O.C.G.A.

50-13A-17 (2019)

Procedure and designation of appealing courts

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this Code section, the term ‘‘reviewing court’’ means the Superior Court of Fulton County. (b) Any party may appeal a final judgment of the tribunal, except for judgments of the small claims division, to the reviewing court. Proceedings for judicial review shall be instituted by filing a petition with the reviewing court within 30 days after the service of the tribunal’s final

judgment or, if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the decision thereon. Copies of the petition for judicial review shall be served upon the tribunal and all parties of record. The petition shall state the nature of the petitioner’s interest, the fact showing that the petitioner is aggrieved by the judgment, and the grounds as specified in subsection (g) of this Code section upon which the petitioner contends that the judgment should be reversed or modified. The petition for judicial review may be amended by leave of the reviewing court. (c) Notwithstanding any provisions of law or tribunal rule with respect to motions for rehearing or reconsideration after a final tribunal judgment or interlocutory order, the filing of such a motion shall not be a prerequisite to the filing of any action for judicial review or relief; provided, however, that no objection to any order or judgment of the tribunal shall be considered by the reviewing court upon petition for review unless such objection has been heard by the tribunal. (d) Within 30 days after the service of the petition for judicial review or within further time allowed by the reviewing court, the tribunal shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings, the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the reviewing court for the additional costs. The reviewing court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record. (e) If, before the date set for hearing in the reviewing court, application is made to the reviewing court for leave to present additional evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of the reviewing court that the additional evidence is material and there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the tribunal, the reviewing court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the tribunal upon conditions determined by the reviewing court. A tribunal judge may modify his or her findings and judgment by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or judgments with the reviewing court. (f ) The hearing or a petition for judicial review shall be conducted by the reviewing court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the tribunal not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the reviewing court. The reviewing court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs. The reviewing court shall affirm, reverse, or modify the tribunal’s judgment or remand the case for further proceedings within 90 days of the filing of the last such written brief. (g) The reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the tribunal’s as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The

reviewing court may affirm the tribunal’s judgment or remand the case for further proceedings. The reviewing court may reverse or modify the judgment if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the tribunal judge’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or judgments are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the tribunal; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. (h) An aggrieved party may seek a review of any final judgment of the reviewing court by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided by law.

History

Code 1981, § 50-13A-17, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 318, § 15/HB 100.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 2016–2025 · leading case: Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 2017).
Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 50-13A-17 (b). And as we have held, sovereign immunity is no bar to petitions for writs of mandamus.”
Inglett & Stubbs Int'l, Ltd. v. Riley, 791 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 6× “Pursuant to OCGA § 50-13A-17, any party may appeal a final decision of the Tax Tribunal to the Superior Court of Fulton County 3 The superior court defers to the Tribunal’s factual findings, but may reverse or modify the judgment if substantial rights of the petitioner have been…”
Funvestment Grp., LLC v. Robyn A. Crittenden, in Her Off. Capacity as Comm'r of the Georgia Dep't of Revenue (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 16× “3 Pursuant to OCGA § 50-13A-17,4 the Department sought judicial review by the Fulton County Superior Court.”
T-Mobile South, LLC v. Robyn A. Crittenden, in Her Off. Capacity as Comm'r of the Georgia Dep't of Revenue (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 8× “Pursuant to OCGA § 50-13A-17, any party may appeal a final decision of the Tax Tribunal to the Superior Court of Fulton County.”
Inglett & Stubbs Int'l, Ltd. v. Lynnette T. Riley, Comm'r of Georgia Dep't of Revenue (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 6× “Pursuant to OCGA § 50-13A-17, any party may appeal a final decision of the Tax Tribunal to the Superior Court of Fulton County.”
Exec. Limousine Transp., Inc. v. David Curry, in His Off. Capacity as Revenue Comm'r of the Georgia Dep't of Revenue (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4× “urt defers to the Tribunal’s factual findings, but may reverse or modify the judgment if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the Tribunal’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or judgments are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory…”
Uber Tech., Inc. v. Frank M. O'connell, in His Off. Capacity as Revenue Comm'r of the State of Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 50-13A-17 (a), (b). When reviewing an appeal from the Tax Tribunal, the superior court defers to the tribunal’s factual findings and “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the tribunal’s as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
Lathrop v. Deal, Governor (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 50-13A-17 (b). And as we have held, sovereign immunity is no bar to petitions for writs of mandamus.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.