Editor's note.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 51, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Construction.

- Superior and state courts did not err in entering nearly identical orders which held that because O.C.G.A. § 51-14-1 et seq. required asbestos plaintiffs to provide proof that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor in their medical condition, it unconstitutionally affected an employee's substantive rights by establishing a new element which did not exist when the original cause of action accrued and, hence, could not be applied retrospectively; moreover, because these requirements and limitations were the heart of the statute, their severance would result in a statute that failed to correspond to the main legislative purpose, or give effect to that purpose. DaimlerChrysler v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006)(decided under former O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 51).

Cited in Butler v. Union Carbide Corp., 310 Ga. App. 21, 712 S.E.2d 537 (2011).