Illinois Compiled Statutes
820 ILCS 305/11 (2026)
Measure of responsibility
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
IL-ILGAilga.gov
JustiaChapter on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
(820 ILCS 305/11)
(from Ch. 48, par. 138.11)
Sec. 11. Measure of responsibility. Except as provided in Section 1.2, the compensation herein provided, together with the
provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of
any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated
in Section 3 of this Act, or of any employer who is not engaged in any
such enterprises or businesses, but who has elected to provide and pay
compensation for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising
out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions
of this Act, and whose election to continue under this Act, has not been
nullified by any action of his employees as provided for in this Act.
Accidental injuries incurred while participating in voluntary recreational
programs including but not limited to athletic events, parties and picnics
do not arise out of and in the course of the employment even though the
employer pays some or all of the cost thereof. This exclusion shall not apply
in the event that the injured employee was ordered or assigned by his employer
to participate in the program.
Notwithstanding any other defense, accidental injuries incurred while the employee is engaged in the active commission of and as a proximate result of the active commission of (a) a forcible felony, (b) aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof, or (c) reckless homicide and for which the employee was convicted do not arise out of and in the course of employment if the commission of that forcible felony, aggravated driving under the influence, or reckless homicide caused an accident resulting in the death or severe injury of another person. If an employee is acquitted of a forcible felony, aggravated driving under the influence, or reckless homicide that caused an accident resulting in the death or severe injury of another person or if these charges are dismissed, there shall be no presumption that the employee is eligible for benefits under this Act. No employee shall be entitled to additional compensation under Sections 19(k) or 19(l) of this Act or attorney's fees under Section 16 of this Act when the employee has been charged with a forcible felony, aggravated driving under the influence, or reckless homicide that caused an accident resulting in the death or severe injury of another person and the employer terminates benefits or refuses to pay benefits to the employee until the termination of any pending criminal proceedings. Accidental injuries incurred while participating as a patient in a drug
or alcohol rehabilitation program do not arise out of and in the course
of employment even though the employer pays some or all of the costs thereof. Any injury to or disease or death of an employee arising from the administration of a vaccine, including without limitation smallpox vaccine, to prepare for, or as a response to, a threatened or potential bioterrorist incident to the employee as part of a voluntary inoculation program in connection with the person's employment or in connection with any governmental program or recommendation for the inoculation of workers in the employee's occupation, geographical area, or other category that includes the employee is deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment for all purposes under this Act. This paragraph added by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly is declarative of existing law and is not a new enactment.
No compensation shall be payable if (i) the employee's intoxication is the proximate cause of the employee's accidental injury or (ii) at the time the employee incurred the accidental injury, the employee was so intoxicated that the intoxication constituted a departure from the employment. Admissible evidence of the concentration of (1) alcohol, (2) cannabis as defined in the Cannabis Control Act, (3) a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or (4) an intoxicating compound listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act in the employee's blood, breath, or urine at the time the employee incurred the accidental injury shall be considered in any hearing under this Act to determine whether the employee was intoxicated at the time the employee incurred the accidental injuries. If at the time of the accidental injuries, there was 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the employee's blood, breath, or urine or if there is any evidence of impairment due to the unlawful or unauthorized use of (1) cannabis as defined in the Cannabis Control Act, (2) a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or (3) an intoxicating compound listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act or if the employee refuses to submit to testing of blood, breath, or urine, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the employee was intoxicated and that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the employee's injury. The employee may overcome the rebuttable presumption by the preponderance of the admissible evidence that the intoxication was not the sole proximate cause or proximate cause of the accidental injuries. Percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based on grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Percentage by weight of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Any testing that has not been performed by an accredited or certified testing laboratory shall not be admissible in any hearing under this Act to determine whether the employee was intoxicated at the time the employee incurred the accidental injury. All sample collection and testing for alcohol and drugs under this Section shall be performed in accordance with rules to be adopted by the Commission. These rules shall ensure: (1) compliance with the National Labor Relations Act | regarding collective bargaining agreements or regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Transportation; |
(2) that samples are collected and tested in | conformance with national and State legal and regulatory standards for the privacy of the individual being tested, and in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or interference with the collection or testing of reliable sample; |
(3) that split testing procedures are utilized; (4) that sample collection is documented, and the | documentation procedures include: |
(A) the labeling of samples in a manner so as to | reasonably preclude the probability of erroneous identification of test result; and |
(B) an opportunity for the employee to provide | notification of any information which he or she considers relevant to the test, including identification of currently or recently used prescription or nonprescription drugs and other relevant medical information; |
(5) that sample collection, storage, and | transportation to the place of testing is performed in a manner so as to reasonably preclude the probability of sample contamination or adulteration; and |
(6) that chemical analyses of blood, urine, breath, | or other bodily substance are performed according to nationally scientifically accepted analytical methods and procedures. |
The changes to this Section made by Public Act 97-18 apply only to accidental injuries that occur on or after September 1, 2011. (Source: P.A. 101-6, eff. 5-17-19.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 64
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: McNamee v. Federated Equip. & Supply Co., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 1157 (Ill. 1998).
McNamee v. Federated Equip. & Supply Co., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 1157 (Ill. 1998). “" 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1996). This court has explained the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act as follows: "`Pursuant to the statutory scheme implemented by the Act, the employee gave up his common law rights to sue his employer in tort, but recovery for injuries arising…”
Adams v. N. Illinois Gas Co., 809 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2004). “2d 919 (1998) (interpreting 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1996)). *1272 For example, in Barthel , the plaintiffs brought a statutory cause of action against the defendant railroad seeking damages for personal injuries and wrongful death.”
Gray v. Nat'l Restoration Sys., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “" filed a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss Gray's second amended complaint based on the settlement contract and the exclusive remedy provision of the Act (820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2002)). Section 11 of the Act states: "§ 11.”
Buckner v. Atl. Plant Maint., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 565 (Ill. 1998). “See 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1996). Presumably, the intent of an employer who adopts a policy of firing employees for seeking workers' compensation benefits is to avoid having to pay such benefits to employees.”
Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 676 N.E.2d 1295 (Ill. 1997). “See 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1994). We reject All Tri-R’s argument that the Kotecki cap cannot be waived by contract.”
West Bend Mut. Ins. v. Mulligan Masonry Co., 786 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “Assuming arguendo joint and several liability was assumed, then it would mean that the nonemployer/indemnitee would be able to obtain total satisfaction of the judgment entered in the original cause in violation of the Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act…”
Bagcraft Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 705 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). “820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1996). Illinois courts, however, have also long adhered to the traveling employee doctrine, which allows an employee to recover for injuries he sustained during reasonable and expected activity while traveling away from home, even if that activity was…”
Moore v. Centreville Twp. Hosp., 616 N.E.2d 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). “Stat.1991, ch. 48, par. 138.5(b), now 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1992).”
Ulm v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 964 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2006). Accordingly, in general, the Workers' Compensation Act preempts employees' claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision arising out of their employment.”
Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n of Dighton, 35 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2001). “See 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1996). Presumably, the intent of an employer who adopts a policy of firing employees for seeking workers' compensation benefits is to avoid having to pay such benefits to employees.”
Schusse v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg'l Transp. Auth., 779 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “Section 11 of the Act also states: “The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer *** for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment…”
Wells v. Enloe, 669 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “” 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 1992). For reasons we will fully explain, we reverse and remand.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.
|