Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2 (2026)
Harassment; "obscene message" defined
✓ current as of May 2026
Sec. 2. (a) A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication:
(1) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;
(2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or other form of written communication;
(3) transmits an obscene message, or indecent or profane words, on a Citizens Radio Service channel; or
(4) uses a computer network (as defined in IC 35-43-2-3(a)) or other form of electronic communication to:
(A) communicate with a person; or
(B) transmit an obscene message or indecent or profane words to a person;
commits harassment, a Class B misdemeanor.
(b) A message is obscene if:
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds that the dominant theme of the message, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(2) the message refers to sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and
(3) the message, taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific value.
As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.5. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.72; Acts 1977, P.L.343, SEC.1; Acts 1978, P.L.82, SEC.4; P.L.216-1996, SEC.22.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 40
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “[2] I.C. § 35-45-2-2. [3] I.C. § 35-45-10-5. [4] Detective Rimstidt's efforts to locate "David Deckard" proved futile.”
Kiel Stone v. State of Indiana, 128 N.E.3d 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “[13] In its response to Stone's motion to dismiss, the State argued that Section 35-45-2-2 "criminalizes conduct, not speech"; that, therefore, "a First Amendment analysis premised on an alleged restriction of the freedom of speech is inapplicable"; and that the content of…”
A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008). “Indiana Code § 35-45-2-2 (2004). . The grant of transfer operates to automatically vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals unless this Court expressly adopts or affirms the Court of Appeals.”
VanHorn v. State, 889 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “[3] This definition of harassment is separate from the offense of harassment defined in Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-2, which provides, (a) A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (1) makes a telephone…”
Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). “The arrest was upon a charge of telephone harassment, Indiana Code section 35-45-2-2, based upon the laughing box incident.”
Rakiea McCaskill v. State of Indiana, 3 N.E.3d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-45-2-2(a), a person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (1) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; (2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or…”
Groves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “Ind.Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(2) (1998). 4 . The Abstract of Judgment provides that Groves spent zero days confined prior to sentencing.”
McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 882 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “I.C. § 35-45-2-2. *260 Stalking. I.C. § 35-45-10-5 (increasing the crime to a class C felony if it involves a threat placing the victim in fear of sexual battery, serious bodily injury, or death, is in disregard of a protective order, or occurs while a criminal case of…”
Brown v. State, 848 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “In Kinney , the defendant claimed that the harassment statute, Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.), was unconstitutionally vague.”
Rodregus Morgan v. State of Indiana, 4 N.E.3d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “at 50 (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 35-45-2-2(a)). Because the statute requires that a “specific act” be “accompanied by a specific intent,” we held that it was not void for vagueness.”
J.T. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “The relevant part of Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-2, which defines the offense, provides: (a) A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or other form of…”
Leuteritz v. State, 534 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). “” I.C. § 35-45-2-2. The State claims the trial court properly inferred Leuteritz had no intent of legitimate communication because Leuteritz did not explain his reason for calling to Debbie.”
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a) — 7 cases
Kiel Stone v. State of Indiana, 128 N.E.3d 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “[13] In its response to Stone's motion to dismiss, the State argued that Section 35-45-2-2 "criminalizes conduct, not speech"; that, therefore, "a First Amendment analysis premised on an alleged restriction of the freedom of speech is inapplicable"; and that the content of…”
Rakiea McCaskill v. State of Indiana, 3 N.E.3d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-45-2-2(a), a person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (1) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; (2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or…”
A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008). “Indiana Code § 35-45-2-2 (2004). . The grant of transfer operates to automatically vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals unless this Court expressly adopts or affirms the Court of Appeals.”
Rodregus Morgan v. State of Indiana, 4 N.E.3d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “at 50 (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 35-45-2-2(a)). Because the statute requires that a “specific act” be “accompanied by a specific intent,” we held that it was not void for vagueness.”
AB v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(1) — 3 cases
Leuteritz v. State, 534 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). “” I.C. § 35-45-2-2. The State claims the trial court properly inferred Leuteritz had no intent of legitimate communication because Leuteritz did not explain his reason for calling to Debbie.”
Craig Robert Hendry v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).
Xavier Isiah Alexander v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(2) — 5 cases
Groves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “Ind.Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(2) (1998). 4 . The Abstract of Judgment provides that Groves spent zero days confined prior to sentencing.”
J.T. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “The relevant part of Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-2, which defines the offense, provides: (a) A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: (2) communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or other form of…”
JT v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Mark Lynn Rushing v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Daniel M. Krum v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(4) — 4 cases
A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008). “Indiana Code § 35-45-2-2 (2004). . The grant of transfer operates to automatically vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals unless this Court expressly adopts or affirms the Court of Appeals.”
A.B. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
AB v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008).
AB v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(A) — 1 case
Xavier Isiah Alexander v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(4)(B) — 3 cases
Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “[2] I.C. § 35-45-2-2. [3] I.C. § 35-45-10-5. [4] Detective Rimstidt's efforts to locate "David Deckard" proved futile.”
Constance J. McGuire v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Xavier Isiah Alexander v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).
— Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(b) — 1 case
Constance J. McGuire v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
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