Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23 (2025)
Repealed
✓ 2025 Indiana Code: the 2026 session is not included
As added by P.L.311-1983, SEC.32. Amended by P.L.16-1984, SEC.20; P.L.140-1994, SEC.9; P.L.17-1997, SEC.7. Repealed by P.L.158-2013, SEC.584.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 78
cases, 1984–2020 · leading case: State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1997).
State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1997). “Summary and Conclusion Given the limited role of the judiciary in this arena, we agree with the Attorney General that the trial court impermissibly infringed upon the legislative prerogative when it held Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23 unconstitutional on its face.”
Grim v. State, 797 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “See I.C. § 35-47-2-23(0)(@)(B). Following a jury trial on September 23 and 24, 2002, Grim was convicted upon all counts.”
Anthony H. Dye v. State of Indiana, 972 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 2012). “It is true that there is a different statute, Indiana Code § 35-47-2-23 (the “handgun statute”), which is a progressive penalty statute.”
Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 2000). “9 Prosecutors had alleged that the handgun misdemeanor should be enhanced to a felony under the handgun statute, Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23 (c)(2)(B), because Ross had been convicted of another felony within the past fifteen years.”
Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Compare Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c) with Ind.Code § 35^7-4-5.”
Lewis v. State, 769 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “The supreme court agreed, noting that the handgun statute, Indiana Code section 35-47-2-23, is the more detailed and specific statute because it contains a more severe penalty for a repeat violation and for spé-cific cireumstances, whereas the general habitual offender statute,…”
Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 2001). “[4] In this regard the observations of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals are instructive: [Allowing a police officer to immediately ask the driver of a vehicle about the presence of weapons] could conceivably result in a full-blown search of the passenger compartment of the…”
McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002). “Ind.Code Ann. § 35-47-2-23(c) (West 1998).”
Conrad v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “[9] Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(2)(B). [10] A court may, however, consider the particularized circumstances of the criminal act in determining an appropriate sentence.”
Alexander v. State, 768 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “1998); Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 2001). “Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c). 4 . Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8.”
Townsend v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. 1986). “…GIVAN, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 . [2] Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 . [3] Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 . [4] Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23 (c).”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(0): 1 case
Grim v. State, 797 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “See I.C. § 35-47-2-23(0)(@)(B). Following a jury trial on September 23 and 24, 2002, Grim was convicted upon all counts.”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(2)(B): 1 case
Michael Williams, Jr. v. State of Indiana, 983 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(b): 1 case
State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1997). “Summary and Conclusion Given the limited role of the judiciary in this arena, we agree with the Attorney General that the trial court impermissibly infringed upon the legislative prerogative when it held Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23 unconstitutional on its face.”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c): 19 cases
Grim v. State, 797 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “See I.C. § 35-47-2-23(0)(@)(B). Following a jury trial on September 23 and 24, 2002, Grim was convicted upon all counts.”
McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002). “Ind.Code Ann. § 35-47-2-23(c) (West 1998).”
Alexander v. State, 768 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “1998); Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 2001). “Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c). 4 . Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8.”
Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Compare Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c) with Ind.Code § 35^7-4-5.”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(1): 1 case
Lewis v. State, 769 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “The supreme court agreed, noting that the handgun statute, Indiana Code section 35-47-2-23, is the more detailed and specific statute because it contains a more severe penalty for a repeat violation and for spé-cific cireumstances, whereas the general habitual offender statute,…”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(1)(B): 1 case
Scott v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(2): 2 cases
Anthony H. Dye v. State of Indiana, 972 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 2012). “It is true that there is a different statute, Indiana Code § 35-47-2-23 (the “handgun statute”), which is a progressive penalty statute.”
Henderson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. 1998).
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(2)(B): 15 cases
Conrad v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “[9] Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c)(2)(B). [10] A court may, however, consider the particularized circumstances of the criminal act in determining an appropriate sentence.”
Grim v. State, 797 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “See I.C. § 35-47-2-23(0)(@)(B). Following a jury trial on September 23 and 24, 2002, Grim was convicted upon all counts.”
Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Compare Ind.Code § 35-47-2-23(c) with Ind.Code § 35^7-4-5.”
Phillip T. Billingsley v. State of Indiana, 980 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 2000). “9 Prosecutors had alleged that the handgun misdemeanor should be enhanced to a felony under the handgun statute, Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23 (c)(2)(B), because Ross had been convicted of another felony within the past fifteen years.”
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(e): 1 case
Whatley v. State, 685 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. 1997).
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