O.C.G.A. § 41-2-12 (2019)
The clerk of superior court shall record and index such certified copy of the order in the deed records of the county and enter the lien on the general execution docket. The lien shall be superior to
all other liens on the property, except liens for taxes to which the lien shall be inferior, and shall continue in force until paid.
(2) Upon final determination of costs, fees, and expenses incurred in accordance with this chapter, the public officer responsible for enforcement actions in accordance with this chapter shall transmit to the appropriate county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer a statement of the total amount due and secured by said lien, together with copies of all notices provided to interested parties. The statement of the public officer shall be transmitted within 90 days of completion of the repairs, demolition, or closure. It shall be the duty of the appropriate county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer, who is responsible or whose duties include the collection of municipal taxes, to collect the amount of the lien using all methods available for collecting real property ad valorem taxes, including specifically Chapter 4 of Title 48; provided, however, that the limitation of Code Section 48-4-78 which requires 12 months of delinquency before commencing a tax foreclosure shall not apply. A county tax commissioner shall collect and enforce municipal liens imposed pursuant to this chapter in accordance with Code Section 48-5-359.1. The county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer shall remit the amount collected to the governing authority of the county or municipality whose lien is being collected.
(3) Enforcement of liens pursuant to this Code section may be initiated at any time following receipt by the county tax commissioner or municipal tax collector or city revenue officer of the final determination of costs in accordance with this chapter. The unpaid lien amount shall bear interest and penalties from and after the date of final determination of costs in the same amount as applicable to interest and penalties on unpaid real property ad valorem taxes. An enforcement proceeding pursuant to Code Section 48-4-78 for delinquent ad valorem taxes may include all amounts due under this chapter.
(4) The redemption amount in any enforcement proceeding pursuant to this Code section shall be the full amount of the costs as finally determined in accordance with this Code section together with interest, penalties, and costs incurred by the governing authority, county tax commissioner, municipal tax collector, or city revenue officer in the enforcement of such lien. Redemption of property from the lien may be made in accordance with the provisions of Code Sections 48-4-80 and 48-4-81.
(c) The governing authority may waive and release any such lien imposed on property upon the owner of such property entering into a contract with the county or municipality agreeing to a timetable for rehabilitation of the real property or the dwelling, building, or structure on the property and demonstrating the financial means to accomplish such rehabilitation.
(d) Where the abatement action does not commence in the superior court, review of a court order requiring the repair, alteration, improvement, or demolition of a dwelling, building, or structure shall be a de novo proceeding in the superior court under Code Sections 5-3-4 and
(e) In addition to the procedures and remedies in this chapter, a governing authority may provide by ordinance that designated public officers may issue citations for violations of state minimum standard codes, optional building, fire, life safety, and other codes adopted by ordinance, and conditions creating a public health hazard or general nuisance, and seek to enforce such citations in a court of competent jurisdiction prior to issuing a complaint in rem as provided in this Code section.
(f) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to impair or limit in any way the power of the county or municipality to define and declare nuisances and to cause their removal or abatement by summary proceedings or otherwise.
History
Code 1981, § 41-2-9, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 45; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 30; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 41; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 14, § 41; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1161, § 3; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1347, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 41; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1196, § 3; Ga. L. 2004, p. 907, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 41/HB 95; Ga. L. 2022, p. 767, § 2-32/HB 916. The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2023, in subsection (d), substituted “a de novo proceeding in” for “by direct appeal to” and “Code Sections 5-3-4 and 5-3-5” for “Code Section 5-3-29” at the end. See Editor’s notes for applicability.
Annotations
Code Commission notes. Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, “and” was added at the end of paragraph (a)(6). Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2022, p. 767, § 3-1/HB 916, not codified by the General Assembly, makes this Code section applicable to petitions for review filed in superior or state court on or after July 1, 2023. Law reviews. For note on 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 284 (1989).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS County’s recovery of compensatory damages not authorized. - When a county recovered, identified, and properly disposed of bodies found at a crematorium, O.C.G.A. §§ 31-5-10(d) and 41-29(a)(7) did not authorize the county to recover the county’s costs of doing so as compensatory damages in a tort action
against the crematorium, funeral homes, and funeral directors alleging negligence and public nuisance; O.C.G.A. §§ 31-5-10 and 41-2-9 do not authorize a county to obtain compensatory damages in a tort action as a means of redress for abating a public nuisance. Walker County v. TriState Crematory, 284 Ga. App. 34, 643
S.E.2d 324, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 249 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1025, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 459 (Ga. June 4, 2007). Construction with § 41-2-17. - It was error to hold, based on O.C.G.A. § 412-17, that landowners were not entitled under O.C.G.A. § 41-2-9(d) to directly appeal from a municipal court’s demolition order because the city’s nuisance ordinance predated § 41-2-9(a). Section 41-29(d) was a specific statute, thereby prevailing over the general statute, § 41-217, and as § 41-2-9(d) was unambiguous, the court would not read any limitation onto the statute’s plain meaning. Yasmine’s Entm’t Hall v. City of Marietta, 292 Ga. App. 114, 663 S.E.2d 741, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 633 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1791, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 929 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2008).
Tax foreclosure sale. - Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the county as the nuisance abatement statute did not preclude the county from using a nonjudicial tax foreclosure sale, instead of a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale, to sell the property because both methods were available for collecting real property ad valorem taxes; judicial in rem tax foreclosure procedures were an alternative to nonjudicial tax foreclosure procedures, rather than a replacement for them; and the nuisance abatement statute did not require the county to use a judicial in rem tax foreclosure sale when collecting on a nuisance abatement lien. Derby Props., LLC v. Watson, 346 Ga. App. 631, 816 S.E.2d 766, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (2018).