Sec. 6. The rights and remedies granted to an employee
subject to IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 on account of personal injury
or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such
employee, the employee's personal representatives, dependents, or next
of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death,
except for remedies available under IC 5-2-6.1.
Formerly: Acts 1929, c.172, s.6. As amended by Acts 1982,
P.L.21, SEC.50; P.L.2-1992, SEC.740; P.L.47-1993, SEC.11.
Notes of Decisions
Jennings v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 832 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 12× “…"co-employee" of St. Vincent and StarMed. I vote to reverse the trial court and to reinstate the complaint. NOTES [1] Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6.”
Sims v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 2003).
· cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6 (West Supp.2002). This statute limits an employee whose injury meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Act to the rights and remedies provided therein.”
Christopher R. Brown v. Decatur Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642 (Ind. 2008).
· cites it 4× “" I.C. §§ 22-3-2-6, 22-3-6-1(e). As we have also observed the basic policy underlying the Act was to shift the economic burden for employment-connected injuries from the employee to the employer: When an injury to a servant is found to be covered by a workers' compensation act,…”
Bender v. Peay, 433 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 8× “Ind. Code 22-3-2-6. The issue was whether the plaintiff's claim was abrogated by statute, not whether it was foreclosed by res judicata.”
ProCare Rehab Servs. of Cmty. Hosp. v. Vitatoe, 888 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 14× “Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6 (emphases added). According to our supreme court, This statute limits an employee whose injury meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Act to the rights and remedies provided therein.”
Mary (Jones) Shirey v. Rex Flenar, 89 N.E.3d 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “” Id; see also Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6 (providing that WCA is exclusive remedy available to employees for accidental personal injury arising out of and in course of employment).”
Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1994).
· cites it 4× “Those questions are: I) Whether there is an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act, Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6, and II) Whether there is an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the Occupational Diseases…”
Tacket v. Gen. Motors Corp. Delco Remy Div., 818 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
· cites it 14× “Preemption Finally, the defendant claims that Tacket’s claim for emotional damages is preempted by Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6 of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation System.”
Foshee v. Shoney's, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1277 (Ind. 1994).
· cites it 4× “Shoney's moved for a judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Foshee's common law tort claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act, Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-2-6 (West Supp. 1992), and that Foshee had thus failed to state a claim on…”
Nelson v. Denkins, 598 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 5× “Therefore, Taylor's [the harasser] acts did not arise out of his employment and he is not immune from suit under I.C. § 22-3-2-6 and 22-3-2-13." Id. at 638.”
Tippmann v. Hensler, 716 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Tippmann moved for summary judgment, claiming that the exclusivity provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act, Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6, barred Hensler’s action against him.”
Seiler v. Grow, 507 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 6× “Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6 ; Clem v. Steveco, Inc.”
Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6(1)(a): 1 case
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