(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Land" means land, rocks, boulders, cliffs, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty;
(b) "Owner" means the possessor of a fee, reversionary, or easement interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the premises;
(c) "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, rock climbing, bouldering, rappelling, bicycling, horseback riding, pleasure driving, nature study, water-skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites; and
(d) "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land but does not include fees for general use permits issued by a government agency for access to public lands if the permits are valid for a period of not less than thirty (30) days.
(2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.
(3) Except as specifically recognized by or provided in subsection (6) of this section, an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on the premises to persons entering for such purposes.
(4) Except as specifically recognized by or provided in subsection (6) of this section, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreation purposes does not thereby:
(a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;
(b) Confer upon the person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
(c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of those persons.
(5) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.
(6) Nothing in this section limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(a) For willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity; or
(b) For injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof, except that in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.
(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed to:
(a) Create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to persons or property;
(b) Relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he or she may have in the absence of this section to exercise care in his or her use of the land and in his or her activities thereon, or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care; or
(c) Ripen into a claim for adverse possession, absent a claim of title or legal right.
(8) No action for the recovery of real property, including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for recreational purposes. Effective: June 27, 2025 History: Amended 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 133, sec. 2, effective June 27, 2025. -- Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 306, sec. 2, effective July 15, 2002. -- Amended 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 338, sec. 12, effective July 14, 2000. -- Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 275, sec. 12, effective July 15, 1998. -- Created 1966 Ky. Acts ch. 252, secs. 1 to 7.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
24
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case:
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 54× “This Court then granted Respondents' motion for discretionary review to consider whether Petitioners' use of the disputed land for recreational purposes was sufficient to establish their adverse possession of it, and in particular whether the Recreational Use Statute, KRS…”
Huddleston by & Through Lynch v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 21× “Because we agree that Kentucky's "Recreational Use Statute" (KRS 411.190) has application to the defendant, we affirm that aspect of the judgment below.”
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 20× “With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
Bryant v. Jefferson Mall Co., 486 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 14× “190 — the recreational use statute — to warn mall walkers of dangerous conditions on the premises or otherwise make the premises safe for them.”
City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 14× “KRS 411.190 provides in pertinent part: [[Image here]] (2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.”
Midwestern, Inc. v. N. Kentucky Cmty. Ctr., 736 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 9× “The only issue on appeal concerns the applicability of KRS 411.190 to the facts of this case. After an exhaustive review of the relevant case law, we affirm.”
Coursey v. Westvaco Corp., 790 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1990).
· cites it 3× “The effect of KRS 411.190, the recreational use statute, if properly understood, is to change the status of the recreational user from trespasser to licensee where he is now making recreational use of the landowner’s property, “encourage[d]” to do so, “directly or indirectly,”…”
Sublett v. United States, 688 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1985).
· cites it 2× “KRS 411.190(l)(b) reads as follows: “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.”
Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 3× “The amendment reads: “No action for the recovery of real property, including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for recreational purposes.” KRS 411.”
Miller as Next Friend of E.M. v. House of Boom Ky., LLC, 575 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
“However, the same public policy implications that apply when dealing with the voluntary opening of private property or a school district's limited immunity allowing community use of school property do not apply when dealing with a commercial entity.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(1) — 1 case
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
“This Court then granted Respondents' motion for discretionary review to consider whether Petitioners' use of the disputed land for recreational purposes was sufficient to establish their adverse possession of it, and in particular whether the Recreational Use Statute, KRS…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(1)(b) — 2 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(1)(c) — 2 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(1)(d) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(2) — 9 cases
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
“This Court then granted Respondents' motion for discretionary review to consider whether Petitioners' use of the disputed land for recreational purposes was sufficient to establish their adverse possession of it, and in particular whether the Recreational Use Statute, KRS…”
Miller as Next Friend of E.M. v. House of Boom Ky., LLC, 575 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
“However, the same public policy implications that apply when dealing with the voluntary opening of private property or a school district's limited immunity allowing community use of school property do not apply when dealing with a commercial entity.”
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
“KRS 411.190 provides in pertinent part: [[Image here]] (2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(3) — 4 cases
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(4) — 1 case
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(4)(c) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(6) — 6 cases
Huddleston by & Through Lynch v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
“Because we agree that Kentucky's "Recreational Use Statute" (KRS 411.190) has application to the defendant, we affirm that aspect of the judgment below.”
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
Bryant v. Jefferson Mall Co., 486 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).
“190 — the recreational use statute — to warn mall walkers of dangerous conditions on the premises or otherwise make the premises safe for them.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(6)(a) — 4 cases
Huddleston by & Through Lynch v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
“Because we agree that Kentucky's "Recreational Use Statute" (KRS 411.190) has application to the defendant, we affirm that aspect of the judgment below.”
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
“KRS 411.190 provides in pertinent part: [[Image here]] (2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(7) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(7)(b) — 2 cases
City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
“KRS 411.190 provides in pertinent part: [[Image here]] (2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(8) — 5 cases
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
“This Court then granted Respondents' motion for discretionary review to consider whether Petitioners' use of the disputed land for recreational purposes was sufficient to establish their adverse possession of it, and in particular whether the Recreational Use Statute, KRS…”
Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
“The amendment reads: “No action for the recovery of real property, including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for recreational purposes.” KRS 411.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(d) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(l)(a) — 1 case
Bryant v. Jefferson Mall Co., 486 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).
“190 — the recreational use statute — to warn mall walkers of dangerous conditions on the premises or otherwise make the premises safe for them.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(l)(b) — 4 cases
Roach v. Hedges, 419 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
“With this standard in mind, we turn to the application of KRS 411.190. Roach does not challenge the recreational nature or public use of the property.”
Sublett v. United States, 688 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1985).
“KRS 411.190(l)(b) reads as follows: “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(l)(c) — 4 cases
Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2010).
“This Court then granted Respondents' motion for discretionary review to consider whether Petitioners' use of the disputed land for recreational purposes was sufficient to establish their adverse possession of it, and in particular whether the Recreational Use Statute, KRS…”
Bryant v. Jefferson Mall Co., 486 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).
“190 — the recreational use statute — to warn mall walkers of dangerous conditions on the premises or otherwise make the premises safe for them.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.190(l)(d) — 1 case
City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
“KRS 411.190 provides in pertinent part: [[Image here]] (2) The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.