Sec. 3. (a) The following definitions apply throughout
this section:
(1) "Chokehold" means applying pressure to the throat or neck of
another person in a manner intended to obstruct the airway of the
other person.
(2) "Deadly force" includes a chokehold.
(b) A person other than a law enforcement officer is justified in
using reasonable force against another person to effect an arrest or
prevent the other person's escape if:
(1) a felony has been committed; and
(2) there is probable cause to believe the other person committed
that felony.
However, such a person is not justified in using deadly force unless that
force is justified under section 2 of this chapter.
(c) A law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force
if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to enforce
a criminal law or to effect a lawful arrest. However, an officer is
justified in using deadly force only if the officer:
(1) has probable cause to believe that that deadly force is
necessary:
(A) to prevent the commission of a forcible felony; or
(B) to effect an arrest of a person who the officer has probable
cause to believe poses a threat of serious bodily injury to the
officer or a third person; and
(2) has given a warning, if feasible, to the person against whom
the deadly force is to be used.
(d) A law enforcement officer making an arrest under an invalid
warrant is justified in using force as if the warrant was valid, unless the
officer knows that the warrant is invalid.
(e) A law enforcement officer who has an arrested person in custody
is justified in using the same force to prevent the escape of the arrested
person from custody that the officer would be justified in using if the
officer was arresting that person. However, an officer is justified in
using deadly force only if the officer:
(1) has probable cause to believe that deadly force is necessary to
prevent the escape from custody of a person who the officer has
probable cause to believe poses a threat of serious bodily injury
to the officer or a third person; and
(2) has given a warning, if feasible, to the person against whom
the deadly force is to be used.
(f) A guard or other official in a penal facility or a law enforcement
officer is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the force is necessary to
prevent the escape of a person who is detained in the penal facility.
(g) Notwithstanding subsection (c), (e), or (f), a guard, penal facility
official, or law enforcement officer who is a defendant in a criminal
prosecution has the same right as a person who is not a guard, penal
facility official, or law enforcement officer to assert self-defense under
IC 35-41-3-2.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.1. Amended by Acts
1977, P.L.340, SEC.9; Acts 1979, P.L.297, SEC.2; P.L.245-1993,
SEC.1; P.L.12-2021, SEC.7.
Notes of Decisions
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
· cites it 2× “05 (1983); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1979); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann.”
McConnell v. McKillip, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3 authorizes officers to use reasonable force to effect lawful arrests.”
Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. 2010).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiffs contend on appeal that the government is not immune from liability for the deputy's conduct because disputed facts exist regarding whether the deputy used unreasonable and excessive force contrary to Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(b), which provides in relevant part: "A…”
Brown v. State, 830 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “" Ind.Code § 35-41-3-3. In our view, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that this is precisely what occurred here.”
O'BANNON v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 4× “In Indiana, I.C. § 35-41-3-3(b) reflects the same principles and provides in relevant part: (b) A law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest.”
Thomas P. Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC d/b/a Hoosier Park, Racing & Casino, Centaur, Inc., Hoosier Park, L.P., Centaur Holdings, LLC, & Terrance Sollars, 84 N.E.3d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3 (b) (1993) (“A law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest.”
Fidler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
· cites it 2× “Fidler may still pursue his state tort claims against the City of Indianapolis stemming from the defendants’ alleged use of excessive force in apprehending and arresting him.”
Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. 1993).
· cites it 2× “§ 35-41-3-3 (West 1986). Accordingly, the use of excessive force is not conduct immunized by Section 3(7).”
Est. of Williams v. Indiana State Police, 26 F. Supp. 3d 824 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 35-41-3-3(b). The Court need not repeat the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in detail here, as the Court set forth that standard above.”
Tom v. Voida, 654 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “I.C. § 35-41-3-3(b). The facts most favorable to Appellant show that Tom was shot as he was "coming at" Voida a second time with his arms spread out.”
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(a): 2 cases
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b): 8 cases
Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. 2010).
“The plaintiffs contend on appeal that the government is not immune from liability for the deputy's conduct because disputed facts exist regarding whether the deputy used unreasonable and excessive force contrary to Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(b), which provides in relevant part: "A…”
O'BANNON v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“In Indiana, I.C. § 35-41-3-3(b) reflects the same principles and provides in relevant part: (b) A law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force if the officer reasonably believes that the force is necessary to effect a lawful arrest.”
Fidler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
“Fidler may still pursue his state tort claims against the City of Indianapolis stemming from the defendants’ alleged use of excessive force in apprehending and arresting him.”
Est. of Williams v. Indiana State Police, 26 F. Supp. 3d 824 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
“Ind.Code § 35-41-3-3(b). The Court need not repeat the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard in detail here, as the Court set forth that standard above.”
Tom v. Voida, 654 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
“I.C. § 35-41-3-3(b). The facts most favorable to Appellant show that Tom was shot as he was "coming at" Voida a second time with his arms spread out.”
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b)(1)(B): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(b)(2): 1 case
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(c): 4 cases
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3(d): 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.