§291-2 [OLD] REPEALED. L 1971, c 150,
§3.
§291-2 Reckless driving of vehicle or
riding of animals; penalty. Whoever operates any vehicle or rides any
animal recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is guilty
of reckless driving of vehicle or reckless riding of an animal, as appropriate,
and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than thirty
days, or both. [PC 1869, c 26, §1; am L 1907, c 68, §1; RL 1925, §4388; RL
1935, §6280; am L 1941, c 116, §1; RL 1945, §11701; RL 1955, §311-1; HRS
§291-1; am L 1976, c 149, §1; am L 1977, c 162, §1; ren L 1986, c 171, §1; am L
1998, c 287, §2]
Cross References
Wild cattle or other dangerous animals, see §142-97.
Case Notes
Instructions to jury, see 22 H. 786 (1915).
Complaint held insufficient though substantially in language
of statute. 25 H. 584 (1920).
Death ensuing from the operation of a vehicle in violation of
this section may constitute manslaughter. 29 H. 7 (1926).
Instruction singling out "unavoidable accident".
32 H. 728 (1933).
Person convicted of heedless and reckless driving may not
invoke double jeopardy when person is indicted for negligent homicide upon the
death of the injured. 40 H. 331 (1953).
Charge in language of statute held insufficient. 41 H. 591
(1957).
Statute requires no more than ordinary negligence as a
standard of guilt. 46 H. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).
Substantial evidence test applies to review of evidence; this
test not altered by HRCrP. 46 H. 245, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).
Standard not affected by point system law. 46 H. 345, 379
P.2d 592 (1963).
Section not limited to public property but applies to private
property as well. 55 H. 505, 523 P.2d 315 (1974).
No obvious defect in an oral charge where the record
demonstrates the charge tracks the statutory language, and the defendant
clearly understood the accusation plus mounted a viable defense. 70 H. 314,
769 P.2d 1105 (1989).
Officer's additional observations, considered in concert with
the reasonable inferences arising from defendant's screeching of tires,
warranted an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant had, at a minimum,
committed the offense of reckless driving of a vehicle, in violation of this
section; thus, officer's investigative stop was within the parameters of
permissible police conduct. 102 H. 228, 74 P.3d 980 (2003).
The reckless state of mind definition under §702-206(3)
(1993) applies to this reckless driving statute; in determining whether an
identified risk is substantial and unjustifiable under §702-206(3), the nature
and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct, and the circumstances known to the actor in acting must be
weighed. 113 H. 321, 151 P.3d 802 (2007).
Where a reckless state of mind could be inferred from the
circumstances to conclude that there was conscious awareness of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others and property on the part of
defendant, and deference must be given to the trier of fact with respect to
questions of credibility and weight of the evidence, there was substantial
evidence to find defendant guilty of reckless driving in violation of this
section. 113 H. 321, 151 P.3d 802 (2007).
See 35 H. 324 (1940); 35 H. 396 (1940); 36 H. 537 (1943); 37
H. 591 (1947); 43 H. 54 (1958).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
43
cases (
11 in the last 5 years), 1960–2026 · leading case:
State v. Agard, 151 P.3d 802 (Haw. 2007).
State v. Agard, 151 P.3d 802 (Haw. 2007).
· cites it 13× “We hold that (1) the reckless state of mind definition under HRS § 702-206(3) (1993) applies to the reckless driving statute, HRS § 291-2; (2) in determining whether an identified risk is substantial and unjustifiable under HRS § 702-206(3), the nature and degree of the risk…”
State v. Bohannon, 74 P.3d 980 (Haw. 2003).
· cites it 8× “ld not, without more, provide the basis for the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Bohannon, the officer's additional observations, considered in concert with the reasonable inferences arising from the "screeching of tires," warranted an objectively reasonable suspicion that…”
State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004).
· cites it 8× “2000) [1] and with reckless driving of a vehicle in violation of HRS § 291-2 (Supp.2000). [2] Prendergast moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search and seizure of his person and property.”
Schwartz v. State., 361 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2015).
· cites it 6× “2 Count Two alleged Reckless Driving of Vehicle in violation of HRS § 291-2 (2007). The charge read as follows: (continued .”
State v. Bayly, 185 P.3d 186 (Haw. 2008).
· cites it 4× “See HRS § 291-2 (2007) ("Whoever operates any vehicle or rides any animal recklessly in disregard of the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving of vehicle or reckless riding of an animal, as appropriate, and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned…”
State v. Davia, 953 P.2d 1347 (Haw. 1998).
· cites it 4× “With regard to the second prong of the Freitas /Lynch test, the prosecution observes that a person convicted of reckless driving of a vehicle or riding of animals in violation of HRS § 291-2 (1993) 7 faces a penalty of up to one year in prison and/or a fine of up to $1,000.”
State v. Valdivia, 24 P.3d 661 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 2× “5(1)(a) (1993), reckless driving, in violation of HRS § 291-2 (1993 & Supp.2000), and two counts of resisting an order to stop a motor vehicle, in violation of HRS § 710-1027 (1993).”
State v. Lian-Wen Chen, 884 P.2d 392 (Haw. App. 1994).
· cites it 4× “HRS § 291-2 (1968) repealed by 1971 Haw. Sess.”
State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 2× “The November 23, 1998 complaint filed against Defendant also charged him with the offenses of driving under the influence of drugs, in violation of HRS § 291-7 (Count II), reckless driving, in violation of HRS § 291-2 (Supp.1998) (Count III), and promoting detrimental drugs in…”
State v. Skapinok., 510 P.3d 599 (Haw. 2022).
· cites it 3× “Corporal 3 HRS § 291-2 provides: “Whoever operates any vehicle .”
State v. Moleta, 145 P.3d 776 (Haw. App. 2006).
· cites it 7× “On his primary point, Defendant essentially avers there was not substantial evidence adduced at trial to show that he drove recklessly; in other words, that he “consciously disregarded] a substantial and unjustifiable risk[,]” HRS § 702-206(3)(a) (emphasis supplied), to “the…”
State v. St. Clair, 67 P.3d 779 (Haw. 2003).
· cites it 2× “5(1) (1993) (Count II); 5 (3) DUI, in violation of HRS § 291E-81 (Count III); 6 (4) reckless driving of a vehicle, in violation of HRS § 291-2 (Supp.2002) (Count IV); 7 (5) reckless endangering in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 707-714(1) (1993) (Count V); (6) driving…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.