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Illinois Compiled Statutes

735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (2026)

Right to possession

✓ current as of May 2026
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(735 ILCS 5/15-1701) (from Ch. 110, par. 15-1701)
    Sec. 15-1701. Right to possession.
    (a) General. The provisions of this Article shall govern the right to possession of the mortgaged real estate during foreclosure. Possession under this Article includes physical possession of the mortgaged real estate to the same extent to which the mortgagor, absent the foreclosure, would have been entitled to physical possession. For the purposes of Part 17, real estate is residential real estate only if it is residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced.
    (b) Pre-Judgment. Prior to the entry of a judgment of foreclosure:
        (1) In the case of residential real estate, the
    
mortgagor shall be entitled to possession of the real estate except if (i) the mortgagee shall object and show good cause, (ii) the mortgagee is so authorized by the terms of the mortgage or other written instrument, and (iii) the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing of the cause, the court shall upon request place the mortgagee in possession. If the residential real estate consists of more than one dwelling unit, then for the purpose of this Part residential real estate shall mean only that dwelling unit or units occupied by persons described in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 15-1219.
        (2) In all other cases, if (i) the mortgagee is so
    
authorized by the terms of the mortgage or other written instrument, and (ii) the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing of the cause, the mortgagee shall upon request be placed in possession of the real estate, except that if the mortgagor shall object and show good cause, the court shall allow the mortgagor to remain in possession.
    (c) Judgment Through 30 Days After Sale Confirmation. After the entry of a judgment of foreclosure and through the 30th day after a foreclosure sale is confirmed:
        (1) Subsection (b) of Section 15-1701 shall be
    
applicable, regardless of the provisions of the mortgage or other instrument, except that after a sale pursuant to the judgment the holder of the certificate of sale (or, if none, the purchaser at the sale) shall have the mortgagee's right to be placed in possession, with all rights and duties of a mortgagee in possession under this Article.
        (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of subsection (b)
    
and paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of Section 15-1701, upon request of the mortgagee, a mortgagor of residential real estate shall not be allowed to remain in possession between the expiration of the redemption period and through the 30th day after sale confirmation unless (i) the mortgagor pays to the mortgagee or such holder or purchaser, whichever is applicable, monthly the lesser of the interest due under the mortgage calculated at the mortgage rate of interest applicable as if no default had occurred or the fair rental value of the real estate, or (ii) the mortgagor otherwise shows good cause. Any amounts paid by the mortgagor pursuant to this subsection shall be credited against the amounts due from the mortgagor.
    (d) After 30 Days After Sale Confirmation. The holder of the certificate of sale or deed issued pursuant to that certificate or, if no certificate or deed was issued, the purchaser, except to the extent the holder or purchaser may consent otherwise, shall be entitled to possession of the mortgaged real estate, as of the date 30 days after the order confirming the sale is entered, against those parties to the foreclosure whose interests the court has ordered terminated, without further notice to any party, further order of the court, or resort to proceedings under any other statute other than this Article. This right to possession shall be limited by the provisions governing entering and enforcing orders of possession under subsection (g) of Section 15-1508. If the holder or purchaser determines that there are occupants of the mortgaged real estate who have not been made parties to the foreclosure and had their interests terminated therein, the holder or purchaser may bring an eviction proceeding under subsection (h) of this Section, if applicable, or under Article IX of this Code to terminate the rights of possession of any such occupants. The holder or purchaser shall not be entitled to proceed against any such occupant under Article IX of this Code until after 30 days after the order confirming the sale is entered.
    (e) Termination of Leases. A lease of all or any part of the mortgaged real estate shall not be terminated automatically solely by virtue of the entry into possession by (i) a mortgagee or receiver prior to the entry of an order confirming the sale, (ii) the holder of the certificate of sale, (iii) the holder of the deed issued pursuant to that certificate, or (iv) if no certificate or deed was issued, the purchaser at the sale.
    (f) Other Statutes; Instruments. The provisions of this Article providing for possession of mortgaged real estate shall supersede any other inconsistent statutory provisions. In particular, and without limitation, whenever a receiver is sought to be appointed in any action in which a foreclosure is also pending, a receiver shall be appointed only in accordance with this Article. Except as may be authorized by this Article, no mortgage or other instrument may modify or supersede the provisions of this Article.
    (g) Certain Leases. Leases of the mortgaged real estate entered into by a mortgagee in possession or a receiver and approved by the court in a foreclosure shall be binding on all parties, including the mortgagor after redemption, the purchaser at a sale pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure and any person acquiring an interest in the mortgaged real estate after entry of a judgment of foreclosure in accordance with Sections 15-1402 and 15-1403.
    (h) Proceedings Against Certain Occupants.
        (1) The mortgagee-in-possession of the mortgaged real
    
estate under Section 15-1703, a receiver appointed under Section 15-1704, a holder of the certificate of sale or deed, or the purchaser may, at any time during the pendency of the foreclosure and up to 90 days after the date of the order confirming the sale, file a supplemental eviction petition against a person not personally named as a party to the foreclosure. This subsection (h) does not apply to any lessee with a bona fide lease of a dwelling unit in residential real estate in foreclosure.
        (2) The supplemental eviction petition shall name
    
each such occupant against whom an eviction order is sought and state the facts upon which the claim for relief is premised.
        (3) The petitioner shall serve upon each named
    
occupant the petition, a notice of hearing on the petition, and, if any, a copy of the certificate of sale or deed. The eviction proceeding, including service of the notice of the hearing and the petition, shall in all respects comport with the requirements of Article IX of this Code, except as otherwise specified in this Section. The hearing shall be no less than 21 days from the date of service of the notice.
        (4) The supplemental petition shall be heard as part
    
of the foreclosure proceeding and without the payment of additional filing fees. An eviction order obtained under this Section shall name each occupant whose interest has been terminated, shall recite that it is only effective as to the occupant so named and those holding under them, and shall be enforceable for no more than 120 days after its entry, except that the 120-day period may be extended to the extent and in the manner provided in Section 9-117 of Article IX and except as provided in item (5) of this subsection (h).
        (5) In a case of foreclosure where the occupant is
    
current on his or her rent, or where timely written notice of to whom and where the rent is to be paid has not been provided to the occupant, or where the occupant has made good-faith efforts to make rental payments in order to keep current, any eviction order must allow the occupant to retain possession of the property covered in his or her rental agreement (i) for 120 days following the notice of the hearing on the supplemental petition that has been properly served upon the occupant, or (ii) through the duration of his or her lease, whichever is shorter, provided that if the duration of his or her lease is less than 30 days from the date of the order, the order shall allow the occupant to retain possession for 30 days from the date of the order. A mortgagee in possession, receiver, holder of a certificate of sale or deed, or purchaser at the judicial sale, who asserts that the occupant is not current in rent, shall file an affidavit to that effect in the supplemental petition proceeding. If the occupant has been given timely written notice of to whom and where the rent is to be paid, this item (5) shall only apply if the occupant continues to pay his or her rent in full during the 120-day period or has made good-faith efforts to pay the rent in full during that period.
        (6) The court records relating to a supplemental
    
eviction petition filed under this subsection (h) against an occupant who is entitled to notice under item (5) of this subsection (h), or relating to an eviction action brought against an occupant who would have lawful possession of the premises but for the foreclosure of a mortgage on the property, shall be ordered sealed and shall not be disclosed to any person, other than a law enforcement officer or any other representative of a governmental entity, except upon further order of the court.
    (i) Termination of bona fide leases. The holder of the certificate of sale, the holder of the deed issued pursuant to that certificate, or, if no certificate or deed was issued, the purchaser at the sale shall not terminate a bona fide lease of a dwelling unit in residential real estate in foreclosure except pursuant to Article IX of this Code.
(Source: P.A. 100-173, eff. 1-1-18.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 45 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1993–2025 · leading case: The Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
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The Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 4× “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b) (West 2008). In other words, in both cases, the trial court must find authorization in the mortgage and a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail, but if the property is residential under the Foreclosure Law, the mortgagor presumptively…”
Schweihs v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2016 IL 120041 (Ill. 2016). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2014). She maintains that, absent a court order granting Chase the right to enter the property, defendants had no right to enter her home.”
First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 3× “See 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2016) (“real estate is residential real estate only if it is residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced”).”
Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747 (N.D. Ill. 2011). · cites it 2× “First, Defendants contend that Boyd may not predicate his ICFA claim on an IMFL violation because the IMFL does not create a private right of action.”
Falk v. Perez, 973 F. Supp. 2d 850 (N.D. Ill. 2013). · cites it 2× “) The August 22 Order provides, in relevant part: That the successful bidder; or its assigns, is entitled to and shall have possession of the mortgaged real estate as of a date 30 days after entry of this Order, without further Order of Court, as provided in Section 15-1701 of…”
PNC Bank v. Zubel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130976 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). · cites it 2× “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(d) (West 2010). Although Zubel suggests that she was not properly named in a certain provision in PNC’s complaint, there is no dispute that Zubel was identified by PNC as the mortgagor and party liable on the note and that the court terminated her interests…”
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Luckett, 2013 IL App (1st) 113678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 2× “Bank issued a preeviction notice pursuant to section 15-701 of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2010)). The preeviction notice was on the law firm’s letterhead, which bore the firm’s name, address, and phone number.”
Schweihs v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2016 IL 120041 (Ill. 2017). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2014). She maintains that, absent a court order granting Chase the right to enter the property, defendants had no right to enter her home.”
CNA Int'l, Inc. v. Baer, 2012 IL App (1st) 112174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2008) (the Act).”
Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Foster, 2013 IL App (1st) 121361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 2× “735 ILCS 5/15-1701(e) (West 2010). Rather, lawful occupants of foreclosed properties cannot be removed except by FED proceedings or unless they were made a party to foreclosure proceedings.”
Old Second Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Karolewicz, 2022 IL App (1st) 192091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701(d) (West 2020). On July 11, 2019, the Karols filed a motion to extend the stay of possession, and then filed their motion to vacate the order confirming the sale.”
Pennymac Corp. v. Jenkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 171191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 2× “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2014). We find that section 15-1701 of the Foreclosure Law is inapplicable where Citibank filed a separate action for forcible entry and detainer, rather than a supplemental petition in the foreclosure case.”
Show all 45 citing cases →
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) — 6 cases
First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “See 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2016) (“real estate is residential real estate only if it is residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced”).”
Pennymac Corp. v. Jenkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 171191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2014). We find that section 15-1701 of the Foreclosure Law is inapplicable where Citibank filed a separate action for forcible entry and detainer, rather than a supplemental petition in the foreclosure case.”
Pennymac Corp. v. Jenkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 171191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
Urban P'ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Urban P'ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b) — 6 cases
The Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b) (West 2008). In other words, in both cases, the trial court must find authorization in the mortgage and a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail, but if the property is residential under the Foreclosure Law, the mortgagor presumptively…”
Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747 (N.D. Ill. 2011). “First, Defendants contend that Boyd may not predicate his ICFA claim on an IMFL violation because the IMFL does not create a private right of action.”
WIlliam Werner v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 106 F.4th 676 (7th Cir. 2024).
William Werner v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (7th Cir. 2024).
McHenry Sav. Bank v. Daniel, 2021 IL App (1st) 210070-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b)(1) — 4 cases
First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “See 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2016) (“real estate is residential real estate only if it is residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced”).”
BMO Harris N.A. v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
BMO Harris N.A. v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
McHenry Sav. Bank v. Daniel, 2021 IL App (1st) 210070-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b)(2) — 10 cases
The Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b) (West 2008). In other words, in both cases, the trial court must find authorization in the mortgage and a reasonable probability that the mortgagee will prevail, but if the property is residential under the Foreclosure Law, the mortgagor presumptively…”
First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “See 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2016) (“real estate is residential real estate only if it is residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced”).”
Mandile v. Basta, 2023 IL App (2d) 220329-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
Urban P'ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
BMO Harris N.A. v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(b)(l) — 1 case
Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747 (N.D. Ill. 2011). “First, Defendants contend that Boyd may not predicate his ICFA claim on an IMFL violation because the IMFL does not create a private right of action.”
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(c)(1) — 1 case
United States v. Howard (C.D. Ill. 2022).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(d) — 4 cases
PNC Bank v. Zubel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130976 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “” 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(d) (West 2010). Although Zubel suggests that she was not properly named in a certain provision in PNC’s complaint, there is no dispute that Zubel was identified by PNC as the mortgagor and party liable on the note and that the court terminated her interests…”
Old Second Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Karolewicz, 2022 IL App (1st) 192091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701(d) (West 2020). On July 11, 2019, the Karols filed a motion to extend the stay of possession, and then filed their motion to vacate the order confirming the sale.”
Rembert v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995).
Rembert v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(e) — 2 cases
Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Foster, 2013 IL App (1st) 121361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “735 ILCS 5/15-1701(e) (West 2010). Rather, lawful occupants of foreclosed properties cannot be removed except by FED proceedings or unless they were made a party to foreclosure proceedings.”
Black Reef Trust v. Starkman, 2021 IL App (2d) 200134-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(f) — 4 cases
Urban P'ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Urban P'ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Thakkar v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (N.D. Ill. 2019).
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. DL Woodlawn I, LLC, 2025 IL App (1st) 242068-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(h) — 3 cases
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Puma, 2016 IL App (1st) 153513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Puma, 2016 IL App (1st) 153513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
Menard, Inc. v. 1945 Cornell, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 121422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(h)(1) — 4 cases
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Pennymac Corp. v. Jenkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 171191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “) 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(a) (West 2014). We find that section 15-1701 of the Foreclosure Law is inapplicable where Citibank filed a separate action for forcible entry and detainer, rather than a supplemental petition in the foreclosure case.”
Pennymac Corp. v. Jenkins, 2018 IL App (1st) 171191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(h)(2) — 1 case
Menard, Inc. v. 1945 Cornell, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 121422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(h)(4) — 1 case
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Luckett, 2013 IL App (1st) 113678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “Bank issued a preeviction notice pursuant to section 15-701 of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1701 (West 2010)). The preeviction notice was on the law firm’s letterhead, which bore the firm’s name, address, and phone number.”
— 735 ILCS 5/15-1701(i) — 1 case
Black Reef Trust v. Starkman, 2021 IL App (2d) 200134-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
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