Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9 (2026)

Denial of disclosure; action to compel disclosure; intervenors; burden of proof; attorney's fees and costs

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 9. (a) This section does not apply to a request for information under section 4.4 of this chapter.

     (b) A denial of disclosure by a public agency occurs when the person making the request is physically present in the office of the agency, makes the request by telephone, or requests enhanced access to a document and:

(1) the person designated by the public agency as being responsible for public records release decisions refuses to permit inspection and copying of a public record when a request has been made; or

(2) twenty-four (24) hours elapse after any employee of the public agency refuses to permit inspection and copying of a public record when a request has been made;

whichever occurs first.

     (c) If a person requests by mail or by facsimile a copy or copies of a public record, a denial of disclosure does not occur until seven (7) days have elapsed from the date the public agency receives the request.

     (d) If a request is made orally, either in person or by telephone, a public agency may deny the request orally. However, if a request initially is made in writing, by facsimile, or through enhanced access, or if an oral request that has been denied is renewed in writing or by facsimile, a public agency may deny the request if:

(1) the denial is in writing or by facsimile; and

(2) the denial includes:

(A) a statement of the specific exemption or exemptions authorizing the withholding of all or part of the public record; and

(B) the name and the title or position of the person responsible for the denial.

     (e) A person who has been denied the right to inspect or copy a public record by a public agency may file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the denial occurred to compel the public agency to permit the person to inspect and copy the public record. Whenever an action is filed under this subsection, the public agency must notify each person who supplied any part of the public record at issue:

(1) that a request for release of the public record has been denied; and

(2) whether the denial was in compliance with an informal inquiry response or advisory opinion of the public access counselor.

Such persons are entitled to intervene in any litigation that results from the denial. The person who has been denied the right to inspect or copy need not allege or prove any special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.

     (f) The court shall determine the matter de novo, with the burden of proof on the public agency to sustain its denial. If the issue in de novo review under this section is whether a public agency properly denied access to a public record because the record is exempted under section 4(a) of this chapter, the public agency meets its burden of proof under this subsection by establishing the content of the record with adequate specificity and not by relying on a conclusory statement or affidavit.

     (g) This subsection does not apply to an action under section 5.2 of this chapter. If the issue in a de novo review under this section is whether a public agency properly denied access to a public record because the record is exempted under section 4(b) of this chapter:

(1) the public agency meets its burden of proof under this subsection by:

(A) proving that:

(i) the record falls within any one (1) of the categories of exempted records under section 4(b) of this chapter; and

(ii) if the action is for denial of access to a recording under section 5.1 of this chapter, the plaintiff is not a "requestor" as that term is defined in section 5.1 of this chapter; and

(B) establishing the content of the record with adequate specificity and not by relying on a conclusory statement or affidavit; and

(2) a person requesting access to a public record meets the person's burden of proof under this subsection by proving that the denial of access is arbitrary or capricious.

     (h) The court may review the public record in camera to determine whether any part of it may be withheld under this chapter. However, if the complaint alleges that a public agency denied disclosure of a public record by redacting information in the public record, the court shall conduct an in camera inspection of the public record with the redacted information included.

     (i) Except as provided in subsection (k), in any action filed under this section, a court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses of litigation to the prevailing party if:

(1) the plaintiff substantially prevails; or

(2) the defendant substantially prevails and the court finds the action was frivolous or vexatious.

Except as provided in subsection (k), the plaintiff is not eligible for the awarding of attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses if the plaintiff filed the action without first seeking and receiving an informal inquiry response or advisory opinion from the public access counselor, unless the plaintiff can show the filing of the action was necessary because the denial of access to a public record under this chapter would prevent the plaintiff from presenting that public record to a public agency preparing to act on a matter of relevance to the public record whose disclosure was denied.

     (j) Except as provided in subsection (k), a court may assess a civil penalty under section 9.5 of this chapter only if the plaintiff obtained an advisory opinion from the public access counselor before filing an action under this section as set forth in section 9.5 of this chapter.

     (k) This subsection applies only to an action to appeal the denial of access to a law enforcement recording under section 5.1 of this chapter. A requestor (as defined in section 5.1 of this chapter) may bring an action to appeal from the denial of access to a law enforcement recording without first seeking or receiving an informal inquiry response or advisory opinion from the public access counselor. If the requestor prevails in an action under this subsection:

(1) the requestor is eligible for an award of reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses; and

(2) a court may assess a civil penalty under section 9.5 of this chapter.

     (l) A court shall expedite the hearing of an action filed under this section.

As added by P.L.19-1983, SEC.6. Amended by P.L.54-1985, SEC.7; P.L.50-1986, SEC.3; P.L.68-1987, SEC.2; P.L.58-1993, SEC.10; P.L.19-1997, SEC.4; P.L.70-1999, SEC.2 and P.L.191-1999, SEC.2; P.L.173-2003, SEC.6 and P.L.261-2003, SEC.8; P.L.22-2005, SEC.2; P.L.134-2012, SEC.19; P.L.248-2013, SEC.5; P.L.58-2016, SEC.8.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1992–2025 · leading case: William Groth v. Mike Pence, as Governor of the State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
William Groth v. Mike Pence, as Governor of the State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 25× “I.C. § 5-14-3-9(f). [28] The white paper is a privileged attorney-client communication and is protected by the common interest privilege.”
John Doe 1 v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 81 N.E.3d 199 (Ind. 2017). · cites it 4× “§ 23-19-5-9 (2016) (securities fraud); I.C. § 24-3-2-12(b) (2016) (cigarette fair trade); I.”
City of Elkhart v. Agenda: Open Gov't, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 8× “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d). The person who has been denied such right “need not allege or prove any special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.”
John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his Off. capacity of Chief of Police, & the Indianapolis Police Dep't, 13 N.E.3d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 17× “With respect to the timeliness of the IPD’s exemption claim, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9 (2006) provides that: .”
Smith v. Maximum Control Facility, 850 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 8× “The Public Access Counselor also reminded Smith of his right "to file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in [which] the denial occurred" pursuant to Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9. Id. The Maximum Control Facility did not give Smith access to these records either.”
Unincorporated Operating Div. of Indiana Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
Shepherd Props. Co., d/b/a Shepco Com. Finishes v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012). · cites it 5× “§ 5-14-3-9®. In this case, the parties agree that Township is a “public agency” as defined in the APRA and that ShepCo is not a “public agency.”
Marion Cnty. Election Bd. & Marion Cnty. Bd. of Voter Reg. v. Gregory Bowes, Mark King, Paul Ogden, Zach Mullholland, & Brian Cooper, 53 N.E.3d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “” Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9© (emphasis added). Based on this provision, the trial court awarded Bowes $147.”
Indianapolis Newspapers v. Indiana State Lottery Comm'n, 739 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9 (d). The public agency must then notify each person who supplied any part of the disputed record that a request for release of the information has been denied.”
State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 2001). · cites it 2× “5-7 (West 2001), and Access to Public Records statute, Ind.Code Ann. § 5-14-3-9 (West 2001), both allow attorney fees but only if the plaintiff follows certain specific “procedural prerequisites before filing suit.”
State Ex Rel. Masariu v. Marion Superior Court No. 1, 621 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1993). · cites it 4× “The plaintiff's amended complaint seeks declaratory relief and attorney fees, remedies ostensibly available under Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9 (Indiana Access to Public Records Law) and Ind.”
Bobrow v. Bobrow, 810 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “Rather, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9(e) provides: A person who has been denied the right to inspect or copy a public record by a public agency may file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the denial occurred to compel the public agency to permit the…”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(6) — 1 case
Kentner v. Indiana Pub. Employers' Plan, Inc., 852 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(a) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(d) — 6 cases
Unincorporated Operating Div. of Indiana Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
City of Elkhart v. Agenda: Open Gov't, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d). The person who has been denied such right “need not allege or prove any special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.”
Sims v. Scopelitis, 797 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Indianapolis Newspapers v. Indiana State Lottery Comm'n, 739 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9 (d). The public agency must then notify each person who supplied any part of the disputed record that a request for release of the information has been denied.”
Journal Gazette v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 698 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(e) — 14 cases
Smith v. Maximum Control Facility, 850 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “The Public Access Counselor also reminded Smith of his right "to file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in [which] the denial occurred" pursuant to Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9. Id. The Maximum Control Facility did not give Smith access to these records either.”
City of Elkhart v. Agenda: Open Gov't, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d). The person who has been denied such right “need not allege or prove any special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.”
Bobrow v. Bobrow, 810 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Rather, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9(e) provides: A person who has been denied the right to inspect or copy a public record by a public agency may file an action in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the denial occurred to compel the public agency to permit the…”
Shepherd Props. Co., d/b/a Shepco Com. Finishes v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012). “§ 5-14-3-9®. In this case, the parties agree that Township is a “public agency” as defined in the APRA and that ShepCo is not a “public agency.”
John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his Off. capacity of Chief of Police, & the Indianapolis Police Dep't, 13 N.E.3d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “With respect to the timeliness of the IPD’s exemption claim, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9 (2006) provides that: .”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(f) — 4 cases
William Groth v. Mike Pence, as Governor of the State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “I.C. § 5-14-3-9(f). [28] The white paper is a privileged attorney-client communication and is protected by the common interest privilege.”
Unincorporated Operating Div. of Indiana Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.”
John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his Off. capacity of Chief of Police, & the Indianapolis Police Dep't, 13 N.E.3d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “With respect to the timeliness of the IPD’s exemption claim, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9 (2006) provides that: .”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(f)(1)(A) — 1 case
Newman v. Bernstein, 766 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(f)(1)(B) — 2 cases
Newman v. Bernstein, 766 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Journal Gazette v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 698 N.E.2d 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(g) — 2 cases
William Groth v. Mike Pence, as Governor of the State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “I.C. § 5-14-3-9(f). [28] The white paper is a privileged attorney-client communication and is protected by the common interest privilege.”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(g)(2) — 1 case
John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his Off. capacity of Chief of Police, & the Indianapolis Police Dep't, 13 N.E.3d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “With respect to the timeliness of the IPD’s exemption claim, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9 (2006) provides that: .”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(h) — 2 cases
City of Elkhart v. Agenda: Open Gov't, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9(d). The person who has been denied such right “need not allege or prove any special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.”
John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his Off. capacity of Chief of Police, & the Indianapolis Police Dep't, 13 N.E.3d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “With respect to the timeliness of the IPD’s exemption claim, Indiana Code § 5-14-3-9 (2006) provides that: .”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(i) — 8 cases
Shepherd Props. Co., d/b/a Shepco Com. Finishes v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012). “§ 5-14-3-9®. In this case, the parties agree that Township is a “public agency” as defined in the APRA and that ShepCo is not a “public agency.”
Marion Cnty. Election Bd. & Marion Cnty. Bd. of Voter Reg. v. Gregory Bowes, Mark King, Paul Ogden, Zach Mullholland, & Brian Cooper, 53 N.E.3d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “” Ind.Code § 5-14-3-9© (emphasis added). Based on this provision, the trial court awarded Bowes $147.”
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(i)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 5-14-3-9(j) — 1 case
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