(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(a) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he or she
causes the death of such person or of a third person;
(b) With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of
such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute
murder because he or she acts under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, as defined in subsection (1)(a) of KRS 507.020;
(c) Through circumstances not otherwise constituting the offense of murder, he or
she intentionally abuses another person or knowingly permits another person
of whom he or she has actual custody to be abused and thereby causes death
to a person twelve (12) years of age or less, or who is physically helpless or
mentally helpless; or
(d) He or she knowingly sells fentanyl or a fentanyl derivative to another person,
and the injection, ingestion, inhalation, or other introduction of the fentanyl or
fentanyl derivative causes the death of the person.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a Class B felony.
Effective: July 15, 2024
History: Amended 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 5, effective July 15, 2024. -- Amended
2015 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 2, effective June 24, 2015. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch.
406, sec. 62, effective January 1, 1975.
Legislative Research Commission Note (6/24/2015). 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 3
provides that the amendments to this statute and KRS 507.010 made in 2015 Ky.
Acts ch. 64, secs. 1 and 2 may be cited as "Conner's Law."
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
85
cases (
21 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case:
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
· cites it 10× “'" Under EED, "mitigation is not restricted to circumstances which would constitute provocation `in the ordinary meaning of the term.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003).
· cites it 6× “Was [the victim] a careful person about who she would let into her house? A. Very cautious.”
Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1994).
· cites it 12× “We should vacate the judgment, reverse and remand because the trial court erred in failing to instruct on Manslaughter I (KRS 507.030) as a lesser included offense for the jury to consider along with the murder charge.”
McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1994).
· cites it 6× “KRS 507.030(1). Likewise, Manslaughter I is the appropriate verdict should the jury conclude Terry shot to kill while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.”
Eugene Williams Gall, Jr. v. Phil Parker, Warden, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2000).
· cites it 3× “020 (murder) and KRS 507.030 (voluntary manslaughter), the differentiating standard between the two, under the common law, was "sudden heat and passion.”
Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006).
· cites it 4× “020 (murder) and KRS 507.030 (manslaughter). In regard to how EED fits into this statutory pattern, our prior decisions have established that A person is guilty of murder under KRS 507.”
Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 2001).
· cites it 4× “KRS 507.030 (1974 Commentary). The statutory description first adopts the common-law concept of “provocation,” i.”
Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2002).
· cites it 2× “" The first-degree manslaughter statute, KRS 507.030, requires the presence of extreme emotional disturbance.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999).
· cites it 2× “Such evidence did not warrant an instruction on the defense of intoxication. B.”
Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1980).
· cites it 2× “Voluntary manslaughter has been replaced in the Penal Code by manslaughter in the first degree, which is defined in KRS 507.030. In lieu of sudden affray or sudden heat of passion upon reasonable provocation, the mitigating circumstance now reducing the crime from murder to…”
McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 100 (Ky. 2012).
· cites it 2× “Appellant Brian Allen McGuire appeals from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.030) and unlawful possession of a weapon on school property (KRS 527.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(1) — 7 cases
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
“'" Under EED, "mitigation is not restricted to circumstances which would constitute provocation `in the ordinary meaning of the term.”
McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1994).
“KRS 507.030(1). Likewise, Manslaughter I is the appropriate verdict should the jury conclude Terry shot to kill while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(1)(a) — 18 cases
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003).
“Was [the victim] a careful person about who she would let into her house? A. Very cautious.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(1)(b) — 15 cases
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
“'" Under EED, "mitigation is not restricted to circumstances which would constitute provocation `in the ordinary meaning of the term.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003).
“Was [the victim] a careful person about who she would let into her house? A. Very cautious.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999).
“Such evidence did not warrant an instruction on the defense of intoxication. B.”
Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006).
“020 (murder) and KRS 507.030 (manslaughter). In regard to how EED fits into this statutory pattern, our prior decisions have established that A person is guilty of murder under KRS 507.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(2) — 5 cases
McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1994).
“KRS 507.030(1). Likewise, Manslaughter I is the appropriate verdict should the jury conclude Terry shot to kill while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(l)(a) — 10 cases
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003).
“Was [the victim] a careful person about who she would let into her house? A. Very cautious.”
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
“'" Under EED, "mitigation is not restricted to circumstances which would constitute provocation `in the ordinary meaning of the term.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 507.030(l)(b) — 17 cases
Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355 (Ky. 2001).
“KRS 507.030 (1974 Commentary). The statutory description first adopts the common-law concept of “provocation,” i.”
Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2003).
“'" Under EED, "mitigation is not restricted to circumstances which would constitute provocation `in the ordinary meaning of the term.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003).
“Was [the victim] a careful person about who she would let into her house? A. Very cautious.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999).
“Such evidence did not warrant an instruction on the defense of intoxication. B.”
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