(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, a judgment,
including a judgment for prejudgment interest, shall bear six percent (6%)
interest compounded annually from the date the judgment is entered. A
judgment may be for the principal and accrued interest.
(2) A judgment for unpaid child support payments shall bear twelve percent (12%)
interest compounded annually from the date the judgment is entered.
(3) A judgment rendered on a contract, promissory note, or other written obligation
shall bear interest at the interest rate established in that contract, promissory
note, or other written obligation.
(4) When a claim for unliquidated damages is reduced to judgment, such judgment
may bear less interest than six percent (6%) if the court rendering such
judgment, after a hearing on that question, is satisfied that the rate of interest
should be less than six percent (6%). All interested parties must have due
notice of said hearing.
Effective:June 29, 2017
History: Amended 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 17, sec. 1, effective June 29, 2017. --
Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1982. -- Amended 1976
Ky. Acts ch. 59, sec. 2. -- Amended 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 1. -- Recodified
1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec.
2220.
Legislative Research Commission Note (6/29/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 17, sec. 4
provided that amendments made to this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 17, sec. 1
apply to all judgments entered by a court on or after June 29, 2017, the effective
date of that Act.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
106
cases (
31 in the last 5 years), 1942–2026 · leading case:
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009).
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 25× “GMRI argues: (1) that the trial court admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; (2) that the jury verdict below was inconsistent; (3) that the jury awarded an excessive and unsupported amount for pain and suffering; and, (4) that KRS 360.040 is unconstitutional. For these…”
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Anson Stamping Co. Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 579 (W.D. Ky. 2006).
· cites it 20× “ARGUMENTS Anson argues that the above language refers to KRS 360.040, Kentucky’s post-judgment interest statute.”
Hill v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 8× “POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST KRS 360.040 directs that a judgment "shall bear twelve percent (12%) interest *428 compounded annually from its date.”
Courtenay v. Wilhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 21× “" The motion was denied by order entered on January 4, 1982, and this appeal ensued.”
Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 6× “Interest on judgments is governed by KRS 360.040, which provides in relevant part that "[a] judgment shall bear twelve percent (12%) interest compounded annually from its date.”
Hazel Enter., LLC v. Ray, 510 S.W.3d 840 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 7× “Hazel argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law, as KRS 360.040 mandated Ray’s liability for post-judgment interest.”
Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin, 432 S.W.3d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 6× “On appeal, University Hospital contends that the trial court erred: by concluding that the doctrine of the law of the case prevented it from reconsidering University Hospital’s motion to reduce the post-judgment interest rate pursuant to the provisions of KRS 360.040; by denying…”
Serv. Fin. Co. v. Ware, 473 S.W.3d 98 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 7× “the circuit court that KRS 360.040 requires that when a judgment is “rendered for accruing interest on a written obligation, it shall bear interest in accordance with the instrument *104 reporting such accruals.”
Perkins v. Daugherty, 722 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 6× “" The interest is to be determined according to KRS 360.040. As Daugherty was a licensed engineer, and did perform engineering services for Perkins, we believe the lien filed against Crosswoods Subdivision was rightfully filed.”
Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1991).
· cites it 4× “We can think of no rational reason to exclude the period between the date of acceleration and the date of judgment for the accrual of interest.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 360.040(1) — 14 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 360.040(2) — 3 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 360.040(3) — 8 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 360.040(4) — 7 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.