Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IX and antecedent provisions, specifying the method by which intention to introduce local legislation was to be advertised, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Notice of intent to introduce legislation to continue the effectiveness of a 1952 constitutional amendment allowing the establishment of a joint board of tax assessors in a population category applying only to Fulton County and the City of Atlanta was sufficient, notwithstanding that the notice did not specifically refer to either Fulton County or the City of Atlanta. Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 408 S.E.2d 788 (1991).

Purpose of paragraph.

- One of the purposes of this paragraph is to prevent local and special laws which affect only a particular locality, such as a county or municipality, from becoming laws unless notice of intention to introduce such bills be given during a specified time preceding their introduction in the General Assembly by newspaper advertisement published in the locality affected, with the object of preventing duties and obligations from being imposed on local governments without giving those in charge of such governments an opportunity to oppose their passage. Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43, 142 S.E.2d 804 (1965); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Purpose of advertisement is to protect against surprise legislation.

- The purpose of the advertisement under this paragraph as to local legislation is "to protect the people against covert or surprise legislation." Brown v. Clower, 225 Ga. 165, 166 S.E.2d 363 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Cannot restrain power to create or abolish charters of municipal corporations.

- This paragraph may not be extended by implication to place restraint upon power of General Assembly to create or abolish charters of municipal corporations, either by local or general law, since municipalities are creatures of the legislature, and their existence may be established, altered, amended, enlarged, or diminished, or utterly abolished by the legislature. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Paragraph as test of whether bill is special.

- A decisive proof that laws are not local or special within the meaning of the Constitution is, that by this paragraph every local or special bill has to be advertised beforehand in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated. Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S.E. 1018 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Acts which affect only certain counties are local and special Acts. Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43, 142 S.E.2d 804 (1965).

Standing to challenge constitutionality of Act.

- Parties as citizens and taxpayers are entitled to challenge the constitutionality under this paragraph of an Act purporting to incorporate town. Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Creation of board of county commissioners not unconstitutional infringement on power of ordinary (now judge of the probate court).

- Since the General Assembly has constitutional authority to create a board of county commissioners, and since the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) is given jurisdiction over county matters only when such a board has not been created, a contention that an Act creating such a board unconstitutionally infringes upon and restricts the power and authority of an ordinary (now judge of the probate court) is without merit. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Authority of General Assembly to prescribe powers of ordinary (now judge of the probate court) over county affairs necessarily includes authority to increase or diminish such powers. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Changing commission form of government not violation of paragraph.

- Act replacing one county commissioner with three member board of commissioners, and keeping the incumbent commissioner as member of board, did not abolish the office of the commissioner in violation of this paragraph. Webb v. Echols, 211 Ga. 724, 88 S.E.2d 625 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

To abolish office means to abrogate, annihilate, destroy, extinguish, or put an end to it. Webb v. Echols, 211 Ga. 724, 88 S.E.2d 625 (1955).

General Assembly may not provide for initial appointment of new county commissioners.

- This paragraph requires new members of the board of commissioners of a county to be elected, and it is not constitutionally permissible for the General Assembly to provide for the initial appointment of additional commissioners pending a subsequent election. Lance v. Stepp, 232 Ga. 675, 208 S.E.2d 559 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Recall of county officeholder provided for under special Act does not abolish or modify term of office but merely creates a vacancy in the office and such a recall procedure does not abolish, shorten, or lengthen the term of office. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).

Paragraph not violated when office and court of justice of the peace abolished at end of term of such officer, at which time the magistrate's court will operate in lieu of the justice court. Burpee v. Logan, 216 Ga. 434, 117 S.E.2d 339 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Former third sentence of this paragraph not violated by Act which classed judge as "junior," because the Act does not change the office held, the duties thereof, or the term. Mulling v. Houlihan, 205 Ga. 735, 55 S.E.2d 150 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948, 70 S. Ct. 486, 94 L. Ed. 585 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Advertisement required.

- Under this paragraph, the absence of the required proof of advertisement prevents an Act from becoming a law. It follows that a referendum approving the Act is unlawful, and the result of the unlawful referendum is likewise unlawful. Smith v. City Council, 203 Ga. 511, 47 S.E.2d 582 (1948) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Notice as proven becomes integral part of bill itself and as such must be embodied within the enrollment of such bill. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947).

Inclusion of proof of notice imputes absolute verity as to contents.

- When the enrollment of any local or special bill has incorporated therein the required proof of notice, and after it has been properly signed and filed with the Secretary of State, it will not only impute absolute verity as to its contents, but it will also conclusively show upon its face its validity with respect to this paragraph; whereas, if such enrollment fails to show the required proof of notice, it is upon its face invalid. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947); Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951); Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

No presumption or evidence allowed to speak in lieu of contents of enrolled Act.

- It is the manifest intention of the first two paragraphs of this section that the bill finally enrolled as the statute shall speak for itself, and that no presumption and no sort of evidence shall be allowed to speak in lieu of what the enrolled Act says for itself; this clear manifestation of intent can not be defeated by mere punctuations that might appear therein. Smith v. McMichael, 203 Ga. 74, 45 S.E.2d 431 (1947); Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969), commented on in 10 Ga. B.J. 227 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

For decisions holding that presumption of proper notice is operative, see Speer v. Mayor of Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 11 S.E. 802 (1890); Peed v. McCrary, 94 Ga. 487, 21 S.E. 232 (1894); Fullington v. Williams, 98 Ga. 807, 27 S.E. 183 (1896); Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266, 41 S.E. 691 (1902); Lee v. Tucker, 130 Ga. 43, 60 S.E. 164 (1908).

No particular form of affidavit required.

- An affidavit of publication of notice of intention to introduce a local Act into the General Assembly is essential to its validity. It certifies that the local people are notified of the proposed legislation as required by law. However, no particular form of affidavit is required. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979).

Example of affidavit meeting requirements of paragraph.

- An affidavit showing publication in the newspaper in which sheriff's advertisements for the locality affected, were published once a week for three weeks during a period of 60 days immediately preceding its introduction into the General Assembly "as provided by law," satisfies the requirements of this paragraph. City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 902, 99 S. Ct. 1205, 59 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Enrolled copy of bill providing for trial by jury of six fails to show compliance with this paragraph, so it can never become law. Smith v. Clayton, 80 Ga. App. 21, 55 S.E.2d 171 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Act relating to management of county school system failed to show proof of notice, and is therefore void. Nickles v. County Bd. of Educ., 203 Ga. 755, 48 S.E.2d 546 (1948).

Act amending town charter violates this paragraph. Bergman v. Dutton, 203 Ga. 672, 48 S.E.2d 101 (1948) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Paragraph does not require more information than in caption of bill.

- Under reasonable rules of construction, this paragraph does not require more information as to the law to be enacted than would be required in the caption of the bill itself. Walker Elec. Co. v. Walton, 203 Ga. 246, 46 S.E.2d 184 (1948); Swiney v. City of Forest Park, 211 Ga. 154, 84 S.E.2d 573 (1954); Parker v. Mayor of Savannah, 216 Ga. 210, 115 S.E.2d 555 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Paragraph requires only general notice.

- This paragraph does not require specificity in the notice, but requires only a general notice sufficient to put the public on notice that legislation affecting a particular subject will be introduced. Cain v. Lumpkin County, 229 Ga. 274, 190 S.E.2d 910 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Sufficient notice found.

- Where the corporate limits of a municipality include portions of two counties, and the notice of intention to apply for passage of a local bill is published as required by law in the newspaper in which the sheriff's advertisements for the county of the legal situs of the municipality are published, and the local act in its enrolled form contains proof of such publication in the county of the legal situs of the municipality, this is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. XIV of the Constitution of 1945. Robertson v. Temple, 207 Ga. 311, 61 S.E.2d 285 (1950).

Omission of material provision violates paragraph.

- Where the notice of intention to apply for local legislation specifically details the matters to be included in the Act, but omits a material provision of the proposed Act, the notice does not meet the requirements of this paragraph. DeKalb County v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 228 Ga. 512, 186 S.E.2d 732 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Mention of specific matters excludes foreign subjects.

- Specificity of subject matter in the notice is not required by this paragraph; however, once specific matters are mentioned in the notice, matters foreign to those subjects may not constitutionally appear in the bill. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Not necessary to specify state or legislative body of introduction of bill.

- Contention that notice is insufficient under this paragraph because it does not say in what General Assembly of what state a bill is to be introduced, or that a bill is to be introduced in any legislative forum, is without merit. Swiney v. City of Forest Park, 211 Ga. 154, 84 S.E.2d 573 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Title of Act to amend charter sufficiently broad to include any change.

- Where the title of an Act expressly declares that its purpose is to amend the charter of a city, this is clearly broad enough to refer to any change made in the charter in the body of the act. Parker v. Mayor of Savannah, 216 Ga. 210, 115 S.E.2d 555 (1960).

Use of words sufficient to include enlargement of city limits.

- The words "to define said limits of said city", as used in notice of legislation, are sufficiently broad to include the extension or enlargement of the corporate limits. Swiney v. City of Forest Park, 211 Ga. 154, 84 S.E.2d 573 (1954).

Advertisement which appears on January 1, a legal holiday, is valid. Parker v. Mayor of Savannah, 216 Ga. 210, 115 S.E.2d 555 (1960).

This paragraph is not complied with when one of the publications is on a Sunday for the reason that where the law requires publication of a notice as a condition precedent to the doing of some act, its publication on a Sunday is not legal and amounts to no publication at all. Gay v. Laurens County, 213 Ga. 518, 100 S.E.2d 271 (1957), commented on in 20 Ga. B.J. 535 (1958)(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Personal notice of proposed annexation is not required under this paragraph, although notice by publication is required. Ballentine v. Willingham, 237 Ga. 60, 226 S.E.2d 593, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 909, 97 S. Ct. 298, 50 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IX).

Bill cannot be introduced during third week of publication.

- This paragraph requires that the notice be published at least once a week during three separate weeks, and the first publication must not be more than 60 days before the bill is introduced, and the local bill cannot be introduced during the week embraced in the third publication. Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. IX and antecedent provisions, which specified the method by which intention to introduce local legislation was to be advertised, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Legal requirements for publication of notice.

- For discussion of the various legal requirements concerning the publication of advertisements of notices of intention to introduce local legislation, see 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 376.

Local Act which does not contain any evidence of publication is unconstitutional and void, and the courts will look to the enrolled Act to see whether it was duly published. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 4.

Notice must put citizens on notice of general nature of legislation.

- The notice of intention to apply for local legislation must be sufficient to put the citizens on notice as to the general nature of the proposed legislation. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 3.

Copy of notice must be attached to bill.

- Evidence that the caption of the bill has been advertised need not be set out in the body of the bill, but a copy of the notice which has been certified by the publisher or an affidavit of the author to the effect that the notice has been published must be attached to the bill. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 23.

Newspaper must cover entire judicial circuit area.

- If one newspaper does not cover the entire area included in the judicial circuit, the required notice must be run in as many newspapers as necessary so as to cover the entire area included in the judicial circuit affected by the local legislation. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-453.

Any bill passed without notice required by this paragraph being attached is unconstitutional and void. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 37.

When local bill is rendered unconstitutional by failure to show publication, new notice of intent to introduce must be published. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 24.

This section applies only to local bills and does not apply to general legislation. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 178.

Proposed local constitutional amendment need not be published in accordance with this paragraph. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-117.

Since city court involves local or special law, provisions of this section are applicable with respect to its abolition. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 46.

Referendum must be held to abolish city court before all terms of office expire.

- The proper means of abolishing a city court would be by a local Act, duly advertised, repealing the Act creating said court, and if such Act were to take effect immediately, or any time before the date on which all terms of office of the court officials expire, such Act, to be constitutional, would have to require that a referendum be held. If the Act should provide that it would not take effect until the expiration of the terms of office of the present officeholders a referendum is not necessary. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 46.

For opinion that Act creating city court is a general law, see 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 74.

History of naming officials to hold commission office.

- If referendum is held under this paragraph, one-man commission abolished, and completely new commission established, situation exists where General Assembly has in past named individuals who will fill new offices. The only objection which could be made would be that it would be against public policy to name individuals to hold office for a long term without an election. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 36.

Time between publication and introduction.

- As long as there is no more than 60 days between first publication and introduction of bill, which introduction must of course be after third publication, then it will comply with this paragraph. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 23.

This paragraph does not mean that a bill must be advertised 60 days before its introduction; therefore a bill may be advertised any time during a period of 60 days before it is introduced in the General Assembly. For example, a bill could be advertised on December fourteenth, twenty-first and twenty-eighth and introduced any time during the month of January or the first part of February, so long as the introduction comes within the period of 60 days. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 24.

Appointive office.

- Since the third sentence limits its application to elected officials, the General Assembly may enact legislation which has the effect of shortening the term of appointed small claims court judge without necessity of a referendum approving the legislation. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U82-13.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 30 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 18 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutional provisions against special legislation relating to counties or municipalities as affected by the distinction between their political and nonpolitical character, 50 A.L.R. 1163.