O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 37-3-85 (2019)

Periodic review of individualized service plan; procedure upon end of need for involuntary treatment; designation of discharge decision maker; notice of discharge or transfer to voluntary status

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Each individualized service plan for a patient receiving involuntary inpatient treatment shall be reviewed at regular intervals to determine the patient’s progress toward the stated goals and objectives of the plan and to determine whether the plan should be modified because of the patient’s present condition. These reviews should be based upon relevant progress notes in the patient’s clinical record and upon other related information; and input from the patient should be obtained and utilized where feasible. (b) Any time a patient receiving involuntary inpatient treatment is found by the chief medical officer, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, no longer to be a mentally ill person requiring involuntary inpatient treatment, the chief medical officer may: (1) Discharge the patient from involuntary outpatient or inpatient treatment, or both, subject to the conditions of Code Section 37-3-95; (2) Discharge the patient from involuntary inpatient treatment and require that the patient obtain available outpatient treatment for the remaining period the patient was to have been required to obtain inpatient treatment, as long as the patient then meets the standards for being discharged to outpatient treatment under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 37-3-81.1 and subject to the conditions of Code Section 37-3-95; or (3) Transfer the patient to voluntary status at the patient’s request, as provided in Code Section 37-3-24.

(c) The chief medical officer may designate in writing another physician, who may be the attending physician, to make these discharge decisions. If the decision of the designee is contrary to the recommendations of the treatment team, the issue must go to the chief medical officer for final determination. Where the treatment team and the designee concur, the decision of the designee will be final. (d) Notice of the discharge or the transfer of status shall be given to the patient and his representatives; if the patient’s hospitalization was authorized by order of a court, to the court which entered such order; and, if the patient was under criminal charges of which the facility received written notification, by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the law enforcement agency originally having custody of the patient.

History

Ga. L. 1874, p. 91, § 1; Code 1882, § 1344a; Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 61, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 1416; Civil Code 1910, § 1578; Ga. L. 1931, p. 7, § 41; Code 1933, § 35-206; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 308, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1958, p. 697, § 11; Ga. L. 1960, p. 837, § 11; Code 1933, § 88-511, enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 499, § 1; Code 1933, § 88-506.7, enacted by Ga. L. 1969, p. 505, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p.

1293, § 10; Code 1933, § 88-506.6, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1789, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 1098, § 4; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1059, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Determination that a patient met former Code 1933, § 88-506.2 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-80) criteria was not an adjudication that the patient was mentally competent at the time of the trial of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against the patient, and rightly comprehends the patient’s own condition in reference to such proceedings, and is capable of rendering the patient’s attorneys such assistance as a proper defense to the indictment preferred against the patient demands. Rather, one who was previously adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, is entitled to have the issue of present competency determined prior to standing trial. Gibbs v. State, 235 Ga. 480, 220 S.E.2d 254 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 924, 96 S. Ct. 1134, 47 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1976).

Presumption of sanity raised by administrative release. - Assuming that previous commitment as ‘‘a mentally ill person and in need of hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital’’ raised a counter presumption to the rebuttable presumption of ‘‘sound mind and discretion,’’ the administrative release from hospitalization cancelled any previously existing presumption of insanity, leaving a presumption of sanity, which was rebuttable. Hodges v. State, 257 Ga. 818, 364 S.E.2d 275 (1988). Cited in Brackett v. State, 227 Ga. 493, 181 S.E.2d 380 (1971); Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501, 220 S.E.2d 262 (1975); Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 223 S.E.2d 803 (1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Necessity and sufficiency of statements informing one under investigation for involuntary commitment of right to remain silent, 23 A.L.R.4th 563.

Right to notice and hearing prior to revocation of conditional release status of mental patient, 29 A.L.R.4th 394.

PART 4 INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT CARE

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1984–1989 · leading case: Butler v. State, 311 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 1984).

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Butler v. State, 311 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 4× “We now hold that an order of the Probate Court finding one a "mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment," OCGA § 37-3-1 (12) (Code Ann. § *138 88-501), cancels a previously existing presumption of sanity and raises a presumption of insanity.”

Salter v. State, 356 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 2× “, his administrative release from hospitalization under OCGA § 37-3-85 cancelled any previously existing presumption of insanity, leaving a presumption of sanity, which, of course, was rebuttable.”

Ruff v. Cent. State Hosp., 385 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “from the date of this order, subject to the power of the chief medical officer to discharge the patient at any time under the power of OCGA § 37-3-85 (b).” The appellant thereupon filed an appeal to the superior court, which, following a de novo hearing, issued a final order on…”

Newman v. State, 369 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “7 is located at OCGA § 37-3-85. 4 Gilbert, supra, 235 Ga.”

Hodges v. State, 364 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. 1988). · cites it 2× “previous commitment as ‘a mentally ill person and in need of hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital’ raised a counter presumption to the rebuttable presumption of ‘sound mind and discretion,’ Butler v.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.