O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20 (2019)

‘‘Contiguous area’’ defined

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this article, the term ‘‘contiguous area’’ means, at the time the annexation procedures are initiated, any area that meets the following conditions: (1) At least one-eighth of the aggregate external boundary or 50 feet of the area to be annexed, whichever is less, either abuts directly on the municipal boundary or would directly abut on the municipal boundary if it were not otherwise separated from the municipal boundary by lands owned by the municipal corporation or some other political subdivision, by lands owned by this state, or by the definite width of: (A) Any street or street right of way; (B) Any creek or river; or (C) Any right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation which divides the municipal boundary and any area proposed to be annexed; (2) The entire parcel or parcels of real property owned by the person seeking annexation is being annexed; provided, however, that lots shall not be subdivided in an effort to evade the requirements of this paragraph; and (3) The private property annexed, excluding any right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation, complies with the annexing municipality’s minimum size requirements, if any, to construct a building or structure occupiable by persons or property under the policies or regulations of the municipal development, zoning, or subdivision ordinances. (b) Notwithstanding the limitations of subsection (a) of this Code section, an area may be annexed by agreement between the municipal corporation and the governing body of the county in which the territory proposed to be annexed is located. (c) If, at the time annexation procedures are initiated, the entire area to be annexed is owned by the municipal governing authority to which

the area is to be annexed and if the annexation of municipally owned property is approved by resolution of the governing authority of the county wherein the property is located, then the term ‘‘contiguous area’’ shall mean any area which, at the time annexation procedures are initiated, abuts directly on the municipal boundary or which would directly abut on the municipal boundary if it were not otherwise separated from the municipal boundary by lands owned by the municipal corporation or some other political subdivision, by lands owned by this state, or by the definite width or by the length of: (1) Any street or street right of way; (2) Any creek or river; or (3) Any right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation which divides the municipal boundary and any area proposed to be annexed.

History

Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1011, § 1; Code 1981, § 36-36-1; Code 1981, § 36-36-20, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2592, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 164, § 5.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1992, p. 2592, § 3, effective July 1, 1992, renumbered former Code Section 36-36-1 as present Code Section 36-36-20. Law reviews. - For article discussing

municipal annexation and the concept of contiguity, see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 167 (1974). For article questioning the constitutionality of this Code section, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 169 (1975). For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005); and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006). For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2005); and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Annexation not improper. - Strip of land excepted from annexation by a city was excepted not in an effort to evade the ‘‘entire parcel’’ requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a)(2), but to annex the property without creating an unincorporated island in violation of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-4(a); there was no showing that the landowner subdivided the property to evade the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a)(2), and the appellate court affirmed a trial court’s refusal to enter a judgment declaring that a city’s annexation was null and void, declining to reach a finding that would, in effect, have left the landowner no way of having the landowner’s property annexed. Fayette County v. Steele, 268 Ga. App. 13, 601 S.E.2d 403 (2004). County estopped to oppose annexation. - County was estopped from chal-

lenging a city’s annexation of county roads by the county’s failure to oppose the annexation for 20 years. The county had approved the annexation, and the city, with the county’s knowledge, maintained the roads, patrolled the roads, set speed limits, and otherwise exercised control over the roads. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009). Annexation not ultra vires. - City’s failure to finalize the city’s annexation of county roads by adopting an ordinance, preparing a survey, and filing the annexation with the Georgia Secretary of State were errors of omission, not ultra vires actions contrary to former O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-1 and 36-36-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-20 and 36-36-21) which the city had no power to take. Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 did not preclude the city from

contending that the county was estopped from challenging the annexation. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009). Limited applicability of section. - Obvious purpose of this definition of ‘‘contiguous’’ is to explain the Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21) provision for annexing to the existing corporate limits unincorporated areas ‘‘contiguous to the existing corporate limits.’’ This provision has no reference to any lands where the owners sign no application to annex. The law’s sole purpose is to say that although a road, creek, river, interstate highway, railroad, or even other municipal property of another political subdivision passes between the lands of ‘‘A’’ and the corporate boundary, ‘‘A’s’’ land

is contiguous for the purpose of annexing the land when ‘‘A’’ signs an application therefor. City of Adel v. Georgia Power Co., 224 Ga. 232, 161 S.E.2d 297 (1968). Cited in City of Gainesville v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 233 Ga. 77, 209 S.E.2d 637 (1974); City of Marietta v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 237 Ga. 518, 228 S.E.2d 894 (1976); Paulding County v. City of Hiram, 240 Ga. 220, 240 S.E.2d 71 (1977); City of Cartersville v. Bartow County Sch. Dist., 145 Ga. App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978); City of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Boger, 267 Ga. 485, 480 S.E.2d 186 (1997); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014); City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Property of one of owners must abut directly upon municipal boundary. - Upon consideration of Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20) in conjunction with Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21), in order for a municipal corporation to annex property, at least one of the owners of the property to be annexed must have property which abuts directly on the municipal boundary, or which would otherwise abut directly on the municipal boundary except for the fact that the property is separated by a street, street right of way, creek, river, the right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the city or some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the state. Right of way for a state-aid road which is

owned by the state would qualify as lands owned by the State of Georgia. 1968 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 68-49. It is necessary for owner of road to sign or consent to petition for annexation; neither the State Transportation Board nor the commissioner of transportation has authority to consent for such annexation. 1969 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 69-81. Signing of petition. - Neither State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) nor director of State Highway Department (now Commissioner of Transportation) has authority to sign petition for annexation of right of way of state-aid road as part of the corporate limits of a municipality of this state. 1968 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 68-217.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 53 et seq. C.J.S. - 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 63 et seq.

ALR. - What land is contiguous or adjacent to municipality so as to be subject to annexation, 49 A.L.R.3d 589.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1989–2020 · leading case: Fulton Cnty. v. City of Atlanta, 791 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2016).
Fulton Cnty. v. City of Atlanta, 791 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 2× “And as to form, an annexation pursuant to OCGA § 36-36-20 et seq. — the so-called “100 percent” method by which the City proposed to annex the property in question here — requires the adoption of a municipal ordinance.”
City of Atlanta v. Mays, 801 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “346 ( 765 SE2d 33 ) (2014): *375 The General Assembly [has] passed legislation delegating to municipalities the authority to annex adjoining land under three alternative methods: (1) the “100% method,” by which a municipality may annex adjoining land upon application by all the…”
City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee Cnty., 682 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “The annexation statutes were extensively revised and renumbered in 1992, and these sections now appear as OCGA §§ 36-36-20 and 36-36-21. Ga. L. 1992, p.”
City of Centerville v. City of Warner Robins, 508 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 4× “See OCGA §§ 36-36-20 ("the 100% method"); 36-36-30 ("the 60% method"); and 36-36-50 ("the majority method").”
Fayette Cnty. v. Steele, 601 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 10× “The County objected and sought a declaratory judgment on the ground that by excepting the ten-foot strip of land, the City violated the requirement of OCGA § 36-36-20 (a) that annexed property be contiguous with the City’s property.”
City of Fort Oglethorpe v. Boger, 480 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 4× “See generally OCGA § 36-36-20; OCGA § 36-36-31; OCGA § 36-36-90.”
City of Brookhaven Et Al. v. City of Chamblee, 765 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “The General Assembly subsequently passed legislation delegating to municipalities the authority to annex adjoining land under three alternative methods: (1) the “100% method,” by which a municipality may annex adjoining land upon application by all the owners of the land, with…”
Cherokee Cnty., Georgia v. Inline Communities, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 26× “We conclude that this annexation meets all of the relevant criteria under OCGA § 36-36-20 (a) because (1) the entire annexation area has a sufficiently long border with the existing city limits; (2) the annexation area includes only whole “parcels” of land; and (3) the…”
City of Arcade v. Emmons, 486 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 2× “1 As detailed in appellees’ amended complaint, the annexations were alleged to be in violation of OCGA §§ 36-36-20, 36-36-21, and 36-36-59.”
City Council of Augusta v. Richmond Cnty., 377 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 2× “The trial court found that the City failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 36-36-20 et seq., and on September 23, 1988, declared the ordinance null, void and of no force or effect.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.