Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 17-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 106 (2026)

Physical force by persons with special responsibilities

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  A parent, foster parent, guardian or other similar person responsible for the long term general care and welfare of a child is justified in using a reasonable degree of force against that child when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish the child's misconduct. A person to whom such parent, foster parent, guardian or other responsible person has expressly delegated permission to so prevent or punish misconduct is similarly justified in using a reasonable degree of force. For purposes of this subsection, "child" means a person who has not attained 18 years of age and has not been ordered emancipated by a court pursuant to Title 15, section 3506‑A.  
[PL 2009, c. 336, §6 (AMD).]
1-A.  For purposes of subsection 1, "reasonable degree of force" is an objective standard. To constitute a reasonable degree of force, the physical force applied to the child may result in no more than transient discomfort or minor temporary marks on that child.  
[PL 2009, c. 336, §7 (AMD).]
2.  A teacher or other person entrusted with the care or supervision of a person for special and limited purposes is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force against any such person who creates a disturbance when and to the extent that the teacher or other entrusted person reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to remove a person from the scene of such disturbance.  
[PL 2009, c. 336, §8 (AMD).]
3.  A person responsible for the general care and supervision of a mentally incompetent person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force against such person who creates a disturbance when and to the extent that the responsible person reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to remove such person from the scene of such disturbance.  
[PL 2009, c. 336, §9 (AMD).]
4.  The justification extended in subsections 2 and 3 does not apply to the intentional, knowing or reckless use of nondeadly force that creates a substantial risk of extraordinary pain.  
[PL 2009, c. 336, §10 (AMD).]
5.  A person required by law to enforce rules and regulations, or to maintain decorum or safety, in a vessel, aircraft, vehicle, train or other carrier, or in a place where others are assembled, may use nondeadly force when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary for such purposes.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD).]
6.  A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to self-inflict serious bodily injury may use a degree of force on such other person as the person reasonably believes to be necessary to thwart such a result.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD).]
7.  A licensed physician, or a person acting under a licensed physician's direction, may use force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment that the physician reasonably believes will tend to safeguard the physical or mental health of the patient, provided such treatment is administered:  
A. With consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or incompetent person, with the consent of the person entrusted with the patient's care and supervision; or   [PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD).]
B. In an emergency relating to health when the physician reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person concerned for the welfare of the patient would consent.   [PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).]
[PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD).]
8.  A person identified in this section for purposes of specifying the rule of justification herein provided is not precluded from using force declared to be justifiable by another section of this chapter.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 1979, c. 127, §127 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 512, §22 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 663, §121 (AMD). PL 2003, c. 143, §§1,2 (AMD). PL 2007, c. 173, §22 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 336, §§6-10 (AMD).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32 (Me. 2000).
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State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32 (Me. 2000). · cites it 10× “1978), (addressing the status of the law before the effective date of the Criminal Code, but citing 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106 in support of the statement of the law).”
In Re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987). · cites it 4× “17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 106(6), [3] 201(1)(C), [4] 204.”
State v. York, 2001 ME 30 (Me. 2001). · cites it 7× “” [¶ 5] At the close of the State’s evidence, York made a motion for a judgment of acquittal based largely on the parental discipline justification, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(1) (1983). See also State v.”
State of Maine v. Meggan M. Pratt, 2020 ME 141 (Me. 2020). · cites it 3× “17-A M.R.S. § 106(1) (2020); see infra ¶ 10.”
State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21 (Me. 2006). · cites it 2× “See 17-A M.R.S. § 106(1) (2005). 4 A fact that is of consequence in a parental discipline defense is whether the force used by the parent results in temporary marks and transient pain.”
Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149 (Me. 2002). · cites it 2× “We conclude that the trial court's finding that Kate reasonably feared bodily injury as a result of Hawthorne's course of conduct is supported by competent evidence in the record.”
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985). · cites it 2× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(1). True, this justification does not apply to the purposeful or reckless use of force that creates a substantial risk of death, serious bodily injury, or extraordinary pain.”
Shaw v. Packard, 2005 ME 122 (Me. 2005). · cites it 2× “The court found no abuse as to the son based on 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106 (1983 & Supp.2004), which allows a parent to use minor force to discipline a child.”
State of Maine v. Stephen Treadway, 2014 ME 124 (Me. 2014). · cites it 6× “See 17-A M.R.S. § 106(1-A) (2013); York, 2001 ME 30, ¶ 14 , 766 A.”
Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861 (Mass. 2015). “8 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 106. See Wash.”
State v. Patterson, 2004 ME 79 (Me. 2004). · cites it 2× “§ 105, and the second incident pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(6) (1983). 2 [¶ 7] The District Court made findings on the record concerning each of the two separate incidents, which the court considered separate assaults.”
In Re Dorothy V., 2001 ME 97 (Me. 2001). “[¶ 7] Wilder addressed criminal law justifications pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(1) (1983). 1 There, we recognized a parent’s limited privilege to apply a reasonable degree of force that he or she reasonably believes necessary to prevent or punish a child’s misconduct.”
Show all 19 citing cases →
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 106(1) — 11 cases
State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32 (Me. 2000). “1978), (addressing the status of the law before the effective date of the Criminal Code, but citing 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106 in support of the statement of the law).”
State v. York, 2001 ME 30 (Me. 2001). “” [¶ 5] At the close of the State’s evidence, York made a motion for a judgment of acquittal based largely on the parental discipline justification, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(1) (1983). See also State v.”
State of Maine v. Meggan M. Pratt, 2020 ME 141 (Me. 2020). “17-A M.R.S. § 106(1) (2020); see infra ¶ 10.”
State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21 (Me. 2006). “See 17-A M.R.S. § 106(1) (2005). 4 A fact that is of consequence in a parental discipline defense is whether the force used by the parent results in temporary marks and transient pain.”
Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149 (Me. 2002). “We conclude that the trial court's finding that Kate reasonably feared bodily injury as a result of Hawthorne's course of conduct is supported by competent evidence in the record.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 106(2) — 1 case
Hinkley v. Baker, 122 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D. Me. 2000).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 106(6) — 3 cases
In Re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987). “17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 106(6), [3] 201(1)(C), [4] 204.”
State v. Patterson, 2004 ME 79 (Me. 2004). “§ 105, and the second incident pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(6) (1983). 2 [¶ 7] The District Court made findings on the record concerning each of the two separate incidents, which the court considered separate assaults.”
State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 55 (Me. 2005).
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