of disability or death.
(1) If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160,
except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action accrued, an
infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought within the same number of
years after the removal of the disability or death of the person, whichever happens
first, allowed to a person without the disability to bring the action after the right
accrued.
(2) The right of action upon the official bond of a guardian, personal representative,
curator, of the sheriff, or the officer acting as personal representative, or of any
other person receiving and holding money to be distributed to a ward, distributee or
devisee, under the order of court or by authority of law, of a ward, distributee,
devisee or other person entitled, who was an infant when the bond was executed,
shall not be deemed to have accrued, unless otherwise expressed in the bond, before
the plaintiff attained the age of twenty-one (21) years. Where there are several
wards, or several distributees or devisees or other beneficiaries secured by the same
bond, who, or some of whom, were infants when the bond was given, the right of
action of each one (1) of such infants shall not be deemed to have accrued before he
attained the age of twenty-one (21) years.
Effective: October 1, 1942
History: Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky.
Stat. secs. 2521, 2525.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
61
cases (
22 in the last 5 years), 1945–2026 · leading case:
Bradford v. Bracken Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
Bradford v. Bracken Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
· cites it 16× “2, 2007), in which the court held that KRS § 413.170 did not apply because “the children’s claims were prosecuted on their behalf by their mother, as guardian and next friend.”
Green v. Floyd Cnty., 803 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
· cites it 6× “1953) (holding that § 413.170’s “unsound mind” provision does not “depend upon a legal adjudication following a sanity inquest”).”
Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 7× “KRS 413.170. Thus, if a child of age eight is injured by some negligent person the period of one year, KRS 413.”
Se. Kentucky Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Gaylor, 756 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1988).
· cites it 4× “The essence of the mother's complaint is that the trial judge erred in finding that no issue existed as to whether she was under a medical disability sufficient to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to KRS 413.170. A person may be mentally disabled, within the meaning of…”
Hazel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 863 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Ky. 1994).
· cites it 2× “Ky.Rev. StatAnn. § 413.170(1). 5 . The Court considers here a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, which potentially bars a plaintiff's suit before the cause of action arises.”
Lemmons v. Ransom, 670 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1984).
· cites it 5× “Here the statute of limitations in KRS 304.39-230(6) modifies only that language contained in KRS 413.”
Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 837 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1992).
· cites it 7× “778, it was stated: Heretofore our statutes of limitation have been extended to permit one who is a minor when a right of action accrues in his behalf to bring suit within the same period of time after he reaches his major-ity_ (KRS 413.170[1]). To the extent that KRS 304.”
Commonwealth v. Stacey, 177 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Stacey relies on the Court of Appeals' analogy of the instant situation to the provisions of KRS 413.170(1), which toll the statute of limitations in civil cases if the plaintiff was, at the time the cause of action accrued, "of unsound mind.”
Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
“The term “unsound mind” within the meaning of KRS 413.170(1) has been interpreted by our Supreme Court to mean that the person claiming the disability must show that he has been rendered incapable of managing his own affairs.”
Hardin Cnty. v. Wilkerson, 255 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2008).
· cites it 2× “1984) (extending the savings statute, KRS 413.170, as applicable to tort liability actions).”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.170(1) — 40 cases
Green v. Floyd Cnty., 803 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
“1953) (holding that § 413.170’s “unsound mind” provision does not “depend upon a legal adjudication following a sanity inquest”).”
Bradford v. Bracken Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
“2, 2007), in which the court held that KRS § 413.170 did not apply because “the children’s claims were prosecuted on their behalf by their mother, as guardian and next friend.”
Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
“KRS 413.170. Thus, if a child of age eight is injured by some negligent person the period of one year, KRS 413.”
Hazel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 863 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Ky. 1994).
“Ky.Rev. StatAnn. § 413.170(1). 5 . The Court considers here a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, which potentially bars a plaintiff's suit before the cause of action arises.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.170(2) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.170(a) — 3 cases
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