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Call Now: 904-383-7448Section 1.
[Negro Suffrage]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2.
[Power to Enforce This Article]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
- For article suggesting county unit system discriminates against classes of voters in violation of equal protection clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, see 14 Ga. B.J. 28 (1951). For article discussing concept of judicial neutrality in relation to the school desegregation cases, see 11 J. of Pub. L. 48 (1962). For article, "Reapportionment and Local Government," see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 596 (1967). For article "The Right to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments," see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (1967). For article, "Law and Social Change: The Dynamics of the 'State Action' Doctrine," see 17 J. of Pub. L. 258 (1968). For article discussing functional broadening of Congress' delegated powers and its effect on civil liberties, see 18 J. of Pub. L. 103 (1969). For article, "Federalizing Through the Franchise: The Supreme Court and Local Government," see 6 Ga. L. Rev. 34 (1971). For article, "State Action and Civil Rights," see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 519 (1972). For article, "Racial Gerrymandering and Southern State Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act," see 22 J. of Pub. L. 37 (1973). For article, "Toward a Constitutional Definition of Racial Discrimination," see 25 Emory L.J. 509 (1976). For article discussing constitutional challenges to at-large elections on grounds of dilution of the vote, see 10 Ga. L. Rev. 353 (1976). For article discussing the impact on bond issues of challenges to voting procedures, see 15 Ga. St. B.J. 15 (1978). For article discussing federal civil litigation, with respect to U.S. Const., Art. III and Amends. 1, 14, and 15, issues, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 821 (1979). For survey article on constitutional law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 53 (1982). For article, "Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?," see 36 Emory L.J. 1 (1987). For article, "Education: Education's Elusive Future, Storied Past, and the Fundamental Inequities Between," see 46 Ga. L. Rev. 557 (2012). For article, "What We Can Learn About the Art of Persuasion from Candidate Abraham Lincoln: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Three Speeches that Propelled Lincoln into the Presidency," see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2013). For article, "Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 577 (2015). For note on "State Action and White Primaries," see 2 J. of Pub. L. 463 (1953). For note, "ERA: The Effect of Extending the Time for Ratification on Attempts to Rescind Prior Ratifications," see 28 Emory L.J. 71 (1979). For note, "Towards Proportional Representation?: The Strange Bedfellows of Racial Gerrymandering and Equal Protection in Easley v. Cromartie," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 945 (2002). For comment on Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944), holding unconstitutional denial of right to vote in primary to black citizen, see 7 Ga. B.J. 245 (1944). For comment on Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 675, 67 S. Ct. 21, 91 L. Ed. 596, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 829, 67 S. Ct. 296, 91 L. Ed. 704 (1946), see 9 Ga. B.J. 335 (1947). For comment discussing discrimination against black voters manifested in voter registration requirements, in light of Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd without opinion, 336 U.S. 933, 69 S. Ct. 749, 93 L. Ed. 1093 (1949), see 12 Ga. B.J. 94 (1949). For comment discussing Supreme Court treatment of political questions, in light of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S. Ct. 125, 5 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1960), see 23 Ga. B.J. 545 (1961). For comment on Anderson v. Martin, 206 F. Supp. 700 (D. La. 1962), holding designation of race of candidates on ballot does not violate constitutional rights, see 25 Ga. B.J. 416 (1963). For comment discussing Gaston County v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678 (D.C. Cir. 1968), as to the propriety under U.S. Const., Amend. 15, as well as the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq., of reinstating the literacy requirement for voting in a county which had maintained a racially segregated school system, see 3 Ga. L. Rev. 485 (1969). For comment on the right to vote as affected by state residency requirements, in light of Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972), see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 389 (1971).
- The right of suffrage is a political right, as compared with a property or civil right. In the absence of an express constitutional grant of suffrage, it is not a vested, absolute, or natural right such as it is deemed a citizen cannot be deprived of except by due process of law. The right to vote is not granted to a citizen by the United States Constitution. Nor is it a privilege of a citizen of the United States under U.S. Const., amend. 14. Nor does U.S. Const., amend. 15 abridge a state's power over suffrage, but only denies to the states any action which discriminates against citizens of the United States to qualify or vote, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Though the Constitution of this state guarantees the right of suffrage to those who meet its qualifications, and they are entitled to register, and this right cannot be absolutely denied or taken away by legislative enactment, the Legislature has the right to prescribe reasonable regulations as to how these qualifications shall be determined. The fact that a citizen who meets one of several tests provided by the Constitution had to register or reregister does not deprive him of his constitutional right of suffrage, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right may be exercised. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 804, 94 L. Ed. 1361 (1950).
- Constitution of the United States protects right of all qualified citizens to vote in state as well as in federal elections. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
- Since right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil rights, any alleged infringement of right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
- Qualified citizens not only have a constitutionally protected right to vote, but also the right to have their votes counted, a right which can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot box stuffing. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
- Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963).
The concept of political equality in the voting booth extends to all phases of state elections. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963).
- A party primary merely chooses candidates or nominees of a political party to be submitted to the entire electorate in the general election, and is not an "election" within the meaning of that term as used in the statutory and constitutional provisions of Georgia conferring upon its citizens the right to vote in an election. The right to participate in such a primary does not come within the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 15 and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Cox v. Peters, 208 Ga. 498, 67 S.E.2d 579 (1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 936, 72 S. Ct. 559, 96 L. Ed. 697 (1952).
- U.S. Const., amend. 15 forbids any distinction in the voting process based upon race or color irrespective of whether such distinction involves the actual denial of the vote. United States v. Bibb County Democratic Executive Comm., 222 F. Supp. 493 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
- Congressional power to legislate in furtherance of the elimination of racial discrimination is derived from U.S. Const., amend. 13, the power over interstate commerce, and the power under U.S. Const., amend. 14 and 15. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).
- Ga. L., 1949, p. 1204 (see O.C.G.A. Art. 6, Ch. 2, T. 21), as against the attack on the act as a whole, does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14, nor U.S. Const., amend. 15. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 804, 94 L. Ed. 1361 (1950).
- The mere possibility that a board of registrars may act arbitrarily or recklessly in administering the law and thereby violate constitutional rights is not a ground for declaring a voter registration act as a whole unconstitutional. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 804, 94 L. Ed. 1361 (1950).
Every state official is bound by U.S. Const., amend. 14, and U.S. Const., amend. 15. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S. Ct. 519, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960).
Segregation of polling places, although involving no actual denial of the vote, is constitutionally impermissible as the elective franchise is a junction of interest importance in the process of government and so intrinsically characteristic of the dignity of citizenship. Anderson v. Courson, 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
- Where a state qualifying fee statute has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise and where this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate, the statute must be closely scrutinized and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster. Stoner v. Fortson, 359 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
- African-American residents of a city failed to establish that, by retaining an at-large election system for city officials, the city acted with a discriminatory purpose in violation of the federal constitution. Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
- Four factors are of primary importance in determining whether a plaintiff in a voting rights suit has met the burden of proving that a minority's votes are being diluted: whether minority group members have equal access to the political process; whether past discrimination has the present effect of discouraging participation by minority members in the political process; whether the policy underlying the use of the at-large district is rooted in racial discrimination; and whether the government body in question is unresponsive to the needs of the minority community. McIntosh County Branch of NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1979).
- A speech favoring a "white primary bill" made by the sponsor of the 1947 Single-Commissioner Act for Carroll County, which act was later sponsored in 1951, was evidence of an intent to discriminate against black voters in any voting legislation before the General Assembly during that session, and a finder of fact might well infer that such intent continued until 1951 when the bill was re-introduced under the same sponsorship. City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S. Ct. 1111, 99 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1988).
When a county board of education called for a school board referendum to provide funds to build a new high school and middle school and to air condition existing school buildings and submitted the issues as separate questions to be voted on individually during the general election rather than holding the referendum on Super Tuesday, March 8, 1988, the date of the presidential primary in which Jesse Jackson was a candidate, plaintiffs, representing black citizens, failed to prove a violation of the first, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution because their expert's conclusion dealt with only candidate elections, plaintiffs did not demonstrate racially polarized voting, the totality of the circumstances did not show a discriminatory effect, and there was no evidence that the board purposefully chose the general election date so as to dilute the black vote. Lucas v. Townsend, 967 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1992).
- While voting rights and the right to run for public office are core constitutional rights, an attempted deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights is not the same as an actual deprivation. Furthermore, incurring legal fees to vindicate rights does not itself establish that those rights were violated. Thus, plaintiff, a school board member, pursing attempted violations of plaintiff's right to run and hold a designated seat in a predefined district, could not succeed as an injunction in another lawsuit and failure of preclearance interfered with the implementation of the efforts of defendants, the local voting registrars; since the attempt to deprive plaintiff of plaintiff's constitutional rights did not succeed, neither can plaintiff's lawsuit succeed. Cook v. Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2009).
- In requesting the county board of commissioners to submit a package bond issue to the voters instead of three separate bond issues, the county board of education did not time and structure the school bond referendum with the intent of diluting minority voting strength and manipulating the minority vote in violation of the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Lucas v. Townsend, 783 F. Supp. 605 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 967 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1992).
Cited in King v. Chapman, 62 F. Supp. 639 (M.D. Ga. 1945); South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.C. Ga. 1950); United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960); United States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Ga. 1961); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964); Barnum v. Chambliss, 247 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Ga. 1965); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 16 L. Ed. 2d 925 (1966); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Smith v. State Executive Comm. of Democratic Party, 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S. Ct. 1702, 36 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1973); Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976); Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977); Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. King, 587 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1979); Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 639 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1981); Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
- Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes regarding party affiliations or change thereof as affecting eligibility to nomination for public office, 153 A.L.R. 641.
Racial segregation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1188.
Who is "prevailing party" for purposes of awards of attorneys' fees under 42 USCS § 19731(e), providing for such awards to prevailing parties in actions or proceedings to enforce voting guarantees under fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, 127 A.L.R. Fed. 1