Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070 (2026)

"Secured person" -- Obligor's rights to recovery

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) "Secured person" means the owner, operator or occupant of a secured motor vehicle, and any other person or organization legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such owner, operator or occupant.

(2) A reparation obligor which has paid or may become obligated to pay basic reparation benefits shall be subrogated to the extent of its obligations to all of the rights of the person suffering the injury against any person or organization other than a secured person.

(3) A reparation obligor shall have the right to recover basic reparation benefits paid to or for the benefit of a person suffering the injury from the reparation obligor of a secured person as provided in this subsection, except as provided in KRS 304.39- 140(3). The reparation obligor shall elect to assert its claim (i) by joining as a party in an action that may be commenced by the person suffering the injury, or (ii) to reimbursement, pursuant to KRS 304.39-030, sixty (60) days after said claim has been presented to the reparation obligor of secured persons. The right to recover basic reparation benefits paid under (ii) shall be limited to those instances established as applicable by the Kentucky Insurance Arbitration Association as provided in KRS 304.39-290.

(4) Any entitlement to recovery for basic or added reparation benefits paid or to be paid by the subrogee shall in no event exceed the limits of automobile bodily injury liability coverage available to the secured party after priority of entitlement as provided in this section and KRS 304.39-140(3) has been satisfied.

(5) An attorney representing a secured person in any action filed under KRS 304.39- 060 shall be entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee in the event that reparation benefits paid to said secured person by that secured person's reparation's obligor are reimbursed by any insurance carrier on behalf of a tortfeasor who is the defendant in any such action filed by the said secured person or in the event such potential "action" is settled by said potential tortfeasor's insurance carrier on his behalf prior to the filing of any such suit. Effective: June 17, 1978 History: Amended 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 215, sec. 4, effective June 17, 1978; and ch. 384, sec. 104, effective June 17, 1978. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 385, sec. 7, effective July 1, 1975. Legislative Research Commission Note. This section was amended by two 1978 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 62 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1991).

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State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1991). · cites it 18× “2d 416 (1980), we held: "[U]nder the Kentucky No-fault Act, an injured party is not entitled to an award of damages from the defendant in the trial on liability for any item of damages which was compensated by BRB.”

City of Louisville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 304 (Ky. 2006). · cites it 26× “The two principal provisions of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) pertaining to BRB subrogation claims are found in KRS 304.39-070, viz: (2) A reparation obligor which has paid or may become obligated to pay basic reparation benefits shall be subrogated to the…”

Schmidt v. Leppert, 214 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2007). · cites it 6× “” A “secured person” is defined at KRS 304.39-070(1) as “the owner, operator or occupant of a secured motor vehicle, and any other person or organization legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such owner, operator or occupant.”

Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. Drury, 582 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 10× “These two cases have been heard together by this court because they have a common issue, that being, whether a reparations obligor which has paid basic reparations benefits, or personal injury protection [hereinafter called PIP] to the party not-at-fault in the automobile…”

Lafferty v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Ky. 1995). · cites it 18× “2d 64, 67 (1979), which held that subsection (3) of KRS 304.39-070 creates a separate right of recovery in the basic reparation obligor and that “the purpose of the statute is to allocate, still under a fault concept, the ultimate responsibility for the benefits paid to the…”

Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 9× “KRS 304.39-070(2). She, however, has not raised this issue on this appeal.”

Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kidd, 602 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1980). · cites it 5× “It is clear that this section, taken together with KRS 304.39-070, means that the injured party may not assert a claim which includes benefits already paid by its insurer as BRB.”

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1992). · cites it 4× “Addressing the no-fault carriers' right to intervene in the tort action, the "piggyback" procedure allowed by KRS 304.39-070(3), in Grange Mut. v. McDavid , we stated (p.”

Lawson v. Helton Sanitation, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2001). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to KRS 304.39-070(2) and (3), a reparation obligor (Farm Bureau), which has made BRB payments to its insured (Lawson), may intervene in the insured's tort action against the tortfeasor (Helton) in order to assert a direct claim against the tortfeasor's insurer…”

Woodall v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 648 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1983). · cites it 5× “This appeal raises issues concerning the appropriateness and reasonableness of the award of an attorney’s fee made pursuant to KRS 304.39-070(5). The award was made to an attorney representing a secured person in an action against a tort-feasor involved in a vehicular collision…”

Coots v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1993). · cites it 2× “Just as an injured party may not release a subrogation claim belonging to a reparations obligor under the Kentucky No-Fault Statute, KRS 304.39-070, by executing a release in favor of a tortfeasor; similarly, a UIM insured would have no right or standing to release a potential…”

United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Smith, 580 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979). · cites it 6× “” KRS 304.39-070(1) defines “secured person” as meaning “the owner, operator or occupant of a secured motor vehicle, and any other person or organization legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such owner, operator or occupant.”

Show all 62 citing cases →

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(1) — 10 cases

Schmidt v. Leppert, 214 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2007). “” A “secured person” is defined at KRS 304.39-070(1) as “the owner, operator or occupant of a secured motor vehicle, and any other person or organization legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such owner, operator or occupant.”

City of Louisville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 304 (Ky. 2006). “The two principal provisions of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) pertaining to BRB subrogation claims are found in KRS 304.39-070, viz: (2) A reparation obligor which has paid or may become obligated to pay basic reparation benefits shall be subrogated to the…”

Lafferty v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. Ky. 1995). “2d 64, 67 (1979), which held that subsection (3) of KRS 304.39-070 creates a separate right of recovery in the basic reparation obligor and that “the purpose of the statute is to allocate, still under a fault concept, the ultimate responsibility for the benefits paid to the…”

Ammons v. Winklepleck Ex Rel. Winklepleck, 570 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Ky. 2009).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(2) — 24 cases

State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1991). “2d 416 (1980), we held: "[U]nder the Kentucky No-fault Act, an injured party is not entitled to an award of damages from the defendant in the trial on liability for any item of damages which was compensated by BRB.”

Wine v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 917 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. 1996).

Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kidd, 602 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1980). “It is clear that this section, taken together with KRS 304.39-070, means that the injured party may not assert a claim which includes benefits already paid by its insurer as BRB.”

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(3) — 29 cases

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1992). “Addressing the no-fault carriers' right to intervene in the tort action, the "piggyback" procedure allowed by KRS 304.39-070(3), in Grange Mut. v. McDavid , we stated (p.”

Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). “KRS 304.39-070(2). She, however, has not raised this issue on this appeal.”

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(3)(4) — 1 case

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 635 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(3)(ii) — 1 case

MFA Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 687 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(4) — 6 cases

Saxe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 955 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

MFA Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 687 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.39-070(5) — 14 cases

Woodall v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 648 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1983). “This appeal raises issues concerning the appropriateness and reasonableness of the award of an attorney’s fee made pursuant to KRS 304.39-070(5). The award was made to an attorney representing a secured person in an action against a tort-feasor involved in a vehicular collision…”

MFA Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 687 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 602 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Saxe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 955 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Inn-Grp. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Greer, 71 S.W.3d 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

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