Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701-114 (2026)

     §701-114  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  (1)  Except as otherwise provided in section 701-115, no person may be convicted of an offense unless the following are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

     (a)  Each element of the offense;

     (b)  The state of mind required to establish each element of the offense;

     (c)  Facts establishing jurisdiction;

     (d)  Facts establishing venue; and

     (e)  Facts establishing that the offense was committed within the time period specified in section 701-108.

     (2)  In the absence of the proof required by subsection (1), the innocence of the defendant is presumed. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1973, c 136, §2(a)]

Cross References

  Elements of an offense, see §702-205.

COMMENTARY ON §701-114

  This section announces the usual burden of proof in criminal cases; the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  The matters which must be so proved are spelled out in detail.  They include elements of the offense, the requisite state of mind, and facts establishing jurisdiction, venue, and timeliness.

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §701-114

  Section 114(2) of the Proposed Draft of the Code had provided that the "innocence of the defendant is assumed."  The legislature found that "the use of the word 'assumed' in this manner is novel and prefers the term 'presumed' since it has a definite meaning in jurisprudence."  Conference Committee Report No. 2 (1972).

  Act 136, Session Laws 1973, amended this section by adding the introductory phrase now contained in subsection (1) ("Except as otherwise provided in section 701-115, ...") to eliminate the possibility of confusion in the application of §§701-114 and 701-115.

Law Journals and Reviews

  Agonizing Over Aganon:  A New Approach to Drafting Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.  10 HBJ, no. 13, at 73 (2007).

Case Notes

  Appearance in court by defendant did not waive right to insist that State prove venue.  66 H. 530, 668 P.2d 32 (1983).

  State need not establish jurisdiction of trial court by proving defendant is over eighteen years of age.  67 H. 68, 678 P.2d. 1080 (1984).

  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt not established where trial judge found defendant guilty based on substantial credible evidence.  72 H. 296, 815 P.2d 1025 (1991).

  Requirements of HRPP rule 18 and article I, §14 of Hawaii constitution having been satisfied, venue was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  78 H. 185, 891 P.2d 272 (1995).

  State tax maps could not be used to establish venue in DUI prosecution where maps did not represent legislatively authorized schematics of official district boundaries for non-taxation purposes.  80 H. 291, 909 P.2d 1106 (1995).

  Officer's testimony regarding Ewa boundary of Honolulu district, being probative of "facts establishing venue" under this section, was relevant and admissible under chapter 626, rule 803(b)(20).  80 H. 297, 909 P.2d 1112 (1995).

  Testimony of officer supplemented with tax map information which court could have taken judicial notice of pursuant to chapter 626, rule 201, constituted substantial evidence supporting "facts establishing venue" with respect to DUI offense.  80 H. 297, 909 P.2d 1112 (1995).

  Where defendant requested court to instruct jury on time-barred lesser included offense of simple trespass under §708-815, defendant waived statute of limitations under subsection (1)(e).  87 H. 108, 952 P.2d 865 (1997).

  Defendant's right to have all elements of an offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt was statutorily protected under this section and constitutionally protected under the Hawaii and federal constitutions; as only defendant personally could have waived such fundamental right and such right could not have been waived or stipulated to by defendant's counsel, stipulation by defendant's counsel of the fact that defendant committed defendant's crime within two years of a second or prior conviction of abuse for purposes of the §709-906(7) charge violated defendant's due process rights.  116 H. 3, 169 P.3d 955 (2007).

  Trial court erred in convicting defendant for illegal camping pursuant to county ordinance where there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to show that defendant illegally camped "in any park not designated as a campground" because the evidence at trial established that the beach park was designated as a campground and defendant was in the designated camping area on the night defendant was cited.  123 H. 369, 235 P.3d 365 (2010).

  Where the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the offense, or at least a "part of it" occurred on the island of Oahu, a reasonable mind could have "fairly concluded" that the events occurred on the island of Oahu; thus, venue in the first circuit was established beyond a reasonable doubt.  131 H. 365, 319 P.3d 284 (2013).

  Although defendant waived defendant's statute of limitations defense for a lesser included offense by requesting a jury instruction on the lesser included offense, the intermediate court of appeals erred in holding that the same request also waived defendant's statute of limitations challenge as to the charged crime.  137 H. 19, 364 P.3d 917 (2016).

  Defendant's statute of limitations challenge was timely, despite first raising it in a post-verdict judgment of acquittal.  137 H. 19, 364 P.3d 917 (2016).

  Where the alleged crime occurred while the victim was a minor and the defendant was indicted nearly fifteen years after the alleged crime took place, the circuit court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support the statutory tolling period; however, the circuit court's instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record contained undisputed evidence regarding the timeliness of the prosecution.  137 H. 19, 364 P.3d 917 (2016).

  Failure to instruct jury as to venue and timeliness of prosecution is error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  5 H. App. 644, 706 P.2d 1321 (1985).

  State proved jurisdictional facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  8 H. App. 497, 810 P.2d 668 (1991).

  Failure to instruct jury on state of mind element under §134-7, as required by subsection (1)(b), was prejudicial and not harmless error.  78 H. 422 (App.), 895 P.2d 173 (1995).

  Judicial notice taken that trial, being held in first circuit, was held in proper circuit.  78 H. 422 (App.), 895 P.2d 173 (1995).

  Where, under subsection (1)(a), proof of each element of an offense is required for a conviction, and the term "habitual" or "habitual operator" in the indictment did not convey the narrow definition that the person charged with habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant had to have three or more convictions within the previous ten years, the phrase "habitual operator" did not provide adequate notice to defendant what the State was required to prove as an element of the offense; thus, defendant's conviction vacated.  128 H. 132 (App.), 284 P.3d 905 (2012).