"Contacts" with forum state not germane to Bankruptcy Act.

- As federal district courts have personal jurisdiction in federal bankruptcy actions over any person with minimum contacts with the United States, and as the federal Bankruptcy Act permits nationwide service of process, a federal district court had ancillary personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a "non-core," related bankruptcy proceeding. This was true even though the defendant lacked minimum contacts with the forum state. Chemical Bank v. Grigsby's World of Carpet, Inc. (In re WWG Indus., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Congress clearly had the power to confer on the United States District Court subject matter jurisdiction of a suit against a nonresident by an assignee of a debtor in bankruptcy to collect on accounts allegedly owed the debtor. Chemical Bank v. Grigsby's World of Carpet, Inc. (In re WWG Indus., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Prosecution for violation of 29 U.S.C.

§ 461 must occur in the District of Columbia. - Prosecution for failure to file with the Secretary of Labor the trusteeship reports required by 29 U.S.C. §§ 461(a) and (c) (1980) when an international union takes over the operation of a local union can only take place in the District of Columbia. United States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758 (11th Cir. 1984).

Maritime attachment procedures.

- For case discussing the constitutionality of maritime attachment procedures under admiralty rules, see Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).

Composition and placement of United States Sentencing Commission, created by the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998), was unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of powers. United States v. Richardson, 690 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1988); United States v. Kane, 691 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Statute allowing removal of prosecutions against members of armed forces.

- The statute allowing removal of certain state criminal prosecutions against members of the armed forces, 28 U.S.C. § 1442a, is not a statute upon which "arising under" jurisdiction can be based; it requires that a defendant must present a federal defense for removal. Georgia v. Westlake, 929 F. Supp. 1516 (M.D. Ga. 1996).

Cited in Ventimiglia v. Aderhold, 51 F.2d 308 (N.D. Ga. 1931); Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1938); Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Smith v. UMW, 180 F. Supp. 796 (M.D. Ga. 1958); United States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Ga. 1961); Wirtz v. Alapaha Yellow Pine Prods., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Franklin v. United States, 384 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967); Stevens Indus., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 391 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1968); Bond v. Fortson, 334 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v. Crow, Pope & Land Enters., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974); Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982); Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 689 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1984); Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1993); Sammons v. National Comm'n on Certification of Physician Assistants, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2000).

Nature of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

- Jurisdiction is conferred on the federal courts in admiralty because, as the seas are the joint property of the nations, the jurisdiction is essentially national and because of their nature such cases are closely connected with the grant of the commerce power. The jurisdiction is not restricted to admiralty, but includes all maritime jurisdiction. The constitutional provision for federal jurisdiction refers to a system of law operating uniformly in the whole country, and regard must be had to the legal history, Constitution, legislation, customs, and adjudications. The admiralty jurisdiction was not intended to be as limited as it was in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and it was to guard against a narrow construction of the word "admiralty" that "maritime" was added. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Grant, 169 Ga. 325, 150 S.E. 424 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 690, 50 S. Ct. 240, 74 L. Ed. 1120 (1930).

Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction require location and nexus.

- Admiralty and general maritime jurisdiction require a showing of both location in navigable waters as well as a nexus to traditional maritime activity. Cochran v. E.I. duPont de Nemours, 933 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1035, 112 S. Ct. 881, 116 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1992).

Only one jurisdiction conferred under "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction".

- Although there is no question but that originally the words "admiralty" and "maritime" were not identical in meaning, there is no question but that there was one jurisdiction given by the phrase "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Renew v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Ga. 1932).

What constitutes "navigable waters".

- Strom Thurmond Lake does not constitute "navigable waters" as that term is used for invoking admiralty jurisdiction. Seymour v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Ga. 1990).

Necessarily, the word "affecting" must be given its reasonable and sensible meaning in light of purposes of Constitution. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, 61 S. Ct. 1109, 85 L. Ed. 1541 (1941).

Under facts, case not one "affecting" foreign ministers.

- Because two Japanese officials named in an indictment were not prosecuted, nor their persons in any manner subjected to threats, arrest, punishment, or any control whatsoever, nor their property in any manner interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, nor were they called upon to do anything whatsoever, and their prosecution or conviction was in no way necessary to the establishment of the case against petitioner, the case against petitioner was not one "affecting" foreign ministers. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, 61 S. Ct. 1109, 85 L. Ed. 1541 (1941).

Jurisdiction of trial court over case involving foreign official.

- U.S. Const., art. III, sec. II, cl. 1 was not intended to deny a trial court jurisdiction, even if it should appear from the evidence that a foreign minister was involved in any manner, whether innocently or criminally and however slightly. It was meant merely to prevent any interference with the person or property of such ministers. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, 61 S. Ct. 1109, 85 L. Ed. 1541 (1941).

Jurisdiction over aliens.

- Under U.S. Const., art. III, sec. II, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a permanent resident alien residing within the district and his habeas corpus petition which alleged deprivation of liberty without due process based on the prolonged determination of his deportation proceedings. Grodzki v. Reno, 950 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

Federal restriction of jurisdiction of state courts.

- The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts may be restricted by federal district courts only in obedience to Congressional legislation in conformity with U.S. Const., art. III. Hughes v. District Att'y, 436 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914, 91 S. Ct. 1397, 28 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1971).

Federal jurisdiction of criminal liability under state law.

- The arrest by the federal courts of the processes of criminal law within the states, and the determination of questions of criminal liability under state law by a federal court of equity, are to be supported only on a showing of danger of irreparable injury both great and immediate. Hughes v. District Att'y, 436 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914, 91 S. Ct. 1397, 28 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1971).

In diversity case, federal court must be sensitive to doctrinal trends of state law, and the policies which inform the prior adjudications by the state courts. Timms v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 520 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Jurisdiction to issue writ of attachment against businesses aboard vessel.

- A federal court had the authority, under its inherent power to apply traditional maritime law, to issue a writ of attachment against bankers and stores located aboard a vessel; it did not have to rely on any grant of authority under Rule B(1), Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claim Rules, governing attachments. Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 773 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985).

Preliminary services contract outside admiralty jurisdiction.

- If the subject matter of an agency agreement deals with preliminary services, that contract is not a maritime contract and is outside the admiralty jurisdiction. The fact that plaintiff in an in rem proceeding claimed a lien on a vessel for performance of those services under the Federal Maritime Lien Act did not change the character of those services or create in the district court the admiralty jurisdiction that was otherwise lacking. E.S. Binnings, Inc. v. M/V Saudi Riyadh, 815 F.2d 660 (11th Cir. 1987).

Racial discrimination cases.

- In a case against university officials involving a race discrimination claim, the critical inquiry for standing purposes was whether the plaintiff's application had actually been treated differently at some stage in the admissions process on the basis of race. If so, then the plaintiff had not competed on an equal footing with other applicants outside plaintiff's racial classification, and standing should have been conferred regardless of whether race was ultimately a factor in the decision to reject the application. Conversely, if the plaintiff's application was never actually treated differently because of race, then the fact that race may have been a consideration in assessing other applicants at a different stage of the process would not by itself confer standing. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).

Case or controversy requirement in class action.

- To satisfy the case or controversy requirement, there must not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed and at the time the class action is certified by the district court, but there must also be a live controversy at the time the Supreme Court reviews the case. The controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1976).

Article III courts have jurisdiction over actual controversies; they are not permitted luxury of issuing advisory opinions. Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1976).

Actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply on date action is initiated. McRae v. Hogan, 576 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1978).

Authority to decide moot or abstract issues.

- Because the judicial power conferred by Art. III depends upon the existence of cases or controversies, federal courts lack authority to decide moot questions or abstract propositions or issues that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. McRae v. Hogan, 576 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1978).

Mootness doctrine does not apply when challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and there is a reasonable expectation that some complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Although the power of federal courts is limited to justiciable or live controversies, a judicially carved exception to the mootness doctrine applies when a claim is capable of repetition yet evades review. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 454 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1978).

Existence of controversy demonstrated by showing of threats of criminal prosecution.

- While the availability of declaratory relief in a federal challenge to a state criminal statute is not precluded merely because a plaintiff has not made the required showing for injunctive relief, so long as threats of prosecution are not imaginary, speculative, or chimerical, the plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of an Art. III controversy. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1982).

Basic test for determining whether litigant alleges case or controversy is whether conflicting contentions of parties present real and substantial controversy between persons having adverse legal interests, a dispute that is definite and concrete. Western Bus. Sys. v. Slaton, 502 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

There can be no case or controversy where parties seek adjudication of only political question, or merely seek advisory opinion, or where the litigation presents merely an abstract, academic, or hypothetical question, or where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, or where the plaintiff has no standing to maintain the action. Western Bus. Sys. v. Slaton, 502 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Controversy must be definite and concrete, touching legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests; it must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical statement of facts. Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 3151, 69 L. Ed. 2d 999 (1981).

Federal courts do not decide abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions. This is but another way of stating the requirement for a justiciable case or controversy under U.S. Const., art. III, sec. II, cl. 1. Halder v. Standard Oil Co., 642 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1981).

Justiciable controversy is distinguished from dispute merely hypothetical or abstract in nature; it must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, not an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical statement of facts. Halder v. Standard Oil Co., 642 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1981).

District courts lack jurisdiction to express legal opinions based upon hypothetical or academic facts. It is not the function of a United States District Court to sit in judgment on questions which today may readily be imagined, but may never in fact come to pass. Mere predictions of what may or may not occur cannot confer jurisdiction on a court to render an advisory opinion relating to those predictions. Halder v. Standard Oil Co., 642 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1981).

Establishing existence of case or controversy.

- The existence of a case or controversy is established if there is "sufficient immediacy and reality" to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Rights of parties before court must be at issue.

- Article III of the Constitution conditions the exercise of federal judicial power upon the existence of a case or controversy. As a result of Article III's proscription, federal courts are without authority to decide questions which cannot affect the rights of the parties before the court. Afro-American Patrolmen's League v. City of Atlanta, 817 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1987).

Nature of mootness doctrine.

- An action that has become moot does not present a justiciable case or controversy within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. III. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation, such as where there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will occur again or where interim relief or events have eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).

Matters that are resolved or that have come to an end during litigation in a United States court, cease to be part of the "case" or "controversy" and become moot - unless such matters are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 630 F. Supp. 344 (M.D. Ga. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed after remand, 804 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

Capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness doctrine.

- Because the duration of a preliminary order reinstating an employee under § 405 of the Surface Transportation Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. App. § 2305, was too short for the employer's challenge to be fully litigated, yet it could reasonably be expected that the employer would be subjected to similar preliminary orders in the future, the controversy between the employer and the Secretary of Labor as to the constitutional adequacy of the secretary's procedures prior to the issuance of the preliminary reinstatement order fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 107 S. Ct. 1740, 95 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1987).

The federal court may exercise jurisdiction in cases if the conduct complained of is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Chris C. v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 780 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 25 (11th Cir. 1992).

Demonstration of direct injury.

- A plaintiff 's request for injunctive relief fails to satisfy this section's "case or controversy" requirement if the plaintiff does not demonstrate that the plaintiff has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984).

Unconstitutional statute interfering with plaintiff 's normal conduct.

- An anticipatory attack is appropriate if the allegedly unconstitutional statute interferes with the way the plaintiff would normally conduct one's affairs. American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Suit brought by juror in state court murder trial against the presiding judge, claiming that the judge violated constitutional rights by singling the juror out in open court, after the verdict, as the only juror to vote against the death penalty and by commenting about the juror in a published interview, and seeking declaratory relief, failed to satisfy the threshold "case or controversy" requirement, no allegation being made that such conduct by the judge would be continued. Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).

Temporary restraining order where obscenity statute not in issue.

- Because there was no state obscenity enforcement action concerning a particular issue of a magazine, and because the complaint of the magazine's publisher sought no ultimate relief, by way of either injunction or declaration, but only a temporary restraining order, there was no "case or controversy" to authorized federal court jurisdiction. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Webb, 594 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Plaintiffs demonstrated existence of requisite "case or controversy".

- See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Dispute over ownership and possession of documents which the FBI had provided to a city satisfied the requirement of a case or controversy, even though plaintiff federal government and city defendants had both previously sought to prevent dissemination of the documents. United States v. Napper, 694 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1989).

Claims for reinstatement and front pay were moot because claimant had already had former job reinstated and reinstatement and front pay are alternative, rather than cumulative, remedies. Morris v. Roche, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ga. 2002).

Essence of standing questions.

- As part of the case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have "standing" before he may bring a lawsuit in federal court. The essence of a standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).

Ripeness doctrine involves both jurisdictional limitations imposed by U.S. Const., art. III's requirement of a case of controversy and prudential considerations arising from problems of prematurity and abstractness that may present insurmountable obstacles to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, even though jurisdiction is technically present. Johnson v. Sikes, 730 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1984).

Standing to attack tax statute.

- A taxpayer who is not affected and thus not harmed by an alleged deficiency in a tax statute is not in a position to attack its constitutionality on the ground that such effect is unconstitutional. Lott Inv. Corp. v. Gerbing, 242 Ga. 90, 249 S.E.2d 561 (1978).

One to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. Lott Inv. Corp. v. Gerbing, 242 Ga. 90, 249 S.E.2d 561 (1978).

One who would strike down state statute as violative of federal Constitution must show that the person is within class of persons with respect to whom the Act is unconstitutional and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures the person. Lott Inv. Corp. v. Gerbing, 242 Ga. 90, 249 S.E.2d 561 (1978).

Plaintiff who challenges a state practice must demonstrate realistic danger of sustaining direct injury from its application. Western Bus. Sys. v. Slaton, 502 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Important factor in considering ripeness is whether the tendered issue involves uncertain and contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 3151, 69 L. Ed. 2d 999 (1981).

Standing under establishment clause.

- As to scope of the establishment clause of the first amendment and ability to demonstrate Article III standing thereunder, see American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 678 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).

Standing to attack campaign finance system.

- Individual citizens eligible to vote in Georgia elections, former and future candidates for state office, and organizations whose members are citizens eligible to vote in Georgia elections lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment stating that the state campaign finance system violates their rights under the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

Standing to seek injunctive relief against city and police.

- The plaintiff in a federal civil rights action had no standing to seek injunctive relief against a city and its police officers respecting certain allegedly unconstitutional practices, because the plaintiff failed to show that the plaintiff would have another encounter with the police and would again be subjected to unconstitutional treatment. Lambert v. McFarland, 612 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Standing to challenge government-sponsored religious statements.

- City residents and taxpayers had standing to challenge the display of a city seal used both on city stationery and to emboss official documents, since a non-economic injury which results from a party's being subjected to unwelcome religious statements can support a standing claim. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).

Standing to contest forfeiture.

- In order to contest a forfeiture, a claimant must first demonstrate a sufficient interest in the property to give the claimant Article III standing; otherwise, there is no "case or controversy," in the constitutional sense, capable of adjudication in the federal courts. United States v. $38,000.00 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987).

Standing to challenge government's timber cutting policy.

- In order for timber purchasers to have standing to bring an action challenging the government's timber cutting policy, they were required to meet the minimal Article III requirement of personally suffering an actual or threatened injury due to the government's allegedly illegal conduct. Their injury must have been fairly traceable to the government's actions and redressable by order of the court. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 736 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 993 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S. Ct. 683,126 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1994).

Standing to contest constitutionality of statutory penalty.

- Defendant who was sentenced to less than the maximum penalty provided by the sodomy statute lacked standing to contest whether such maximum penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. King v. State, 265 Ga. 440, 458 S.E.2d 98 (1995).

Internal Revenue Service regulations.

- Institute that certifies those who offer tax service to the public failed in its attempt to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from enforcement of a directive prohibiting the use of the term "certified" by an individual who practices as an "enrolled agent" for the Internal Revenue Service; the institute failed to establish that the directive placed an unconstitutional burden on its first amendment rights in that it did not show any instance of threatened enforcement action by the Internal Revenue Service and did not show a concrete factual situation sufficient to establish a case in controversy. Institute of Certified Practitioners, Inc. v. Bentsen, 874 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

Standing to challenge prison policy.

- An inmate does not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of prison guards relative to a prison policy prohibiting its employees from communicating directly with the parole board on behalf of prisoners. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045, 115 S. Ct. 641, 130 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1994).

Teacher had standing to challenge Moment of Quiet Reflection Act.

- Plaintiff's status as a teacher, the plaintiff's objection to implementing the moment of silence in the classroom, and the plaintiff's subsequent suspension and termination were sufficient to afford standing to challenge the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act. Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997).

Bailee of currency may challenge forfeiture.

- The bailee of an amount of currency, who was in constructive possession of the currency when it was seized, had Article III standing to contest forfeiture of the currency. United States v. $38,000.00 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987).

Uninjured plaintiff lacks standing in antitrust action.

- Plaintiff, a generator of electricity, had no standing to sue under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, for alleged antitrust violations resulting from wholesale power sales contract requiring members of wholesaler to purchase all power therefrom, because plaintiff suffered no injuries. Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 844 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988).

Conversion of bankruptcy proceeding.

- There was no case or controversy, and thus no federal jurisdiction, because debtor rendered moot Chapter 7 discharge by converting the bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 13, and because the possibility of debtor's reconversion to Chapter 7 was not ripe for adjudication. Mann v. Hahn, 167 Bankr. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).

Summary judgment.

- Once it is determined that some of the plaintiffs have standing, standing exists for purposes of determining that a case or controversy is before the court under Article Three of the Constitution, but if it is clear that a plaintiff is without standing to maintain the action, summary judgment in favor of defendant on this ground is appropriate. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 349 v. City of Rome, 682 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Standing in bankruptcy proceeding.

- Though corporation holding second security deed on debtor's property lacked standing to recover under Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), corporation did have standing to seek other relief, including actions to initiate contempt proceedings or to seek declaration that defendant's foreclosure was void, in action against defendant, who held first priority security deed and whose advertising of property for foreclosure violated automatic stay. Barnett Bank v. Trust Co. Bank (In re Ring), 178 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995).

Standing to assert violation of "one person, one vote" rule.

- In an action against the state, its state legislative bodies, the Fulton County House and Senate delegations, other unspecified local legislative delegations, the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, and other state government officials alleging that the method by which the Georgia General Assembly enacted "local legislation" violated the principle of "one person, one vote," the plaintiffs, who were residents of and registered voters in unincorporated Fulton County, had standing on the basis of their entitlement to full and equal representation without invidious discrimination. DeJulio v. Georgia, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

State flag.

- African-American citizen's argument that the state flag, incorporating the stars and bars of the Confederate flag, compelled the citizen to be the courier of an ideological message that the citizen found morally objectionable failed because the flag on its face did not promulgate a sufficiently clear message of discrimination and because the record contained no evidence that the citizen was forced to acknowledge the flag in any way. Coleman v. Miller, 885 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 1199, 140 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1998).

Standing not found.

- In order to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement, a party must have standing to bring a case. Since the injury that plaintiffs allege, namely the monies lost as a result of the failure to perfect the security interest, is too hypothetical to constitute injury in fact, the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a motion for class certification in their suit against the U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank's suit against other banking institutions may have the effect of recouping all funds lost as a result of the failure to perfect, thereby nullifying any injury that U.S. Bank's actions would have had on the bondholders. As the outcome of an existing suit could effectively eliminate any injury suffered by the bondholders, plaintiffs have failed to adequately demonstrate that they suffered actual, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical, injury in fact. In re S. Fulton Hosp. Certificate Holder Litig., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2003).

Requirements for pendent jurisdiction.

- If a federal claim has substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, and both the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, but where, if considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. Davis v. Griffin-Spalding County Bd. of Educ., 445 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional case. Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 240 S.E.2d 241 (1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936, 99 S. Ct. 1281, 59 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1979).

Pendent jurisdiction relates to issues of which federal court would not have jurisdiction if raised independently of federal claim. Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982).

If federal court would have refrained from or been precluded from exercising pendent jurisdiction over state claims, then subsequent suit in state court would not be barred by res judicata. Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982).

Limitations on federal court jurisdiction.

- Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and federal systems requires a federal court scrupulously to confine itself to the jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution. In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949, 101 S. Ct. 1410, 67 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).

Federal court has pendent jurisdiction over state claim not otherwise cognizable in that tribunal if and only if it has jurisdiction over the federal claim. Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982).

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction over state case.

- Even after entry of final judgment, the constitutional balance of policies that underlies the Art. III grant of judicial power impels the vacation of that judgment and remand to the state court having jurisdiction when it is determined that the federal court was without power to act because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case. In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949, 101 S. Ct. 1410, 67 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981).

There are three factors for a federal district court to consider in deciding whether or not to abstain: (1) whether the disposition of a question of state law involved in the case can eliminate or narrow the scope of the federal constitutional issue; (2) whether the state law question presents difficult, obscure, or unclear issues of state law; and (3) whether a federal decision could later conflict with subsequent state court resolutions concerning the same regulatory program or scheme, thus engendering more confusion. High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980).

Effect of dismissal of federal claim.

- Because the federal court dismissed appellant's federal claim, there was nothing from which it could be urged that appellant's state claim would have been pendent. There otherwise being no federal jurisdiction, the federal court would not have been a competent tribunal to hear appellant's state claims. Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 291 S.E.2d 418 (1982).

Validity of concurrent jurisdiction of district court.

- In a case in which a former attache to an embassy was tried and convicted for conspiracy under the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. § 31 et seq. (repealed by 62 Stat. 862, effective Sept. 1, 1948), there was no unconstitutional intrusion on the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and exercise of jurisdiction by a district court, which had concurrent jurisdiction by the terms of an Act of Congress, was valid. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, 61 S. Ct. 1109, 85 L. Ed. 1541 (1941).

Judicial status of former attache.

- An attache to an embassy is a public minister, but only so long as the attache is attached to the embassy. When the attache ceases to be attached and returns to the attache's own country, the attache is no longer entitled to diplomatic immunity and a case against the attache afterwards instituted does not affect an ambassador or minister within the meaning of the Constitution. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, 61 S. Ct. 1109, 85 L. Ed. 1541 (1941).

Original habeas petitions.

- The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain original habeas petitions. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996).

Press interference with trial of criminal case by impartial jury.

- A responsible press, appreciating as it must the great power of the press in a democratic society, should refrain from publishing and distributing news articles which, in the normal course of events would, or which it could reasonably anticipate would, interfere with the trial of a criminal case by an impartial jury; and to do so may subject it to punishment for contempt of court. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

Defendant newspaper corporation would not be required to have reasonably anticipated that publication and distribution of articles regarding defendant would have come to the attention of the jurors or have interfered with the trial of the case by an impartial jury; for they had a right to expect that the jury would have been kept together until the conclusion of the trial or otherwise properly instructed upon being permitted to disperse. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

ALR.

- Right to jury trial in case of seizure of property alleged to be illegally used, 17 A.L.R. 568; 50 A.L.R. 97.

Power of the state to create and enforce liens on ships for a nonmaritime tort, 20 A.L.R. 1095.

Workmen's Compensation Act: applicability of state compensation Act to injury within admiralty jurisdiction, 25 A.L.R. 1029; 31 A.L.R. 518; 56 A.L.R. 352.

Alienage of party as affecting right of removal of suit on ground of diverse citizenship, 49 A.L.R. 1226.

Right to jury trial in will contest, 62 A.L.R. 82.

Jurisdiction of state courts of actions in relation to interstate shipments, 64 A.L.R. 333.

Nature and extent of review upon appeal of causes in admiralty, 103 A.L.R. 775.

Waiver of right to jury trial as operative after expiration of term during which it was made, or as regards subsequent trial, 106 A.L.R. 203.

Right of user of gasoline or other commodity to question validity of a statute or ordinance imposing a tax upon dealer, 125 A.L.R. 734.

Citizenship of executor or administrator as test of diversity of citizenship for purposes of jurisdiction of federal court, 136 A.L.R. 938.

Right of defendant to waive right of trial by jury where he is not represented by counsel, 143 A.L.R. 445.

What actions arise under Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States; general principles, 12 A.L.R.2d 5.

May federal court, acquiring jurisdiction because of federal question but deciding such question adversely to party invoking jurisdiction, decide non-federal questions, 12 A.L.R.2d 695.

Federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction where one of the states in which multistate corporation party litigant is alleged to be incorporated is also state of citizenship of opponent, 27 A.L.R.2d 745.

Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to enforce right to jury trial, 41 A.L.R.2d 780.

Withdrawal of waiver of right to jury trial in criminal case, 46 A.L.R.2d 919.

Anticipatory relief in federal courts against state criminal prosecutions growing out of civil rights activities, 8 A.L.R.3d 301.

Modern status of the rules as to immunity of foreign sovereign from suit in federal or state courts, 25 A.L.R.3d 322.

Choice of law in actions arising from airplane crash in territorial waters of state, 39 A.L.R.3d 196.

Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of unanimous verdict, 97 A.L.R.3d 1253.

Waiver after not guilty plea, of trial in felony cases, 9 A.L.R.4th 695.

Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 A.L.R.4th 565.

What is "a separate and independent claim or cause of action" within 28 USCS § 1441(c) which permits nonresident codefendant to remove case from state to federal court, 58 A.L.R. Fed. 458.

Methods other than arrest of vessel for obtaining an rem jurisdiction in admiralty, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 225.

Admiralty jurisdiction over contracts for services in connection with off-shore drilling operations, 114 A.L.R. Fed. 623.