§2798.4. Immunity from liability; injuries sustained by persons driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages or drugs
A. Neither the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision of the state nor any person shall be liable for damages, including those available under Civil Code Article 2315.1 or 2315.2, for injury, death, or loss of the operator of a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel who:
(1) Was operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel while his blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight based on grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood; or
(2) Was operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel while he was under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance described in R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(c) or R.S. 40:964.
B. The provisions of this Section shall not apply unless:
(1) The operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the limits provided in R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(b), or the operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of being under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance described in R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(c); and
(2) This negligence was a contributing factor causing the damage.
C. For purposes of this Section, "damages" include all general damages, including those otherwise recoverable in a survival or wrongful death action, which may be recoverable for personal injury, death or loss, or damage to property by the operator of a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or vessel or the category of persons who would have a cause of action for the operator's wrongful death.
D. The provisions of this Section shall not apply if the operator tests positive for any controlled dangerous substance covered by the provisions of R.S. 14:98(A)(1)(c) or R.S. 40:964 and the operator is taking that substance pursuant to a valid prescription for the identified substance or a health care provider verifies that he has prescribed or furnished the operator with that particular substance.
E. Unless the operator's insurance policy provides otherwise, nothing in this Section shall be construed to preclude the operator from making a claim under his or her own policy for first party indemnity coverages.
Acts 1999, No. 1224, §1, eff. July 9, 1999; Acts 2004, No. 394, §1.
Notes of Decisions
Wiltz v. Bros. Petroleum, L.L.C., 140 So. 3d 758 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 16× “R.S. 9:2798.4 Winn-Dixie and Meraux assert that the trial court erroneously found La.”
In re the Complaint of Antill Pipeline Constr. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2011).
· cites it 25× “Primarily, Petitioner moves the Court to determine whether La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2798.4, which prohibits recovery by the estate of the operator of a watercraft who is: (1) found to have driven while his blood alcohol concentration was of 0.”
Lyncker v. Design Eng'g, Inc., 51 So. 3d 137 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 19× “The plaintiffs opposed summary judgment, arguing that DOTD’s alleged negligence in failing to construct advanced warning systems creates a material issue of fact as to liability, thus precluding summary judgment.”
Townes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 41 So. 3d 520 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 8× “R.S. 9:2798.4 operated as a complete bar to any recovery by any of the plaintiffs from any of the answering defendants and as complete immunity of the answering defendants from any liability to any of the plaintiffs.”
Graham v. Hamilton, 872 F. Supp. 2d 529 (W.D. La. 2012).
· cites it 10× “Availability of La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2798.4 Plaintiffs request that the Court prohibit Defendants from asserting immunity under La.”
Foster v. Kinchen, 217 So. 3d 437 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 8× “On December 7, 2015, Kinchen and Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff was precluded from recovering damages from the accident as LSA-R.S. 9:2798.4 provided them with statutory immunity from liability as a result of plaintiffs intoxication.”
Stead v. Swanner, 52 So. 3d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 8× “R.S. 9:2798.4 applied to the case. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Swanner, finding that La.”
Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So. 3d 1041 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 31× “R.S. 9:2798.4, which bars an operator from recovering damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident if the operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of a blood alcohol concentration beyond the legal limits, could not be applied in an action…”
McGrail v. Lee, 814 So. 2d 729 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
“*735 Motion in Limine The defendants contend the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from stating to the jury the effect of LSA-R.S. 9:2798.4, which provides that a plaintiff may not recover damages if the jury finds that the person was…”
Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 3d 627 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 8× “R.S. 9:2798.4. OPINION In its reasons for judgment, the trial court set forth its factual analysis in intricate detail and applied those factual findings to the law applicable to this accident.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(A): 1 case
Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So. 3d 1041 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
“R.S. 9:2798.4, which bars an operator from recovering damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident if the operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of a blood alcohol concentration beyond the legal limits, could not be applied in an action…”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(A)(1): 1 case
Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 3d 627 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
“R.S. 9:2798.4. OPINION In its reasons for judgment, the trial court set forth its factual analysis in intricate detail and applied those factual findings to the law applicable to this accident.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(A)(2): 1 case
Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 3d 627 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
“R.S. 9:2798.4. OPINION In its reasons for judgment, the trial court set forth its factual analysis in intricate detail and applied those factual findings to the law applicable to this accident.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(B): 1 case
Graham v. Hamilton, 872 F. Supp. 2d 529 (W.D. La. 2012).
“Availability of La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2798.4 Plaintiffs request that the Court prohibit Defendants from asserting immunity under La.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(B)(1): 1 case
Lyncker v. Design Eng'g, Inc., 51 So. 3d 137 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
“The plaintiffs opposed summary judgment, arguing that DOTD’s alleged negligence in failing to construct advanced warning systems creates a material issue of fact as to liability, thus precluding summary judgment.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(B)(2): 2 cases
Lyncker v. Design Eng'g, Inc., 51 So. 3d 137 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
“The plaintiffs opposed summary judgment, arguing that DOTD’s alleged negligence in failing to construct advanced warning systems creates a material issue of fact as to liability, thus precluding summary judgment.”
Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 3d 627 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
“R.S. 9:2798.4. OPINION In its reasons for judgment, the trial court set forth its factual analysis in intricate detail and applied those factual findings to the law applicable to this accident.”
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2798.4(D): 1 case
Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So. 3d 1041 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
“R.S. 9:2798.4, which bars an operator from recovering damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident if the operator is found to be in excess of twenty-five percent negligent as a result of a blood alcohol concentration beyond the legal limits, could not be applied in an action…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.