Sec. 3. (a) This section does not apply to a law
enforcement officer who is acting within the scope of the law
enforcement officer's official duties or to a person who is justified in
using reasonable force against another person under:
(1) IC 35-41-3-2; or
(2) IC 35-41-3-3.
(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally points a firearm at
another person commits a Level 6 felony. However, the offense is a
Class A misdemeanor if the firearm was not loaded.
As added by P.L.296-1995, SEC.2. Amended by P.L.158-2013,
SEC.589.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
95
cases (
10 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case:
Brown v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Brown v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 30× “We held that Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3 "proscribes in no uncertain terms the knowing or intentional pointing of a firearm `at another person,' regardless of whether that firearm is loaded.”
Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010).
· cites it 4× “[2] Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3 (2008). [3] Ind.Code § 35-50-2-11 (2008).”
Ramon v. State, 888 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “[5] Ind.Code Ann. § 35-47-4-3 (West, PREMISE through 2007 1st Regular Sess.”
Harmon v. State, 849 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 4× “, Indiana Code Section 35^7-2-1, and forbidding serious violent felons from knowingly or intentionally possessing firearms, i.”
Collins v. State, 826 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “[5] Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
Harrison v. State, 901 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “Harrison asserts that Section 35-48-4-16(b) is analogous to the defenses of sud'den heat, which reduces a defendant's culpability from murder to voluntary manslaughter, and an unloaded firearm, which reduces class D felony pointing a firearm pursuant to Indiana Code Section…”
Adkins v. State, 887 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2008).
· cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3(b) (2004). 2 . The decision of the Court of Appeals addressed Adkins's additional contentions that the trial court committed reversible error when it (1) did not allow Adkins’s wife to testify as a witness; and (2) did not tell the jury that the offense of…”
Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3. 7 . I.C. § 35-47-2-1.”
Armstrong v. State, 742 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-3 proscribes in no uncertain terms the knowing or intentional pointing of a firearm “at another person [,] ” regardless of whether that firearm is loaded.”
Adkins v. State, 870 N.E.2d 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 12× “NOTES [1] Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3 (2004). [2] We recognize, however, that the practical effect of Brown was to make "unloaded" a fact as to which the defendant would have to produce evidence, if there otherwise would be no such evidence.”
Nantz v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3. Petro testified that Nantz pointed a pistol at his head and ordered him off the prop *1280 erty.”
Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3(b). 5 . Ind.Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).”
Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3(b): 31 cases
Brown v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
“We held that Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3 "proscribes in no uncertain terms the knowing or intentional pointing of a firearm `at another person,' regardless of whether that firearm is loaded.”
Adkins v. State, 887 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 2008).
“Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3(b) (2004). 2 . The decision of the Court of Appeals addressed Adkins's additional contentions that the trial court committed reversible error when it (1) did not allow Adkins’s wife to testify as a witness; and (2) did not tell the jury that the offense of…”
Johnican v. State, 804 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
“Ind.Code § 35-47-4-3(b). 5 . Ind.Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.