[§520-5] Exceptions to limitations.
Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, or structure which the owner knowingly
creates or perpetuates and for wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous activity which the owner knowingly pursues or perpetuates.
(2) For injury suffered in any case where the owner
of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the
recreational use thereof, except that in the case of land leased to the State
or a political subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for
such lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.
(3) For injuries suffered by a house guest while on
the owner's premises, even though the injuries were incurred by the house guest
while engaged in one or more of the activities designated in section [520-2].
[L 1969, c 186, §5]
Law Journals and Reviews
The Hawai`i Recreational Use Statute: A Practical Guide to
Landowner Liability. 22 UH L. Rev. 237 (2000).
Case Notes
U.S. government immune from negligence liability under Hawaii
recreational use statute (HRUS) for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff
while plaintiff was using a military recreational facility, where (1) because
the government did not impose a "charge" or "fee" for
plaintiff to enter upon and use the recreational facility, plaintiff's use of
the government's property was "without charge" under the statute; (2)
the fact that dock on which plaintiff was injured was closed to everyone except
the instructors and students of the sailing course on day of plaintiff's injury
did not strip the government of its HRUS immunity; (3) plaintiff argued that
legislative history indicated that HRUS was not intended to immunize businesses
from liability to their business invitees, there was no need to resort to
statute's legislative history in search of an exception that was clearly not
included; and (4) although plaintiff may have had professional as well as
personal reasons for taking the sailing course, plaintiff's alleged "professional"
motivation did not convert plaintiff into a "nonrecreational" user;
plaintiff's subjective intent was, in the situation, immaterial. 181 F.3d 1064
(1999).
Hotel owner not liable for swimmer's injuries since owner did
not charge swimmer for access to beach and had no duty to warn swimmer of
dangerous surf. 634 F. Supp. 226 (1986).
False appearance of safety created by placement of inadequate
or untrained lifeguards on beach, might result in potentially dangerous
condition above and beyond natural danger created by ocean currents and surf;
thus, government may be held liable to extent it created, and maliciously or
wilfully failed to guard or warn against, the danger. 902 F. Supp. 1207 (1995).
Given staffing, training, and equipping of lifeguards on
beach on day in question, beach was not rendered more dangerous than it would
be for swimmers in its natural untouched state, where training of lifeguards
was adequate; thus, question whether United States knew that its actions had
rendered beach more dangerous for swimmers was answered in the negative, since
United States' knowledge was irrelevant; plaintiff also failed to prove
wilfulness. 916 F. Supp. 1511 (1996).
Where plaintiff alleged that the United States navy received
a financial benefit from the Pearl Harbor bike path when its members commuted
by bicycle on the bike path, reducing the need for parking spaces at Pearl
Harbor naval station, and that the city of Honolulu's bicycle registration fee
constituted a "charge" under Hawaii recreational use statute (HRUS),
the United States did not charge plaintiff to enter the bike path and the "charge"
exception to HRUS was not applicable. 180 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (2001).
Notes of Decisions
Crichfield v. Grand Wailea Co., 6 P.3d 349 (Haw. 2000).
· cites it 5× “HRS, § 520-5 (1993). In summary, HRUS confers upon the “owner” of land immunity from negligence liability to any person—who is neither “charged” for the right to be present nor a “house guest”—injured on the land while that person is using the owner’s land for a “recreational…”
Thompson v. Kyo-Ya Co., Ltd., 146 P.3d 1049 (Haw. 2006).
· cites it 4× “[6] HRUS allows for only three exceptions to the limitations to landowner duty and liability set forth in HRS §§ 520-3 and 520-4:(1) willful or malicious failures to warn by the landowner; (2) entrance to the land being premised on payment of a fee; and (3) any claim involving a…”
Viess v. Sea Enter. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 226 (D. Haw. 1986).
· cites it 5× “The statute sets out, in § 520-5, the activities which will expose a landowner to tort liability even if he makes his land available for recreational use in compliance with the statute.”
Covington v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Haw. 1996).
· cites it 13× “§ 520-5 thus imposes upon the United States a duty to refrain from (1) “wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against” (2) “a dangerous condition, use, or structure which [it] knowingly creates or perpetuates.”
Collard v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 256 (D. Haw. 1988).
· cites it 7× “Section 520-5 sets out exceptions which will expose a landowner to tort liability even if he makes his land available for recreational use in compliance with the statute.”
Palmer v. United States, 742 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Haw. 1990).
· cites it 6× “Haw.Rev.Stat. § 520-5. The evidence shows that it is more likely than not that the steps in question were not dangerously slippery.”
Brown v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Haw. 2001).
· cites it 6× “Haw.Rev.Stat. § 520-5 states that HRUS does not limit liability: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, or structure which the owner knowingly creates or perpetuates and for wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a…”
Stout v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 538 (D. Haw. 1987).
· cites it 2× “Plaintiff also argued that HRS § 520-5(1) applies: “Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard against a dangerous condition, use, or structure which the owner knowingly creates or perpetuates and…”
Covington v. United States, 902 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Haw. 1995).
· cites it 3× “§ 520-5. At least one United States District Court for the District of Hawaii has held that this exception does not require the government to warn of the “per se dangerous natural conditions always existing in ocean waters.”
Jacobs v. Billy Casper Golf, LLC., 500 P.3d 474 (Haw. App. 2021).
· cites it 11× “HRS § 520-5 (2006).4/ The Hawai#i Supreme Court has summarized the immunity provided by the HRUS as follows: [The] HRUS confers upon the "owner" of land immunity from negligence liability to any person—who is neither "charged" for the right to be present nor a "house…”
Raquinio v. Kohanaiki Cmty. Ass'n (D. Haw. 2021).
· cites it 2× “§ 520-4 , which limits liability for landowners who allow people to access their property for recreational purposes, and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 520-5 , which provides for exceptions to those limitations on liability; [id.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 520-5(1) — 5 cases
Viess v. Sea Enter. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 226 (D. Haw. 1986).
“The statute sets out, in § 520-5, the activities which will expose a landowner to tort liability even if he makes his land available for recreational use in compliance with the statute.”
Collard v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 256 (D. Haw. 1988).
“Section 520-5 sets out exceptions which will expose a landowner to tort liability even if he makes his land available for recreational use in compliance with the statute.”
Stout v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 538 (D. Haw. 1987).
“Plaintiff also argued that HRS § 520-5(1) applies: “Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard against a dangerous condition, use, or structure which the owner knowingly creates or perpetuates and…”
Covington v. United States, 916 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Haw. 1996).
“§ 520-5 thus imposes upon the United States a duty to refrain from (1) “wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against” (2) “a dangerous condition, use, or structure which [it] knowingly creates or perpetuates.”
Jacobs v. Billy Casper Golf, LLC., 500 P.3d 474 (Haw. App. 2021).
“HRS § 520-5 (2006).4/ The Hawai#i Supreme Court has summarized the immunity provided by the HRUS as follows: [The] HRUS confers upon the "owner" of land immunity from negligence liability to any person—who is neither "charged" for the right to be present nor a "house…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 520-5(2) — 3 cases
Viess v. Sea Enter. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 226 (D. Haw. 1986).
“The statute sets out, in § 520-5, the activities which will expose a landowner to tort liability even if he makes his land available for recreational use in compliance with the statute.”
Brown v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Haw. 2001).
“Haw.Rev.Stat. § 520-5 states that HRUS does not limit liability: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, or structure which the owner knowingly creates or perpetuates and for wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a…”
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