(1) No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract or sounding in tort, resulting from or arising out of any deficiency in the construction components, design, planning, supervision, inspection, or construction of any improvement to real property, or for any injury to property, either real or personal, arising out of such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any person after the expiration of seven (7) years following the substantial completion of such improvement.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, in the case of such an injury to property or the person or wrongful death resulting from such injury, which injury occurred during the seventh year following substantial completion of such improvement, an action to recover damages for such injury or wrongful death may only be brought within one (1) year from the date upon which such injury occurred (irrespective of the date of death), but in no event may such an action be brought more than eight (8) years after the substantial completion of construction of such improvement.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by statute for the bringing of any action for damages.
(4) As used in this section, the term "person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated association, or joint stock company; the term "substantial completion" shall be construed to mean the date upon which the owner of the structure, project, or facility first entered upon the occupancy or commenced the use thereof. Effective: July 13, 1990 History: Repealed and reenacted 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 425, sec. 4, effective July 13, 1990. -- Amended 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 479, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1986. -- Created 1966 Ky. Acts ch. 246, sec. 1. Legislative Research Commission Note. Subsection (1) of this section was amended in 1986 Acts Ch. 479, Section 1, to extend the period of time in which certain actions may be brought from five to seven years. Inadvertently, when the period of time was extended by committee amendment, subsection (2) was not amended to conform. Pursuant to KRS 7.136, the Reviser of Statutes has made a technical correction in order to make the subsections consistent.
Notes of Decisions
In Re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 672 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1984).
· cites it 43× “The question as stated by the United States District Court is: "Is KRS 413.135 unconstitutional as applied to facts of this case by virtue of Kentucky Constitution §§ 14, 54 and/or 241?" Memorandum Opinion and Order, Wilhoit, J.”
Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
· cites it 11× “District Court for the Western District of Kentucky has certified to the Kentucky Supreme Court the following Questions of Law at issue in the above-styled case: “(1) whether KRS 413.135 violates Kentucky Constitution §§ 14, 54, 59, and/or 241; and (2) whether KRS 413.”
Nucor Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 812 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1991).
· cites it 4× “Trial was then rescheduled and before the new trial date, in November 1983, the trial court dismissed the products liability claim holding that this theory was barred by KRS 413.135, a statute then providing that "no action" could be brought after the expiration of five years…”
Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985).
· cites it 6× “At trial, Carney raised the statute of limitations as a defense, arguing that because the building had been completed more than five years before the accident, KRS 413.135 barred the action against him.”
Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
· cites it 4× “120(14) and KRS 413.135. From this order of dismissal of the builder, the plaintiffs appealed, after meeting the procedural requisites for such action.”
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998).
· cites it 2× “[6] KRS 413.135 [7] Nowhere in HB 250 is RWJF given the powers of appointment alleged by appellants.”
Massie v. Persson, 729 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “2d 179 (1986), which held that KRS 413.135 violated Kentucky Constitution § 59, subd.”
Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994).
“1993); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.135 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Me.”
In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
· cites it 10× “The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also addressed the defendants’ cross-appeal of the first trial judge’s denial of summary judgment based on Kentucky’s “no-action” statute, KRS § 413.135. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the defendants that the no-action statute would bar the plaintiffs’…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.135(1) — 6 cases
Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
“120(14) and KRS 413.135. From this order of dismissal of the builder, the plaintiffs appealed, after meeting the procedural requisites for such action.”
Massie v. Persson, 729 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
“2d 179 (1986), which held that KRS 413.135 violated Kentucky Constitution § 59, subd.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.135(2) — 1 case
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