Case transferred when not within jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

- Where allegations and prayers of the petition do not make a case which comes within the jurisdiction of Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the writ of error and the case must be transferred. Bond v. Ray, 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951), commented on in 3 Mercer L. Rev. 220 (1951).

Erroneous decision of Court of Appeals within its exclusive jurisdiction is final and binding in that case. Saffold v. Mangum, 139 Ga. 119, 76 S.E. 858 (1912); Buck v. Duval, 139 Ga. 599, 77 S.E. 809 (1913).

Decisions of Supreme Court are precedents in other cases. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Glawson, 140 Ga. 507, 79 S.E. 136 (1913); Holmes v. Southern Ry., 145 Ga. 172, 88 S.E. 924 (1916).

The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind the Court of Appeals as precedents, and the Court of Appeals is not authorized by this paragraph to request a review by the Supreme Court of a decision rendered by the Supreme Court. Cargile v. State, 194 Ga. 20, 20 S.E.2d 416, answer conformed to, 67 Ga. App. 610, 21 S.E.2d 326 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

The appellate court was not at liberty to overrule the established line of authority for the hearsay rule to which the Supreme Court of the state adhered. Day v. State, 235 Ga. App. 771, 510 S.E.2d 579 (1998).

Decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals that were inconsistent with Georgia Supreme Court precedent were not binding.

- Following the defendant's conviction for attempted murder, there was no change in the law because McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (2013) applying the rule of lenity when there was ambiguity between two felony punishments, was dictated by the Supreme Court's own precedents. Contrary cases by the Georgia Court of Appeals were never binding precedents. Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 784 S.E.2d 341 (2016).

Supreme Court decisions need not be unanimous.

- As to the Court of Appeals, a Supreme Court decision is a binding precedent even though not unanimous. Life Ins. Co. v. Lawler, 211 Ga. 246, 85 S.E.2d 1 (1954).

A decision rendered by a divided Supreme Court is authoritative as a precedent, and, although a decision of the Supreme Court may have been rendered by a divided court, the Court of Appeals is nevertheless bound thereby. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Michael, 43 Ga. App. 703, 160 S.E. 93 (1931).

Effect of Court of Appeals' opinions on trial court.

- A trial court, regardless of its good intentions, cannot decide to disregard the opinions of the Court of Appeals. Eastgate Assocs. v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 200 Ga. App. 872, 410 S.E.2d 129, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 896, 410 S.E.2d 129 (1991).

Where the opinion of the Court of Appeals was not appealed by either party, the holdings therein were binding on the trial court. Jackson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 217 Ga. App. 498, 458 S.E.2d 377 (1995).

Argument of reliance on precedent without merit.

- There was no merit in contention of insurer that a policy should be construed in accordance with named earlier decisions of the Court of Appeals relating to similar policies, upon the theory that, in the absence of any other pertinent decision at the time, the parties in issuing and accepting the instant policy presumably relied upon those decisions as to how it should be construed. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Barron, 198 Ga. 1, 30 S.E.2d 879 (1944).

Court of Appeals cannot render advisory opinion as such, although in many cases where the principal question decided leaves the case for further treatment in the lower court, instructions are often given for the guidance of the lower court and counsel for the parties. Harmon v. Southern Ry., 123 Ga. App. 309, 180 S.E.2d 604 (1971).

Court of Appeals has the power to entertain a petition for mandamus or prohibition in order to enforce its judgments. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Moran, 248 Ga. 461, 284 S.E.2d 256 (1981).

Court of Appeals without power to require lower court judge to issue writ returnable before the judge for trial.

- While the Supreme Court may aid a party by the writ of mandamus to bring to it the party's case from the lower court, as by issuing the writ to compel the judge to certify a bill of exceptions or to require the proper officers to perform their legal duties in reference to such proceeding, it is without any power or jurisdiction to require the judge of the lower court to issue a writ returnable before the judge for the purpose of trial. This rule is equally applicable to the Court of Appeals. McPhail v. Bagley, 96 Ga. App. 179, 99 S.E.2d 500 (1957).

Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to construe constitutional provision.

- In reversing a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, the Georgia Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction by construing a constitutional provision that had not previously been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court and then applying the newly construed provision to the facts of the case. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 284 Ga. 434, 668 S.E.2d 247 (2008).

Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a debtor's claim of state court judicial misconduct after the stay was lifted to permit a state court suit involving the debtor to proceed because nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 157 granted the court appellate power over, or disciplinary power, or oversight responsibility of the state court. Proper forum for the claim was the state appellate court pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III. In re Osborne, Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2001).

Cited in Griffin v. Sisson, 146 Ga. 661, 92 S.E. 278 (1917); American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Quarterman, 19 Ga. App. 798, 92 S.E. 350 (1917); Fountain v. State, 149 Ga. 519, 101 S.E. 294 (1919); Taylor v. Stovall, 155 Ga. 894, 118 S.E. 715 (1923); City of Winder v. Winder Nat'l Bank, 161 Ga. 882, 132 S.E. 217 (1926); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Stanley, 38 Ga. App. 773, 145 S.E. 530 (1928); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia Sweet Potato Growers' Ass'n, 171 Ga. 30, 154 S.E. 698 (1930); Pearson v. Stamey, 172 Ga. 282, 157 S.E. 468 (1931); Radcliffe v. Jones, 174 Ga. 324, 162 S.E. 679 (1932); Stein & Co. v. State Tax Bd., 174 Ga. 611, 163 S.E. 187 (1932); Cowart v. State, 177 Ga. 377, 170 S.E. 253 (1933); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514, 170 S.E. 369 (1933); Patellis v. King, 52 Ga. App. 118, 182 S.E. 808 (1935); Dillon v. Sills, 181 Ga. 582, 183 S.E. 563 (1936); Johnston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 229, 188 S.E. 27 (1936); Williford v. State, 184 Ga. 59, 190 S.E. 605 (1937); Hall v. Hall, 185 Ga. 502, 195 S.E. 731 (1938); Neely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938); Kinney v. Crow, 186 Ga. 851, 199 S.E. 198 (1938); Lunsford v. State, 187 Ga. 162, 199 S.E. 808 (1938); Freeman v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 62 Ga. App. 523, 8 S.E.2d 711 (1940); Anderson v. State, 190 Ga. 455, 9 S.E.2d 642 (1940); Galloway v. Mitchell County Elec. Membership Corp., 190 Ga. 428, 9 S.E.2d 903 (1940); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Martin, 191 Ga. 458, 12 S.E.2d 633 (1940); Bell v. Bell, 193 Ga. 291, 18 S.E.2d 473 (1942); McDowell v. McDowell, 194 Ga. 88, 20 S.E.2d 602 (1942); Southern Ry. v. Parker, 194 Ga. 94, 21 S.E.2d 94 (1942); Huiet v. Dayan, 194 Ga. 250, 21 S.E.2d 423 (1942); Butler v. State, 194 Ga. 426, 21 S.E.2d 846 (1942); Gaston v. Keehn, 195 Ga. 559, 24 S.E.2d 675 (1943); Mutual Life Ins. v. Barron, 70 Ga. App. 454, 28 S.E.2d 334 (1943); Baker v. State, 198 Ga. 291, 31 S.E.2d 397 (1944); Saxon v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 232, 33 S.E.2d 697 (1945); Ward v. State, 199 Ga. 722, 35 S.E.2d 150 (1945); McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945); Collins v. Sam R. Greenberg & Co., 73 Ga. App. 377, 36 S.E.2d 484 (1945); Galloway v. McKinley, 73 Ga. App. 381, 36 S.E.2d 485 (1945); Brockett v. Maxwell, 200 Ga. 213, 36 S.E.2d 638 (1946); Comstock v. Tarbush, 200 Ga. 320, 37 S.E.2d 148 (1946); Associated Muts., Inc. v. Pope Lumber Co., 200 Ga. 487, 37 S.E.2d 393 (1946); Felton v. Chandler, 201 Ga. 347, 39 S.E.2d 654 (1946); Morris Plan Bank v. Hadsall, 202 Ga. 52, 41 S.E.2d 881 (1947); W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Forbes, 202 Ga. 425, 43 S.E.2d 642 (1947); Edenfield v. Lanier, 203 Ga. 348, 46 S.E.2d 582 (1948); W.R. Rawleigh Co. v. Forbes, 77 Ga. App. 620, 48 S.E.2d 925 (1948); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Wilby-Kincey Serv. Corp., 204 Ga. 273, 49 S.E.2d 514 (1948); Cheek v. White, 204 Ga. 321, 49 S.E. 819 (1948); Odom v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R., 204 Ga. 328, 49 S.E.2d 821 (1948); Dixon v. State, 78 Ga. App. 713, 51 S.E.2d 875 (1949); Galfas v. Ailor, 206 Ga. 76, 55 S.E.2d 582 (1949); McDowall Transp., Inc. v. Gault, 80 Ga. App. 445, 56 S.E.2d 161 (1949); Patterson v. Patterson, 208 Ga. 7, 64 S.E.2d 441 (1951); Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 72 S. Ct. 834, 96 L. Ed. 1130 (1952); Putnam v. Sewell, 209 Ga. 28, 70 S.E.2d 462 (1952); Burnett v. Burnett, 209 Ga. 353, 72 S.E.2d 459 (1952); McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Thompson, 210 Ga. 182, 78 S.E.2d 520 (1953); Roberts v. Georgia S. Supply Co., 211 Ga. 402, 86 S.E.2d 241 (1955); Hubert v. Luden's, Inc., 211 Ga. 544, 87 S.E.2d 74 (1955); Davis v. State, 92 Ga. App. 627, 89 S.E.2d 548 (1955); Ledbetter v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 47, 96 S.E.2d 614 (1957); Robbins Home Imp. Co. v. Guthrie, 213 Ga. 138, 97 S.E.2d 153 (1957); Miller v. Miller, 213 Ga. 435, 99 S.E.2d 129 (1957); Brydie v. Pritchard, 213 Ga. 588, 100 S.E.2d 435 (1957); Gregory v. Ross, 214 Ga. 306, 104 S.E.2d 452 (1958); State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Ga. 316, 104 S.E.2d 574 (1958); Hamner v. Johnson, 215 Ga. 15, 108 S.E.2d 687 (1959); Petty v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 215 Ga. 66, 108 S.E.2d 697 (1959); C.V. Nalley, Inc. v. Schoen, 215 Ga. 513, 111 S.E.2d 40 (1959); Martin v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 215 Ga. 476, 111 S.E.2d 53 (1959); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 215 Ga. 491, 111 S.E.2d 223 (1959); Southern Ry. v. Scott, 215 Ga. 739, 113 S.E.2d 459 (1960); United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960); McMahon v. Folds, 216 Ga. 709, 119 S.E.2d 353 (1961); Kelley v. Tanksley, 217 Ga. 183, 121 S.E.2d 647 (1961); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell Coal Co., 105 Ga. App. 185, 123 S.E.2d 925 (1962); Wright v. Lester, 218 Ga. 31, 126 S.E.2d 419 (1962); Garland v. Gray, 108 Ga. App. 303, 132 S.E.2d 834 (1963); Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. McClain, 221 Ga. 60, 143 S.E.2d 165 (1965); Horton v. Western Contracting Corp., 113 Ga. App. 613, 149 S.E.2d 542 (1966); Taylor v. ROA Motors, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 671, 152 S.E.2d 631 (1966); Bryant v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 853, 152 S.E.2d 759 (1966); Mundy v. Mundy, 114 Ga. App. 788, 152 S.E.2d 831 (1966); Brissette v. Munday, 115 Ga. App. 131, 153 S.E.2d 606 (1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bagwell, 223 Ga. 145, 154 S.E.2d 200 (1967); Griffith v. Morgan, 115 Ga. App. 518, 154 S.E.2d 822 (1967); Johnson v. State, 116 Ga. App. 406, 157 S.E.2d 773 (1967); Colter v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 116 Ga. App. 520, 157 S.E.2d 812 (1967); Kohl v. Manning, 223 Ga. 755, 158 S.E.2d 375 (1967); Reid v. State, 116 Ga. App. 640, 158 S.E.2d 461 (1967); Woods v. State, 117 Ga. App. 546, 160 S.E.2d 922 (1968); Mack v. State, 224 Ga. 352, 161 S.E.2d 874 (1968); Maddox v. City of Newnan, 224 Ga. 361, 162 S.E.2d 419 (1968); Tiller v. State, 224 Ga. 645, 164 S.E.2d 137 (1968); Young v. State, 225 Ga. 221, 167 S.E.2d 591 (1969); Cohran v. Sosebee, 120 Ga. App. 115, 169 S.E.2d 624 (1969); Contractors Equip. Co. v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 121 Ga. App. 184, 173 S.E.2d 270 (1970); Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga. 706, 177 S.E.2d 70 (1970); Miller v. State, 122 Ga. App. 869, 179 S.E.2d 265 (1970); Merneigh v. State, 123 Ga. App. 485, 181 S.E.2d 498 (1971); Leach v. Georgia Power Co., 123 Ga. App. 674, 182 S.E.2d 163 (1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Merritt, 124 Ga. App. 42, 183 S.E.2d 73 (1971); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 126 Ga. App. 134, 190 S.E.2d 136 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 126 Ga. App. 252, 190 S.E.2d 609 (1972); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jackson Transp. Co., 126 Ga. App. 471, 191 S.E.2d 110 (1972); Shingler Motors, Inc. v. West, 127 Ga. App. 230, 193 S.E.2d 60 (1972); Harwell v. State, 127 Ga. App. 204, 193 S.E.2d 257 (1972); Columbia Drug Co. v. Cook, 127 Ga. App. 490, 194 S.E.2d 286 (1972); Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786, 195 S.E.2d 228 (1972); Walker v. Smith, 230 Ga. 626, 198 S.E.2d 320 (1973); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Holcomb v. State, 129 Ga. App. 202, 199 S.E.2d 408 (1973); State Hwy. Dep't v. Union Oil Co., 129 Ga. App. 596, 200 S.E.2d 301 (1973); Estep v. State, 129 Ga. App. 909, 201 S.E.2d 809 (1973); Ben O'Callaghan Co. v. Rose, Silverman & Hunt, 131 Ga. App. 29, 205 S.E.2d 45 (1974); Queen v. State, 131 Ga. App. 370, 205 S.E.2d 921 (1974); Akins v. Tucker, 132 Ga. App. 66, 207 S.E.2d 625 (1974); Southeastern Plumbing Supply Co. v. Lee, 232 Ga. 626, 208 S.E.2d 449 (1974); Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385, 210 S.E.2d 835 (1974); K.E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 843, 216 S.E.2d 670 (1975); Barnes v. State, 135 Ga. App. 190, 217 S.E.2d 443 (1975); Ayala v. Sherrer, 135 Ga. App. 431, 218 S.E.2d 84 (1975); Clark v. State, 138 Ga. App. 266, 226 S.E.2d 89 (1976); Johnson v. State, 140 Ga. App. 343, 231 S.E.2d 75 (1976); McKenzey v. State, 140 Ga. App. 402, 231 S.E.2d 149 (1976); Bickford v. Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256, 235 S.E.2d 743 (1977); Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977); City of Atlanta v. Associated Bldrs. & Contractors, 143 Ga. App. 115, 237 S.E.2d 601 (1977)

Thompson v. Hill, 143 Ga. App. 272, 283 S.E.2d 271 (1977); MPI Corp. v. Northside Realty Assocs., 151 Ga. App. 516, 260 S.E.2d 499 (1979); Grant v. State, 159 Ga. App. 2, 282 S.E.2d 668 (1981); Ferrell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 881, 289 S.E.2d 3 (1982); Byrd v. State, 171 Ga. App. 344, 319 S.E.2d 460 (1984); Sanders v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 279, 355 S.E.2d 705 (1987); Cohran v. Haldi, 189 Ga. App. 529, 376 S.E.2d 416 (1988); DOT v. Franco's Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 437, 390 S.E.2d 655 (1990); Allen v. Bergman, 201 Ga. App. 781, 412 S.E.2d 549 (1991); State v. Brown, 201 Ga. App. 771, 412 S.E.2d 583 (1991); Floyd v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 788, 417 S.E.2d 725 (1992); DOT v. Metts, 208 Ga. App. 401, 430 S.E.2d 622 (1993); Cook v. Board of Registrars, 291 Ga. 67, 727 S.E.2d 478 (2012); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 786 S.E.2d 669 (2016); In the Interest of J. F., 338 Ga. App. 15, 789 S.E.2d 274 (2016).

Appellate court lacks jurisdiction to decide issues of fact.

- Because the trial court, in a DUI case, determined that the arresting officer's testimony was not credible and suppressed the breath test results, the appellate court had to accept that determination because it lacked jurisdiction to decide disputed issues of fact pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III. State v. Ellison, 271 Ga. App. 898, 611 S.E.2d 129 (2005).

Questions certified must be questions of law and not mixed questions of law and fact. Lynch v. Southern Express Co., 146 Ga. 68, 90 S.E. 527 (1916); Brown v. State, 149 Ga. 816, 102 S.E. 449 (1920); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hood, 149 Ga. 829, 102 S.E. 521 (1920).

Error in granting new trial not law question. Randall v. Bell, 12 Ga. App. 614, 77 S.E. 1132 (1912); English v. Rosenkrantz, 150 Ga. 817, 105 S.E. 613 (1920).

Appellate court's review as to evidence is limited to its legal sufficiency, not its weight. Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E.2d 65 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 55 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1978).

Verdict supported by some evidence.

- In the absence of legal error, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to interfere with a verdict supported by some evidence, although the verdict was against the preponderance of the evidence. Black v. Duncan, 79 Ga. App. 342, 53 S.E.2d 726 (1949).

Where there is only an appeal from jury verdict and no description of appealable judgment or order there is nothing to review, and the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction since it is a court for the corrections of errors of law alone. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436, 150 S.E.2d 618, answer conformed to, 114 Ga. App. 332, 151 S.E.2d 486 (1966).

When jury verdict may be set aside.

- In a court for the correction of errors, the verdict of a jury should not be set aside upon the assignment of error that it is without evidence to support it, unless it be further made to appear: (a) that some ruling of the court improperly withheld evidence from the jury; (b) or illegally permitted the jury to consider testimony which should not have been submitted to them; (c) or that the court's instructions, as applied to the evidence, were erroneous, inapplicable, or misleading. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 76 Ga. App. 215, 45 S.E.2d 855 (1947).

Jurisdiction over cross-appeal.

- Although under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(e), a cross-appeal may survive the dismissal of the main appeal, that is true only if the cross-appeal can stand on its own merit, and the Court of Appeals of Georgia has no jurisdiction to entertain a cross-appeal which must derive its life from the main appeal. An appellant's voluntary withdrawal of its direct appeal requires the dismissal of a cross-appeal that has no independent basis for jurisdiction and, to the extent it holds otherwise, MARTA v. Harrington, George & Dunn, P.C., 208 Ga. App. 736 (1993) is overruled. State, DOT v. Douglas Asphalt Co., 297 Ga. App. 511, 677 S.E.2d 728 (2009).

Supreme Court has jurisdiction where constitutionality of law called in question.

- Supreme Court, and not the Court of Appeals, has jurisdiction of writ of error excepting to judgment dismissing motion for new trial in a case involving the constitutionality of a state law. Carmichael v. City of Jackson, 193 Ga. 553, 19 S.E.2d 268, answer conformed to, 67 Ga. App. 278, 19 S.E.2d 922 (1942).

Supreme Court and not Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of action involving construction of United States Constitution. Price v. State, 118 Ga. App. 207, 163 S.E.2d 243 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1970).

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over mere application of Constitution.

- The Court of Appeals can decide questions of law involving the application of a clear constitutional provision to a given set of facts. Howell v. State, 153 Ga. 201, 111 S.E. 675 (1922); Wright v. Southern Ry., 28 Ga. App. 545, 112 S.E. 171 (1922); Daniel v. City of Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S.E. 411 (1926).

Under this paragraph, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide questions of law that involve application, in a general sense, of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution to a given state of facts, and that do not involve construction of some constitutional provision directly in question and doubtful either under its own terms or under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the state or of the United States, and that do not involve the constitutionality of any law of the state or of the United States or any treaty. Meadows v. State, 170 Ga. 802, 154 S.E. 188 (1930); Norman v. State, 171 Ga. 527, 156 S.E. 203 (1930); Thompson v. State, 174 Ga. 804, 164 S.E. 202 (1932); Felker v. Still, 176 Ga. 735, 169 S.E. 15 (1933); Gormley v. Searcy, 179 Ga. 389, 175 S.E. 913 (1934); Payne v. State, 180 Ga. 609, 180 S.E. 130 (1935); Campbell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 186 Ga. 77, 196 S.E. 769 (1938); Head v. Edgar Bros. Co., 187 Ga. 409, 200 S.E. 792 (1939); Turner v. Board of Tax Assessors, 197 Ga. 241, 28 S.E.2d 902 (1944); Reliable Transf. Co. v. May, 70 Ga. App. 613, 29 S.E.2d 187 (1944); Ayers v. Franklin County, 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 455 (1945); Macon Busses, Inc. v. Dashiell, 73 Ga. App. 108, 35 S.E.2d 666 (1945); Dade County v. State, 201 Ga. 241, 39 S.E.2d 473 (1946); Franklin v. Mobley, 202 Ga. 212, 42 S.E.2d 755 (1947); Loomis v. State, 203 Ga. 394, 47 S.E.2d 58 (1948); Boyett v. State, 205 Ga. 370, 53 S.E.2d 919 (1949); Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 146, 71 S.E.2d 216 (1952); Hilliard v. State, 209 Ga. 497, 74 S.E.2d 65 (1953); Abbott v. State, 211 Ga. 200, 84 S.E.2d 667 (1954); Harrold v. State, 217 Ga. 612, 124 S.E.2d 73 (1962); City of Atlanta v. Donald, 220 Ga. 98, 137 S.E.2d 294 (1964); Woods v. State, 223 Ga. 754, 158 S.E.2d 395 (1967), transferred to, 117 Ga. App. 546, 160 S.E.2d 922 (1968); Pollard v. State, 229 Ga. 698, 194 S.E.2d 107 (1972); Scott v. State, 157 Ga. App. 608, 278 S.E.2d 49 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions that do not involve the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this state, or the constitutionality of a law of the United States or of any law of this state. City of Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., 220 Ga. 533, 140 S.E.2d 267 (1965).

Where exception taken to judgment as violative of Constitution, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- Where, in a writ of error to dismissal of a petition for certiorari seeking review of a judgment holding one in contempt of court, exception is taken to such judgment as violative of certain named provisions of the Constitutions of the State of Georgia and of the United States, and such assignment of error does not contemplate construction of the Constitution where the meaning of some provision thereof is directly in question, or is doubtful by force of its own terms, or under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction of the writ of error. White v. State, 196 Ga. 847, 27 S.E.2d 695 (1943).

Supreme Court is without jurisdiction of an action to recover damages for taking and injuring private property for public use, and the mere fact that Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I) forbids such injury to or taking of private property without just and adequate compensation being first paid therefor in nowise makes a constitutional question for decision by such court. Mayor of Athens v. Gamma Delta Chapter House Corp., 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 111 (1951).

Where constitutional question not necessary to determination of case.

- Where a constitutional question is raised in the Court of Appeals, but its solution is not necessary to the determination of the case under consideration, the question will not be certified to the Supreme Court. Brown v. State, 16 Ga. App. 268, 85 S.E. 262 (1915); Kendricks v. Millen, 16 Ga. App. 273, 85 S.E. 264 (1915).

Where question of constitutionality of an Act is improperly raised, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. Neal v. City of Dublin, 20 Ga. App. 263, 92 S.E. 1021 (1917); Lee v. Central of Ga. Ry., 147 Ga. 428, 94 S.E. 558 (1917).

Effect of transfer of action to Court of Appeals on constitutional question.

- The Court of Appeals is authorized to conclude that no constitutional question is properly raised in a case where it is first sent to the Supreme Court for decision, and then is transferred by that court to the Court of Appeals. Wadley S. Ry. v. Faglee, 42 Ga. App. 80, 155 S.E. 65 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 173 Ga. 814, 161 S.E. 847 (1931).

Where case being appealed was filed in the Supreme Court but was subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals for decision, the Supreme Court is deemed to have determined that the constitutional issue was not properly raised or was otherwise not before that court on appellate review. Harris v. State, 157 Ga. App. 367, 278 S.E.2d 52 (1981).

Power of lower courts to rule on constitutionality of laws.

- Any lower or inferior court of original jurisdiction in this state, when a proper attack is made upon an ordinance or statutory provision involved in a matter properly before the court, may rule upon its constitutionality, which becomes the law of the case, unless reversed on appeal; but only the appellate courts of this state can effectively declare an ordinance or a statute of this state unconstitutional and legally obliterate it from the books. Freeman v. City of Valdosta, 119 Ga. App. 345, 167 S.E.2d 170 (1969).

Exceptions to admission of evidence based on violation of Constitution vest jurisdiction in Court of Appeals.

- Where there are certain exceptions based upon the contention that the admission of evidence violated the rights of the defendant as guaranteed to the defendant by the state and federal Constitutions but these assignments of error do not raise such questions as to the construction of any part of the state or federal Constitutions as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction, the questions involve merely the application of well-known constitutional principles and come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Turner v. State, 176 Ga. 823, 169 S.E. 21 (1933).

Duty of court in obscenity case.

- On appeal in an obscenity case, the appellate court cannot merely decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the material is obscene, but must review independently the constitutional fact of obscenity and make a determination of such vel non. Ballew v. State, 138 Ga. App. 530, 227 S.E.2d 65 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 55 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1978).

Municipal ordinance not law of state under this paragraph.

- A municipal corporation is a public corporation, being a subordinate agent of the state, exercising governmental functions in a certain community; and while an ordinance enacted by such governmental agency may in that sense be a law of the state, it is not a law of the state as is contemplated in this paragraph. Maner v. Dykes, 183 Ga. 118, 187 S.E. 699 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

In objection to setting aside homestead, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- The title to the property in which a homestead is sought to be set aside is not directly involved, and therefore the question raised by the application and objections urged by a creditor of the applicant is not one respecting title to land, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. Adams v. Bishop, 174 Ga. 262, 162 S.E. 531 (1932).

In dispute over proper payment of condemnation award, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- On appeal of an award by assessors in a condemnation proceeding in which the condemnor was dissatisfied the question of whether or not the condemnor properly tendered the amount of the award before entering the appeal did not make a question for decision within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, nor did the allegation of estoppel by reason of a judgment decreeing fee-simple title to be in the condemnor make a question involving title to land and within the jurisdiction thereof. Wilson v. State Hwy. Dep't, 208 Ga. 510, 67 S.E.2d 578 (1951).

In action to recover damages for breach of warranty of title, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- The overruling of a demurrer, interposed by a defendant to a petition seeking to recover damages for a breach of warranty of title contained in a deed conveying land, does not present a case respecting title to land, so as to vest jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of a bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) assigning error on such ruling; accordingly, it must be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Sanders v. Calloway, 211 Ga. 580, 87 S.E.2d 397 (1955).

In proceeding to establish copy of lost deed, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- Where a petition in a superior court to establish a copy of a deed claimed to have been lost alleged only that the debtor resided in the county in which the suit was filed, that the debtor had executed to the plaintiff a certain deed, a true copy of which was attached to the petition, and that the deed had been lost, and in which petition the only prayer was that "the clerk of this court issue a rule nisi calling upon (the defendant) to show cause, if any he has, why the copy deed aforesaid should not be established in lieu of said lost original," such petition was a mere statutory proceeding to establish a copy of the deed claimed to have been lost, and was not a suit in equity such as to grant appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Loftin v. Carroll County Bd. of Educ., 195 Ga. 689, 25 S.E.2d 293 (1943).

In dispute over location of boundary line, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- Where the parties by agreement have eliminated all issues in a case to enjoin a continuing trespass and an action in ejectment, except the issue as to the location of the dividing line, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the writ of error. Whaley v. Ellis, 209 Ga. 147, 71 S.E.2d 209 (1952).

Neither an application for the processioning of an alleged disputed land line nor the protest thereto make a case "respecting title to land," and, accordingly, such a case must be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Jarrard v. Wildes, 209 Ga. 282, 71 S.E.2d 549 (1952).

A writ of error will not lie to the Supreme Court to correct a judgment of the superior court where, on the trial of the case, it was stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for the parties that neither party required proof of title on the part of the other party, and that the issue in the case was the correct location of the dividing line between the property of the plaintiff and the property of the defendants. Lively v. Thompson, 209 Ga. 425, 73 S.E.2d 90 (1952).

Where the controlling issue, as limited by stipulation and as actually litigated in the lower court, is the correct location of a boundary line between adjacent tracts of land, and the verdict and judgment in effect do nothing more than establish the boundary line and award damages to the successful litigants, an appeal from the judgment comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Fendley v. Weaver, 121 Ga. App. 526, 174 S.E.2d 369 (1970).

Where dispossessory warrant brought to evict tenant, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. Arnold v. Water Power & Mining Co., 147 Ga. 91, 92 S.E. 889 (1917).

Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction of a case brought after the overruling of a motion for new trial after verdict upon an issue made by the filing of a counter-affidavit to a dispossessory warrant, which affidavit merely denied the tenancy alleged in the warrant. Downs v. Weaver, 184 Ga. 856, 193 S.E. 858 (1937).

Where a dispossessory warrant is sued out to evict a tenant who files a counter-affidavit alleging facts which are only defensive in character, and no equitable or affirmative relief is prayed, the action is a statutory one falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Brumfield v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 196 Ga. 821, 27 S.E.2d 678 (1943).

Where defendants appealed to the Supreme Court from entry by the state court of an order granting a writ of possession in a dispossessory proceeding filed after foreclosure of defendants' interest under a deed to secure debt, as right of possession, not title to land, was the issue before the state court, jurisdiction of the appeal was in the Court of Appeals. Jordan v. Atlanta Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Inc., 251 Ga. 37, 302 S.E.2d 568 (1983).

Transfer to Court of Appeals means no equity jurisdiction in case.

- The transfer of a case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals is an adjudication that the prayers for injunction in the intervention are mere surplusage and that there is no equity jurisdiction in the case. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).

For purpose of testing equity jurisdiction a case is appraised in character it bore at time issues resulting in judgment complained of were submitted. McCowen v. Aldred, 208 Ga. 483, 67 S.E.2d 478 (1951).

Petition containing allegations only appropriate to prayer for damages does not assume character of equitable action by virtue of prayer for injunctive relief. Hollinshed v. Shadrick, 212 Ga. 624, 94 S.E.2d 705 (1956).

Attempts to escape effect of constitution rejected.

- Litigants should not be permitted to evade this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III) by the simple device of adding a spurious prayer for relief of an equitable nature. Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71, 65 S.E.2d 178 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

Mere designation of action as equity not determinative.

- Whether an action is one at law or in equity is determined by the allegations of the petition and the nature of the relief prayed, and not by designation given to the action by the pleader. City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948).

When plaintiff amends plaintiff's petition by eliminating prayer for equitable relief and seeks only legal relief then the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Boze v. Atlanta Veterans Transp., Inc., 218 Ga. 274, 127 S.E.2d 466 (1962).

Cases involving equity or constitutional questions.

- Where a case involves equity or constitutional questions or other features that come within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but all such features are abandoned or otherwise eliminated in the trial court before the judgment of that court, the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction. Leggitt v. Allen, 208 Ga. 298, 66 S.E.2d 709 (1951), disapproved sub nom. Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975).

Where the equity features which a case originally contained have been abandoned or eliminated before the judgment dismissing the petition was rendered, the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Rumph v. Rister, 211 Ga. 312, 85 S.E.2d 768 (1955).

Where by amendment all prayers for equitable relief have been stricken from petition, and court asked to vacate its temporary restraining order and to otherwise treat the case as an action at law for a money judgment against the defendants, the case is no longer one involving equity, and the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Citizens Bank v. Thompson, 214 Ga. 674, 107 S.E.2d 175 (1959).

Dismissal of equitable action removes equity jurisdiction from counterclaim.

- Where a defendant, in answer to an equitable petition for injunctive relief, sets up a money demand, and asks a judgment therefor against the petitioner, and after the grant of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner voluntarily dismisses the petitioner's action, such a dismissal removes all equitable questions involved in the case. Rogers v. Miller Peanut Co., 199 Ga. 835, 35 S.E.2d 469 (1945).

Election of plaintiff to proceed in tort under former Code 1933, § 105-1207 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30) removed all equity from the case and left only an action at law for money damages of which the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Kenimer v. Ward Wight Realty Co., 219 Ga. 275, 133 S.E.2d 18 (1963).

Addition of prayer that contract be set aside insufficient to give Supreme Court jurisdiction.

- In petition seeking money damages because of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations inducing the plaintiff to sign a contract of sale for the purchase of an automobile, the addition of a prayer that the contract of sale "be set aside on the grounds of fraud" was not such a prayer for equitable relief as to give the Supreme Court rather than the Court of Appeals jurisdiction of the appeal. Douglas v. Currie Ford Co., 103 Ga. App. 75, 118 S.E.2d 586 (1961).

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction where equitable challenges raised to senior judgment.

- Where a case involves the distribution of money arising from the sale of property under a senior judgment and execution, and the holder of a junior judgment and execution claims the fund upon the ground that the judgment in the older case is void, because at the time of its rendition the defendant therein was insane and confined in the state sanitarium, it is not an equity case. Burkhalter v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 Ga. 237, 152 S.E. 98 (1930).

In action to recover shares in insolvent institution, Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- Where the case under consideration is an action to recover the statutory liability of an alleged stockholder of an insolvent institution, in the hands of the Superintendent of Banks for liquidation, and to have the property seized under the writ of attachment in pursuance of law, and subjected to payment of the alleged liability, it is not a suit in equity but at law and is, therefore, under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Pignatel v. Mobley, 173 Ga. 410, 160 S.E. 411 (1931).

Where verdict of equity count not appealed, Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- Where petition was in two counts, in which the prayer was for a money judgment in the first count and for reformation of a contract and for the stated amount in count two, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum sued for and the prayer for reformation was not granted, the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49,5-6-50) the exception being to the failure to grant a motion for new trial in which the jury returned a verdict for a money judgment. Ford v. Harden, 212 Ga. 624, 94 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

In action under Declaratory Judgment Act, Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- An action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ga. L. 1945, p. 137 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9), is not per se an equitable proceeding. City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 204 Ga. 276, 49 S.E.2d 661 (1948).

An action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9), not being an equitable proceeding per se, must involve some phase of those cases listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III) in order to come within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on exceptions to the rulings of the lower court. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 210 Ga. 239, 78 S.E.2d 507 (1953).

A case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals where it involves a declaratory judgment and temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo between the parties until an accounting may be had. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 Ga. 804, 158 S.E.2d 382 (1967).

Since an action to enforce an equitable foreclosure is in equity, the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to hear a case arising under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-49. Arnold v. Hickey, 169 Ga. App. 750, 315 S.E.2d 273 (1984).

Jurisdiction of change of venue motion in Court of Appeals.

- The Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, has appellate jurisdiction of a murder case involving change of venue. Wilburn v. State, 140 Ga. 138, 78 S.E. 819 (1913); Scoggins v. State, 24 Ga. App. 677, 102 S.E. 39 (1920); Ruffin v. State, 151 Ga. 743, 108 S.E. 29 (1921).

The jurisdiction of all venue cases of this class (motion to change venue after an indictment for a capital felony) is vested in the Court of Appeals, and not the Supreme Court, provided no constitutional question is raised in the lower court. Humphrey v. State, 175 Ga. 666, 165 S.E. 587 (1932).

Court of Appeals without jurisdiction to review order of State Board of Pardons and Paroles denying the petition of a defendant for reduction of the sentence imposed by the trial court. Aikens v. State, 111 Ga. App. 268, 141 S.E.2d 188 (1965).

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in dispute over admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. Howell v. State, 153 Ga. 201, 111 S.E. 675 (1922).

Where, in a criminal trial, a part of the evidence was objected to upon the ground that it was obtained by an unlawful search of the defendant's house, the error complained of is not of such a character as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thompson v. State, 174 Ga. 804, 164 S.E. 202 (1932).

In appeal from contempt judgment, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

- The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment finding the appellant guilty of contempt in failing to obey a notice to produce certain papers into court, where the contempt feature arises out of the question of law as to the right to require such records produced. Cranford v. Cranford, 225 Ga. 60, 165 S.E.2d 847 (1969).

A life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile who is not properly determined to be in the very small class of juveniles for whom such a sentence may be deemed constitutionally proportionate is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void; it follows that state collateral review courts that are open to federal law claims must apply the holding of Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. - , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), retroactively if a petitioner challenges such a sentence under the Eighth Amendment, and it follows, as a matter of Georgia procedural law, that a defendant's Miller claim, a substantive claim that, if meritorious, would render a sentence void, can be properly raised in an amended motion for new trial and in a direct appeal, despite the failure to raise the claim before the defendant was sentenced. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

Family violence actions.

- Because family violence actions involve neither divorce nor alimony, they do not fall within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction and, therefore, jurisdiction lies in the Georgia Court of Appeals. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 510 S.E.2d 810 (1999).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in action for personal injuries. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Miller, 151 Ga. 727, 108 S.E. 28 (1921).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over gift by testator recovered from executor. Hodgson v. Hodgson, 28 Ga. App. 250, 110 S.E. 754 (1922).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over claim case for ungathered crops. Griffin v. Leggett, 153 Ga. 663, 112 S.E. 899 (1922).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition in nature of rule is filed against clerk of superior court. Wallace v. State, 155 Ga. 414, 117 S.E. 243 (1923).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction after garnishee's answer was denied. Ford v. Southern Ry., 159 Ga. 111, 124 S.E. 887 (1924).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review determination by judge of superior court as to whether particular case is within jurisdiction of justice court. Smith v. Atlanta Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ga. App. 254, 155 S.E. 535 (1930).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in adoption proceeding in adoption proceeding. Criswell v. Jones, 187 Ga. 55, 199 S.E. 804 (1938).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in action on contract providing support for wife in settlement of alimony. Hayes v. Hayes, 191 Ga. 237, 11 S.E.2d 764 (1940).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in proceeding to confirm and validate revenue anticipation certificates. Dade County v. State, 201 Ga. 241, 39 S.E.2d 473 (1946).

Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in custody controversy involving delinquent, unruly, or deprived child. Moss v. Moss, 233 Ga. 688, 212 S.E.2d 853 (1975).

Appeal of an order denying a motion for a default judgment was reviewable because the order denying the motion for default judgment made findings of fact which barred the relief requested by the movant. The order left no issues remaining to be resolved, and constituted the trial court's final ruling on the merits of the action; the trial court left the parties with no further recourse in that court, in such circumstances, the order was a final judgment and the appeal was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Standridge v. Spillers, 263 Ga. App. 401, 587 S.E.2d 862 (2003).

Cases involving revenues of the state.

- The enactment of the 1983 Constitution superseded the Supreme Court's order in Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977), which gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving revenues of the state. Thus, all pending cases which involve revenues of the state and which have been docketed in the Supreme Court will be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Collins v. AT & T Co., 265 Ga. 37, 456 S.E.2d 50 (1995).

Action for accounting against estate of deceased agent.

- Action brought against administration of intestate on grounds that said intestate had been verbally appointed agent of plaintiff's intestate and had made no accounting or settlement was an action at law and not an equity case. Goodwyn v. Roop, 181 Ga. 327, 182 S.E. 4 (1935).

In action against surety on guardian's bond.

- This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III) confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to review a judgment dismissing, on defendant's oral motion, a petition seeking recovery against a surety on a guardian's bond. Gunby v. Roberts, 205 Ga. 346, 53 S.E.2d 370 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

In exception to judgment discharging a rule nisi issued by superior court on address of two-thirds of the grand jury on charges of inefficiency of certain members of county board of education. State v. Walker, 209 Ga. 523, 74 S.E.2d 461 (1953).

Appellate jurisdiction to review grant of summary judgment.

- Court of appeals had appellate jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment in favor of a bank on the bank's conversion claim against a real estate firm because the grant of summary judgment was directly appealable under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h), and the firm's cross-appeal of that grant of summary judgment could stand on its own merits; because the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank on the bank's conversion claim, the court also had jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d) to review the denial of the firm's motion for summary judgment on that same issue. Trey Inman & Assocs., P.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 306 Ga. App. 451, 702 S.E.2d 711 (2010).

Appeal from non-final judgment was dismissed.

- Georgia Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision of a superior court remanding a case involving a challenge to a permit to build a community dock issued under the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-286(a), to an administrative law judge for further consideration. The order was not final as required under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-20. Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm. v. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc., 304 Ga. App. 1, 695 S.E.2d 273, cert. denied, No. S10C1494, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 745 (Ga. 2010).

Rule as to payment of costs.

- The same rule (see Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIV)) applies in the Court of Appeals as to payment of costs as obtains in the Supreme Court. Swearengen v. State, 146 Ga. 3, 90 S.E. 283 (1916).

Case returned without instruction where Supreme Court equally divided.

- Where the Supreme Court is evenly divided in opinion upon the question certified by the Court of Appeals, the case must be returned without instruction in answer to the question. Thornton v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 151 Ga. 312, 106 S.E. 264 (1921).

Ex parte proceedings may be decided by Court of Appeals. Whitehurst v. Singletary, 77 Ga. App. 811, 50 S.E.2d 80 (1948).

Trial courts cannot pass orders in such manner as to preclude appellate courts from exercising their jurisdiction when called upon to do so by a proper bill of exceptions and at the same time treat the order as valid and enforceable at the trial level, for such an order would violate this paragraph and Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. III). Garland v. State, 99 Ga. App. 826, 110 S.E.2d 143 (1959), later appeal, 101 Ga. App. 395, 114 S.E.2d 176 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III).

Effect of entry of new trial motion raising constitutional question after judgment of trial court upon jurisdiction of appellate court. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Michael, 172 Ga. 561, 158 S.E. 426 (1931), appeal dismissed, 291 U.S. 649, 54 S. Ct. 530, 78 L. Ed. 1044 (1934).

Court of Appeals may decide only such questions as are made by specific assignment of error certified to by the judge of the court appealed from. Republic of Cuba v. Arcade Bldg. of Savannah, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 848, 123 S.E.2d 453 (1961).

Proper and timely filing of notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court. Grant v. State, 157 Ga. App. 390, 278 S.E.2d 53 (1981).

Failure to file brief and enumerations of error.

- Georgia Department of Transportation's (DOT's) cross-appeal was dismissed with regard to a trial court's grant of an asphalt company's motions in limine and the denial of the DOT's partial motion for summary judgment since the asphalt company's direct appeal was dismissed for failure to file a brief and enumerations of error, therefore, the cross-appeal could not survive on its own under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48. The DOT never applied for interlocutory review of the rulings of the trial court it was challenging, therefore, the appellate court had no independent basis for jurisdiction over the cross-appeal. State, DOT v. Douglas Asphalt Co., 297 Ga. App. 511, 677 S.E.2d 728 (2009).

In a suit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90 et seq. seeking to recover against a payment bond for amounts due for labor and materials provided on a construction project on private property, the court dismissed the subcontractors' appeal because the subcontractors failed to set forth an enumeration of errors as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-40. Complete Wiring Solutions, LLC v. Astra Group, Inc., 335 Ga. App. 723, 781 S.E.2d 597 (2016).

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 209 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of court to prescribe rules of pleadings, practice, or procedure, 110 A.L.R. 22; 158 A.L.R. 705.