Construction of language.

- The language, "next preceding the expiration of their respective terms," was intended to designate the election at which the district attorneys should be elected for the full term of four years, and was not intended to designate the "general election" at which a successor should be elected in case of a vacancy. Copland v. Wohlwender, 197 Ga. 782, 30 S.E.2d 462 (1944).

Age at time of election.

- The word "election" as it appears in this provision means the day votes are cast, not the day when they are finally tabulated and certified by the Secretary of State. Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 298 S.E.2d 480 (1983) (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Para. I, relating to qualifications of district attorneys and other officials).

"Lawful practice" defined.

- The three-year practice requirement, one of the qualifications for district attorney, of this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 24-2901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-18-3) contemplated lawful practice and lawful practice was defined as the practice of law as an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Ga. 569, 247 S.E.2d 104 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I).

Three-year practice requirement does not include legal practice in other states. Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Ga. 569, 247 S.E.2d 104 (1978).

Qualifications at time of appointment.

- This paragraph does not either expressly, or by inference, by any of its terms, purport to deal with the qualifications of a district attorney at the time of the district attorney's election or appointment. Ray v. Hand, 225 Ga. 589, 170 S.E.2d 692 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I).

Time of effectiveness of active-status membership.

- Where an attorney was sworn in to practice law on Nov. 5, 1981, and the attorney's membership application and dues were received by the State Bar within 60 days as contemplated by the bar's rules, the attorney's active-status membership was effective upon the date of the attorney's admission in the superior court, and thus the attorney was qualified for election as district attorney on Nov. 6, 1984. Weaver v. Cleland, 253 Ga. 482, 322 S.E.2d 56 (1984).

District attorneys performing duties are immune in civil cases.

- District attorneys who send a letter to the parole board describing aspects of crimes, giving their opinion, and including an autobiographical manuscript detailing a murder are protected by the same immunity in civil cases which is applicable to judges, provided their acts are within the scope of their jurisdiction and intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 213 Ga. App. 545, 445 S.E.2d 535 (1994), cert. denied, 5 U.S. 1040, 115 S. Ct. 1409, 131 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1995).

District attorney's function as calendar clerk not unconstitutional.

- Internal Operating Procedure 2000-3 of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit, under which a district attorney set the time for a defendant's arraignment for aggravated assault and related charges in a road rage incident, was not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers and did not require dismissal of the charges against the defendant; the functions of the district attorney were not exclusively executive, as shown by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I(d), O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6(3), and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 30.1. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Internal Operating Procedure 2000-3 of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit, which appoints the district attorney to act as calendar clerk for criminal matters, including setting the time for arraignments, merely aids the judges in the Appalachian Judicial Circuit in organizing their courts and is not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers; the functions of the district attorney are not exclusively executive, as shown by the requirement in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I(d) that the district attorney must perform such other services as shall be required by law, the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 15-18-6(3) that the district attorney shall aid the presiding judge in organizing the courts as the presiding judge may require, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 30.1, providing that the judge or the judge's designee shall set the time of an arraignment. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Department of Transportation condemnation cases prosecuted by Department of Law and not district attorney.

- In condemnation cases which are brought by the Department of Transportation, it is "otherwise specially provided for" that the Department of Law and not the solicitor general (now district attorney) shall prosecute such actions. State Hwy. Dep't v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 529, 171 S.E.2d 575 (1969).

Proceeding for removal from office of county board of education members properly brought by district attorney.

- A county board of education was a political subdivision of the state, an agency through which the county acted in school matters, and the state had an interest in whether or not members of a county school board were competent and qualified to act; hence, a proceeding for removal from office of members of a county board of education under former Code 1933, § 32-905 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-53) was properly brought by the district attorney of the county in the state's name. State v. Walker, 88 Ga. App. 413, 76 S.E.2d 852 (1953).

Paragraph not applicable to divorce cases where state not named nor appears as a party.

- According to the usual and ordinary signification of the language employed, this clause applies only to cases in which the state is a formal party, and would not include a divorce case in which the state has not been named and has not appeared as a party, although the state has an interest in all divorce cases. Boykin v. Martocello, 194 Ga. 867, 22 S.E.2d 790 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I).

Private citizen cannot procure private practitioner to file appeals in state's name when district attorney decides against appeal.

- Where the state, through its authorized legal arm, does not wish to appeal and takes no action in a matter, there is no provision of law allowing a private citizen to procure the services of a private practitioner to file appeals in the name of the state, that being the constitutional and statutory duty of the office of the district attorney. State v. Trice, 150 Ga. App. 588, 258 S.E.2d 270 (1979).

Special prosecutor may take part in prosecution of a case on behalf of the state, and by inference of an appeal therefrom, if the special prosecutor is subject to the direction and control of the district attorney. State v. Trice, 150 Ga. App. 588, 258 S.E.2d 270 (1979).

Performance of duties in another circuit.

- A district attorney may be authorized to perform duties in a county constituting another circuit, but which formerly was embraced in the district attorney's own circuit. Godbee v. State, 141 Ga. 515, 81 S.E. 876 (1914).

A district attorney in a judicial circuit of this state was not disqualified by this paragraph, and former Code 1933, §§ 24-2913, 24-2914 and 24-2908 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-18-5 and15-18-6), or by any other law, to appear before courts of a different judicial circuit at the request of the prosecution on a trial for murder, and assist the district attorney of the latter circuit in the prosecution, notwithstanding the last mentioned officer was not indisposed, or disqualified from interest or relationship, or absent from the circuit, and such assistance was not requisitioned by the presiding judge. Floyd v. State, 182 Ga. 549, 186 S.E. 556 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I).

Effect of failure to give sufficient notice of sanction of writ of certiorari to district attorney.

- A failure to give the district attorney at least ten days written notice of sanction of a writ of certiorari to which the state is a party and of the time and place of hearing, unless prevented by unavoidable cause, or to obtain a waiver of such notice, is fatal to the proceedings; and service upon and notice to the district attorney of the criminal court is insufficient to cure the defect. Washburn v. Thompson, 78 Ga. App. 133, 50 S.E.2d 761 (1948).

Effect of failure to serve notice of appeal upon district attorney.

- Where a misdemeanor was tried in county criminal court and from judgment therein a certiorari was taken to the superior court and, upon judgment entered after hearing, overruling and denying petition for certiorari, a bill of exceptions was sued out to the Court of Appeals, such bill of exceptions should have been served upon the district attorney of the circuit, and since the district attorney was not so served, and did not acknowledge or waive service, the motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions would be granted. Welch v. State, 91 Ga. App. 86, 84 S.E.2d 838 (1954).

Fixing of district attorney's salary by grand jury or probate judge.

- Statute that delegates to grand jury and judge of probate court authority to fix salary to be paid district attorney for years subsequent to 1932 is violative of this paragraph which vests in the General Assembly power to prescribe such salaries, and is violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. I, Para. I) of the Constitution which vests the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly. Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 187 S.E. 20 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I).

Scope of immunity.

- A district attorney is protected by the same immunity in civil cases that is applicable to judges, provided that the district attorney's acts are within the scope of his jurisdiction. Robbins v. Lanier, 198 Ga. App. 592, 402 S.E.2d 342 (1991).

Decision to file charges is protected.

- A prosecutor's decision to file formal criminal charges against an individual is an act intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, for which act the prosecutor would be protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Robbins v. Lanier, 198 Ga. App. 592, 402 S.E.2d 342 (1991).

Counties within circuits legislating individually regarding district attorneys prohibited.

- As to whether it is possible, in a judicial circuit including several counties, to allow each county to legislate separately in regard to the district attorney, such separate treatment would contravene the intent of the state's Constitution; the intent was to treat the judicial circuit as the appropriate legal unit and not subdivide it further when providing for compensation of the district attorney and whether the district attorney may engage in the private practice of law; therefore, the judicial circuit should be dealt with as a unit rather than as individual counties. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-453.

Procedure to fill office after withdrawal of person elected in general election.

- A special election called by the Secretary of State is the proper procedure to fill the office of district attorney for the full four-year term beginning January 1, in the event the person elected to such office in the November general election has withdrawn. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-120.

A person elected to fill a vacancy in the office of district attorney holds only for the unexpired term. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 281.

A district attorney cannot run in the same election for one-half of an unexpired term and for an additional full term. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-77.

Service by third-year law student as legal assistant to district attorney not lawful practice of law.

- A third-year law student who served as a legal assistant to a district attorney pursuant to former Code 1933, § 9-401.2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-18-22) did not thereby become "duly admitted and licensed to practice law in the superior courts" for the purposes of determining eligibility to the office of district attorney under former Code 1933, § 24-2901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-18-3). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-28.

Representing sheriff indicted for federal violation in performance of duties.

- Where sheriff or other enforcement officer is charged or indicted for federal violation in performance of duties, the Attorney General may order a district attorney to represent the sheriff in defense of the charge. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 67.

Role of State Commission on Compensation.

- State Commission on Compensation may make recommendations to General Assembly concerning elimination, increase or decrease of county supplements of salaries of district attorneys. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-173.1.

One county of a judicial circuit cannot legally place a district attorney who is on the fee system on salary. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 317.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 27 C.J.S., District and Prosecuting Attorneys, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of assistant or deputy prosecuting or district attorney to file information, or to sign or prosecute it in his own name, 80 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Validity, under state law, of appointment of independent special prosecutor to handle political or controversial prosecutions or investigations of persons other than regular prosecutor, 84 A.L.R.3d 29.

Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to self-interest or prejudice of jurors as taxpayers as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 60 A.L.R.4th 1063.