(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the
defendant, acting under official authority, is making or assisting in making an arrest,
and he:
(a) Believes that such force is necessary to effect the arrest;
(b) Makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is otherwise known
or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested; and
(c) Believes the arrest to be lawful.
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable
under subsection (1) only when:
(a) The defendant, in effecting the arrest, is authorized to act as a peace officer;
and
(b) The arrest is for a felony involving the use or threatened use of physical force
likely to cause death or serious physical injury; and
(c) The defendant believes that the person to be arrested is likely to endanger
human life unless apprehended without delay.
(3) The use of physical force, including deadly physical force, by a defendant upon
another person is justifiable when the defendant is preventing the escape of an
arrested person and when the force could justifiably have been used to effect the
arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard or other person
authorized to act as a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly
force, which he believes to be necessary to prevent the escape of a person from jail,
prison, or other institution for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of
a crime.
Effective: January 1, 1975
History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 34, effective January 1, 1975.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
45
cases (
22 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003).
Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003).
· cites it 8× “" [42] In Kentucky, however, KRS 503.090 contains an additional, statutory limitation on a peace officer's right to employ deadly force against a suspect, namely that the officer "believes that the person to be arrested is likely to endanger human life unless apprehended without…”
Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
· cites it 8× “With respect to the negligence claim, the plaintiffs complaint states the following: “The acts of the Defendants in violating the provisions of KRS 503.090, constituted negligence per se.”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
· cites it 2× “8 (1983) (suspect has used or threatened deadly force in commission of a felony, or would use deadly force if not caught); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090 (1984) (suspect committed felony involving use or threat of physical force likely to cause death or serious injury, and is likely…”
Degolia v. Kenton Cnty., 381 F. Supp. 3d 740 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
· cites it 2× “" KRS § 503.090(3). In relevant part, KRS § 503.”
Wendy Browning v. Edmonson Cnty., Ky., 18 F.4th 516 (6th Cir. 2021).
· cites it 2× “Jones also asserts a merits-based challenge to the denial of summary judgment, arguing that: (1) his conduct did not rise to the level of a battery under the law and (2) he cannot be held liable because he is entitled to an affirmative defense under KRS § 503.090(1). We have…”
Chris Hartman v. Jeremy Thompson, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019).
“1973) ; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(1). As stated above, Defendants had probable cause to arrest Hartman.”
Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 2× “060(1), KRS 503.090; force used to prevent suicide or to prevent the commission of a crime involving or threatening serious physical injury to person, substantial damage to or loss of property, or any other violent conduct, KRS 503.”
Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Baze's wife testified that she thought that Briscoe was going for his gun and hollered. Moments later, Baze shot the first two volleys into Briscoe's back.”
Smith v. Norton Hospitals, Inc., 488 S.W.3d 23 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).
“2014); see also KRS 503.090. With the above in mind, we find no error in the circuit court’s determination that Phillips was entitled to defend against Smith’s claims .”
Woosley v. City of Paris, 591 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
· cites it 2× “KRS § 503.090. Police officers generally have a privilege to use reasonably necessary force to preserve order.”
State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
· cites it 2× “37, § 703-307(3) (1976); Ky.Rev. Stat. § 503.090(2) (1975); Me.Rev.”
Woodcock v. City of Bowling Green, 165 F. Supp. 3d 563 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
“050 (justification for use of physical force in self-protection) and KRS 503.090 (justification for use of physical force in law enforcement) are justifications in defense of criminal charges for use of physical force, “the same principles applied]” to the plaintiffs state law…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(1) — 15 cases
Wendy Browning v. Edmonson Cnty., Ky., 18 F.4th 516 (6th Cir. 2021).
“Jones also asserts a merits-based challenge to the denial of summary judgment, arguing that: (1) his conduct did not rise to the level of a battery under the law and (2) he cannot be held liable because he is entitled to an affirmative defense under KRS § 503.090(1). We have…”
Chris Hartman v. Jeremy Thompson, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019).
“1973) ; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(1). As stated above, Defendants had probable cause to arrest Hartman.”
Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
“With respect to the negligence claim, the plaintiffs complaint states the following: “The acts of the Defendants in violating the provisions of KRS 503.090, constituted negligence per se.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(1)(a) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(2) — 3 cases
State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
“37, § 703-307(3) (1976); Ky.Rev. Stat. § 503.090(2) (1975); Me.Rev.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(2)(b) — 1 case
Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003).
“" [42] In Kentucky, however, KRS 503.090 contains an additional, statutory limitation on a peace officer's right to employ deadly force against a suspect, namely that the officer "believes that the person to be arrested is likely to endanger human life unless apprehended without…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(2)(c) — 1 case
Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003).
“" [42] In Kentucky, however, KRS 503.090 contains an additional, statutory limitation on a peace officer's right to employ deadly force against a suspect, namely that the officer "believes that the person to be arrested is likely to endanger human life unless apprehended without…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(3) — 2 cases
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