Sec. 9. (a) This section does not apply if an ignition
interlock device order is issued under section 8(d) of this chapter.
(b) If the affidavit under section 8(b) of this chapter states that a
person refused to submit to a chemical test, the bureau shall suspend
the driving privileges of the person:
(1) for:
(A) one (1) year; or
(B) if the person has at least one (1) previous conviction for
operating while intoxicated, two (2) years; or
(2) until the suspension is ordered terminated under IC 9-30-5.
(c) If the affidavit under section 8(b) of this chapter states that a
chemical test resulted in prima facie evidence that a person was
intoxicated, the bureau shall suspend the driving privileges of the
person:
(1) for one hundred eighty (180) days; or
(2) until the bureau is notified by a court that the charges have
been disposed of;
whichever occurs first.
(d) Whenever the bureau is required to suspend a person's driving
privileges under this section, the bureau shall immediately do the
following:
(1) Mail notice to the person's address contained in the records of
the bureau, or send the notice electronically if the person has
indicated a preference for receiving notices from the bureau
electronically, stating that the person's driving privileges will be
suspended for a specified period, commencing:
(A) seven (7) days after the date of the notice; or
(B) on the date the court enters an order recommending
suspension of the person's driving privileges under section 8(c)
of this chapter;
whichever occurs first.
(2) Notify the person of the right to a judicial review under
section 10 of this chapter.
[Pre-1991 Recodification Citation: 9-11-4-9.]
As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC.18. Amended by P.L.76-2004,
SEC.12; P.L.153-2005, SEC.4; P.L.94-2006, SEC.8; P.L.125-2012,
SEC.345; P.L.85-2013, SEC.96; P.L.149-2015, SEC.104;
P.L.188-2015, SEC.111; P.L.141-2024, SEC.47.
Notes of Decisions
Kristy Burnell v. State of Indiana, 56 N.E.3d 1146 (Ind. 2016).
· cites it 4× “evidence presented did not establish as a matter of law that [Burnell] refused to submit to the chemical test under Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9 (b).” Id. at 780 . Having previously granted transfer we also affirm the trial court’s judgment but on grounds different from those expressed…”
State of Indiana & Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehs. v. Nicholas Hargrave, 51 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 10× “In addition, because Har-grave’s driving privileges were suspended under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-9, Hargrave is required to file proof of financial responsibility for three years following the termination of his suspension under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-12, and the trial…”
Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehs. v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-9. On January 9, 2009, she filed a verified petition for a hardship driver's license pursuant to Indiana Code Sections 9-24-15-2 and -8.”
Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 9-30-6-9(a)(l). 5 We do not derive from the implied consent law a legislative intent to preclude a law enforcement officer generally from determining a driver’s blood alcohol content, or specifically from obtaining judicial authorization in the form of a search…”
Silverman v. Fifer, 837 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Citing I.C. § 9-30-6-9 and I.C. § 9-30-5-10, the trial court granted the petition.”
Keyaunna Hurley v. State of Indiana, 75 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. 2017).
· cites it 2× “§ 9-30-6-9(b)(l) (2015 Supp.). A person whose driving privileges were suspended is entitled to prompt judicial review, id § 9-30-6-9(d) (2015 Supp.”
Ham v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 3× “§ 9-30-6-7; I.C. § 9-30-6-9. The defendant is not advised, however, that the fact finder will be permitted to infer that a state of intoxication can be premised on the decision to decline a breath test.”
Kristy Burnell v. State of Indiana, 44 N.E.3d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 4× “2d at 42 (emphasis added), and that accordingly the evidence presented did not establish as a matter of law that she refused to submit to the chemical test under Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9 (b). I would reverse the court’s order on Burnell’s petition for judicial review and reinstate…”
Elberta N. Jackson v. State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “Rather, she received notice from Officer Kilgren that her refusal to submit to a chemical test when offered would result in a license suspension, and Indiana Code section 9-30-6-9(b) required the BMV to automatically suspend Jackson’s driving privileges.”
Schrefler v. State, 660 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
“CODE § 9-30-6-9(b) 3 constitute multiple punishments for the same offense, and thus violate the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions.”
Paul Hassfurther v. State of Indiana, 988 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 6× “I.C. § 9-30-6-9. Nonetheless, these circumstances suggest that it may well be the better practice for police departments to include the two-year suspension provision on the implied consent card.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(a): 1 case
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(a)(1): 1 case
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(a)(l): 1 case
Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
“Ind.Code § 9-30-6-9(a)(l). 5 We do not derive from the implied consent law a legislative intent to preclude a law enforcement officer generally from determining a driver’s blood alcohol content, or specifically from obtaining judicial authorization in the form of a search…”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(b): 5 cases
Silverman v. Fifer, 837 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“Citing I.C. § 9-30-6-9 and I.C. § 9-30-5-10, the trial court granted the petition.”
Schrefler v. State, 660 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
“CODE § 9-30-6-9(b) 3 constitute multiple punishments for the same offense, and thus violate the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions.”
Kristy Burnell v. State of Indiana, 44 N.E.3d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“2d at 42 (emphasis added), and that accordingly the evidence presented did not establish as a matter of law that she refused to submit to the chemical test under Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9 (b). I would reverse the court’s order on Burnell’s petition for judicial review and reinstate…”
Elberta N. Jackson v. State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Rather, she received notice from Officer Kilgren that her refusal to submit to a chemical test when offered would result in a license suspension, and Indiana Code section 9-30-6-9(b) required the BMV to automatically suspend Jackson’s driving privileges.”
Paul Hassfurther v. State of Indiana, 988 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
“I.C. § 9-30-6-9. Nonetheless, these circumstances suggest that it may well be the better practice for police departments to include the two-year suspension provision on the implied consent card.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(b)(1): 1 case
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(b)(l): 1 case
Keyaunna Hurley v. State of Indiana, 75 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. 2017).
“§ 9-30-6-9(b)(l) (2015 Supp.). A person whose driving privileges were suspended is entitled to prompt judicial review, id § 9-30-6-9(d) (2015 Supp.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(b)(l)(B): 1 case
Elberta N. Jackson v. State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“Rather, she received notice from Officer Kilgren that her refusal to submit to a chemical test when offered would result in a license suspension, and Indiana Code section 9-30-6-9(b) required the BMV to automatically suspend Jackson’s driving privileges.”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(c): 3 cases
State of Indiana & Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehs. v. Nicholas Hargrave, 51 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
“In addition, because Har-grave’s driving privileges were suspended under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-9, Hargrave is required to file proof of financial responsibility for three years following the termination of his suspension under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-12, and the trial…”
Ind. Code § 9-30-6-9(d): 1 case
Keyaunna Hurley v. State of Indiana, 75 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. 2017).
“§ 9-30-6-9(b)(l) (2015 Supp.). A person whose driving privileges were suspended is entitled to prompt judicial review, id § 9-30-6-9(d) (2015 Supp.”
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