
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Divorce cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides, if a resident of this state; if the defendant is not a resident of this state, then in the county in which the plaintiff resides; provided, however, a divorce case may be tried in the county of residence of the plaintiff if the defendant has moved from that same county within six months from the date of the filing of the divorce action and said county was the site of the marital domicile at the time of the separation of the parties, and provided, further, that any person who has been a resident of any United States army post or military reservation within the State of Georgia for one year next preceding the filing of the petition may bring an action for divorce in any county adjacent to said United States army post or military reservation.
(Ga. Const. 1983, Art. 6, § 2, Para. 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2430, § 1/HR 585.)
- Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. I.
- Exclusive jurisdiction in the superior court, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I and § 19-5-1.
Residency requirements, § 19-5-2.
- The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1990, p. 2430, § 1) which rewrote Paragraph I was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election held on November 6, 1990.
- For article, "Current Problems With Venue in Georgia," see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 71 (1975). For article surveying developments in Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1981). For comment on Musgrove v. Musgrove, 213 Ga. 610, 100 S.E.2d 577 (1957), upholding validity of divorce decree granted in county other than residence of defendant when defendant waived process and consented to trial elsewhere, see 20 Ga. B.J. 548 (1958). For comment on Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distrib., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 428 (1972).
Impleading of a third-party defendant under this section is an ancillary "suit" or "case" so it must satisfy within itself the venue requirements of the Constitution but is an ancillary proceeding with its venue resting upon that of the main action. Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), commented on in 8 Ga. St. B.J. 428 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
Cited in Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443 (1939); Jones v. State, 70 Ga. App. 431, 28 S.E.2d 373 (1943); Tatum v. Tatum, 203 Ga. 406, 46 S.E.2d 915 (1948); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Ward v. Ward, 223 Ga. 868, 159 S.E.2d 81 (1968); Hunt v. Hunt, 225 Ga. 276, 168 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 234 Ga. 304, 215 S.E.2d 674 (1975); Alcorn v. Alcorn, 245 Ga. 1, 262 S.E.2d 778 (1980); Reno v. Reno, 247 Ga. 560, 277 S.E.2d 511 (1981); Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Browne v. Browne, 258 Ga. 636, 373 S.E.2d 366 (1988).
- The purpose of the state constitution's venue requirement is to protect defendants in divorce actions from having to respond in a foreign, and perhaps hostile court. Williams v. Williams, 259 Ga. 788, 387 S.E.2d 334 (1990).
Where a defendant in a divorce action lives outside of Georgia, the action may be brought in the plaintiff's county of residence. A trial court's finding that venue over a divorce action was improper in Fulton County was error and was reversed where, although the wife had returned to Britain, the husband continued to maintain his residency in Fulton County. Cooke v. Cooke, 277 Ga. 731, 594 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
- The provisions of the state constitution relating to venue in divorce cases are neither mandatory nor exhaustive. Williams v. Williams, 259 Ga. 788, 387 S.E.2d 334 (1990).
- Under certain circumstances both jurisdiction of the person and venue can be conferred by consent. Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 286 S.E.2d 293 (1982).
- Husband's affidavit waived any objection to venue in an uncontested divorce proceeding where the husband was a Chatham County resident and the wife was a resident of Clayton County, and they had agreed to obtain the divorce in Clayton County to save money. Williams v. Williams, 259 Ga. 788, 387 S.E.2d 334 (1990).
- Husband did not waive the defense of improper venue by signing a separation agreement that purported to settle the rights of the parties but did not contain any mention of venue. Bonner v. Bonner, 272 Ga. 545, 533 S.E.2d 72 (2000).
In an action for divorce it is necessary to allege correct venue, as prescribed by this paragraph, and to make affirmative proof thereof. Johnson v. Johnson, 188 Ga. 800, 4 S.E.2d 807 (1939) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
- A judgment of divorce in which the venue was improper was void. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 268 Ga. 724, 492 S.E.2d 887 (1997).
To authorize a valid judgment in a divorce action the allegation of venue must be supported by evidence. Stewart v. Stewart, 195 Ga. 460, 24 S.E.2d 672 (1943).
- The pendency of a suit for divorce in another state, which was dismissed only a short time before filing of a suit for divorce in this state, does not disprove the positive testimony of the plaintiff that the plaintiff had been a bona fide resident of this state for 12 months prior to the filing of the plaintiff's suit. Bellamy v. Bellamy, 187 Ga. 804, 2 S.E.2d 413 (1939).
- Contrary to the wife's claim, venue was proper in Houston County because the record showed that the wife gave the marital address as the wife's place of residence and the residence was located in Houston County. Rymuza v. Rymuza, 292 Ga. 98, 734 S.E.2d 384 (2012).
- Where both parties are residents of this state, a divorce is invalid unless the suit is brought in the county where the defendant resides. Moody v. Moody, 194 Ga. 843, 22 S.E.2d 837 (1942); Musgrove v. Musgrove, 213 Ga. 610, 100 S.E.2d 577 (1957), commented on in 20 Ga. B.J. 548 (1958).
- Where husband was confined in a penitentiary in a county other than that in which he and his wife resided, the venue was in the latter county. McLeod v. McLeod, 144 Ga. 359, 87 S.E. 286 (1915).
- As to venue of suit to annul marriage with nonresident, see Cale v. Davis, 135 Ga. 185, 68 S.E. 1101 (1910).
The residence of an individual cannot be shifted to another county where the individual has a business, so that the latter county may be the proper venue of a suit against the individual because of a tort committed by the individual's agents in the county where the tort was committed. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).
A decree in a suit brought in a county other than that in which the defendant was a resident is void. Allen v. Allen, 218 Ga. 364, 127 S.E.2d 902 (1962).
- Where husband in divorce suit alleged that wife was not a resident of this state, and wife in her answer alleged she was a resident of this state, but of a different county than that in which suit had been brought, verdict in favor of divorce was void, for the reason that the husband could sue only in the county of his wife's residence; and if the answer of the wife be taken as true, and if she was in fact a nonresident of the state, there having been no service by publication or otherwise, the judgment for divorce would also be void. Jones v. Jones, 181 Ga. 747, 184 S.E. 271 (1936).
There is no inhibition against impleading a party who resides in county other than that in which main action pends. Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179 S.E.2d 68 (1971), commented on in 8 Ga. St. B.J. 428 (1972).
- Since venue for divorce lies only in county of residence of defendant, in a suit for separate maintenance, venue may be proper for the main claim and improper for a counterclaim for divorce where parties reside in different counties. Herring v. Herring, 246 Ga. 462, 271 S.E.2d 857 (1980).
- While former Code 1933, § 30-107 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-5-2), in conferring jurisdiction in divorce suits, might not exact citizenship, the word "resident" as used therein was equivalent to domicile; and a nonresident of Georgia cannot acquire a Georgia domicile, such as would authorize the bringing of a divorce suit, under the statute by residing on or within a United States military reservation. Darbie v. Darbie, 195 Ga. 769, 25 S.E.2d 685 (1943).
- The General Assembly has no right to provide that a natural person, an individual, who lives and has a domicile and residence in one county, and the individual's domicile and residence is fixed there under the law as it stands, should be deemed also to be a resident, for certain purposes, of another county. A general law may fix the general place of the individual's residence; but when the individual has a residence and domicile fixed and established in accordance with the law, the legislature cannot declare that the individual may also be a resident of another county at the same time. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).
- To effect a change of domicile there must be an avowed intent which may be shown by declarations or acts equivalent thereto, and an actual removal. Temporary absence from the county by a man who has no family does not operate to change the man's domicile. Bellamy v. Bellamy, 187 Ga. 804, 2 S.E.2d 413 (1939).
- Allegation of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in this paragraph and O.C.G.A. § 19-5-2 is essential to applications for divorce. Rice v. Rice, 223 Ga. 363, 155 S.E.2d 393 (1967) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
- Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).
- The essential allegations in a petition for divorce, including jurisdiction, must be established by evidence, and the burden of proving such allegations rests upon the plaintiff. Johnson v. Johnson, 222 Ga. 433, 150 S.E.2d 684 (1966).
Parties cannot by waiver or agreement confer jurisdiction upon the court where the essential jurisdictional matters stated in this paragraph are absent. Stewart v. Stewart, 195 Ga. 460, 24 S.E.2d 672 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
- Since no valid judgment can be rendered in a divorce case where the court is without jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court, when apprised of the fact that it has no jurisdiction, to dismiss the case at any stage of the proceeding, with or without motion therefor. Cohen v. Cohen, 209 Ga. 459, 74 S.E.2d 95 (1953).
- Petitioner in divorce action carries the burden of proving the jurisdiction of the court, and this duty is no less incumbent upon the defendant who asks for alimony; in neither instance can jurisdiction be conferred by consent or by waiver. Jones v. Jones, 181 Ga. 747, 184 S.E. 271 (1936); Stewart v. Stewart, 195 Ga. 460, 24 S.E.2d 672 (1943).
- While the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the court, where the record shows that the parties affirmatively conceded and confirmed the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the person and subject matter, and the court rendered a divorce decree in the case, neither party can thereafter attack the decree as being void for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter. Herring v. Herring, 246 Ga. 462, 271 S.E.2d 857 (1980).
A divorce granted by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties is a nullity. Harmon v. Harmon, 209 Ga. 474, 74 S.E.2d 75 (1953).
- Even though the allegations showed that the defendant was a resident of a foreign jurisdiction, yet where the defendant was personally served with process while sojourning within the state and county in which the court was located, where the petitioner resided, the court acquired jurisdiction under this paragraph and O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-33, and50-2-21. Miller v. Miller, 216 Ga. 535, 118 S.E.2d 85 (1961) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
If defendant in suit acknowledges service of suit, the presumption is that judgment rendered is based upon proper allegations and proof of jurisdiction as to the parties. Hardin v. Hardin, 218 Ga. 39, 126 S.E.2d 216 (1962).
- Where in an action for divorce brought by wife, the husband appeared and filed an answer denying allegations as to residence and also filed a plea to the jurisdiction, the question as to jurisdiction was litigated despite the fact that he had not appeared to defend the action in person, and the result was binding on the husband, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, unmixed with negligence on his part. Johnson v. Johnson, 188 Ga. 800, 4 S.E.2d 807 (1939).
- Defendant husband, having participated in divorce suit, having admitted jurisdiction of the court, and having obtained the benefit of the decree by another marriage, could not afterwards have the verdict and decree set aside for want of jurisdiction. Davis v. Davis, 191 Ga. 333, 11 S.E.2d 884 (1940).
- Lack of jurisdiction renders the divorce decree null and void. Gates v. Gates, 197 Ga. 11, 28 S.E.2d 108 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I).
- Where the record in a divorce case fails to contain any averment or evidence as to the residence of the plaintiff husband in the county where suit was brought against a resident of another state, it was error to refuse a new trial on general grounds. Wade v. Wade, 195 Ga. 748, 25 S.E.2d 683 (1943).
- In an original suit in equity for decree declaring void and of no effect verdict and decree in divorce suit, on grounds that court was without jurisdiction of the case, because at the time of filing of suit for divorce defendant was a resident of Clayton County, whereas the suit was brought in Fulton County, the alleged want of jurisdiction was sufficient ground of attack upon verdict and decree of divorce as void and ineffectual. Haygood v. Haygood, 190 Ga. 445, 9 S.E.2d 834 (1940).
- Fact that plaintiff husband had brought a petition to modify divorce judgment void for lack of jurisdiction, in which he was unsuccessful and where he filed no exception, would not create such a ratification of the judgment as to make valid that which was void, nor would the fact that the husband, without excepting to the original judgment, had paid alimony in pursuance of the judgment for several years, affect the result. Jones v. Jones, 181 Ga. 747, 184 S.E. 271 (1936).
Where it appears upon the face of the record that the court was without jurisdiction of a divorce case the judgment was void ab initio; and being void the defendant would not be guilty of contempt of court for failing to pay alimony awarded by said judgment. Johnson v. Johnson, 222 Ga. 433, 150 S.E.2d 684 (1966).
Divorce decrees without jurisdiction are nullities; a divorce granted by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties is a nullity. Johnson v. Johnson, 222 Ga. 433, 150 S.E.2d 684 (1966).
Failure to make proof of venue will render a verdict for divorce subject to be set aside by proper procedure, and such proof is essential, even though the absence of this jurisdictional averment may be supplied by amendment. Wade v. Wade, 195 Ga. 748, 25 S.E.2d 683 (1943).
- A husband's confinement under penitentiary sentence in another county is not a voluntary change of domicile and proper venue of his wife's subsequent divorce proceeding against him would be the county where he resided before confinement. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 88.
- 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 88.
- 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 1 et seq., 170 et seq.
- 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 91 et seq.
- Estoppel to assert invalidity of decree of divorce for lack of domicile at divorce forum or failure to obtain jurisdiction of person of defendant, 140 A.L.R. 914; 153 A.L.R. 941; 175 A.L.R. 538.
Venue of divorce action in particular county as dependent on residence or domicile for specified length of time, 54 A.L.R.2d 898.
Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen, 73 A.L.R.3d 431.