Sec. 3. (a) Whenever a law enforcement officer
believes in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or
ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may detain that person
for a time sufficient to:
(1) inform the person of the allegation;
(2) obtain the person's:
(A) name, address, and date of birth; or
(B) driver's license, if in the person's possession; and
(3) allow the person to execute a notice to appear.
(b) If a law enforcement officer detains a person because the law
enforcement officer believes the person has committed an infraction or
ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may not, without the
consent of the person, extract or otherwise download information from
a cellular telephone or another wireless or cellular communications
device possessed by the person at the time the person is detained
unless:
(1) the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that
the:
(A) cellular telephone; or
(B) other wireless or cellular communications device;
has been used in the commission of a crime;
(2) the information is extracted or otherwise downloaded under a
valid search warrant; or
(3) otherwise authorized by law.
[Pre-1998 Recodification Citation: 34-4-32-2.]
As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.24. Amended by P.L.191-2014,
SEC.2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
49
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case:
Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1999).
Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1999).
· cites it 14× “I, § 11, the plaintiffs also asserted that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act and another statute, Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3, were unconstitutional in several other respects.”
Louis Bell v. State of Indiana, 81 N.E.3d 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 8× “]” Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 . “[A] traffic stop and limited search is permissible where an officer has at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law, has been violated.”
Lashley v. State, 745 N.E.2d 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 8× “See Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3; discussion, supra. Finally, when an officer stops a person for an infraction such as violating the speed limit, he has "statutory justification" for requesting that the person produce his license and "for expecting [the person] to comply with his…”
Erving Sanders v. State of Indiana, 989 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 2013).
· cites it 4× “” Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3. The defendant argues that the officer’s belief that the defendant had committed a violation of the Window Tint Statute was not in good faith because, after subsequent testing, the defendant’s window tint was found to be in compliance with the statute.”
Houston v. State, 898 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “[2] Because we determine that the stop of Houston's vehicle was legal, we need not address his argument regarding the good faith exception contained in Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3.”
Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “denied; see also Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3. A stop is lawful if there is an objectively justifiable reason for it, and the stop may be justified on less than probable cause.”
Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “See also Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3. Here, Officer Noble testified that he observed Datzek make a right turn out of the parking lot and onto the highway without using his turn signal.”
State v. Massey, 887 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 6× “Ind.Code § 34-28-5-3. However, “ ‘an officer’s mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith.”
Christopher A. Neeley v. State of Indiana, 70 N.E.3d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 governs traffic detentions and provides: (a) Whenever a law enforcement officer believes in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a time sufficient to: (1) inform…”
Wilson v. State, 754 N.E.2d 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “Therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support Officers Mitchell and Johnson's determination that Wilson had violated the municipal noise ordinance.”
Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “However, the statute in its present form does not require such conduct in making left turns. The State alternatively argues that Officer Wendling’s good faith belief that Gunn made an improper left turn justifies the stop.”
Kevin Dowdy v. State of Indiana, 83 N.E.3d 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “5 Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 provides: , (a) Whenever a law enforcement officer believes in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a time sufficient to: (1) inform the person of the…”
— Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3(a) — 2 cases
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