Sec. 6. (a) This section applies to a criminal action
involving the following offenses where the victim is a protected person
under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2):
(1) Sex crimes (IC 35-42-4).
(2) A battery offense included in IC 35-42-2 upon a child less
than fourteen (14) years of age.
(3) Kidnapping and confinement (IC 35-42-3).
(4) Incest (IC 35-46-1-3).
(5) Neglect of a dependent (IC 35-46-1-4).
(6) Human and sexual trafficking crimes (IC 35-42-3.5).
(b) This section applies to a criminal action involving the following
offenses where the victim is a protected person under subsection (c)(3):
(1) Exploitation of a dependent or endangered adult (IC 35-46-1-12).
(2) A sex crime (IC 35-42-4).
(3) A battery offense included in IC 35-42-2.
(4) Kidnapping, confinement, or interference with custody (IC 35-42-3).
(5) Home improvement fraud (IC 35-43-6).
(6) Fraud (IC 35-43-5).
(7) Identity deception (IC 35-43-5-3.5).
(8) Synthetic identity deception (IC 35-43-5-3.8) (before its
repeal).
(9) Theft (IC 35-43-4-2).
(10) Conversion (IC 35-43-4-3).
(11) Neglect of a dependent (IC 35-46-1-4).
(12) Human and sexual trafficking crimes (IC 35-42-3.5).
(c) As used in this section, "protected person" means:
(1) a child who is less than fourteen (14) years of age at the time
of the offense but less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of trial;
(2) an individual with a mental disability who has a disability
attributable to an impairment of general intellectual functioning
or adaptive behavior that:
(A) is manifested before the individual is eighteen (18) years of
age;
(B) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(C) constitutes a substantial impairment of the individual's
ability to function normally in society; and
(D) reflects the individual's need for a combination and
sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic care,
treatment, or other services that are of lifelong or extended
duration and are individually planned and coordinated; or
(3) an individual who is:
(A) at least eighteen (18) years of age; and
(B) incapable by reason of mental illness, intellectual disability,
dementia, or other physical or mental incapacity of:
(i) managing or directing the management of the individual's
property; or
(ii) providing or directing the provision of self-care.
(d) As used in this section, "provider" means:
(1) a psychiatrist or physician licensed under IC 25-22.5;
(2) a psychologist licensed under IC 25-33;
(3) a marriage and family therapist licensed under IC 25-23.6-8;
(4) an advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) with a
certification as a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner
licensed under IC 25-23; or
(5) a physician assistant specialized in psychiatry and mental
health licensed under IC 25-27.5.
(e) A statement or videotape that:
(1) is made by a person who at the time of trial is a protected
person, as defined in subsection (c);
(2) concerns an act that is a material element of an offense listed
in subsection (a) or (b) that was allegedly committed against the
person; and
(3) is not otherwise admissible in evidence;
is admissible in evidence in a criminal action for an offense listed in
subsection (a) or (b) if the requirements of subsection (f) are met.
(f) A statement or videotape described in subsection (e) is
admissible in evidence in a criminal action listed in subsection (a) or
(b) if, after notice to the defendant of a hearing and of the defendant's
right to be present, all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing:
(A) conducted outside the presence of the jury; and
(B) attended by the protected person in person or by using
closed circuit television testimony as described in section 8(f)
and 8(g) of this chapter;
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement or
videotape provide sufficient indications of reliability.
(2) The protected person:
(A) testifies at the trial; or
(B) is found by the court to be unavailable as a witness for one
(1) of the following reasons:
(i) From the testimony of a provider, and other evidence, if
any, the court finds that the protected person's testifying in
the physical presence of the defendant will cause the
protected person to suffer serious emotional distress such that
the protected person cannot reasonably communicate.
(ii) The protected person cannot participate in the trial for
medical reasons.
(iii) The court has determined that the protected person is
incapable of understanding the nature and obligation of an
oath.
(g) If a protected person is unavailable to testify at the trial for a
reason listed in subsection (f)(2)(B), a statement or videotape may be
admitted in evidence under this section only if the protected person was
available for cross-examination:
(1) at the hearing described in subsection (f)(1); or
(2) when the statement or videotape was made.
(h) A statement or videotape may not be admitted in evidence under
this section unless the prosecuting attorney informs the defendant and
the defendant's attorney at least ten (10) days before the trial of:
(1) the prosecuting attorney's intention to introduce the statement
or videotape in evidence; and
(2) the content of the statement or videotape.
(i) If a statement or videotape is admitted in evidence under this
section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to
determine the weight and credit to be given the statement or videotape
and that, in making that determination, the jury shall consider the
following:
(1) The mental and physical age of the person making the
statement or videotape.
(2) The nature of the statement or videotape.
(3) The circumstances under which the statement or videotape
was made.
(4) Other relevant factors.
(j) If a statement or videotape described in subsection (e) is
admitted into evidence under this section, a defendant may introduce
a:
(1) transcript; or
(2) videotape;
of the hearing held under subsection (f)(1) into evidence at trial.
As added by P.L.180-1984, SEC.1. Amended by P.L.316-1985,
SEC.1; P.L.37-1990, SEC.22; P.L.23-1993, SEC.161; P.L.142-1994,
SEC.7; P.L.43-2004, SEC.1; P.L.2-2005, SEC.120; P.L.173-2006,
SEC.48; P.L.99-2007, SEC.207; P.L.137-2009, SEC.10; P.L.28-2011,
SEC.1; P.L.117-2015, SEC.54; P.L.238-2015, SEC.11; P.L.149-2016,
SEC.89; P.L.65-2016, SEC.26; P.L.142-2020, SEC.58; P.L.174-2021,
SEC.40; P.L.153-2022, SEC.1; P.L.42-2023, SEC.2; P.L.9-2024,
SEC.534.
Notes of Decisions
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
· cites it 36× “’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Christopher C. Norris v. State of Indiana, 53 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 20× “was unavailable to testify pursuant to the provisions of the protected person statute, enacted at I.C. § 35-37-4-6. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great deference on appeal.”
Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987).
· cites it 20× “Fourth, we review the facial validity of Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6. Fifth and finally, we judge the constitutionality of the statute as applied in this case.”
Ian McCullough v. State of Indiana, 973 N.E.2d 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 16× “Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 (h). McCullough‟s trial counsel neither tendered the instruction nor objected to the trial court‟s failure to read it to the jury.”
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
· cites it 18× “Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39 (Ind. 1997).
· cites it 23× “’s statements at Wal-Mart to her mother and the police officers and the videotaped interview exhibit sufficient indications of reliability so as to satisfy the “protected person” statute, Ind.Code 35-37-4-6? II. Was K.D. “available for cross-examination” at the combined…”
Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indiana, 80 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 12× “Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 . On February 24 and 29, 2016, the tidal court held a hearing required by the statute to determine the interview’s admissibility.”
Weis v. State, 825 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 14× “Whether the admission of evidence contrary to the Protected Persons Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6 constituted fiindarmental error; III.”
Surber v. State, 884 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 12× “Ind.Code § 35-37-4-6, commonly referred to as the protected persons statute, allows hearsay statements of child sex crime victims, among others, to be admissible at trial when certain conditions are met.”
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006).
· cites it 12× “With Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, sometimes referred to as the protected person statute, our legislature has enacted specific provisions intended to preserve the confrontation rights of the accused while at the same time “reducing the trauma for child victims in sexual abuse…”
Guy v. State, 755 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 12× “Ind.Code § 35-37-4-6. Here, the deposition testimony of T.”
Agilera v. State, 862 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 10× “Particularly, Agüera claims (1) the statements did not meet the admissibility requirements of I.C. § 35-37-4-6, the protected persons statute, and (2) his Sixth Amendment United States Constitutional rights were violated due to a lack of meaningful cross-examination regarding K.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(2)(A): 2 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(F): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(Lh): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(a): 3 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(a)(1): 6 cases
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(a)(2): 1 case
Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indiana, 80 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 . On February 24 and 29, 2016, the tidal court held a hearing required by the statute to determine the interview’s admissibility.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(a)(l): 2 cases
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
“’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(b)(1): 3 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(b)(2): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(b)(2Q): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(b)(3): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c): 6 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(1): 12 cases
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(1)(e): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(2): 2 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)(B)(i): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)(B)(ii): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(l): 3 cases
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
“’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Surber v. State, 884 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Ind.Code § 35-37-4-6, commonly referred to as the protected persons statute, allows hearsay statements of child sex crime victims, among others, to be admissible at trial when certain conditions are met.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c)(l)(e): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(c0)(8): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d): 11 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(1): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(2): 2 cases
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
“’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(2)(B): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(2)(iii): 1 case
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006).
“With Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, sometimes referred to as the protected person statute, our legislature has enacted specific provisions intended to preserve the confrontation rights of the accused while at the same time “reducing the trauma for child victims in sexual abuse…”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(3): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(8)(C): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(d)(l): 1 case
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006).
“With Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, sometimes referred to as the protected person statute, our legislature has enacted specific provisions intended to preserve the confrontation rights of the accused while at the same time “reducing the trauma for child victims in sexual abuse…”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e): 21 cases
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
“’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Weis v. State, 825 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“Whether the admission of evidence contrary to the Protected Persons Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6 constituted fiindarmental error; III.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(1): 5 cases
Christopher C. Norris v. State of Indiana, 53 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“was unavailable to testify pursuant to the provisions of the protected person statute, enacted at I.C. § 35-37-4-6. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great deference on appeal.”
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(1)(B): 2 cases
Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indiana, 80 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 . On February 24 and 29, 2016, the tidal court held a hearing required by the statute to determine the interview’s admissibility.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2): 2 cases
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(A): 6 cases
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(B): 5 cases
Christopher C. Norris v. State of Indiana, 53 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“was unavailable to testify pursuant to the provisions of the protected person statute, enacted at I.C. § 35-37-4-6. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great deference on appeal.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(B)(G): 1 case
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(B)(i): 7 cases
Christopher C. Norris v. State of Indiana, 53 N.E.3d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“was unavailable to testify pursuant to the provisions of the protected person statute, enacted at I.C. § 35-37-4-6. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and is afforded great deference on appeal.”
Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indiana, 80 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 . On February 24 and 29, 2016, the tidal court held a hearing required by the statute to determine the interview’s admissibility.”
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(B)(ii): 1 case
Coltan A. Perryman v. State of Indiana, 80 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 . On February 24 and 29, 2016, the tidal court held a hearing required by the statute to determine the interview’s admissibility.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(2)(B)(iii): 2 cases
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006).
“With Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, sometimes referred to as the protected person statute, our legislature has enacted specific provisions intended to preserve the confrontation rights of the accused while at the same time “reducing the trauma for child victims in sexual abuse…”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e)(l): 4 cases
Surber v. State, 884 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Ind.Code § 35-37-4-6, commonly referred to as the protected persons statute, allows hearsay statements of child sex crime victims, among others, to be admissible at trial when certain conditions are met.”
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006).
“With Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, sometimes referred to as the protected person statute, our legislature has enacted specific provisions intended to preserve the confrontation rights of the accused while at the same time “reducing the trauma for child victims in sexual abuse…”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f): 8 cases
Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009).
“Protected Person Statute The Protected Person Statute (PPS), Ind.Code Ann. § 35-37-4-6 (West Supp.2008), allows for the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified crimes whose victims are deemed "protected persons.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f)(1): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f)(2)(B)(i): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f)(2)(B)(iii): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(f)(l): 1 case
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013).
“’s statements to Moss under our Rules of Evidence, I write separately because I believe the admissibility of such evidence can and should be evaluated pursuant to the Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-6 (2008 & Supp. 2012), not Rule 803(4).”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(g): 4 cases
Weis v. State, 825 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“Whether the admission of evidence contrary to the Protected Persons Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6 constituted fiindarmental error; III.”
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(h): 3 cases
Ian McCullough v. State of Indiana, 973 N.E.2d 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6 (h). McCullough‟s trial counsel neither tendered the instruction nor objected to the trial court‟s failure to read it to the jury.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.