Notes of Decisions
Cited in
37
cases, 1976–2017 · leading case:
State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me. 1981).
State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 5× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1), (2), or depraved indifference to the value of human life.”
State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 3× “See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 10 (definition of “culpable mental states”) and 11 (requirement of “culpable mental states” in proof of the crime).”
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× ““Recklessly”, as a “culpable state of mind”, is defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3) in a manner including both subjective [10(3)(A)] and objective [10(3)(C)j components.”
United States v. Bennett, 868 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
“1978) (noting that the Maine Criminal Code defined recklessness as the "conscious[] disregard *5 [of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 10(3)(A))).”
State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 4× “First, the definition of “recklessly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10, as originally adopted, read: A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result.”
State v. Hanks, 397 A.2d 998 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 6× “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10 (1975). [2] The Code also provided that a risk was "substantial and unjustifiable" within the meaning of the statute "if .”
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “may be established by any relevant evidence, including evidence of an abnormal condition of mind or intoxication.... Intoxication is otherwise no defense.”
State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 2× “This new definition, coupled with the definition of the terms “intentionally” and “knowingly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1) and (2), precluded convicting the accused of second degree homicide absent, at the very least, a subjective awareness on the part of the accused that his…”
State v. Smith, 382 A.2d 40 (Me. 1978).
· cites it 3× “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A). The Maine Criminal Code further amplified the above section with the following definition: “A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this section if, considering the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances…”
State v. Hicks, 495 A.2d 765 (Me. 1985).
· cites it 3× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A) (Pamph.1976) (repealed 1981).”
State v. Harrington, 440 A.2d 1078 (Me. 1982).
· cites it 4× “17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 10(4)(A), 203(1)(A) (Supp.”
State v. Perfetto, 424 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(4)(A). The evidence here was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that the defendant acted with one or the other requisite culpable mental state.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(1) — 4 cases
State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me. 1981).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1), (2), or depraved indifference to the value of human life.”
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981).
“may be established by any relevant evidence, including evidence of an abnormal condition of mind or intoxication.... Intoxication is otherwise no defense.”
State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1979).
“This new definition, coupled with the definition of the terms “intentionally” and “knowingly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1) and (2), precluded convicting the accused of second degree homicide absent, at the very least, a subjective awareness on the part of the accused that his…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(1)(A) — 5 cases
State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1979).
“First, the definition of “recklessly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10, as originally adopted, read: A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(2)(A) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(3) — 7 cases
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981).
““Recklessly”, as a “culpable state of mind”, is defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3) in a manner including both subjective [10(3)(A)] and objective [10(3)(C)j components.”
State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979).
“See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 10 (definition of “culpable mental states”) and 11 (requirement of “culpable mental states” in proof of the crime).”
State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1979).
“This new definition, coupled with the definition of the terms “intentionally” and “knowingly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1) and (2), precluded convicting the accused of second degree homicide absent, at the very least, a subjective awareness on the part of the accused that his…”
State v. Hanks, 397 A.2d 998 (Me. 1979).
“" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10 (1975). [2] The Code also provided that a risk was "substantial and unjustifiable" within the meaning of the statute "if .”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(3)(A) — 6 cases
United States v. Bennett, 868 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
“1978) (noting that the Maine Criminal Code defined recklessness as the "conscious[] disregard *5 [of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 10(3)(A))).”
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981).
““Recklessly”, as a “culpable state of mind”, is defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3) in a manner including both subjective [10(3)(A)] and objective [10(3)(C)j components.”
State v. Hicks, 495 A.2d 765 (Me. 1985).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A) (Pamph.1976) (repealed 1981).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(3)(C) — 4 cases
State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1979).
“First, the definition of “recklessly” in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10, as originally adopted, read: A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result.”
State v. Smith, 382 A.2d 40 (Me. 1978).
“” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A). The Maine Criminal Code further amplified the above section with the following definition: “A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this section if, considering the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(4) — 4 cases
State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me. 1981).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1), (2), or depraved indifference to the value of human life.”
State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979).
“See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 10 (definition of “culpable mental states”) and 11 (requirement of “culpable mental states” in proof of the crime).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(4)(A) — 4 cases
State v. Perfetto, 424 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
“See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(4)(A). The evidence here was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that the defendant acted with one or the other requisite culpable mental state.”
State v. Smith, 382 A.2d 40 (Me. 1978).
“” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A). The Maine Criminal Code further amplified the above section with the following definition: “A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this section if, considering the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances…”
State v. Hicks, 495 A.2d 765 (Me. 1985).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(3)(A) (Pamph.1976) (repealed 1981).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(4)(C) — 2 cases
State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58 (Me. 1981).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1), (2), or depraved indifference to the value of human life.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 10(S)(A) — 1 case
State v. Perfetto, 424 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
“See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(4)(A). The evidence here was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that the defendant acted with one or the other requisite culpable mental state.”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.