O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 46-8-125 (2019)

Change of general direction and route of railroad

✓ O.C.G.A.: 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 2006, p. 699, § 3/SB 285, effective July 1, 2006.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Relocation not allowed after road constructed and put in operation. - Former Civil Code 1895, § 2171 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-115) did not authorize a railroad company which obtained its charter from the Secretary of State under the general law for the incorporation of railroads, after having located, constructed, and put in operation its road, at its mere volition to tear up such road, or a section thereof nineteen miles in length, and relocate the same at a different place; nor was such authority conferred although the portion of the road sought to be taken up and relocated lied outside the limits of a town or city. Brown v. Atlantic & B. Ry., 126 Ga. 248, 55 S.E. 24, 7 Ann. Cas. 1026 (1906). Exercise of discretion exhausts power of choice. - Where a railroad company to which has been given the power to choose its particular route between designated termini has exercised its discretion in this regard, its power of choice is exhausted, and it can not subsequently change its location without express legislative authority. Brown v. Atlantic & B. Ry., 126 Ga. 248, 55 S.E. 24, 7 Ann. Cas. 1026 (1906). Discretion allowed where charter provides for road to run in easterly direction. - Where the charter of a railroad company fixes one of its termini at a station some

distance outside of the corporate limits of a city, and described the road to be located as running easterly to a point at or near the center of the city, but in fact a line run due east would not enter the city at all, the corporation has a discretion to locate the other terminus at a point within the city, at or near its center; and where a line was located from the initial point to the terminus so fixed, running in a general southeasterly direction, this was not a violation of the charter, nor a change of direction under former Civil Code 1895, § 2171 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-125). Bridwell v. Gate City Term. Co., 127 Ga. 520, 56 S.E. 624, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 909 (1907). Amendment of charter under § 46-8-54 does not require two-thirds vote. - Requirement of former Civil Code 1895, § 2171 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-125) as to two-thirds vote had no application to amendment of charter under former Civil Code 1895, § 2178 see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-54). Alexander v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 108 Ga. 151, 33 S.E. 866 (1899). Municipal authority to change location of railroad track. - Provisions of ordinances are sufficient to express municipal authority to change location of track and employ same in the operation of railroad. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 166 Ga. 310, 143 S.E. 506 (1928).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Rules and regulations as to track relocation by railroad. - It was intention of General Assembly in enactment of former Code 1933, § 94-309 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-8-125) to set down certain rules and regulations as to

how railroad might relocate its tracks. 1950-51 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 206. Special legislative act required for railroad company to change main track location. - Under former Code 1933, § 94-309 (see

O.C.G.A. § 46-8-125) the only way railroad company can change location of its main

tracks was through special legislative act. 1950-51 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 206.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Railroads, § 110 et seq. C.J.S. - 74 C.J.S., Railroads, § 133 et seq. ALR. - Right of railroad company to discontinue or reduce service on branch line or part of road which is unprofitable, 123 ALR 922. Condemnation of premises or part thereof as affecting rights of landlord and tenant inter se, 163 ALR 679. Condemner’s waiver, surrender, or limitation, after award, of right or part of property acquired by condemnation, 5 ALR2d 724. Compensation for, or extent of rights acquired by, taking of land, as affected by condemner’s promissory statements as to character of use or undertakings to be performed by it, 7 ALR2d 364. Spur track and the like as constituting a use for which railroad can validly exercise right of eminent domain, 35 ALR2d 1326. Admissibility, in eminent domain proceed-

ing, of evidence as to price paid for condemned real property during pendency of the proceeding, 55 ALR2d 781. Admissibility, in eminent domain proceeding, of evidence as to price paid for condemned real property on sale prior to the proceeding, 55 ALR2d 791. Right of adjoining landowners to intervene in condemnation proceedings on ground that they might suffer consequential damage, 61 ALR2d 1292. What constitutes abandonment of a railroad right of way, 95 ALR2d 468. Eminent domain: recovery of value of improvements made with knowledge of impending condemnation, 98 ALR3d 504. State statute of limitations applicable to inverse condemnation or similar proceedings by landowner to obtain compensation for direct appropriation of land without the institution or conclusion of formal proceedings against specific owner, 26 ALR4th 68.