as to the admission of the victim’s statements at trial, including those made in a videotape; (2) the victim’s statements contained in the videotape were evidence of prior difficulties, admissible without notice and without a pretrial hearing; (3) after the trial court agreed to give a curative instruction on the wife-beating evidence, counsel withdrew a request for such an instruction on grounds that it would focus too much attention on a very brief statement; and (4) trial counsel was not ineffective. Campbell v. State, 282 Ga. App. 854, 640 S.E.2d 358 (2006). Verdict convicting a defendant of child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) was supported by sufficient evidence; viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record showed that, after watching pornographic movies at the home of the six-year-old victim, the defendant penetrated the victim’s vagina with a finger while the victim’s parent was asleep on a couch. Pendley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 262, 641 S.E.2d 174 (2006). Given the testimony provided by the victim about the repeated acts performed by and for the defendant over a period of months, the fact that the defendant was Application (Cont’d) giving money to the victim’s cousin as an incentive not to tell anyone about the acts, and evidence that the defendant played a sexually explicit video for the victim and the victim’s cousin, the defendant’s child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions were upheld on appeal. Hunter v. State, 282 Ga. App. 355, 638 S.E.2d 804 (2006). Defendant’s aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy convictions were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence including: (1) the testimony from both victims, which was corroborated by an investigator and a treating doctor; and (2) similar transaction evidence of the defendant’s oral and anal molestation of other minor siblings, which was introduced for the purpose of showing a course of conduct, intent, and bent of mind toward sexual behavior with young relatives, and not to impugn the defendant’s character. Chauncey v. State, 283 Ga. App. 217, 641 S.E.2d 229 (2007). Because sufficient evidence was supplied via the testimony from the child victim, and the witnesses who corroborated said testimony, to support the defendant’s aggravated sexual battery and child molestation convictions, despite any alleged inconsistencies, the convictions were upheld as was the denial of the defendant’s motions for an acquittal and a new trial. Lilly v. State, 285 Ga. App. 427, 646 S.E.2d 512 (2007). Trial court upheld the defendant’s statutory rape and child molestation convictions despite a challenge to the date-range period relating to the child molestation charge as sufficient evidence from the victim, which was supported by both the victim’s mother and an examining nurse, supported the conviction; further, the defendant admitted to the victim’s mother that sexual intercourse with the victim had occurred before. Northern v. State, 285 Ga. App. 303, 645 S.E.2d 701 (2007). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of child molestation, kidnapping with bodily injury, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, when the defendant, who lived with an ex-girlfriend and her teenage daughter, called them into a bedroom and bound the ex-girlfriend’s arms, legs, and mouth with duct tape, threatened the women with a hatchet, and led the daughter to another bedroom where the defendant duct-taped her hands and feet and forced her to have intercourse with him. Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 683, 644 S.E.2d 535 (2007). Given the testimony offered by both victims and their father, and a taped telephone conversation between the father and the defendant, during which the defendant asked the father to apologize to the victims, sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s two child molestation convictions. Head v. State, 285 Ga. App. 471, 646 S.E.2d 699 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated child molestation when the victim, who was five or six when the incidents occurred, stated that the defendant had put his penis into the victim’s ‘‘behind’’ or ‘‘bottom’’; any inconsistency in the victim’s statements was a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. Prudhomme v. State, 285 Ga. App. 662, 647 S.E.2d 343 (2007). Given the evidence supporting the defendant’s aggravated child molestation conviction including that: (1) the defendant sodomized the victim; (2) witnesses knew that the defendant had an interest in performing oral sex; and (3) the trial court properly limited the defendant’s cross-examination to only relevant matters, the conviction was upheld on appeal and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial. Gaines v. State, 285 Ga. App. 654, 647 S.E.2d 357 (2007). On appeal from a child molestation and aggravated child molestation conviction, the testimony and statements from the child victim and the witnesses who testified to the acts was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to determine that the defendant committed an indecent and immoral act by touching the victim’s vaginal area with the intent to arouse the defendant’s sexual desires; in addition, the testimony of an examining doctor was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to determine that the defendant physically injured the victim. Cortez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 170, 648 S.E.2d 488 (2007). Because the evidence supported the finding that the defendant attempted to penetrate the 13-year-old victim’s vagina with his penis, touched her breasts with his hands and his mouth, and told her to perform oral sex on him, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict as to each of his convictions for aggravated child molestation and for child molestation; it was not necessary that the victim’s evidence be corroborated, and her credibility was a matter for the jury. Foster v. State, 286 Ga. App. 250, 649 S.E.2d 322 (2007), cert. dismissed, No. S07C1883, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 875 (Ga. 2007). Because sufficient evidence as to venue and of the remaining elements of the crime was presented by the child victim, via both recorded and trial testimony, the child molestation convictions entered against both the defendants under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and 16-6-4 were upheld on appeal. Newman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 353, 649 S.E.2d 349 (2007). In a child molestation case involving four teenagers, the inconsistencies in the teenagers’ statements did not mean that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions; contradictions or issues of credibility were for the jury to resolve. Krirat v. State, 286 Ga. App. 650, 649 S.E.2d 786 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1788, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 745 (Ga. 2007). There was sufficient evidence, including testimony by the victim and similar transaction evidence involving incidents that took place years before, to support a defendant’s convictions of sexual battery, child molestation, and aggravated child molestation; the victim, who testified to various acts the defendant performed upon the victim, stated when confronted with inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony that the victim had been on drugs during that period because the victim was trying to forget everything, and any inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony were for the jury to resolve. Boynton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 778, 653 S.E.2d 110 (2007). Five year old victim. - Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s convictions of child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and aggravated sexual battery after the five-year-old victim stated that the defendant had made her perform an oral act on his penis, that he had put his mouth on her vagina, and that he had stuck his finger in her vagina and anus; furthermore, the victim’s seven-year-old sibling reported that the defendant had been lying on a bed in the same room as the victim, that the defendant had chased the sibling into the sibling’s room and told the sibling to stay in bed until that night, and that the sibling saw ‘‘something bad’’ happen to the victim. Herring v. State, 288 Ga. App. 169, 653 S.E.2d 494 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0448, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 205 (Ga. 2008). Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction of two counts of aggravated child molestation with regard to the defendant’s daughter and the daughter’s friend. The daughter, who was interviewed after a teacher became concerned about a poem she had written, told social services personnel that the defendant had sodomized her several years before by inserting his penis inside of her anus; her disclosures led to questioning of the friend, who had not had contact with the daughter for years, who began to cry immediately after the subject of molestation was broached, and who stated that the defendant had inserted his penis inside her anus while she was attending a slumber party at the daughter’s house. French v. State, 288 Ga. App. 775, 655 S.E.2d 224 (2007). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of child molestation and aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 and of aggravated sexual battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b) because the state provided testimony corroborating the victim’s statements that when the defendant was supposed to babysit the victim after school, defendant regularly abused the victim at the victim’s home, in the defendant’s car, in a park, in a vacant house, and two motels by touching the victim, making the victim perform oral sex on the defendant, by sodomizing the victim, by making the victim wear thong underwear, and by taking cellular telephone photographs of the victim naked. Woods v. State, 304 Ga. App. 403, 696 S.E.2d 411 (2010). Trial court did not err in convicting the Application (Cont’d) defendant of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 because the victim’s video interview with Department of Family and Children Services case workers, which was played for the jury, and the victim’s testimony in court were sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the interview showed the victim saying that the defendant touched the victim where the defendant was not supposed to, and at the trial, the victim was sometimes hesitant to testify but did ultimately testify that the defendant touched the victim between the victim’s legs with the defendant’s hand. Kay v. State, 306 Ga. App. 666, 703 S.E.2d 108 (2010). Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c) because the victim testified that the abuse was long term and ongoing, that the abuse had escalated to include oral sex, and that the defendant had generally done the same thing on each occasion. Arnold v. State, 305 Ga. App. 45, 699 S.E.2d 77 (2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, enticing a child for an indecent purpose, kidnapping, false imprisonment, cruelty to children, burglary, theft by taking, and striking an unattended vehicle were authorized because at trial the defendant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crimes; a nurse and doctor testified that the victim had an injury that was consistent with the molestation allegation, and a videotape depicted the defendant driving a maintenance truck that the defendant did not have authority to take. Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 699 S.E.2d 363 (2010). Evidence from a defendant’s own statement that the defendant touched the fourteen-year-old victim’s vagina and became aroused was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1). Goss v. State, 305 Ga. App. 497, 699 S.E.2d 819 (2010). Inconsistencies in statement between four year old victim and defendant. - Evidence was sufficient to sup- port the defendant’s conviction for molesting a four-year-old girl because the victim testified that the defendant had touched her on her ‘‘front private’’ under her clothes, and defendant admitted doing the same thing; inconsistencies in their testimony merely presented an issue for the jury, not the court of appeals. Fife v. State, 306 Ga. App. 425, 702 S.E.2d 454 (2010). Evidence relating to counts five through seven of the Coweta County indictment was sufficient to convict the defendant of child molestation because the indictment alleged that the defendant molested the victim of that offense by lifting the bedcovers to stare at the victim’s buttocks while the victim was sleeping, by lying down between that victim and a friend as they slept, and lifting the bedcovers off that victim’s buttocks on a different occasion while the victim slept on a couch at the victim’s grandmother’s house; when the victim asked the defendant what the defendant was doing, the defendant left the room; and the defendant committed similar acts against other sleeping girls. Cavender v. State, 329 Ga. App. 845, 766 S.E.2d 196 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of child molestation in Carroll County because the victim of that offense testified that the defendant placed a hand on the victim’s buttocks while the victim was sleeping and, on another occasion, lifted the covers near the victim’s buttocks and stared at the victim; the defendant committed similar acts against other sleeping girls; and a jury could find that the defendant engaged in immoral or indecent acts against that victim with the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant’s sexual desires. Cavender v. State, 329 Ga. App. 845, 766 S.E.2d 196 (2014). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of one count of aggravated child molestation and three counts of child molestation because the defendant touched the 10-year-old victim’s breasts, touched the victim’s private part area both over and under the victim’s clothing, kissed the victim’s private area as the victim lay naked on the defendant’s bed, and showed the victim the defendant’s penis; and the touching happened on more than one occasion and occurred in the defendant’s bedroom, which the victim was able to describe to the investigators. Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 784 S.E.2d 11 (2016). Inconsistencies in evidence goes to weight not sufficiency. - Evidence was legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation and child molestation despite the inconsistencies between the victim’s trial testimony and statement made during the vicitm’s forensic interview, as any inconsistency went to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Atkins v. State, 342 Ga. App. 849, 805 S.E.2d 612 (2017). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of child molestation because the defendant touched the nine-year-old victim’s vagina with the defendant’s hand and with a massager; and the evidence supported the inference that the defendant intended to arouse the defendant’s or the victim’s sexual desires as the defendant touched the victim’s vaginal area with both the defendant’s hand and a massager, the defendant held the massager in place between the victim’s open legs despite the victim’s request that the defendant stop, and the defendant made for the victim a revealing skirt similar to one worn by a model in an adult magazine in the defendant’s possession. Kruel v. State, 344 Ga. App. 256, 809 S.E.2d 491 (2018). Evidence insufficient for conviction. - Evidence was insufficient to sustain all four of the defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation, because a jury reasonably could have inferred that the ‘‘bad things’’ the victim testified the defendant did two or three times a month during the time the victims lived in Oconee County involved the defendant’s routine and, therefore, the defendant performing oral sex on the victim. Bibb v. State, 315 Ga. App. 49, 726 S.E.2d 534 (2012). Kissing as sufficient evidence of molestation. - Evidence supported a defendant’s child molestation conviction as the defendant was a 51-year old man and kissed an unrelated 10-year-old boy on the mouth while the two were swimming together within the context of a relationship involving other acts of molestation; the jury could infer that the defendant kissed the boy with the intent to gratify the defendant’s sexual desires. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006). Victims do not need technical or statutory language to describe acts. - Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of child molestation and cruelty to children under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4 and