Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and antecedent provisions are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Jurisdiction of superior court judges is coextensive with the limits of this state. Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910).

Legislature and judges have no authority to alter superior court jurisdiction.

- The Constitution has vested all the judicial power in the courts of the state, and neither the legislature nor a judge, nor the judges of a superior court have authority to limit or expand the jurisdiction and authority of a superior court. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Court may be presided over by more than one judge.

- There is only one superior court in each county, but the court may be presided over by more than one judge, and the court may be divided into divisions, each presided over by a different judge. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Judges in multi-judge circuits have coequal jurisdiction and authority, yet are subject to reasonable rules designed to expedite the business of the court by adopting a manner or method for distribution of the business of the court among the judges. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Judges of the superior court are coequal in jurisdiction and authority. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Paragraph does not prohibit increase in number of sittings.

- This paragraph requires at least two sittings of the superior court in each county, but does not prohibit more sittings to be held, nor does it prohibit two or more sections of the superior court presided over by different judges sitting at the same time. Bone v. State, 86 Ga. 108, 12 S.E. 205 (1890); Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910); Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Special term of court for trial of criminal offenses may be authorized. Grinad v. State, 34 Ga. 270 (1866); Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 553 (1873).

Court may be presided over by more than one judge.

- There is only one superior court in each county, but the court may be presided over by more than one judge, and the court may be divided into divisions, each presided over by a different judge. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Judge may receive guilty plea in county other than where crime committed.

- A judge of the superior court has jurisdiction under this paragraph to receive a plea of guilty in a county of the judge's circuit other than the county in which the crime is alleged to have been committed. Thompson v. Lynn, 215 Ga. 165, 109 S.E.2d 522 (1959) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Lack of uniformity in disposing of cases permitted.

- This paragraph, in stating that the legislature shall have authority to regulate the manner in which the judges in multi-judge circuits shall dispose of the business of the court, permits lack of uniformity in this respect in multi-judge circuits. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

This paragraph is not violated by local Act authorizing sections of the court to sit in certain counties. Bone v. State, 86 Ga. 108, 12 S.E. 205 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Local Act permitting Governor to appoint judge for a state circuit does not violate this paragraph. Ross v. Jones, 151 Ga. 425, 107 S.E. 160 (1921) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Election held under paragraph not affected by paragraph providing for filling vacancy in unexpired term.

- An election held at the time prescribed by this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I) to fill the office for the next ensuing four-year term is not affected by the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. III), which provide not for the election of a judge for the next ensuing four-year term, but for the filling of a vacancy for the portion of the unexpired term occasioned by the death or resignation of the incumbent. Hooper v. Almand, 196 Ga. 52, 25 S.E.2d 778 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Cited in Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 736 S.E.2d 397 (2013); City of Union Point v. Greene County, Ga. , S.E.2d (Mar. 15, 2018).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, relating to the power of superior courts to hear matters at any time in vacation, or term, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph enlarges jurisdiction of judges of superior court as to hearing and determination of matters in vacation. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817, 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Judge empowered to rule on demurrers (now motions to dismiss) at any time.

- Under the broad power conferred by this paragraph, the judges of the superior court are authorized, on reasonable notice to the parties, to hear, determine, and enter a final judgment on demurrers (now motions to dismiss) in vacation, at chambers, at interlocutory hearings, or at any time, whether before or after the appearance day of an action. Reardon v. Bland, 206 Ga. 633, 58 S.E.2d 377 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Judge may set aside judgment rendered in vacation.

- Under the terms of this paragraph the judge is empowered, for sufficient cause and on proper pleading, to vacate and set aside any order or judgment which the judge was theretofore authorized by law to render in vacation and which the judge did actually render during the same vacation period, and to this extent it is self-executing; in such case the judge will act as a court of general jurisdiction where previously the judge's authority or jurisdiction may have been limited or conditional. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817, 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Any judgment authorized by this paragraph may be attended by presumption of regularity. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817, 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VI).

Presumption of proper notice operative even when judgment rendered in vacation.

- Where the record is silent as to notice, reasonable and proper notice to the parties will be presumed under the principle that any judgment of a court of general jurisdiction will be presumed valid until the contrary appears. This presumption prevails in favor of judgments rendered in vacation, as well as those rendered in term, where the matter so dealt with in vacation was one of which the judge had jurisdiction in vacation to the same extent as in term. Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Garrett ex rel. Le Sueur, 192 Ga. 817, 16 S.E.2d 753 (1941).

Right of new party to preparation time may be waived.

- The right of a new party, who was not made a party defendant until the date of trial and judgment, to have the same time within which to prepare for trial as if the new party had been one of the original parties to the cause may be waived. Barfield v. Aiken, 209 Ga. 483, 74 S.E.2d 100 (1953).

Parties to mandamus action in which there are issues of fact may waive their right to jury trial either tacitly or expressly. City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407, 240 S.E.2d 881 (1977).

Waiver of jury trial at first trial of civil case applies to retrials of same case. City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407, 240 S.E.2d 881 (1977).

Judgment at chambers requires reasonable notice.

- The power of the superior courts to determine issues by final judgment at chambers in any county in the judicial circuit when a jury verdict is not required may be exercised only after reasonable notice to the parties. Hinson v. Hinson, 218 Ga. 447, 128 S.E.2d 487 (1962).

Cited in Bush v. Reeves, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2005).

Judge eligible for emeritus appointment not required to make contribution to retirement fund.

- If a superior court judge who is eligible for emeritus appointment is appointed or elected to another office of profit or trust, the judge is not required to make further contributions to the Superior Court Judges Retirement Fund while holding such other office. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-9.

Since superior court judges are elected officials, they are not covered by workers' compensation law. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-71.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 149, 164, 166, 210.