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K.S.A.Chapter 21

K.S.A. § 21-3718 (2026)

Repealed

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1973–2023 42citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 42 opinions since 1973, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (l) (9 cases).

21-3718.

History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3718; L. 1992, ch. 239, § 117; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 76; L. 1994, ch. 291, § 29; L. 2000, ch. 181, § 6; L. 2002, ch. 155, § 1; L. 2009, ch. 32, § 26; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 21-3718 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
YELLOWState v. McCaslin, 245 P.3d 1030 (Kan. 2011).
cites § 21-3718 4×subsections: (a)cited by 159 cases
Overruled by State v. Astorga on other grounds: 10 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 21-3718
“Aggravated arson is "arson, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3718 . . . committed upon a building or property in which there is a human being.”
The case’s holding
A party must make a timely and specific objection to preserve an error for appeal, even when the error involves a fundamental constitutional right (State v. McCaslin).
Later courts cite it for
“conviction of even the gravest offense ' "can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Houck, 727 P.2d 460 (Kan. 1986).
cites § 21-3718 10×subsections: (l) 4×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“” Arson is defined by K.S.A. 21-3718 as follows: “21-3718. Arson.”
The case’s holding
A felony murder conviction must be reversed if the evidence is insufficient to support the underlying felony (State v. Houck).
3
GREENFerguson v. State, 78 P.3d 40 (Kan. 2003).
cites § 21-3718 4×subsections: (a)cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“21-3718(a)(2), the Court of Appeals wrote: “Defendant argues the information charging her with arson is jurisdictionally defective because it fails to state all the essential elements of a crime.”
The case’s holding
The liberal common-sense rule of State v. Hall applies to collateral attacks challenging defective charging documents, and the pre-Hall standard is inapplicable in such contexts.
4
GREENState v. Rodriguez, 8 P.3d 712 (Kan. 2000).
cites § 21-3718 6×subsections: (a) 4× (b)cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“2d 239, 241-43 (fee interest not required, leasehold sufficient) and see also K.S.A. 21-3718(a)(1) (referring to “any interest” in the property), in this case the statement in the second sentence of Instruction No.”
The case’s holding
A dog constitutes personal property for the purposes of criminal arson statutes.
Later courts cite it for
“may indulge in impassioned bursts of oratory and may use picturesque speech as long as he or she does not refer to facts not disclosed by the evidence.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Kingsley, 851 P.2d 370 (Kan. 1993).
cites § 21-3718 3×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“K.S.A. 21-3718 provides as follows: “(1) Arson is knowingly, by means of fire or explosive: (a) Damaging any building or property in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other person; or (b) Damaging any building or property with intent to injure or…”
The case’s holding
The element of surprise does not factor into the determination of whether a murder is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (K.S.A. 60-445).
Later courts cite it for
“when a defendant has been convicted of the greater offense but evidence supports only a lesser included offense, the case must be remanded to resentence the defendant for conviction of the lesser included offense.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Johnson, 738 P.2d 872 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 21-3718 9×subsections: (l) 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“K.S.A. 21-3718 and 21-3719 provide as follows: “21-3718.”
7
GREENState v. Brewer, 732 P.2d 780 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 21-3718 5×subsections: (l)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“: This is a direct appeal by the defendant, Terry Brewer, from his conviction by a jury of two counts of arson and one count of theft by deception, K.S.A. 21-3718 and 21-3701(b). Defendant was charged with setting a fire to a house in Osawatomie, Kansas, which defendant and his…”
Later courts cite it for
“a record of the factors it considered is even less important.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState v. Dickson, 69 P.3d 549 (Kan. 2003).
cites § 21-3718 2×subsections: (l)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“S.A. 21-3719. The court reversed the conviction of aggravated arson .”
The case’s holding
No multiple acts error occurs when the prosecutor identifies a single incident relied upon during both opening and closing arguments (making the functional equivalent of an election).
Later courts cite it for
“accused cannot be found guilty of some other offense which state did not see fit to charge” · 1 citing court
9
GREENUnited States v. Javier Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“3 (West 2005); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3718 (2005); La.Rev.”
The case’s holding
A state arson conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines if the statute involves the willful and malicious burning of property.
Later courts cite it for
“a willful and malicious burning of property.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Thai Do Hoang, 755 P.2d 7 (Kan. 1988).
cites § 21-3718 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“21-3715) and arson (K.S.A. 21-3718). At the close of the preliminary hearing, held on October 21, 1986, defendant's trial counsel moved for dismissal of the two felony-murder counts.”
The case’s holding
The first-degree felony murder statute applies to the deaths of accomplices during an inherently dangerous felony because the statute contains no exclusion for co-felons.
Later courts cite it for
“review of case law of other jurisdictions on this issue is not particularly helpful herein by virtue of the wide variety of the statutory language employed in the definitions of felony murder.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. McMannis, 747 P.2d 1343 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 21-3718 3×subsections: (l) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“In Houck , the defendant was charged and convicted of committing aggravated arson under K.S.A. 21-3718(l)(a) and K.S.A. 21-3719. However, the evidence of the case was that defendant committed aggravated arson under a different section of the statute, K.”
12
GREENState v. Crump, 654 P.2d 922 (Kan. 1982).
cites § 21-3718 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“21-3414), one count of arson (K.S.A. 21-3718), and one count of attempted arson (K.”
13
GREENState v. Newman, 680 P.2d 257 (Kan. 1984).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“The defendant was charged with arson, K.S.A. 21-3718; burglary, K.S.A. 21-3715; and theft, K.”
The case’s holding
An interlocutory appeal of an evidentiary ruling is permitted only if the suppression substantially impairs the state's ability to prosecute the case.
Later courts cite it for
“interlocutory appeals are to be permitted only where the pretrial order suppressing or excluding evidence places the state in a position where its ability to prosecute the case is substantially impaired.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENIron Horse Auto, Inc. v. Lititz Mut. Ins., 156 P.3d 1221 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
““(b) Except as otherwise specifically provided in K.S.A. 21-3718 and amendments thereto and K.”
15
GREENState v. Gardner, 955 P.2d 1199 (Kan. 1998).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“■ 21-3427); arson (K.S.A. 21-3718); and aggravated burglaiy (K.”
The case’s holding
An improper closing remark regarding the location of evidence is harmless error if the misstatement is made in passing and is not a significant part of the prosecution's case.
Later courts cite it for
“an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” · 5 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Eastridge, 894 P.2d 243 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 21-3718 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“Arson is a class C felony, K.S.A. 21-3718, and conspiracy to commit arson is a class E felony, K.”
Later courts cite it for
“the supreme court has stated that multiplicity is 'the charging of a single offense in several counts of a complaint or information.' the primary concern with multiplicity is that it creates the potential for multiple punishments for a single offense, which is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the united states constitution and section 10 of the kansas constitution bill of rights.” · 3 citing courts
17
NEUTRALState v. Carty, 644 P.2d 407 (Kan. 1982).
cites § 21-3718 8×subsections: (l)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“, was convicted of one count of arson of the Coffeyville Memorial Hall, K.S.A. 21-3718, and one count of aggravated arson of the Caney Grade School, K.”
18
GREENState v. Duke, 887 P.2d 110 (Kan. 1994).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“K.S.A. 21-3718, K.S.A. 21-3719. Duke argues that because the jury instruction failed to include all essential elements of the offense, his convictions for felony murder and arson must be set aside.”
The case’s holding
Prosecutors are granted wide latitude in the language and manner of closing arguments provided the presentation remains consistent with the evidence adduced.
Later courts cite it for
“in criminal trials, the prosecution is given wide latitude in language and in manner of presentation of closing argument as long as it is consistent with the evidence adduced.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENUnited States v. Velez-Alderete, 569 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2009).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“3 ("personal property the value of which exceeds five hundred dollars”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3718 ("any building or property which is not a dwelling in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other person”); La.”
Later courts cite it for
“the full range of conduct prohibited by the texas arson statute falls under the generic, contemporary meaning of arson” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Myers, 640 P.2d 1245 (Kan. 1982).
cites § 21-3718 1×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 21-3718
“21-3427), and arson (K.S.A. 21-3718). The evidence presented by the State at the trial was essentially as follows: The defendant, Joe Myers, Jr.”
The case’s holding
A robbery conviction is supported when an act of force and the taking of property form a continuous chain of events where the force enables the taking.
Later courts cite it for
“where the act of force and the taking of the property are so connected as to form a continuous chain of events” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197319982023

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1982. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan.22Kan. Ct. App.179th Cir.25th Cir.1
By subsection
(a)6 cases
State v. Rodriguez, 8 P.3d 712 (Kan. 2000).“2d 239, 241-43 (fee interest not required, leasehold sufficient) and see also K.S.A. 21-3718(a)(1) (referring to “any interest” in the property), in this case the statement in the second sentence of Instruction No.”
State v. McCaslin, 245 P.3d 1030 (Kan. 2011).“Aggravated arson is "arson, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3718 . . . committed upon a building or property in which there is a human being.”
Ferguson v. State, 78 P.3d 40 (Kan. 2003).“21-3718(a)(2), the Court of Appeals wrote: “Defendant argues the information charging her with arson is jurisdictionally defective because it fails to state all the essential elements of a crime.”
State v. Womelsdorf, 274 P.3d 662 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883 (Kan. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(b)1 case
State v. Rodriguez, 8 P.3d 712 (Kan. 2000).
(l)9 cases
State v. Houck, 727 P.2d 460 (Kan. 1986).“” Arson is defined by K.S.A. 21-3718 as follows: “21-3718. Arson.”
State v. Dickson, 69 P.3d 549 (Kan. 2003).“S.A. 21-3719. The court reversed the conviction of aggravated arson .”
State v. Johnson, 738 P.2d 872 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).“K.S.A. 21-3718 and 21-3719 provide as follows: “21-3718.”
State v. McMannis, 747 P.2d 1343 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).“In Houck , the defendant was charged and convicted of committing aggravated arson under K.S.A. 21-3718(l)(a) and K.S.A. 21-3719. However, the evidence of the case was that defendant committed aggravated arson under a different section of the statute, K.”
State v. Brewer, 732 P.2d 780 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).“: This is a direct appeal by the defendant, Terry Brewer, from his conviction by a jury of two counts of arson and one count of theft by deception, K.S.A. 21-3718 and 21-3701(b). Defendant was charged with setting a fire to a house in Osawatomie, Kansas, which defendant and his…”
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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