States' latitude in devising fiscal systems.

- When dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon prerogatives of national government or violating guaranties of federal Constitution, the states have attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).

States have very wide discretion in levying of their taxes. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).

Taxes and assessments distinguished.

- Taxes are burdens, while assessments are equivalents which are compensated by the benefits received. Hayden v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 (1883).

O.C.G.A.

§ 48-5-28 applies to all property subject to tax. - Former Civil Code 1910, § 1140 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-28) mandates payment of taxes before other claims applies to all property returned or held by a taxpayer that is subject to taxation under the state Constitution. Cason v. Aldred, 175 Ga. 256, 165 S.E. 221 (1932).

Section 7-1-202 not unconstitutional.

- The order of distribution of assets upon insolvency of a bank which grant payments of debts due to depositors prior to payment of state taxes under Ga. L. 1927, p. 195, § 5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) is not an unconstitutional violation of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Paras. I and IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I and Art. VII, Sec. II, Paras. I-IV). Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465, 160 S.E. 419 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

This paragraph was not violated by Ga. L. 1924, p. 87 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-180) abolishing fee system. Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S.E. 38 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Ga. L. 1913, p. 123, § 12 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-2), creating State Tax Commission (now Revenue Commissioner) did not violate this paragraph. Ogletree v. Woodward, 150 Ga. 691, 105 S.E. 243 (1920) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Bonds issued by a municipal corporation of this state in the hands of a resident are not taxable. Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58 S.E. 773, 12 L.R.A. 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346 (1907).

This paragraph does not apply to the expenditure or distribution of money raised by taxes. Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S.E. 38 (1925) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Ga. L. 1937, p. 806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-8-34) is not invalid as violating due process or equal protection clauses of state and federal Constitutions, or the principle of uniformity in matters of taxation, as expressed in the state Constitution. Jeffreys-McElrath Mfg. Co. v. Huiet, 196 Ga. 710, 27 S.E.2d 385 (1943).

Payment of unemployment benefits to employees voluntarily unemployed amounts to unconstitutional donations or gratuities.

- Where unemployment is voluntary or due to fault of the unemployed, to require employers, who sought to persuade them to return to work, to supply the money with which to pay them would encourage and reward idleness and impose an unjust and intolerable burden upon employers by arbitrary and discriminatory legislation. To construe Ga. L. 1945, p. 57 to authorize such payments would be to render it unconstitutional in that it would make donations or gratuities in violation of the plain inhibition of the Constitution. It would be void for the further reason that it classified employers for purpose of imposing a tax upon them while exempting others, when there is no possible relation between the basis of such classification and the objective of donations and gratuities to those workers who had qualified under the article during periods while they are voluntarily unemployed due to their own fault. Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950).

Rule delineating jurisdiction of Appeals Court and state Supreme Court.

- The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide questions of law that involve application, in a general sense, of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the state Constitution to a given state of facts, and that do not involve construction of some constitutional provision directly in question and doubtful either under its own terms or under decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia or of the United States, and that do not involve the constitutionality of any law of the state or of the United States or any treaty. Under this rule, the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction where a surety seeks to be held free of liability on grounds of constitutional provisions which made obligation unenforceable against a school system as principal. Franklin v. Mobley, 202 Ga. 212, 42 S.E.2d 755 (1947).

The General Assembly may fix taxing situs of all tangible or intangible personal property, but it must be by general law, and classified according to nature of the property, and not according to the nature of the owner. County of Walton v. County of Morgan, 120 Ga. 548, 48 S.E. 243 (1904).

Taxation to situs of personalty of deceased person, see City of Blakely v. Hilton, 150 Ga. 27, 102 S.E. 340 (1920).

Cited in Cochran v. City of Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 146 S.E. 462 (1928); Case-Fowler Lumber Co. v. Winslett, 168 Ga. 808, 149 S.E. 211 (1929); City of Waycross v. Bell, 169 Ga. 57, 149 S.E. 641 (1929); Camp v. State, 171 Ga. 25, 154 S.E. 436 (1930); Georgia Hwy. Express v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 431, 157 S.E. 464 (1931); Harrison v. Southern Ry., 44 Ga. App. 49, 160 S.E. 656 (1931); Harrison v. Georgia, F. & A.R.R., 174 Ga. 549, 163 S.E. 200 (1932); City of Atlanta v. Kirk, 174 Ga. 763, 164 S.E. 64 (1932); City of Moultrie v. Moultrie Banking Co., 175 Ga. 738, 165 S.E. 814 (1932); Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933); Beck & Gregg Hdwe. Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 176 Ga. 896, 169 S.E. 114 (1933); City of Moultrie v. Moultrie Banking Co., 177 Ga. 714, 171 S.E. 131 (1933); Guerry v. Harrison, 178 Ga. 669, 173 S.E. 831 (1934); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 179 Ga. 471, 176 S.E. 494 (1934); City of Douglas v. South Ga. Grocery Co., 180 Ga. 519, 179 S.E. 768 (1935); Candler v. Gilbert, 180 Ga. 679, 180 S.E. 723 (1935); Bennett v. Vittum, 185 Ga. 74, 194 S.E. 363 (1937); Gibbs v. Milk Control Bd., 185 Ga. 844, 196 S.E. 791 (1938); Davison v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 186 Ga. 663, 198 S.E. 738 (1938); Scott v. State, 187 Ga. 702, 2 S.E.2d 65 (1939); Newton v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 441, 6 S.E.2d 61 (1939); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458, 6 S.E.2d 320 (1939); Suttles v. Montgomery, 193 Ga. 128, 17 S.E.2d 734 (1941); Duncan v. Proctor, 195 Ga. 499, 24 S.E.2d 791 (1943); Lee v. City of Atlanta, 197 Ga. 518, 29 S.E.2d 774 (1944); Davis v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 Ga. 550, 32 S.E.2d 180 (1944); Parke, Davis & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 296, 36 S.E.2d 773 (1946); Davis v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 821, 41 S.E.2d 406 (1947); Parker v. Mayor of Savannah, 216 Ga. 210, 115 S.E.2d 555 (1960); National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Thompson, 103 Ga. App. 786, 120 S.E.2d 779 (1961); Lott Inv. Corp. v. City of Waycross, 218 Ga. 805, 130 S.E.2d 741 (1963); Brown v. City of Marietta, 220 Ga. 826, 142 S.E.2d 235 (1965); Champion Papers, Inc. v. Williams, 221 Ga. 345, 144 S.E.2d 514 (1965); McLennan v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 302, 149 S.E.2d 705 (1966); Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 403, 162 S.E.2d 333 (1968); Blackmon v. Cobb County-Marietta Water Auth., 126 Ga. App. 459, 191 S.E.2d 128 (1972); Blackmon v. Golia, 231 Ga. 381, 202 S.E.2d 186 (1973); Adams v. Smith, 415 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Boynton v. Carswell, 238 Ga. 417, 233 S.E.2d 185 (1977); Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978); DeKalb County v. City of Decatur, 247 Ga. 695, 279 S.E.2d 427 (1981); Teachers Retirement Sys. v. City of Atlanta, 249 Ga. 196, 288 S.E.2d 200 (1982); Board of Tax Assessors v. Clary, 161 Ga. App. 828, 290 S.E.2d 110 (1982); Fulton County v. Strickland, 251 Ga. 473, 306 S.E.2d 299 (1983); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998).

Uniform rate of taxation required on property.

- Taxation on property must be upon all not exempted by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Paras. I through IV) with a uniform rate upon all kinds. Tarver v. Mayor of Dalton, 134 Ga. 462, 67 S.E. 929, 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 183, 20 Ann. Cas. 281 (1910).

Taxpayer not required to receive equal benefit from tax supported facilities.

- The federal and state Constitutions require an equal assessment of taxes, but there is no requirement that the persons paying the taxes receive equal benefits from facilities for which taxes are used. Decatur Tax Payers League, Inc. v. Adams, 236 Ga. 871, 226 S.E.2d 69 (1976).

Power to require uniformity of taxation may be delegated.

- The General Assembly's power to require uniformity of taxation between counties is inherent, is not prohibited by the Constitution, and may be properly delegated to the state revenue commissioner. Salem v. Tattnall County, 250 Ga. 881, 302 S.E.2d 99 (1983).

Ga. L. 1927, p. 195, § 5 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-1-202) is not unconstitutional as a violation of this paragraph since it does not affect uniformity of taxes, it does not change or make less uniform the rate of taxes fixed upon the same class of subject, nor does it affect the ad valorem taxes on all property subject to taxes within the territorial limits of the state; even though the statute fixes the priority of other claims relative to taxes. Baggett v. Mobley, 171 Ga. 268, 155 S.E. 334 (1930).

Systematic and comprehensive increase in value of property to raise additional revenue violates uniform taxation clause.

- Where courts' tax assessors, without investigation, made a systematic and comprehensive increase in value of all property returned in the county for taxes, for a particular year, not for purpose of fixing just and fair values after investigation, or for purpose of equalizing taxes, but for the sole purpose of raising additional revenue, such assessments were null and void, as they were violative of the uniform-taxation clause of this paragraph of the state Constitution and the equal-protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S.E.2d 183 (1955).

Where uniformity of taxation is involved, reasonableness of classification is all that is required. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).

Construction of uniform taxation clause.

- "All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," means that the levy for county purposes must be uniform throughout the county, and the levy for state purposes must be uniform throughout the state. Hawes v. Conner, 224 Ga. 567, 163 S.E.2d 724 (1968).

Creation of classes of taxpayers based on prior nonuniformity of taxation in group's differing areas unreasonable.

- Where the object of the provision is to insure that uniformity within a class over the state is achieved, and where requirement for a class is that it be based upon some reasonable ground, it is per se unreasonable to create classes of taxpayers based only on prior nonuniformity of taxation within their differing areas. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).

The fact that a revenue or tax-raising statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction. Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933).

Instance of reasonable classification in levying tax.

- State does not create an unreasonable classification in violation of the uniformity clause of this paragraph in levying a tax upon persons who hold or possess for personal use unstamped cigarettes, while exempting those who hold or possess cigarettes for such purpose which have been stamped by a dealer as required by law. Head v. Cigarette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452, 4 S.E.2d 203 (1939) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment does not prohibit flexibility and variety in taxation schemes.

- The states, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to requirements of equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment; but that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).

Assessment at 40% of value.

- Assessment of property at 40% of value did not violate the constitutional requirement of uniformity, even though statistical evidence showed the average level of assessment of other property to be 38.84% of fair market value or lower. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Henry County Bd. of Assessors, 217 Ga. App. 699, 458 S.E.2d 705 (1995).

Discharge of Chief Tax Assessor for noncompliance.

- The giving of preferential treatment to one taxpayer's property violated the long-established laws requiring tax assessors to perform their duties in good faith, and to ensure that the fair market value between individual taxpayers is fairly and justly equalized, and justified the discharge of the Chief Tax Assessor of a county by the board of commissioners of that county. Parsons v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 Ga. App. 130, 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996).

Cigarette tax was excise tax rather than direct tax or ad valorem tax.

- Tax (formerly) imposed under Ga. L. Ex. Sess. 1937-38, pp. 126-144 upon every person who received by means in this state, and who held or possessed for his or her own personal use in this state, or for the use of any member of his or her family, cigarettes which had been stamped, was an excise upon the privilege of holding or possessing such cigarettes for personal use, and not a direct or ad valorem tax upon such articles, and, accordingly, the statute did not violate the Constitution of this state because the statute was not uniform with ad valorem tax levied by the state upon tangible property. Head v. Cigarette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452, 4 S.E.2d 203 (1939).

Instance of valid uniformity taxing.

- Uniformity within the state will not be violated if the tax is imposed by the county only on sales within its unincorporated areas and by municipalities on sales within their boundaries. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975).

Single classes of property must be assessed and taxed alike.

- Under this paragraph, all real and personal tangible property, except "motor vehicles, including trailers," and "mobile homes, other than those mobile homes which qualify the owner thereof for the homestead property tax exemption under Georgia law," constitutes a single class of property and must be assessed and taxed alike. Benson-Corwin, Inc. v. Cobb County School Dist., 239 Ga. 199, 236 S.E.2d 361 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Motor vehicles placed in different category from other tangible property.

- Clause 2 of this paragraph authorized the enactment of Ga. L. 1966, p. 517, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 10, Ch. 5, T. 48), wherein the General Assembly placed motor vehicles in a different category from other tangible property. Hawes v. Cordell Ford Co., 223 Ga. 260, 154 S.E.2d 599 (1967) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Uniform assessment required.

- Having once placed motor vehicles in a separate classification of tangible property, as permitted by this paragraph, all motor vehicles must be assessed uniformly. Hawes v. Cordell Ford Co., 223 Ga. 260, 154 S.E.2d 599 (1967) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Property valuation by method other than standard method.

- The uniformity clause of the state constitution and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions were not offended by a county's valuation of a motel by a method other than the standard method for motels, where the motel property was not actually being operated as a motel and there was no income stream from which to calculate room revenue for use with the standard gross income multiplier method. Coastal Equities, Inc. v. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 201 Ga. App. 571, 411 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 903, 411 S.E.2d 540 (1991).

Inasmuch as O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)(B.1) exempted the low-income housing tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties, the statute granted preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and created a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III (b), which ran afoul of the taxation uniformity provision. Heron Lake II Apts., L. P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 299 Ga. 598, 791 S.E.2d 77 (2016).

Hypothetical lack of uniformity in valuation of property.

- If an Act or the revenue commissioner by regulation should place a valuation upon motor vehicles based upon identity of owner or purpose for which motor vehicles are held then a lack of uniformity in valuation would appear which would be clearly unconstitutional. Hawes v. Cordell Ford Co., 223 Ga. 260, 154 S.E.2d 599 (1967).

Admission of evidence to prove lack of uniformity.

- Where a county increased the value of properties that it had previously deemed comparable at a lower rate than the taxpayers' property, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit evidence that was relevant to prove that the county might not have assessed the taxpayers' property uniformly as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III(a). Buckler v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 263 Ga. App. 305, 587 S.E.2d 797 (2003).

Assessments lacked uniformity in failing to follow the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 regarding consideration of "existing use of the property" and "other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value" and in failing to exempt standing timber under the mandate of O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-7.1(a)(1) and48-5-7.5 as set forth in this paragraph. Leverett v. Jasper County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 233 Ga. App. 470, 504 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

The conflict between this paragraph and the differential rollback that was established by former Code 1933,

§ 91A-4601 (Ga. L. 1975, p. 984, § 26A(i)(j)) was clear. - The Constitution requires uniformity, and the statute provided for nonuniformity. Martin v. Ellis, 242 Ga. 340, 249 S.E.2d 23 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

In a taxpayer's suit against a county and its officials, the court upheld the grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the taxpayer's mandamus failed to present evidence that any actual assessment of any particular property was other than at fair market value or that the county had failed to comply with the county's legal duty to see that all taxable property within the county is assessed and returned for taxes at the property's fair market value. SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

This paragraph was not violated by a tax on collection agencies. Assets Realization Co. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. 301, 103 S.E. 463 (1920) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Homestead freeze local amendment.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a group of taxpayers, as a Homestead Freeze local constitutional amendment was not unconstitutional merely because it conflicted with the uniformity in taxation clause of the Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III; the local constitutional amendment was a subsequent amendment to the uniformity in taxation clause, and continued in force and effect, thus it was valid despite any conflict with the clause. Columbus-Muscogee County Consol. Gov't v. CM Tax Equalization, Inc., 276 Ga. 332, 579 S.E.2d 200, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 878, 124 S. Ct. 288, 157 L. Ed. 2d 142 (2003).

Tax on stock of foreign corporation held by domestic corporation did not violate this paragraph. Wright v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 U.S. 219, 25 S. Ct. 16, 49 L. Ed. 167 (1904) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Real estate and personalty of manufacturing plant taxed as unit did not violate this paragraph. County of Walton v. County of Morgan, 120 Ga. 548, 48 S.E. 243 (1904) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Tax on packing house agents did not violate this paragraph. Stewart v. Kehrer, 115 Ga. 184, 41 S.E. 680 (1902), aff'g, 197 U.S. 60, 25 S. Ct. 403, 49 L. Ed. 663 (1905) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Tax on sale of sewing machines did not violate this paragraph. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 F. 121 (N.D. Ga. 1887), appeal dismissed, 141 U.S. 696, 12 S. Ct. 103, 35 L. Ed. 906 (1891) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Statute creating special districts for the purpose of implementing a hotel/motel tax did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para III. Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).

Tax on aircraft.

- The requirement of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-16(e) to return for taxation an aircraft in the county in which it has its primary home base does not effectively create a prohibited separate class of tangible property in violation of the constitutional requirement for uniformity of taxation. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 269 Ga. 31, 495 S.E.2d 33 (1998).

Challenge reviewed first on administrative appeal.

- Property owners improperly challenged a tax re-valuation by a county in a Georgia trial court because the owners had an adequate remedy at law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 in an appeal to a county board of tax equalization (BOE) as the BOE had to first address procedural errors and errors in methodology to value the property under § 48-5-311(e)-(g); constitutional claims, such as claims of the uniformity of assessment under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III also had to be addressed first before the BOE. Hooten v. Thomas, 297 Ga. App. 487, 677 S.E.2d 670 (2009).

Power to classify must be exercised reasonably.

- The power of the legislature to classify for purposes of taxation is unlimited, unless it exercises its power capriciously or unreasonably, and unless the classification is fictitious rather than real. Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936).

The authority of the General Assembly under the Constitution, to classify subjects for taxation cannot be successfully challenged. The power thus to classify is subject to the limitation that any classification must be reasonable, natural, and not arbitrary. Forrester v. Edwards, 192 Ga. 529, 15 S.E.2d 851 (1941); Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Three classes of taxation.

- The subject of taxation has been divided into three classes - capitation, property, and income; and when one or more is mentioned or treated of, the other is never intended. Mayor of Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23 (1850); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. City Council, 109 Ga. 73, 35 S.E. 71 (1900).

The basis for classification for tax purposes must be related to the objective of the ordinance. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

When the legislature makes a distinct class, it must treat each member of it alike. McGhee v. State, 92 Ga. 21, 17 S.E. 276 (1893); Price v. Richardson, 159 Ga. 299, 125 S.E. 449 (1924).

Where a proper basis for classification exists the law may classify, and uniformity within the classes thus created satisfies the Constitution. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Realty and tangible personal property are of the same class, and the constitutional rule of uniformity in taxation requires that both be taxed alike. Colvard v. Ridley, 218 Ga. 490, 128 S.E.2d 732 (1962); Register v. Langdale, 226 Ga. 82, 172 S.E.2d 620 (1970); Gwinnett County v. Ackerman/Indian Trail Ass'n, 198 Ga. App. 723, 402 S.E.2d 794 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. NABISCO, 296 Ga. App. 884, 676 S.E.2d 41 (2009).

General Assembly power limited.

- The General Assembly has no authority to establish different classes or subclasses of tangible property other than as fixed by this constitutional provision. Griggs v. Greene, 230 Ga. 257, 197 S.E.2d 116 (1973).

Different method of taxing personal property of non real estate owners and real estate owners violates this paragraph.

- A policy of a board of tax assessors not to assess tangible personal property of residents of the county not owning real estate, and to assess the personal property of real estate owners at either 10 percent of the value of the real estate, or at a valuation which the assessors would "imagine" would be a reasonable figure, violates this paragraph. Register v. Langdale, 226 Ga. 82, 172 S.E.2d 620 (1970).

Different classifications permissible.

- A person renting or offering for rent real property and one investing in securities need not be included in the same classification. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968).

Authority to tax occupation.

- There is no constitutional reason why the legislature cannot make one general class of all persons upon whose occupation it imposes taxation; and, if this were done, it would be incumbent on the legislature to make its system of taxation, as to such persons, uniform in all essential particulars, so as to operate fairly and equally upon every member of this general class; and this general class might be made to include every person engaged in any sort of business or vocation. Hoffman & Crowell, Inc. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 792, 156 S.E. 685 (1931).

The legislative right to classify is nothing more or less than authority to discriminate in taxation by the process of making separate classes of different occupations, or by making different classes within a specific occupation, with the only restraint upon the power thus to classify being that it be reasonable and not arbitrary, and the only requirement of the uniformity clause of the Constitution being that the tax operate uniformly upon the members of the separate classes. Cutliff v. Mayor of Albany, 60 Ga. 597 (1878); Fulton County v. Lockhart, 202 Ga. 878, 45 S.E.2d 220 (1947).

Occupation tax.

- The validity of an occupation tax depends upon whether it is confiscatory and oppressive upon the class designated, and is not unreasonable because prohibitive upon certain financially weak persons. Adams Motor Co. v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818, 102 S.E. 440 (1920); Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229, 116 S.E. 795 (1923).

Legislative discretion.

- A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power of the state in the classification of trades, callings, businesses, or occupations which may be subjected to special forms of regulation or taxation through an excise or license tax. If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law. Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga. 674, 169 S.E. 22 (1933).

The legislature can make any classification or subclassification which is reasonable and not arbitrary. Southern Transf. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930); Fulton Bros. Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 571, 156 S.E. 255 (1930); Huffman & Crowell, Inc. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 792, 156 S.E. 685 (1931); Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S.E. 231 (1932); Wright v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 244, 177 S.E. 753 (1934); Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936); Solomons v. Mayor of Savannah, 183 Ga. 631, 189 S.E. 230 (1936); Coolidge v. Mayor of Savannah, 128 Ga. App. 704, 197 S.E.2d 773 (1973).

Power of the legislature to classify persons for purpose of imposing occupation taxes is undisputed, and necessarily includes the power to subclassify. Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936) (decided under Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I).

Limited classes within same occupation.

- It is within the power of the General Assembly to make one general class of persons engaged in a particular business, for purpose of taxing their occupation; and it may constitutionally make for this purpose a more limited class composed of persons engaged in the same occupation in a particular way. Southern Transf. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930).

The General Assembly, in the imposition of occupation taxes, may subdivide into different classes persons engaged in same business but under different conditions and surroundings; in the exercise of this power of classification they may impose an occupation tax upon only one of these classes, provided the classification and the consequent imposition of the tax is based upon sound reason, and is not arbitrary or capricious. Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S.E. 231 (1932); Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936); Cook v. Cobb, 72 Ga. App. 150, 33 S.E.2d 366 (1945).

Reasonable basis for subclassifications required.

- The legislature can divide persons engaged in the same general occupation into subdivisions, if there is reasonable ground for such subclassification, and tax members of one subdivision and exempt those of another subdivision. Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936); Coolidge v. Mayor of Savannah, 128 Ga. App. 704, 197 S.E.2d 773 (1973).

Discretion to determine reasonableness of classification.

- Whether classification in a given instance is a reasonable one or not is a question addressed to the judgment and discretion of the taxing power, subject to review by the courts. Decker v. McGowan, 59 Ga. 805 (1877); United Cigar Stores Co. v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 724, 87 S.E. 1034 (1916).

Exemption does not necessarily destroy uniformity.

- Fact of exemption of certain persons from operation of the tax imposed upon a class does not destroy the uniformity required by this paragraph, provided the exemption is not arbitrary and is based upon some good reason. Southern Transf. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Power of the legislature extends only to classifying business occupations into different branches, and laying upon each separate branch thus created such tax as is deemed proper. Fulton County v. Lockhart, 202 Ga. 878, 45 S.E.2d 220 (1947).

To provide a different rate of taxation as to intangible personal property from that on real property does not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Const., amend. 14. Miller v. Mitchell, 226 Ga. 892, 178 S.E.2d 175 (1970).

Uniformity not violated.

- Classifications of businesses in a license tax ordinance which are related to its objective to raise revenue based upon ability to pay and the burdens upon the city in furnishing facilities and protection to the businesses do not violate the uniformity provisions of this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution. Pharr Rd. Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga. 752, 164 S.E.2d 803 (1968) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Classification void upon showing of unreasonableness and arbitrary classification.

- Where a city is given authority under its charter to make classification of businesses into specific classes for purpose of levying occupational taxes on such businesses, the action of its regularly constituted authorities in making such classification and levying such occupational taxes will not be disturbed as being void and unconstitutional, except where it is clearly apparent that such classification has no reasonable relation to the subject matter and is therefore unreasonable and arbitrary. Wright v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 244, 177 S.E. 753 (1934).

Imposition of license tax.

- Right to classify businesses and occupations for purpose of imposing a license tax lies largely within discretion of the legislative body imposing the tax, and that in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion the courts ought not to interfere with its exercise. Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 189 S.E.2d 439 (1972).

A classification based upon number of employees is not repugnant to this paragraph of the Constitution and such classification is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Atlanta Laundries, Inc. v. Harrison, 174 Ga. 448, 162 S.E. 912 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 34-8-34. - Ga. L. 1937, p. 806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-8-34) defining "employing unit" and providing that an employing unit which maintains two or more separate establishments within the state shall be deemed to be a single employing unit, was not violative of the due process clauses of the state or federal Constitutions on grounds that it raised an irrebuttable presumption; nor did it impose upon petitioners a higher rate of tax than "successors in the same class," in violation of state and federal equal protection claims, since successors who acquire the benefit-experience rating of their predecessors would not be in the same class as petitioners; nor did it violate the uniformity-of-taxation clause of the state. Cartersville Candlewick, Inc. v. Huiet, 204 Ga. 609, 50 S.E.2d 647 (1948).

Inequality among taxpayers in the same taxing authority with respect to distribution of benefits is not unconstitutional. Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980).

Instance of different constitutional classification.

- Though the General Assembly exempts the business of "garages" for safe-keeping and repair of automobiles which are not located in a city or town having a population of 1,000 or more, and not located within a mile of such municipalities, from payment of an occupation tax, while imposing a special tax graduated according to population upon the occupation of keeping such garages as are located in such cities or towns and within one mile thereof, such classification is not violative of the state or the federal Constitution. Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S.E. 231 (1932).

The exclusion from the class of operators of garages generally of those engaged in that business in rural districts is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Milliron v. Harrison, 175 Ga. 764, 166 S.E. 231 (1932).

Graduated occupation tax.

- The legislature can impose upon dealers an occupation tax, graduated according to the population of the towns and cities in which such dealers do business; and when the same tax is imposed upon each member of each class in every incorporated town and city in the state, and the method of its enforcement is the same, the uniformity required by the tax uniformity provision of this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution is secured. Fulton Bros. Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 571, 156 S.E. 255 (1930) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

An occupation tax upon the practice of law which provided for graduated taxes according to the number of years of practice was not unconstitutional under this paragraph. Coolidge v. Mayor of Savannah, 128 Ga. App. 704, 197 S.E.2d 773 (1973) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

The classification must be based on some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification. Wright v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 244, 177 S.E. 753 (1934).

Graduated tax dependent on capacity.

- An ordinance which requires all gasoline filling stations to pay a license tax, the amount of which tax is graduated according to the capacity in gallons of the tanks located at such filling station, is not such an ordinance as will be declared void as being unreasonable and arbitrary. Wright v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 244, 177 S.E. 753 (1934).

An occupation tax may show a relation to the income of the taxpayer although it is not itself an income tax. Coolidge v. Mayor of Savannah, 128 Ga. App. 704, 197 S.E.2d 773 (1973).

Occupation tax reducing railroad franchise tax. State v. Express Co., 133 Ga. 113, 65 S.E. 282 (1909).

It is perfectly competent for the legislature to impose different amounts as taxes upon wholesalers, retailers, and manufacturers. Carswell v. Wright, 133 Ga. 714, 66 S.E. 905 (1910).

Manner of enforcing tax on laundry not discriminatory.

- Where although no fi. fa. had been issued against either of two other laundries subject to an occupational tax, although a fi. fa. was issued and levy made upon a truck belonging to the petitioner, the record disclosed that such proceedings against the petitioner were at the special instance and request of its counsel, in order that a test case might be made as to the legality of the ordinance in question, it could not be said that the ordinance, because of the manner of enforcement, was discriminatory and void. National Linen Serv. Corp. v. City of Gainesville, 181 Ga. 397, 182 S.E. 610 (1935).

The classification for taxation of distributors of motor fuels is not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unnatural, because it seeks to place in the same class and tax under one head distributors of motor fuel engaged in business as an occupation and for profit, and a political subdivision of the state not engaged in business, which uses such fuels for a purely governmental purpose. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929).

Taxation of sleeping cars owned by foreign corporation.

- The State Revenue Commissioner has no authority to assess for county taxation railroad sleeping cars owned by an Illinois corporation, the cars having no fixed situs in the county, but being temporarily out of train in a county, the assessment being based on average number and average value of the cars out of train, and being applied to one group consisting of Pullman cars which, in each day of a number of alleged taxable years, remained in the county as long as 24 hours, and another group consisting of additional cars in the county on each day of a number of alleged taxable years, the period of time being ascertained by adding the car hours for which such cars were in the county and dividing by 24. Forrester v. Pullman Co., 65 Ga. App. 112, 15 S.E.2d 461 (1941).

Disparity in application between Georgia corporations and domesticated foreign corporations prohibited.

- To so construe this constitutional exemption of property owned by a Georgia corporation and to deny its application to the same class or species of property when owned by a domesticated foreign corporation would violate state constitutional requirements which require that protection to person and property be impartial and complete, and that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and would also violate that provision of the U.S. Const., amend. 14, which declares that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Redwine v. Southern Co., 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194 (1950).

An occupation tax conditioned upon the amount of ad valorem tax is invalid. Wright v. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 127 Ga. 227, 56 S.E. 116 (1906).

Ad valorem tax not applicable to occupation and business taxes.

- The provision of this paragraph that "and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws," has no application to occupation and business taxes. Wright v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 244, 177 S.E. 753 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

A tax upon a business or occupation is not a tax upon property within the ad valorem and uniformity clause of this provision of the Constitution. Solomons v. Mayor of Savannah, 183 Ga. 631, 189 S.E. 230 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Uniformity taxation clause not violated.

- Georgia L. 1935, p. 81 (repealed by Ga. L. 1965, p. 373) imposing an excise tax on all oleomargarine sold in this state containing any fat or oil other than certain specified fats or oils, was not violative of the uniform taxation provision of this paragraph of the Constitution. Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S.E. 26 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Former Code 1933, §§ 42-551 - 42-555 (repealed by Ga. L. 1972, p. 1015, § 509) did not levy any tax upon dealers, producers, or producer-distributors, but exacted merely a license fee to be used in aid of the expenses of administration of the law as a health measure did not violate this paragraph. Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 188 Ga. 358, 3 S.E.2d 705 (1939) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Exemption to dealer-owned vehicles.

- Clause (b)(3) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III is broad enough to authorize the General Assembly to grant an exemption to dealer-owned vehicles, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-472(b), and is not in conflict with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Paras. I and II. Lowry v. McDuffie, 269 Ga. 202, 496 S.E.2d 727 (1998).

Disproportionate tax on out-of-state water users not invalid.

- Where the city has the right under its charter to furnish water to resident and nonresident users, and to classify the rates for such service, an ordinance, increasing the rates and fixing rates for nonresident users higher than for resident users, is not violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402 (1955).

Taxation of leasehold estate of state property.

- Under the general language of this paragraph, a leasehold estate in state owned property (governor's mansion) is taxable by a municipality. Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 818, 135 S.E. 68 (1926) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Local constitutional amendment gave discretion to board of commissioners.

- Local constitutional amendment authorizing county to impose business license taxes vests discretionary power in board of commissioners of that county, and the court cannot say that in imposing the tax on places of amusement charging an admission fee and not upon other places of amusement they have abused their discretion. Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 189 S.E.2d 439 (1972).

Classification must be based on reasonable ground.

- Only requirement with respect to classification for taxation purposes is that the classification must be based on some reasonable ground. The classification must be based on some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification. Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 189 S.E.2d 439 (1972).

Discretion did not violate equal protection or due process.

- Reasonable exercise of discretion, even to extent of imposing tax on one class and none on other classes, does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 189 S.E.2d 439 (1972).

This paragraph refers to subjects of taxation other than property and means only that if one kind of business, privilege, franchise, right, etc., is taxed, the tax shall be uniform and means only that if one kind of business, privilege, franchise, or right is taxed, the tax shall be uniform upon all of those who engage in that business. Lake Lanier Theatres v. Hall County, 229 Ga. 54, 189 S.E.2d 439 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

There is a relative sense in which mere local law can, with intelligible meaning, be called law of general obligation.

- If it acts upon the whole municipal area, and upon all persons and property therein, with the same comprehensive generality as it would act throughout the state were it applicable to the state at large, it is a law of general, though local, operation. This generality as to territory, with full generality as to subject matter, that is, that the tax shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed, within the given territory - is the generality which is needful. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888).

Ordinance was special law.

- The omission of property, which constitutionally had to be taxed under this paragraph, from village tax ordinance narrowed the ordinance into particular or special law, whereas the Constitution declares that all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws; hence, the ordinance was void. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Property subject to tax.

- The only classification of property, relative to taxation, that is made or authorized, is into exempt property, and property subject to be taxed; and taxation on all property subject to be taxed is required to be ad valorem, that is, according to value. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888).

Enumeration of property classes exhaustive.

- This paragraph has enumerated two classes of property, which enumeration the legislature, the courts, and the citizen must recognize as exhaustive. Property, whatever its species, is simply exempt or subject to tax. If exempt, it pays nothing; if subject, the amount it shall pay is measured by multiplying the fixed rate into the actual value. The result will be, in every instance, that all persons who own taxable property of equal value will pay the same amount of taxes, and all who own more than others will pay more, and all who own less will pay less. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Village tax ordinance imposing tax ad valorem upon real estate only is void by reason of conflict with the Constitution in not laying the tax ad valorem upon all property, real and personal, subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888).

Uniformity of tax rates is not required between city and city, when the levy is for municipal taxes; but it is required between every man's property and every other man's property in the same city or village. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888).

Storm water utility charges.

- Trial court properly concluded that a storm water utility charge which Columbia County (Georgia) imposed on property owners was not an invalid tax and that the county's method of apportioning costs of storm water services was not arbitrary. McLeod v. Columbia County, 278 Ga. 242, 599 S.E.2d 152 (2004).

Property subject to be taxed is treated as one single class, and the only division of it contemplated or allowable is by territorial lines coinciding with the territorial limits of the various authorities by which the taxes upon it are levied. There cannot be this rate on one species of property, and that on another, though there can be different rates for different cities or villages on all taxable property whatsoever. Verdery v. Village of Summerville, 82 Ga. 138, 8 S.E. 213 (1888).

Suit barred by laches.

- In suit in which plaintiffs sought, among other things to enjoin enforcement of tax executions, upon the ground that the city tax assessors from 1932 through 1937 intentionally and systematically discriminated against real estate and in favor of personal property in fixing the basis of value for taxation, the petition showed upon its face that the plaintiffs were guilty of such laches as to bar their claim for injunction to restrain the proposed tax sales because of alleged discrimination. Mayor of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132, 197 S.E. 253 (1938).

County land assessment procedures, including those that involve subclassification of real property, did not offend this constitutional provision unless they affected the uniformity of tangible property assessments, which under former Code 1933, § 92-5703, (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7) must be made at 40 percent of fair market value. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Ga. L. 1972, p. 1094 provides an adequate remedy for failure at the county level to obtain uniformity of assessment between individual taxpayers. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975).

Part 2, Art. 4, Ch. 5, T. 3 does not impose a state tax for state purposes, which would invoke this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I); instead, it imposes a state tax for local purposes, and the counties' adherence to the tests of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I and II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Paras. II and III), delineating the allowable scope of county purposes of taxation is all that is required. Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Tax levying cost of paving assessment against street railway company not unconstitutional.

- Acts amending the charter of Decatur and the ordinance padded thereunder by the municipal authorities ordering levying of cost of paving assessment against the street railway company and its property located therein and used by it in operation of said street-railway system, are not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 14, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II), neither are they in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I), against the taking of private property for public use without paying adequate compensation therefor as that provision relates to the exercise of the power of eminent domain; whereas the levying of any assessment for a local public benefit is imposed as a special tax in the exercise of the police power of the state. Neither do they violate this paragraph, which provides a uniform system of taxation for the general support of the government. Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 170 Ga. 699, 154 S.E. 268 (1930) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Tax reasonable revenue measure.

- Ordinance imposing a license tax on the right to operate butcher-shops and retail grocery stores, classified according to a graduated scale based on the number of meat blocks, or value of stock and fixtures, respectively, and number of hours operated, and applicable to all persons operating businesses of the designated classes within the city, were reasonable revenue measures, and not violative of this paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, Ga. Const. 1983 Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II), and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Ard v. City of Macon, 187 Ga. 127, 200 S.E. 678 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Graduated tax on different classes valid.

- Provisions of a city ordinance imposing a graduated tax on those persons using the streets for business purposes who use vehicles in connection therewith, in addition to the business tax required of them, and also levying a graduated tax for doing business on the streets upon carriers for hire, was not violative of this paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I), and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Solomons v. Mayor of Savannah, 183 Ga. 631, 189 S.E. 230 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Tax on single person.

- An amendment to a general tax assessment on property by a county commissioner which amounts to a new levy against a single tax payer violates this paragraph. Wright v. Southern Ry., 28 Ga. App. 545, 112 S.E. 171 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Over assessment of railroad's property unconstitutional.

- An assessment of the railroad's property at $18,700,000.00 under the ad valorem taxation provisions for public utilities (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 11, Ch. 5, T. 48), while the properties of other taxpayers in those counties are being assessed on a basis of value which would produce an assessment of the railroad's property at $13,692,342.00, violates this paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II), and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Undercofler v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 222 Ga. 822, 152 S.E.2d 878 (1966).

Tax by county commissioners violated uniformity provision.

- An Act authorizing the Commissioners of Fulton County to classify businesses in unincorporated areas of the county and to levy a tax thereon for general revenue purposes was invalid as being violative of the uniform-taxation provision of this paragraph. Fulton County v. Lockhart, 202 Ga. 878, 45 S.E.2d 220 (1947) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Ordinance imposing gross receipts tax on secondary suppliers of electricity.

- A city ordinance imposing a gross receipts tax on secondary suppliers of electricity that have not entered into franchise agreements pursuant to another ordinance, also applying to secondary suppliers, did not violate uniformity requirements of the constitution. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, 264 Ga. 769, 450 S.E.2d 410 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109, 115 S. Ct. 1960, 131 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995).

Methods employed in assessing value of property may be varied.

- Object of tax assessors must be to determine fair market value of property subject to taxation in county and methods employed may be varied if object is attained. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).

While tax assessor must use same standard - fair market value - or system - 40 percent of fair market value - in determining and fixing taxable value of all property of same class, it is not impermissible under uniformity of taxation provision of the Constitution to apply different methods of arriving at fair market value on tangible property. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).

Different valuation methods used.

- Utilization of different methods for determining fair market value for purposes of taxation creates no infirmity under the state Constitution or laws. Dougherty County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Burt Realty Co., 250 Ga. 467, 298 S.E.2d 475, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 3540, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1390 (1983).

Tax assessors have the authority to place property in homogeneous groups for the purpose of determining its value in relation to other and like property, and different valuation methods may be utilized. Harrington v. Baldwin County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 214 Ga. App. 178, 447 S.E.2d 300 (1994).

Location as determinant of value.

- Method of appraisal of rural property within a county which realistically emphasized the location of the property as determinant of value was not an impermissible subclassification of the same type of property in violation of the uniform taxation clause. Thomas County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Balfour Land Co., 214 Ga. App. 181, 446 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

Taxation on all real and tangible personal property subject to be taxed is required to be ad valorem - that is, according to value, and the requirement in the Constitution that the rule of taxation shall be uniform, means that all kinds of property of the same class not absolutely exempt must be taxed alike, by the same standard of valuation, equally with other taxable property of the same class, and coextensively with the territory to which it applies, meaning the territory from which the given tax, as a whole, is to be drawn. Colvard v. Ridley, 218 Ga. 490, 128 S.E.2d 732 (1962).

A classification exempting sale of agricultural products from taxation is reasonable. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 187 Ga. 117, 200 S.E. 712 (1938).

Construction of "property."

- "Property," within the meaning of this paragraph, providing that taxation should be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed, was not intended to include all species of property, but property upon which value can be placed, and which is capable of ownership. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 187 Ga. 117, 200 S.E. 712 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Sales of agricultural products were not property within the meaning of this paragraph, and hence former Code 1933, § 5-603, exempting such sales from taxation, was not inhibited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Paras. I-IV), providing that laws exempting property from taxation other than property therein enumerated were void, nor was former Code 1933, § 5-603 violative of the provision of this paragraph relating to uniformity of taxation upon the same class of subjects. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 187 Ga. 117, 200 S.E. 712 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Legislature has authority to classify as to taxes not on property within the meaning of the Constitution, and to be uniform such taxation need not be universal; certain objects may be its subjects and others may be exempted from its operation, all the law requires being that classifications be reasonable. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 187 Ga. 117, 200 S.E. 712 (1938).

Method of assessing land values not accurate reflection of value.

- Where assessors assigned vacant land a base value according to the district in which it was located, determined by the sale price of other vacant lands purchased for development, relying upon the property's highest and best use and the sales relied upon did not accurately reflect the value of other vacant land because such sales were often for special purposes such as schools or parks, or speculative development, evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate judgment that the assessors failed to consider the existing use of vacant land not commercial, industrial, or residential subdivision. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

"Existing use of property" cannot be assigned any particular value as real property is unique and the extent to which existing use affects its value is dependent upon a great variety of other factors. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

Existing use of property is not the exclusive factor in determining fair market value; the assessors are directed to consider also "existing zoning of property," "existing covenants or restrictions in deed dedicating the property to a particular use," or "any other factors deemed pertinent in arriving at fair market value." Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 244 Ga. 404, 260 S.E.2d 313 (1979).

Utilization of one method of determining fair market value of real property and another method of determining the fair market value of tangible personal property does not violate this paragraph. Wade v. Ray, 234 Ga. 234, 214 S.E.2d 923 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Authority of county board of tax assessors.

- The Court of Appeals of Georgia properly held that, although the county board of tax assessors could alter the assessment ratio proposed by the Georgia Revenue Commissioner on land owned by a utility in the course of making a final assessment of a utility's property, it could not alter the apportioned fair market value for the property used by the Commissioner in its proposed assessment. Monroe County v. Ga. Power Co., 283 Ga. 12, 655 S.E.2d 817 (2008).

Home site value added to all residences.

- A taxpayer did not show that the taxpayer's property was not uniformly taxed. The $2,500 home site value added to all residential property in the county was only one factor in the valuation of such property, and there was no evidence that the home site value resulted in some houses not being assessed at their fair market value. Smith v. Elbert County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 292 Ga. App. 417, 664 S.E.2d 786 (2008), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

Club membership appurtenant to property.

- Although taxpayers' memberships in a club were not subject to taxation, if a taxpayer relinquished that membership upon sale of the taxpayer's real estate, the buyer could apply for immediate membership, and such an application would normally be granted. Therefore, a county board of tax assessors would have violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 if it excluded the enhanced value of the properties attributable to the right to apply for such memberships from ad valorem taxation, because it was part of the properties' fair market value. Morton v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 294 Ga. App. 901, 670 S.E.2d 528 (2008).

Public property can be taxed.

- Construing together the provisions of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I), the Constitution does not prohibit taxing of public property. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Supreme Court has construed this to mean that all property within the limits of the state is subject to taxation, except such as the Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to exempt from taxation. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929).

Effect of construing tax immunity as applicable to in state corporation.

- To construe the tax immunity provision of the Georgia Constitution so as to make it applicable only to those cooperative, nonprofit, membership corporations which have been incorporated under the laws of this state for the purpose of engaging in rural electrification, and so as to deny its application to a like membership corporation when incorporated in another state and duly domesticated in this state for the purpose of engaging in rural electrification here, would be offensive to those provisions of the Georgia Constitution which require impartial and complete protection to person and property, and that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and also, offensive to that provision of the U.S. Const., amend. 14 which declares that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. City of McCaysville v. Tri-State Elec. Coop., 211 Ga. 5, 83 S.E.2d 598 (1954).

This paragraph shall not apply to persons, firms, or corporations hauling farm produce, livestock, and fertilizers exclusively; provided, that the width of load of trucks and trailers shall not be more than eight feet, was not unconstitutional and void as violative of this paragraph. Southern Transf. Co. v. Harrison, 171 Ga. 358, 155 S.E. 338 (1930) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

A leasehold granted to a railroad in a charter granting certain exemptions, is not taxable, and such exemptions are not affected by a subsequent merger. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 250 U.S. 519, 40 S. Ct. 1, 63 L. Ed. 1123 (1919), aff'g, 248 U.S. 525, 39 S. Ct. 181, 63 L. Ed. 401 (1919).

County homestead exemptions did not violate the Uniformity Clause.

- County homestead exemptions were constitutional under the Tax Exemption Clauses of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. II, although the nature of tax exemptions was at odds with the equality of taxation sought by the Uniformity Clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III. Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 702 S.E.2d 145 (2010).

City's authority to levy and collect taxes.

- Authority to levy and collect taxes, not otherwise prohibited by state law or constitutional provision, may be conferred upon a city by amendment to the city charter provided such charter provision satisfies the requirements in this paragraph that the tax have uniform application throughout the territorial limits of the city and that it be for a public purpose. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-521.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III).

Board members are personally liable for the illegal expenditure of public tax funds. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-172.

County tax funds cannot be used to construct or maintain privately owned driveways or roads. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-172.

Administrative caps on assistance grants prohibited.

- Because neither Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III nor the Forest Land Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.7, authorize or contemplate a cap on assistance grants based on the total exemption value of forest land conservation use property, the Department of Revenue would not be authorized to impose an administrative cap on assistance grants issued pursuant to the Forest Land Protection Act of 2008 in the manner proposed. 2016 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 16-5.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 113 et seq.

ALR.

- Tax on automobile or on its use for cost of road or street construction, improvement, or maintenance, 24 A.L.R. 937; 68 A.L.R. 200.

Classification of coal for purposes of taxation, 24 A.L.R. 1225.

Tax on automobile, or on its use, for cost of road or street construction, improvement, or maintenance, 68 A.L.R. 200.

Constitutionality and construction of statute providing for or authorizing waiver or reduction of penalty or interest in respect of taxes in default, 68 A.L.R. 431; 79 A.L.R. 999.

Constitutionality of chain store tax, 73 A.L.R. 1481; 85 A.L.R. 736; 112 A.L.R. 305.

Constitutionality of statute permitting payment of taxes in installments, 101 A.L.R. 1335.

Defects in tax proceedings, affecting liability for tax, that may be remedied by curative statute, 140 A.L.R. 959.

Legislative power to further classify within class specifically named by constitutional provision in relation to taxation, 162 A.L.R. 1051.

State taxation of motor carriers as affected by commerce clause, 17 A.L.R.2d 421.

Real estate tax equalization, reassessment, or revaluation program commenced but not completed within the year, as violative of constitutional provisions requiring equal and uniform taxation, 76 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Validity of governmental borrowing or expenditure for purposes of acquiring, maintaining, or improving stadium for use of professional athletic team, 67 A.L.R.3d 1186.

Property taxation of computer software, 82 A.L.R.3d 606.

Classification, as real estate or personal property, of mobile homes or trailers for purposes of state or local taxation, 7 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of state and local public-utility-gross-receipts-tax statutes - modern cases, 58 A.L.R.5th 187.