Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A (2026)

Persons subject to jurisdiction

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Declaration of purpose.  It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands that the State provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this State, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this State and persons of other states.  
This section, to insure maximum protection to citizens of this State, shall be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th amendment.  
[PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
2.  Causes of action.  Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:  
A. The transaction of any business within this State;   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
B. Doing or causing a tortious act to be done, or causing the consequences of a tortious act to occur within this State;   [PL 1977, c. 696, §162 (AMD).]
C. The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this State;   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
D. Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting;   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
E. Conception resulting in parentage within the meaning of Title 19‑A, chapter 61;   [PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. C, §2 (AMD); PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. D, §1 (AFF).]
F. Contracting to supply services or things within this State;   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
G. Maintaining a domicile in this State while subject to a marital or family relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, property settlement, child support or child custody; or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to such a claim; or   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
H. Acting as a director, manager, trustee or other officer of a corporation incorporated under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within, this State.   [PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
I. Maintain any other relation to the State or to persons or property which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States.   [PL 1977, c. 696, §163 (AMD).]
[PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. C, §2 (AMD); PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. D, §1 (AFF).]
3.  Personal service.  Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.  
[PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
4.  Jurisdiction based upon this section.  Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section.  
[PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
5.  Other service not affected.  Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.  
[PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 770, §80 (NEW). PL 1977, c. 696, §§162,163 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 694, §D14 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 694, §E2 (AFF). PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. C, §2 (AMD). PL 2015, c. 296, Pt. D, §1 (AFF).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 149 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014).
Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014). · cites it 7× “For Hallee to have been amenable to service, (1) the law must have authorized service on him as an out-of-state defendant, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) (Maine’s long-arm statute), 2 and (2) Angelí must have been able, “through reasonable effort,” to find and serve Hal-lee, a…”
Robert S. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992). · cites it 3× “Under a literal interpretation of Maine's long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, courts sitting in Maine may exercise personal jurisdiction over any party who transacts business in the state or who commits a tort if either the tort itself or the consequences of the tort occur in…”
Com. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dworman, 2004 ME 142 (Me. 2004). · cites it 4× “Because Maine courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Dworman pursuant to the long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (2003), we affirm the judgment.”
Est. of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24 (Me. 2011). · cites it 4× “On appeal, the Stifels argue that: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to the long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2010), and due process; (2) the court erred in concluding that venue in Franklin County was proper; (3) the court abused its discretion…”
Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 855 A.2d 1150 (Me. 2004). · cites it 4× “Personal Jurisdiction Over Bickford’s Tort Claims [¶ 9] Accordingly, we go on to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Onslow Hospital by the Maine Superior Court in the present case complies with the provisions of Maine’s long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. §…”
Fore, LLC v. Benoit, 34 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012). · cites it 5× “” 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(1) (2011); Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 22 , 16 A.”
Lorelei Corp. v. Cnty. of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991). · cites it 4× “2 Instead, Lorelei argues that personal jurisdiction was created by the Maine long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A. The statute enumerates several specific instances in which a defendant’s contacts with the state may subject him to long arm jurisdiction, including two cited by…”
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Tim Walker, Docket No. 04-3924-Cv, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007). “"); see also Michael Quinion, World Wide Words, http:// www.worldwidewords.”
Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564 (Me. 1979). · cites it 3× “Even before the enactment of our present “long-arm statute,” 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, we observed: “[T]he Legislature intended to fashion a ‘long-arm’ statute of maximum permissible reach ‘to the extent permitted by the due process clause.”
Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591 (Me. 1995). · cites it 3× “Unpersuaded by Murphy’s contentions that there is jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980), we affirm the judgment.”
Cavers v. Houston Mclane Co., Inc., 2008 ME 164 (Me. 2008). · cites it 3× “The long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2007), and personal jurisdiction due process analysis are appropriately applied to the determination of whether the Workers’ Compensation Board has authority over claims against employers arising from injuries that occur in other states…”
Angell v. HALLEE, 2012 ME 10 (Me. 2012). · cites it 3× “In Patten II we held that the long-arm statute then in effect, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980), 3 did not render the tolling statute inapplicable when the only reasonable means of service was by publication.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(1) — 17 cases
Harlow v. Child.'s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005).
Robert S. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992). “Under a literal interpretation of Maine's long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, courts sitting in Maine may exercise personal jurisdiction over any party who transacts business in the state or who commits a tort if either the tort itself or the consequences of the tort occur in…”
Fore, LLC v. Benoit, 34 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012). “” 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(1) (2011); Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 22 , 16 A.”
Maine Rubber Int'l v. Env't Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Me. 2004).
In re Emma B., 2017 ME 187 (Me. 2017).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2) — 20 cases
Com. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dworman, 2004 ME 142 (Me. 2004). “Because Maine courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Dworman pursuant to the long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (2003), we affirm the judgment.”
Est. of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24 (Me. 2011). “On appeal, the Stifels argue that: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to the long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2010), and due process; (2) the court erred in concluding that venue in Franklin County was proper; (3) the court abused its discretion…”
Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 855 A.2d 1150 (Me. 2004). “Personal Jurisdiction Over Bickford’s Tort Claims [¶ 9] Accordingly, we go on to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Onslow Hospital by the Maine Superior Court in the present case complies with the provisions of Maine’s long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. §…”
Cavers v. Houston Mclane Co., Inc., 2008 ME 164 (Me. 2008). “The long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2007), and personal jurisdiction due process analysis are appropriately applied to the determination of whether the Workers’ Compensation Board has authority over claims against employers arising from injuries that occur in other states…”
Hawley v. Murphy, 1999 ME 127 (Me. 1999).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(1) — 1 case
Melhuish v. Crompton Corp. (Me. Super. Ct 2004).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(2011) — 1 case
Fore, LLC v. Benoit, 34 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012). “” 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(1) (2011); Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 22 , 16 A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(A) — 12 cases
Robert S. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992). “Under a literal interpretation of Maine's long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, courts sitting in Maine may exercise personal jurisdiction over any party who transacts business in the state or who commits a tort if either the tort itself or the consequences of the tort occur in…”
Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564 (Me. 1979). “Even before the enactment of our present “long-arm statute,” 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, we observed: “[T]he Legislature intended to fashion a ‘long-arm’ statute of maximum permissible reach ‘to the extent permitted by the due process clause.”
GENUJO LOK Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573 (Me. 2008).
Lorelei Corp. v. Cnty. of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991). “2 Instead, Lorelei argues that personal jurisdiction was created by the Maine long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A. The statute enumerates several specific instances in which a defendant’s contacts with the state may subject him to long arm jurisdiction, including two cited by…”
Fore, LLC v. Benoit, 34 A.3d 1125 (Me. 2012). “” 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(1) (2011); Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 22 , 16 A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(B) — 16 cases
Bickford v. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 855 A.2d 1150 (Me. 2004). “Personal Jurisdiction Over Bickford’s Tort Claims [¶ 9] Accordingly, we go on to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Onslow Hospital by the Maine Superior Court in the present case complies with the provisions of Maine’s long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. §…”
Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014). “For Hallee to have been amenable to service, (1) the law must have authorized service on him as an out-of-state defendant, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) (Maine’s long-arm statute), 2 and (2) Angelí must have been able, “through reasonable effort,” to find and serve Hal-lee, a…”
Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. O'Connor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Me. 2009).
Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591 (Me. 1995). “Unpersuaded by Murphy’s contentions that there is jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980), we affirm the judgment.”
Lorelei Corp. v. Cnty. of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991). “2 Instead, Lorelei argues that personal jurisdiction was created by the Maine long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A. The statute enumerates several specific instances in which a defendant’s contacts with the state may subject him to long arm jurisdiction, including two cited by…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(C) — 1 case
Morton v. Burr (Me. Super. Ct 2014).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(E) — 1 case
Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014). “For Hallee to have been amenable to service, (1) the law must have authorized service on him as an out-of-state defendant, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A (1980) (Maine’s long-arm statute), 2 and (2) Angelí must have been able, “through reasonable effort,” to find and serve Hal-lee, a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(G) — 2 cases
State v. Falcone, 902 A.2d 141 (Me. 2006).
Jackson v. Weaver, 678 A.2d 1036 (Me. 1996).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(H) — 1 case
Comiclink Inc v. Zipperer (D. Me. 2025).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(I) — 5 cases
Von Schack v. Von Schack, 2006 ME 30 (Me. 2006).
Foreside Common Dev. Corp. v. Bleisch, 463 A.2d 767 (Me. 1983).
Christiansen v. Elwin G. Smith, Inc., 598 A.2d 176 (Me. 1991).
Melhuish v. Crompton Corp. (Me. Super. Ct 2004).
Hasse v. Downeast Energy Corp. (Me. Super. Ct 2010).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(3) — 1 case
Frazier v. Bankamerica Int'l, 593 A.2d 661 (Me. 1991).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(4) — 2 cases
Lorelei Corp. v. Cnty. of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1991). “2 Instead, Lorelei argues that personal jurisdiction was created by the Maine long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A. The statute enumerates several specific instances in which a defendant’s contacts with the state may subject him to long arm jurisdiction, including two cited by…”
Shremshock v. Hyundai Motor Co. (Me. Super. Ct 2008).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 704-A(l) — 22 cases
Est. of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24 (Me. 2011). “On appeal, the Stifels argue that: (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to the long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2010), and due process; (2) the court erred in concluding that venue in Franklin County was proper; (3) the court abused its discretion…”
Connelly v. Doucette, 909 A.2d 221 (Me. 2006).
Danton v. Innovative Gaming Corp. of Am., 246 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Me. 2003).
Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d 1035 (Me. 1986).
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