Annexation not improper.

- Strip of land excepted from annexation by a city was excepted not in an effort to evade the "entire parcel" requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a)(2), but to annex the property without creating an unincorporated island in violation of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-4(a); there was no showing that the landowner subdivided the property to evade the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20(a)(2), and the appellate court affirmed a trial court's refusal to enter a judgment declaring that a city's annexation was null and void, declining to reach a finding that would, in effect, have left the landowner no way of having the landowner's property annexed. Fayette County v. Steele, 268 Ga. App. 13, 601 S.E.2d 403 (2004).

County estopped to oppose annexation.

- County was estopped from challenging a city's annexation of county roads by the county's failure to oppose the annexation for 20 years. The county had approved the annexation, and the city, with the county's knowledge, maintained the roads, patrolled the roads, set speed limits, and otherwise exercised control over the roads. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009).

Annexation not ultra vires.

- City's failure to finalize the city's annexation of county roads by adopting an ordinance, preparing a survey, and filing the annexation with the Georgia Secretary of State were errors of omission, not ultra vires actions contrary to former O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-1 and36-36-2 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-20 and36-36-21) which the city had no power to take. Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 did not preclude the city from contending that the county was estopped from challenging the annexation. City of Holly Springs v. Cherokee County, 299 Ga. App. 451, 682 S.E.2d 644 (2009).

Limited applicability of section.

- Obvious purpose of this definition of "contiguous" is to explain the Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21) provision for annexing to the existing corporate limits unincorporated areas "contiguous to the existing corporate limits." This provision has no reference to any lands where the owners sign no application to annex. The law's sole purpose is to say that although a road, creek, river, interstate highway, railroad, or even other municipal property of another political subdivision passes between the lands of "A" and the corporate boundary, "A's" land is contiguous for the purpose of annexing the land when "A" signs an application therefor. City of Adel v. Georgia Power Co., 224 Ga. 232, 161 S.E.2d 297 (1968).

Cited in City of Gainesville v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 233 Ga. 77, 209 S.E.2d 637 (1974); City of Marietta v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 237 Ga. 518, 228 S.E.2d 894 (1976); Paulding County v. City of Hiram, 240 Ga. 220, 240 S.E.2d 71 (1977); City of Cartersville v. Bartow County Sch. Dist., 145 Ga. App. 129, 243 S.E.2d 293 (1978); City of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Boger, 267 Ga. 485, 480 S.E.2d 186 (1997); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014); City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017).

Property of one of owners must abut directly upon municipal boundary.

- Upon consideration of Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 2 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-36-20) in conjunction with Ga. L. 1962, p. 119, § 1 (now O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21), in order for a municipal corporation to annex property, at least one of the owners of the property to be annexed must have property which abuts directly on the municipal boundary, or which would otherwise abut directly on the municipal boundary except for the fact that the property is separated by a street, street right of way, creek, river, the right of way of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the city or some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the state. Right of way for a state-aid road which is owned by the state would qualify as lands owned by the State of Georgia. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-49.

It is necessary for owner of road to sign or consent to petition for annexation; neither the State Transportation Board nor the commissioner of transportation has authority to consent for such annexation. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-81.

Signing of petition.

- Neither State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) nor director of State Highway Department (now Commissioner of Transportation) has authority to sign petition for annexation of right of way of state-aid road as part of the corporate limits of a municipality of this state. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-217.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 53 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 63 et seq.

ALR.

- What land is contiguous or adjacent to municipality so as to be subject to annexation, 49 A.L.R.3d 589.