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Call Now: 904-383-7448(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the power of taxation over the whole state may be exercised for any purpose authorized by law. Any purpose for which the powers of taxation over the whole state could have been exercised on June 30, 1983, shall continue to be a purpose for which such powers may be exercised.
(b) Subject to conditions and limitations as may be provided by law, the power of taxation may be exercised to make grants for tax relief purposes to persons for sales tax paid and not otherwise reimbursed on prescription drugs. Credits or relief provided hereunder may be limited only to such reasonable classifications of taxpayers as may be specified by law.
- Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I.
- Public debt, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Paras. I through XI.
State sinking fund, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. V, Para. III.
Education, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. I, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VII, Para. I.
Purposes of county taxation, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. III.
Retirement systems for public employees, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. X, Paras. I through V.
- For article, "School Systems, Segregation and the Supreme Court," see 6 Mercer L. Rev. 189 (1955). For article, "Quasi-Municipal Tort Liability in Georgia," see 6 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (1955). For article, "The County Spending Power: An Abbreviated Audit of the Account," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 599 (1982). For note discussing Georgia's local options sales tax, Art. 2, Ch. 8, T. 48, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1979). For comment on Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969) as to the constitutionality of Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969).
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I and antecedent provisions, providing for specific allowable purposes of taxation, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.
- The General Assembly has only those powers of taxation over the state which it is permitted to exercise under the grant of power contained in the Constitution. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172, 132 S.E. 896 (1926).
Sole purposes for which the state may tax are listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. III). City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
List of purposes in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. III) is the only source of purposes of taxation for which the state may validly delegate to its creatures the power to tax. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
Express constitutional authorization is required to validate a tax levy by a creature of the state. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
This paragraph is not applicable to a taxation act by county. Columbus S. Ry. v. Wright, 89 Ga. 574, 15 S.E. 293 (1892), aff'd, 151 U.S. 470, 14 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 238 (1894) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
County tax for purpose of paying pensions is invalid. Verdery v. Walton, 137 Ga. 213, 73 S.E. 390 (1911).
- Though the purposes listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) are capable of delegation, the right of the state to tax in order to grant funds to municipalities under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. III) is not capable of delegation to counties or to any other subdivision of the state. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
It can never be a valid county purpose to provide revenue to a municipality, because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties - they are an entirely different form of government. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
Restitution does not fully satisfy injury which results to one from wrongful levy and collection of a tax for payment of which the person is not legally liable. Agricultural Commodities Auth. v. Balkcom, 215 Ga. 107, 109 S.E.2d 276 (1959).
- The assessment which the agricultural commodities authority was empowered to levy and collect from the producers of the commodity peanuts, under the attacked section of former Code 1933, Ch. 5-26, § 10 of Ga. L. 1951, p. 717, as amended by Ga. L. 1958, p. 237, was unquestionably a tax on that particular agricultural commodity, which was levied and collected by the state through one of its instrumentalities solely for the purpose of advertising and promoting such commodity by the authority; and since it was not a tax which the General Assembly has constitutional power to impose only on that particular agricultural commodity for any one of the purposes enumerated in this provision of the Constitution, the General Assembly was without constitutional authority to create an instrumentality of the state and clothe it with power to impose a tax on such commodity. Agricultural Commodities Auth. v. Balkcom, 215 Ga. 107, 109 S.E.2d 276 (1959).
- Invalidity of former Code 1933, Ch. 5-26, § 10 of Ga. L. 1951, p. 717, as amended by Ga. L. 1958, p. 237, empowering agricultural commodities authority to levy and collect from procedures of the commodity peanuts, was not cured by the election provided for by § 7 of the act or by provision in § 10 for refund to dissatisfied producer. Agricultural Commodities Auth. v. Balkcom, 215 Ga. 107, 109 S.E.2d 276 (1959).
Term "debt," as used in this paragraph, refers to the principal of the debt due, exclusive of unearned interest on the debt. City Council v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 32 S.E. 907 (1899); Epping v. City of Columbus, 117 Ga. 263, 43 S.E. 803 (1903), overruled on other grounds, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
None of the purposes of taxation enumerated by this paragraph are broad enough to include acquisition of a railroad. Park v. Candler, 113 Ga. 647, 39 S.E. 89 (1901) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
This paragraph authorizes levy of an ad valorem tax upon all property in the state for support of public institutions, which includes the superior courts. Clark v. Hammond, 134 Ga. 792, 68 S.E. 600 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
Constitution adheres to the strict requirement that all school funds be devoted to educational purposes as defined in the statutes and Constitution of this state. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 132 Ga. App. 314, 208 S.E.2d 126 (1974), cert. dismissed, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
Neither payment nor settlement of a claim is within the ambit of "educational purpose" for which alone a school board may spend its funds. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 132 Ga. App. 314, 208 S.E.2d 126 (1974), cert. dismissed, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
Loaning of money to political subdivisions of this state or authorities controlled by them is not a permitted purpose for which public funds may be used under this paragraph and, therefore, it is not a facility or service of the state within the meaning of that term in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I). Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
Former Code 1933, § 58-706.1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 5, T. 3) did not impose a state tax for state purposes, which would invoke this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III); instead, it imposes a state tax for local purposes, and the counties' adherence to the tests of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I and II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV), delineating the allowable scope of county purposes of taxation is all that is required. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
Provided the authority has been established for a valid public purpose, the legislature may appropriate money for administrative expenses of that authority and such appropriation would be a valid use of tax funds under this paragraph. Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
- This paragraph authorizes the state to levy taxes to be used to construct and maintain state docks, and to promote natural resources of the state. The acquisition, construction, maintenance, and operation of public ports, docks, wharves and related facilities is a function ordinarily carried on by the state, or a state instrumentality, and is a legitimate function of state government. Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958).
The Ports Authority is a creature of the state, and in the operation of the docks, wharves, etc., it does so as the instrumentality of the state for governmental purposes as authorized by the Constitution. The Ports Authority as an employer comes within the exception provision of 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 of the National Labor Relations Act and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922, 82 S. Ct. 1561, 8 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1962).
This paragraph and Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I), are in pari materia, and must be construed together. When so construed, ample authority is found in the Constitution for those provisions of former Code 1933, Ch. 95A-12 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32) which authorize the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) to expend appropriated tax funds for purpose of renting bridge facilities from the State Bridge Building (now Georgia Highway) Authority for state highway uses. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
Allocation of a portion of the fines and forfeitures collected in this state to the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund is not an unauthorized tax in violation of this paragraph. McCallum v. Moore, 215 Ga. 705, 113 S.E.2d 202 (1960); Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
-.
In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I and antecedent provisions, relating to specific allowable purposes of taxation, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.
Former Code 1933, § 32-403 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-11) did not exceed this paragraph's constitutional limitations on the use of moneys derived from state taxation. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 697.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
For the state to provide with state funds an awards luncheon would violate Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (1) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI) prohibiting granting any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-42.
Department of Public Safety may expend funds allotted by the Office of Planning and Budget for purpose of printing posters and leaflets in connection with campaign to promote safe driving. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 601.
State departments, institutions, or agencies can pay dues and membership fees in various state and national organizations from state appropriated funds. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-110.
Expression "for educational purpose" is to be given the broadest significance; the expression is ". . . broad enough to cover all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of education . . .," but the scope of the expression does not extend to any measure that might incidentally prove to be of assistance to a program of education. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-33.
The phrase "educational purposes" in this paragraph does not include a school lunch program. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 71.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
- Since the impediment to the expenditure of school funds for purposes other than school or educational purposes is constitutional, suffice it to say with reference to the statutory authorization in § 20-2-184, that simply "calling"a proposed expenditure an expenditure "for school purposes" does not necessarily make it an expenditure "for school purposes." 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-52.
Local school boards may spend state and local tax funds to maintain debate program; these expenditures may include payment of debate meet registration fees for individuals and schools. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-20.
State tax funds may be spent on individual and school registration fees for centrally located debate meets. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-20.
Local, but not state, tax funds may be spent on room or board for students attending centrally located debate meets. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-20.
- Answering of the question of whether a given expenditure can be said to be an expenditure "for school purposes" is exceedingly difficult and an area as broad as "medical services" is not one which can be said to be either wholly within or wholly without the outer limits of a lawful expenditure "for school purposes." 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-52.
Some forms of medical service have such direct and substantial relationship to the educational process as to render it unlikely a court would not authorize expenditure of school funds for such service at least where arguably authorized by statute. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-44.
School funds cannot lawfully be expended to provide pupils with full medical care. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-44.
- In view of the inherent nature of library facilities as a learning tool and the pervasive relationship between educational authorities and library systems on both state and local governmental levels, together with the stated legislative policy that establishment of a public library service is to be part of the provisions for public education in this state, the use of common school funds for construction of public library facilities is an expenditure for educational purposes. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-33.
An expenditure involving expenses for conducting a Junior Fire Marshal Camp is not an illegal expenditure, it being a constitutional and authorized educational expense authorized by Ga. L. 1949, p. 1057, § 26 (see now O.C.G.A. § 25-2-31). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 446.
Expenditure of school funds for payment of rewards offered for information concerning damage to and destruction of school property is not an expenditure for educational purposes, and therefore not a lawful use of general school funds. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-122.
- Concerning the legality of a school system paying personnel for unused sick or personal leave, there does not seem to be any extant constitutional or statutory prohibition of making such payments as a part of an overall compensation plan, provided that specific peripheral statutory requirements, such as those pertaining to the maximum number of days of sick leave which can be accumulated, are not violated. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-19 (decided under former § 20-2-284).
Payment of unemployment compensation coverage for state or local employees of public hospitals and institutions of higher learning would be authorized by this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (8) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II) to provide necessary welfare benefits as specified by the General Assembly. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-35 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
- No one except employees actually in employment of such governmental agencies, or dependents, or survivors of such employees can be covered by an act of the General Assembly relating to any program of benefits financed through taxation of public funds raised by taxation. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 233.
- This paragraph, enabling the General Assembly to authorize counties to use public funds for school lunch purposes, does not confer any authority or enable the General Assembly to confer any authority upon independent school systems to use public funds for such purposes. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 167.
- The proper authority to determine how much of the state funds allocated for school lunch purposes shall be spent is the State Board of Education which in determining what it believes to be necessary in the way of state fiscal assistance could presumably take into account the amount of available funds from other areas such as local taxation and federal grants. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-8.
- Provided that state funds allocated by the State Board of Education "for school lunch purposes" are expended for this purpose and none other, there is no legal, as opposed to state board policy, restriction on the use of such funds flowing from the fact that the school lunch programs of local school systems also receive federal fiscal support. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-8.
- Provided that state funds appropriated for support of school lunch programs of local school systems are not expended for other than school lunch purposes, restrictions on and reasonable conditions appertaining to the use of such funds by local school systems is a matter to be determined by policies, rules, and regulations of the State Board of Education. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-8.
Neither state nor local school funds may be used to provide lunches for children not enrolled in the public school program. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-155.
- No direct provision of law prohibits a local school system from providing school lunches for children not enrolled in the public school program, assuming full reimbursement is made to the school system for expenses incurred in the providing of such service. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-155.
- From a viewpoint of state law, since there are no longer any apparent state constitutional restrictions (as opposed to statutory and regulatory authorizations and restraints) respecting charges for school meals, in determining the sum it will charge teachers and other school employees for school meals, a local school system may properly exclude those indirect costs which the school system would have to bear whether or not the meals were sold to teachers and employees as well as to students; it would be permissible for a local school system to calculate the sum to be charged to the teacher or other employee based upon direct costs only. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-23.
- The General Assembly could tax for, and appropriate funds for, the same purposes as may be intended by Ducks Unlimited, e.g., recreation, conservation of the natural resources of the state, etc.; however, this does not mean the General Assembly may grant a donation or gratuity, in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (1) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI) prohibition, in order to effectuate the purposes for which it is authorized to levy taxes. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-128.
An agency or department of the state may employ Atlanta Historical Society to obtain information in connection with advertising and promoting historical resources. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 287.
Under this paragraph, it is immaterial that the state appropriation might exceed 10 percent of some individual contract, as long as 10 percent of the total overall cost of the project is not exceeded. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-318.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
- This paragraph allows partial reimbursement of expenses incurred by two or more separate instrumentalities, working on the same transportation project. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-318.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I).
- The expenditure of public school funds by a county board of education to run sewer lines from its schools to city sewer lines on nearby city streets, and to purchase sewage disposal services from the city, would not violate any constitutional or statutory provision of the State of Georgia. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-85.
- The State Board of Education is fully authorized by law to make grants to local school systems for purpose of enabling local systems to provide in-service training for teachers in their employment. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-79.
Common school funds can lawfully be used for support of "community school programs," which programs are ordinarily conducted after normal school hours and consist of various activities of an educational nature provided for the general citizenry without violating constitutional prohibitions on the expenditure of school funds for purposes other than "school" or "educational" purposes. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-60.
Public school funds cannot lawfully be expended for extra-curricular athletic teams such as football and basketball teams. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-10; 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-6.
School funds may not legally be used to purchase uniforms for school lunch personnel. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-182.
- Where the State Board of Education received $15,000 from the Governor's Emergency Fund and these funds were then transferred to the Dougherty County Board of Education, and the Dougherty County Board of Education used the funds to alleviate a drainage problem at the Mills Memorial Stadium, which is owned and operated by the Albany Stadium Authority; the funds involved in this transfer were state funds, and correction of the drainage problems at the stadium is not an "educational purpose" and was an improper expenditure of state funds. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-41.
Neither the State Board of Education nor local boards of education can lawfully use school funds for room and board, other than school lunches, or for medical, including psychiatric treatment or services beyond such evaluation as is necessary to placement and the determination of the proper educational program for a given child. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1.
- Expenditures for an annual physical examination of a School Superintendent, for a faculty banquet, and for payment of insurance premiums for members of a high school football team would be improper objects for the expenditure of common school funds. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-12.
- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 36 et seq.
- 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 21 et seq.
- Constitutionality of statutes providing for bounty or pension for soldiers, 7 A.L.R. 1636; 13 A.L.R. 587; 15 A.L.R. 1359; 147 A.L.R. 1432; 156 A.L.R. 1458.
Construction and effect of soldiers' bounty laws, 13 A.L.R. 594; 35 A.L.R. 791; 22 A.L.R.2d 1134.
Taxes paid or due to federal government as deductible in computing state personal property or income tax, 35 A.L.R. 1457.
Scope and effect of express constitutional provisions prohibiting Legislature from imposing taxes for county and corporate purposes, or providing that Legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in local authorities, 46 A.L.R. 609; 106 A.L.R. 906.
Power of state to tax royalties from patents, 55 A.L.R. 931.
What are "commodities" within meaning of constitutional provision for excise tax, 63 A.L.R. 956.
Schools: free textbooks and other school supplies for individual use of pupils, 67 A.L.R. 1196.
Classification as regards counties or other political divisions permissible in statute imposing cost of construction or maintenance of highways upon property specially benefited, 77 A.L.R. 1285.
Obligation payable from special fund created by imposition of fees, penalties, or excise taxes as a "debt" within constitutional debt limitation, 100 A.L.R. 900.
Scope and effect of express constitutional provisions prohibiting Legislature from imposing tax for county or corporate purposes, or providing that Legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in local authorities, 106 A.L.R. 906.
Constitutionality of chain store tax, 112 A.L.R. 305.
Encouragement or promotion of industry not in nature of public utility, carried on by private enterprise, as public purpose for which tax may be imposed or public money appropriated, 112 A.L.R. 571.
Statute or ordinance in relation to advertising as interference with interstate commerce, 115 A.L.R. 952.
Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highway, 123 A.L.R. 1462.
State taxation of livestock as affected by federal constitutional or statutory provisions relating to imports, exports, or interstate commerce, 130 A.L.R. 969.
Validity of statute or municipal ordinance which provides generally that occupations or businesses for which no specific license tax has been imposed, shall be subject to a license tax of a specified amount or rate, 134 A.L.R. 841.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute imposing tax on business of acquiring notes or other forms of indebtedness secured by retaining title to, or by liens upon, motor vehicles or other specified articles, 140 A.L.R. 1037.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute or ordinance imposing license fee or tax upon automobiles or trailers used for habitation, 150 A.L.R. 853.
Tolls as taxes within constitutional provisions respecting taxes, 167 A.L.R. 1356.
What constitutes moral obligation justifying appropriation of public moneys for benefit of an individual, 172 A.L.R. 1407.
Construction and effect of veterans' bonus laws during and after World War II, 22 A.L.R.2d 1134.
Validity, construction, and application of state statutes forbidding possession, transportation, or sale of unstamped or unlicensed cigarettes or other tobacco products, 46 A.L.R.3d 1342.