Ky. Rev. Stat. » Chapter 413
Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.190 (2026)

Result of absence from the state or obstruction of action under KRS

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section KY-LRCapps.legislature.ky.gov JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

413.090 to 413.160.

(1) If, at the time any cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, he is absent from it, the period limited for the commencement of the action against him shall be computed from the time of his return to this state.

(2) When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, and he by absconding or concealing himself or by any other indirect means obstructs the prosecution of the action, the time of the continuance of the absence from the state or obstruction shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action shall be commenced. But this saving shall not prevent the limitation from operating in favor of any other person not so acting, whether he is a necessary party to the action or not. Effective: October 1, 1942 History: Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. secs. 2531, 2532.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 68 cases (21 in the last 5 years), 1943–2026 · leading case: Linda Holt v. John Griffin, 865 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2017).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Linda Holt v. John Griffin, 865 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2017). · cites it 6× “Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.190(2). The parties dispute the applicability of this tolling provision.”
Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Lab'y, 831 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1992). · cites it 14× “The Court emphasized the language in KRS 413.190 "by any other indirect means" and stated: "The indirect means employed by the uncle in the case at Bar, if it existed, was a failure to speak and advise his niece that he had exchanged her bonds for other bonds and taken the title…”
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009). · cites it 5× “The most pertinent exception to our discussion here is that which Emberton advances on appeal: concealment or obstruction, as expressed in KRS 413.190(2). See generally Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v.”
Keith Guy, Sr. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty Gov't, 488 F. App'x 9 (6th Cir. 2012). · cites it 8× “The court assumed that the tolling provision in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.190 (2) applied, but concluded that, even so, the plaintiff would only have been entitled to tolling until sometime in April 2002 because of the “widespread publicity” of “the abuse scandal.”
The Est. of Christina Wittich by & Through Judith Wittich & Frederick Wittich in Their Duly Appointed Capacities as Co-Adm'x & Co-Adm'r v. Michael Joseph Flick, 519 S.W.3d 774 (Ky. 2017). · cites it 5× “KRS 413.190 acts as a tolling statute in certain instances for claims falling within *778 KRS 413.”
Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 5× “See-ter contends, however, that his complaint was timely filed under the discovery rule or, in the alternative, that the Diocese is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment by operation of KRS 413.190(2). The first argument of the Diocese…”
Metro Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Gov't v. Abma, 326 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “FACTS While the appeal we consider today is limited to the breach of contract claim, it stems from the same miscalculation of overtime pay performed by the City between 1984 and 2001. On June 16, 2006, an opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court was entered granting…”
Anderson v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., 616 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Ky. 2009). · cites it 7× “Tolling — Fraudulent Concealment Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitation is tolled pursuant to KRS 413.190(2), due to the Board’s obstruction of the prosecution of Plaintiffs’ claims.”
Cabrera v. JBS USA, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 865 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3× “Cabrera, in turn, responded by arguing the statute of limitations had been effectively tolled by virtue of KRS 413.190(2), which provides: When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.”
Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. 2010). · cites it 2× “KRS 413.190 states: (1) If, at the time any cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.”
Martello v. Santana, 874 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Ky. 2012). · cites it 6× “Thus, the statute was not tolled under KRS § 413.190. Martello further argues that, given the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Santana and Martello, he had a *676 duty to disclose the settlement amounts and the legal fees received for each of the cases at…”
Old Mason's Home of Kentucky, Inc. v. Mitchell, 892 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 5× “On appeal Mason cites and relies upon Subsection 2 of KRS 413.190 which states: When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.”
Show all 68 citing cases →
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.190(1) — 3 cases
Brownell Combs, Ii, Adm'r C.T.A. Of the Est. of Leslie Combs, Ii, Deceased v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
4th Leaf, LLC v. City of Grayson (E.D. Ky. 2019).
Marcum (W.D. Ky. 2025).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.190(2) — 54 cases
Linda Holt v. John Griffin, 865 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2017). “Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.190(2). The parties dispute the applicability of this tolling provision.”
Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Lab'y, 831 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1992). “The Court emphasized the language in KRS 413.190 "by any other indirect means" and stated: "The indirect means employed by the uncle in the case at Bar, if it existed, was a failure to speak and advise his niece that he had exchanged her bonds for other bonds and taken the title…”
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009). “The most pertinent exception to our discussion here is that which Emberton advances on appeal: concealment or obstruction, as expressed in KRS 413.190(2). See generally Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v.”
Keith Guy, Sr. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty Gov't, 488 F. App'x 9 (6th Cir. 2012). “The court assumed that the tolling provision in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.190 (2) applied, but concluded that, even so, the plaintiff would only have been entitled to tolling until sometime in April 2002 because of the “widespread publicity” of “the abuse scandal.”
Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). “See-ter contends, however, that his complaint was timely filed under the discovery rule or, in the alternative, that the Diocese is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment by operation of KRS 413.190(2). The first argument of the Diocese…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.