O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell any motor vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1954, including any motorcycle or motor driven cycle manufactured after January 1, 1954, in this state or for any person to drive such vehicle on the highways unless it is equipped with at least one brake light meeting the requirements of Code Section (b) If a motor vehicle is manufactured with two brake lights, both must be operational. (c) No person shall sell or offer for sale or operate on the highways any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer registered in this state and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1954, unless it is equipped with mechanical or electrical turn signals meeting the requirements of Code Section 40-8-26. This subsection shall not apply to any motorcycle or motor driven cycle manufactured prior to January 1, 1972.
History
(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 108; Code 1933, § 68E-206, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 4; Code 1981, § 40-8-25, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 10.)
Annotations
Cross references. - Provisions regarding turn signals as required equipment on vehicles, § 40-6-124. Code Commission notes. - Pursuant
to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, ‘‘motor driven’’ was substituted for ‘‘motor-driven’’ in subsections (a) and (c).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Violation as basis for traffic stop. - Conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) was affirmed.
District court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress since the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by a traffic stop as: (1) the stop was not pretextual since the defendant was in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25(b); (2) only 15-17 minutes elapsed between the initial stop and the defendant’s arrest; (3) the district court did not err in finding that the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle and that the search did not exceed the scope of permission given; and (4) to the extent that the defendant argued that the dog sniff was illegal because the traffic stop was illegal, that argument failed because the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to stop the defendant’s car. United States v. Terry, 220 Fed. Appx. 961 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (Unpublished). Mistaken belief of officer regarding violation does not invalidate stop. - Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because, even if the officer was mistaken in the belief that
the center light was a brake light and that all brake lights had to be illuminated under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25, the officer’s reasonable belief that an offense had been committed as the center light was not illuminated, though the officer might have been mistaken either as to fact or law, was a sufficient founding suspicion to enable the trial court to determine that the stop was not mere arbitrariness or harassment, which was the real question; furthermore, the trial court’s reasoning that a crime had to have been committed for the stop to have been valid was improper. State v. Cartwright, 329 Ga. App. 154, 764 S.E.2d 175 (2014). Cited in Williams v. Herr, 112 Ga. App. 529, 145 S.E.2d 639 (1965); Thomson Whsle. Grocery Co. v. Merritt, 116 Ga. App. 764, 159 S.E.2d 107 (1967); Lancaster v. State, 261 Ga. App. 348, 582 S.E.2d 513 (2003).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 201, 205. C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S, Motor Vehicles, § 43
et seq. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 625 et seq. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1639, 1640.
Notes of Decisions
The State v. Cartwright, 764 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 16× “It contends that the trial court erred in finding that OCGA § 40-8-25 (b) did not apply to a nonfunctioning center brake light.”
Abercrombie v. The State., 808 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “Abercrombie argues in a separate enumeration of error that the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the suppression hearing by neglecting to show that his truck was originally equipped by the manufacturer with an interior rearview mirror.”
Lancaster v. State, 582 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 8× “He argues that under OCGA § 40-8-25 only two brake lights must be functioning while driving on the highway and that at the time he was stopped at least two of the three brake lights on his BMW were functioning.”
Dixon v. State, 609 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “6 OCGA § 40-8-25. 7 See Nelson v. State, 224 Ga.”
Hamlett v. State, 746 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “The jury also found Jalim Hamlett guilty of two misdemeanor traffic offenses: improper tag display, OCGA § 40-2-41, and failure to have operational brake lights, OCGA § 40-8-25 (a), (b). The trial court denied their motions for new trial, and the Hamletts have appealed.”
Carlton Reid v. Henry Cnty., Georgia, 568 F. App'x 745 (11th Cir. 2014).
“Although Officer Slaton did not base the traffic stop on a non-working turn signal, his discovery after the stop that Reid’s turn signal was not working, a violation of O.”
Morris v. the State, 769 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “Following a jury trial, Johnny David Morris was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”) less safe (OCGA § 40-6-391), driving too fast for conditions (OCGA § 40-6-180), failing to use brake lights (OCGA § 40-8-25), failing to use headlights (OCGA § 40-8-22), and a window…”
Stubbs v. State, 387 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 40-8-25 requires that all motor vehicles manufactured after 1954 be equipped with mechanical or electrical turn signals.”
United States v. Bennie Devon Terry, 220 F. App'x 961 (11th Cir. 2007).
“” O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25(b). At the suppression hearing, Deputy Greer Smith, an officer with the sheriffs department in Lamar County, Georgia, testified that he, along with Deputy Shannon Williamson and a canine trained to detect narcotics stopped Terry because he observed the…”
White v. State, 732 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “The argument made here that OCGA § 40-8-25 only requires two brake lights to be functioning was not made below and will not be considered here for the first time.”
Zione White v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “The argument made here that OCGA § 40-8-25 only requires two brake lights to be functioning was not 3 White also testified, however, that he did not say anything when Jones opened his trunk “because I gave consent to search and I felt like it was nothing I could really do, you…”
— 40-8-25(b) — 1 case
United States v. Bennie Devon Terry, 220 F. App'x 961 (11th Cir. 2007).
“” O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25(b). At the suppression hearing, Deputy Greer Smith, an officer with the sheriffs department in Lamar County, Georgia, testified that he, along with Deputy Shannon Williamson and a canine trained to detect narcotics stopped Terry because he observed the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.