"Maintain" construed.

- Word "maintain" as used in this paragraph does not constitute a constitutional prohibition upon the growth of municipal school systems. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Prohibition on "establishment" is prohibition on "creation."

- Prohibition on "establishment" of new independent school systems is a prohibition on their "creation." Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Territorial expansion of existing city school system by annexation of territory into corporate limits of city is not "creation" or "establishment" of independent school system in contravention of this paragraph. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Construction of paragraph.

- The provision in this paragraph that authority was granted to counties to establish and maintain public schools within their limits, and that each county, exclusive of any independent school system now in existence in a county would be confined to the control and management of a county board of education amounted to complete constitutional vesting of authority to manage and control county schools in the county board of education. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Paragraph does not prescribe exclusive method by which school systems can be merged, but merely establishes procedure by which two school districts or any portions thereof can be combined to create a new entity, an area school district, which is separate and distinct from either of merged school districts. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Annexation by municipality also extends city school system limits.

- Absent expression of legislative intent clearly to the contrary or a valid agreement between school systems involved, annexation of territory into corporate limits of municipality operating independent school system also extends limits of city school system, so that limits of city school district remain coterminous with city's corporate limits. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Intent.

- This provision of the Constitution was intended to do only one thing insofar as independent school systems were concerned, and that was to prohibit the creation of independent systems after adoption of the Constitution, and to preserve those in existence until consolidated or merged as provided by law. Bailey v. County Bd. of Educ., 213 Ga. 308, 99 S.E.2d 124 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Immunity.

- School district, as established by Georgia law, was not an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Lightfoot v. Henry County Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2014).

Control and management of public schools is in the county boards of education, and will not be interfered with by the courts except in cases where that control and management is contrary to law. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Other than independent school systems existing in 1945. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Local school board power limited.

- Local school boards, existing only by virtue of the state Constitution, must be restricted to those powers either expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute, since their composition and function are extensively regulated by the state. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

In its control and management of schools, the county board of education has broad discretionary powers. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Effect of board's broad powers.

- Since a county board of education has complete control and management of the schools in the county and is empowered to reorganize them and fix the number of grades to be taught in each, action taken by it with respect thereto is not void and of no legal effect, though it may be erroneous. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Board and School Superintendent authority to contract for employment of teachers settled.

- The right and power of the county boards of education and the county superintendents of education to operate the schools of the counties and to make contracts of employment with teachers is settled by the Constitution and laws of this state, as construed by this court. Jones v. Ellis, 182 Ga. 380, 185 S.E. 510 (1936).

It is the board of education and not a court which is empowered by law to manage a county school system, and it is their duty to hire and fire teachers as necessary. To this end, the law grants the board and its Superintendent broad discretion. The orderly operation of the schools depends upon their expertise and not upon whatever skills a judge may possess in the area of school administration. The board's discretion, though, is not unbounded. Standards which they use in the evaluation of prospective teachers must be reasonably related to teaching competency and effectiveness. Their standards must be applied in a uniform fashion so that no group of prospective teachers is singled out for greater scrutiny than other prospective teachers and employment cannot be conditioned upon factors which infringe upon the free exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

Exercise of constitutional rights does not prohibit termination of teacher.

- The constitutional guarantees of free speech, free association, and free exercise of religion do not mean that a school board has no control over the activities or actions of its teachers. A school board may fire, refuse to rehire, or refuse to hire a teacher who has exercised constitutionally protected rights in such a manner as to seriously impair or destroy the teacher's effectiveness as a teacher. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

In an action against the State Board of Education for discriminatory hiring practices, the burden of proof is on the state to prove justification of its actions once a plaintiff has shown that the state action stemmed from the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

Finality of board's decision.

- When sitting as a court to hear and determine an issue over which it has jurisdiction, decision of school board is final unless an appeal therefrom is taken. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Limited interference by courts.

- Unless the board violates some law, or its action is such a gross abuse of discretion as amounts to a violation of law, courts should not and cannot interfere. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Judicial intervention requires gross abuse of discretion that must be such as of itself amounts to a violation of law. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Necessary showing for equity jurisdiction.

- In the absence of a showing of the inadequacy of the remedy of appeal to the State Board of Education equity would not take jurisdiction and grant relief in a school matter contrary to former Code 1933, § 37-120 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4). Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956) (case decided under former § 32-414 re: appeals).

Equity will not interfere with the management of schools unless it clearly appears that the board has acted without authority of law. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Provision for equitable relief construed.

- Statement that decisions of the boards of education will not be interfered with by courts of equity unless they amount to a violation of law or are a gross abuse of discretion must be read and considered along with the rule of law that remedies at law, if adequate, must be exhausted before resort to equity will be allowed; when thus construed they mean simply that, when the remedy by appeal has failed to eliminate the law violation or gross abuse of discretion which is its equivalent, equity will grant relief or, as is permissible in all cases to prevent irreparable injury, or where equity alone can grant adequate relief, exhaustion of the statutory remedy of appeal is not a prerequisite to relief in equity. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Court must balance exercise of rights with effectiveness of schools.

- A court must balance the individual's interest in free exercise of the individual's rights with the government's need to maintain appropriate order and effectiveness in the operation of schools. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

Rule governing review by Court of Appeals.

- The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide questions of law that involve application, in a general sense, of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution to a given state of facts, and that do not involve construction of some constitutional provision directly in question and doubtful either under its own terms or under decisions of the Supreme Court of the state or of the United States, and that do not involve the constitutionality of any law of the state or of the United States or any treaty. Under this rule, the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction where a surety seeks to be held free of liability on grounds of constitutional provisions which made obligation unenforceable against school system as principal. Franklin v. Mobley, 202 Ga. 212, 42 S.E.2d 755 (1947).

Legislative intent by enactment of § 20-3-59. - Conditions affecting schools and the operation of them frequently change materially and it was unquestionably the intention of the legislature, by former Code 1933, § 32-933 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-3-59), to give county boards of education power to so deal with their schools whenever, in their opinion, the welfare of the schools and the best interests of the pupils require it. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Liability of county education board members.

- Members of the county boards of education are not individually liable for the negligent performance of their official duties unless it is shown that their negligence amounts to malicious, or willful and wanton misconduct. Krasner v. Harper, 90 Ga. App. 128, 82 S.E.2d 267 (1954).

Under this paragraph, there is no prima facie authority existing in any school district in this state to levy a district school tax. To state a prima facie case that shows a duty upon the defendants to levy a district school tax, the petition for mandamus must show that such tax levy has been authorized as required by this constitutional provision. In the absence of such averments, a petition shows neither the authority nor duty of the secretary and treasurer and county superintendent of schools to levy a district tax. Wrightsville Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Selig Co., 195 Ga. 408, 24 S.E.2d 306 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Effect of mandamus proceeding requiring levy of tax to pay judgment obtained against district school.

- A local school district is a body corporate or legal entity subject to be sued for any liability which it may lawfully incur, but the judgment rendered in such suit does not adjudicate the authority to levy a local tax for the purpose of paying the claim upon which the judgment is based; and in a mandamus proceeding to require levy of a district tax for purpose of paying such a judgment, the court will look behind the judgment and determine whether or not the claim upon which it is based is one for which a tax may be levied; and if it is not, the writ of mandamus will be denied. Wrightsville Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Selig Co., 195 Ga. 408, 24 S.E.2d 306 (1943).

Contract for continuance of school cannot arise by implication.

- In the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision authorizing contracts for continuance of a school, as opposed to consolidation with another school, for an indefinite period of time, a contract for continuance may not arise by implication because citizens and patrons of the school have been generous and have donated good facilities for the use and benefit of the children of the school district. Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8 (1954).

Inappropriate division of authority.

- A town cannot be marked off inside a school district, and granted power to exercise all municipal functions and the school district none. Neal v. McWhorter, 122 Ga. 431, 50 S.E. 381 (1905).

Exercise of eminent domain by municipality for enlargement of school grounds.

- The provision of the municipal charter of the City of Edison is sufficiently broad to authorize exercise of the power of eminent domain by the municipality for enlargement of school grounds maintained by the city for public schools. Sheppard v. City of Edison, 166 Ga. 111, 142 S.E. 535 (1928).

High schools.

- The board of education of any county has the right to establish one or more necessary high schools or junior high schools. Smith v. Tolbert, 160 Ga. 268, 127 S.E. 868 (1925).

County board of education is not prohibited by law from contracting with a city board for education of children residing within its jurisdiction. Walton County Bd. of Educ. v. Academy of Social Circle, 229 Ga. 114, 189 S.E.2d 690 (1972).

Suit challenging carrying weapon in school safety zone properly dismissed.

- Trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's suit challenging the enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1), making it a crime to carry a firearm in a school safety zone, by the school that the plaintiff's child attended because the school had sovereign immunity against state law claims and the threat of arrest if the plaintiff brought a weapon in the school safety zone did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation to be remedied by the suit. Evans v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 337 Ga. App. 690, 788 S.E.2d 577 (2016).

Cited in Gwinnett County Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 289 Ga. 265, 710 S.E.2d 773 (2011).

Constitution manifests General Assembly's and peoples intent to create two political subdivisions for handling schools.

- Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I) and this paragraph indicate that it was the intention of the General Assembly proposing the new Constitution, and of the people in adopting same, that there should be two political subdivisions for handling school affairs: first, the county district composed of the territory lying outside of the independent system, which territory should be under the control and management of a county board of education and, secondly, independent systems operated by municipal corporations. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 115 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Requirements governing election of candidates to county boards of education.

- Candidates for election to county boards of education must comply with the requirements of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II), concerning qualification of candidates except that they must qualify within the time specified by former Code 1933, § 34-1904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-128 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

County boards of education are county offices.

- County boards of education, even though appointive and created by statute prior to and existent at the time of adoption of the Constitution of 1877, have consistently been held by appellate courts to be county offices. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 58.

Control and management of public schools of a county school district is confined to the county board of education, including the assignment of pupils to a particular school within a county. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 135.

This paragraph seems to imply that no more independent school systems other than those now in existence shall be established; it would appear, therefore, that a military reservation could not be a part of the state in such manner as to be a part of or constitute a local unit of administration of the state public school system. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 516 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Effect of discontinuance of independent school system prior to 1945.

- If a city's discontinuance of its independent school system was accomplished under provisions of former Code 1933, Ch. 32-11, prior to 1945, then it would not have had an existing independent school system as contemplated by this paragraph and thus would not be able to reactivate, maintain, or preserve a city system. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 49 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

County-wide school districts as successors to local school districts can incur bonded indebtedness independently of county indebtedness.

- Former local school districts have been recognized as separate political divisions of the state, such as were entitled to incur a bonded indebtedness independently of county bonded obligations; upon merger by the General Assembly of local school districts, in harmony with the provisions of this paragraph into county-wide school districts, the new county-wide district would likewise constitute a separate political entity under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. III (see Ga. Code 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I), and could do as a unit that which its previous component parts could have done separately, and could therefore incur a bonded indebtedness independently of any indebtedness for general authorized county purposes. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 123 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Restriction on consolidation by local school districts.

- Local school districts may not consolidate under this paragraph so as to make the consolidated district liable for the bonded indebtedness of any one of the districts consolidated, unless approved by voters in each district affected. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 127 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Restriction on consolidation of local school districts by county board of education.

- A county board of education cannot consolidate local school districts for the purpose of making a nonbonded district liable for bonds of a bonded district unless there had been separate elections in each district. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 126.

Contracting between local education boards.

- Local boards of education may contract with each other for care, education, and transportation of pupils, but not for joint management, operation, and control of school facilities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-32.

Where county board of education and independent system contract with each other for education, transportation and care of pupils under this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II), this does not give residents of independent system the right to vote in election held to select county school superintendent, nor may such right be given by contract; such a contract does not amount to merger. Where election requirements were set out by former statute neither individuals nor groups could alter such legislative intent by contract. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 216 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Paragraph grants local school systems broad managerial authority.

- Power granted under this paragraph is construed as granting local school systems broad authority to manage and control their own programs and affairs, absent some constitutional or statutory prohibition. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-2 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Management and control of local school systems are vested at the local level in this state, specifically in the boards of education of the various county and independent city school systems, and this very broad power includes, subject to minimum standards as may be established by the State Board of Education as a condition of continued state fiscal assistance, the right to decide upon educational programs, curricula, course offerings, and general educational opportunities. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-60.

Authority of State Board of Education to preempt local education boards from promoting students invalid.

- Inasmuch as former Code 1933 §§ 32-901, 32-1101, 32-907, and 32-912 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-50,20-2-57, and20-2-59) Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Paras. II, IV), and this paragraph have been judicially endorsed numerous times, and in consideration of the fact that the State Board of Education has no express authority to preempt local boards in decisions concerning promotion of individual students, it would appear that the state board could not directly stop an individual student from passing to the next grade level should the county board feel the child is reading sufficiently. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-63 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Implementation of reading requirements as prerequisite to grade passage permissible.

- Although the State Board of Education does not have explicit authority to directly preclude a student in a local school district from progressing from one grade level to another if the child is not capable of reading in the higher grade level, the board may, as a condition of continued state fiscal assistance, require local boards of education to implement state board established reading requirements to be imposed on public school students for passage to the next grade level. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-63.

Attendance outside of school district.

- The school laws of the State of Georgia do not prohibit a child from receiving an education in a school system other than that in which the child resides; however, if a child desires to enter a school in any other territory, it is permissible to charge such child tuition for the privilege. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-70.

Place county board of education members selected from.

- It was clear from this paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I) and former Code 1933, §§ 32-901 and 32-1101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-50) that members of the county board of education should be selected from that portion of the county not embraced within the territory of an independent school district. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 510 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

County board of education can determine where a pupil may attend school and can deny a pupil, in their discretion, the right to attend a school of the pupil's choice; where, however, it can be shown that the county board of education was abusing the discretion vested in it, then the aggrieved party could take proper action as provided by law. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 273.

County board of education authority to divide county into attendance area and require mandatory attendance.

- A county board of education may not divide the county into school districts, but by the authority of this paragraph and former Code 1933, §§ 32-901 and 32-1101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-50) it appears that a county board does have the power to divide the county into attendance areas and require that persons of school age living in a certain area attend the school in that area. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 41 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I).

Failure of United States Justice Department to approve change in election procedures leaves prior law in effect. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-14.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, §§ 20 et seq., 48 et seq.

ALR.

- Discretion of administrative officers as to changing boundaries of school district, 65 A.L.R. 1523; 135 A.L.R. 1096.

Unionization, centralization, or consolidation of school districts as affecting indebtedness and property of the individual districts, 121 A.L.R. 826.

Discretion of administrative officers as to changing boundaries of school district, 135 A.L.R. 1096.

Power of school district or school board to employ counsel, 75 A.L.R.2d 1339.

Validity of regulation by public school authorities as to clothes or personal appearance of pupils, 14 A.L.R.3d 1201.

Zoning regulations as applied to public elementary and high schools, 74 A.L.R.3d 136.