Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (2025)
Voluntary manslaughter
✓ 2025 Indiana Code: the 2026 session is not included
Sec. 3. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) kills another human being; or
(2) except as provided in section 6.5 of this chapter, kills a fetus in any stage of development;
while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony.
(b) The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder under section 1(1) of this chapter to voluntary manslaughter.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.2. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.27; P.L.321-1987, SEC.1; P.L.261-1997, SEC.4; P.L.158-2013, SEC.413; P.L.203-2018, SEC.2.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 243
cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3(a). The charging information against Ross did not specify that he committed murder by means of a deadly weapon.”
Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000). “[15] The following Class A felonies are defined as crimes of violence: voluntary manslaughter (Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3); kidnapping ( Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2 ); rape (Ind.”
Mann v. State, 742 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “" Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 . The trial court noted that Merriman was defenseless when Mann attacked her, that he placed her body back in her car to conceal the killing, and that he fled the scene without regard to her physical condition.”
Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3. 2 . In Fajardo v. State, our Supreme Court found that the State's amendment to the *610 charging information constituted an amendment in matters of substance and, therefore, was required to be done thirty days before the omnibus date under the prior…”
Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. 2002). “Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (b); Bane, 587 N.E.”
Beverly v. State, 801 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3(a)(2). On appeal, Beverly argues that the State failed to prove that he acted knowingly or intentionally.”
Perigo v. State, 541 N.E.2d 936 (Ind. 1989). “Perigo also refers to Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 [1] (Burns 1985 Repl.”
Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2008). “Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3 (2004). The statute specifies that sudden heat is a mitigating factor to murder, not an element of voluntary manslaughter.”
Collins v. State, 966 N.E.2d 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “Code § 35-42-1-1 (murder) with Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3 (voluntary manslaughter).”
Billy Brantley v. State of Indiana, 71 N.E.3d 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (2014). [15] Usually, either a defendant raises voluntary manslaughter in an attempt to mitigate a murder charge or the State charges voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to a murder charge.”
Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. 1994). “" Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (a) (1988). Defendant contends that the subsequent three stabbings were part of a continuing reaction to the provocation caused by Betty Waggoner.”
Billy Brantley v. State of Indiana, 91 N.E.3d 566 (Ind. 2018). “while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony."). As evident by its own definition, we find that voluntary manslaughter may be brought as a standalone charge and, accordingly, the State was permitted to charge Brantley with only voluntary…”
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(2): 1 case
Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a): 12 cases
Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3(a). The charging information against Ross did not specify that he committed murder by means of a deadly weapon.”
Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3. 2 . In Fajardo v. State, our Supreme Court found that the State's amendment to the *610 charging information constituted an amendment in matters of substance and, therefore, was required to be done thirty days before the omnibus date under the prior…”
Morgan v. State, 759 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. 1994). “" Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (a) (1988). Defendant contends that the subsequent three stabbings were part of a continuing reaction to the provocation caused by Betty Waggoner.”
McGinity v. State, 824 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a)(1): 4 cases
Ketcham v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Gillespie v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Hamilton v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Daryl Gilbert v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), No. 18A-PC-2697 (Ind. Ct. App. July 22, 2019).
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a)(2): 2 cases
Beverly v. State, 801 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3(a)(2). On appeal, Beverly argues that the State failed to prove that he acted knowingly or intentionally.”
Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3(a). The charging information against Ross did not specify that he committed murder by means of a deadly weapon.”
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(b): 10 cases
Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2008). “Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3 (2004). The statute specifies that sudden heat is a mitigating factor to murder, not an element of voluntary manslaughter.”
Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3. 2 . In Fajardo v. State, our Supreme Court found that the State's amendment to the *610 charging information constituted an amendment in matters of substance and, therefore, was required to be done thirty days before the omnibus date under the prior…”
Jackson v. State, 709 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. 1999).
Billy Brantley v. State of Indiana, 71 N.E.3d 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (2014). [15] Usually, either a defendant raises voluntary manslaughter in an attempt to mitigate a murder charge or the State charges voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to a murder charge.”
Eichelberger v. State, 852 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
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