Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 17-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251 (2026)

Definitions and general provisions

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  In this chapter the following definitions apply.  
A. "Spouse" means a person legally married to the actor, but does not include a legally married person living apart from the actor under a defacto separation.   [PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).]
B.   [PL 1989, c. 401, Pt. A, §2 (RP).]
C. "Sexual act" means:  
(1) Any act between 2 persons involving direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the mouth or anus of the other, or direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the genitals of the other;  
(2) Any act between a person and an animal being used by another person which act involves direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the mouth or anus of the other, or direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the genitals of the other; or  
(3) Any act involving direct physical contact between the genitals or anus of one and an instrument or device manipulated by another person when that act is done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact.  
A sexual act may be proved without allegation or proof of penetration.   [PL 1985, c. 495, §5 (RPR).]
D. "Sexual contact" means any touching of the genitals or anus, directly or through clothing, other than as would constitute a sexual act, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact.   [PL 1985, c. 495, §6 (AMD).]
E. "Compulsion" means the use of physical force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or another human being.  
"Compulsion" as defined in this paragraph places no duty upon the victim to resist the actor.   [PL 1991, c. 457 (AMD).]
E-1. "Consent" means a word or action by a person that indicates a freely given agreement.   [PL 2023, c. 280, §1 (NEW).]
F. "Safe children zone" means on or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school or on or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a day care center licensed pursuant to Title 22, section 8301‑A.   [PL 1997, c. 768, §1 (NEW).]
G. "Sexual touching" means any touching of the breasts, buttocks, groin or inner thigh, directly or through clothing, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.   [PL 2003, c. 138, §1 (NEW).]
[PL 2023, c. 280, §1 (AMD).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 1975, c. 740, §44 (AMD). PL 1981, c. 252, §1 (AMD). PL 1985, c. 495, §§5,6 (AMD). PL 1989, c. 401, §A2 (AMD). PL 1991, c. 457 (AMD). PL 1997, c. 768, §1 (AMD). PL 2003, c. 138, §1 (AMD). PL 2023, c. 280, §1 (AMD).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 135 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988).
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State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). · cites it 16× “" This instruction tracks the language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1987), [2] rather than the language of 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Theodore S. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43 (Me. 2013). · cites it 6× “See footnote two of this opinion for the definition of "sexual act” in 17-A M.R.S. § 251 (1)(C).”
State of Maine v. Richard E. Murphy, 2016 ME 5 (Me. 2016). · cites it 4× “[¶ 8] Construing the term “sexual partners” to include persons who have engaged with each other in a single consensual “sexual act” as defined in 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(C) (2015), 4 is consistent with the rest of the statutory definition of “family or household members” and with…”
State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985). · cites it 4× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) (1983) provides in pertinent part: *1070 “Sexual intercourse” means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”
State v. Aboda, 2010 ME 125 (Me. 2010). · cites it 3× “Aboda argues that the law’s definition of “compulsion” is internally inconsistent and unconstitutionally vague because the statute allows for a finding of compulsion when the alleged victim is “unable to physically repel the actor,” see 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(E) (2009), but the…”
State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me. 1982). · cites it 4× “§ 252(1); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) (Supp. 1980) (defining “sexual intercourse”).”
State v. Gantnier, 55 A.3d 404 (Me. 2012). · cites it 7× “§ 255-A (criminalizing unlawful sexual contact) and 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (defining sexual contact) with 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Keith Coleman, 2018 ME 41 (Me. 2018). · cites it 2× “See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 251(1)(C), 253(1)(C), 508 (2017).”
State v. Severy, 2010 ME 126 (Me. 2010). · cites it 3× “” 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (2009). 4 [¶ 11] The verb “subject” is not defined by statute.”
State v. Morrison, 567 A.2d 1350 (Me. 1990). · cites it 4× “[3] 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251 (Supp.1989) establishes the following definitions in pertinent part: C.”
State v. Taylor, 661 A.2d 665 (Me. 1995). · cites it 4× “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1994).”
City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985). · cites it 2× “The other consequence on which the Ordinance's definition depends is an "appeal to the prurient interest in sex.”
Show all 135 citing cases →
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1) — 1 case
Jackson v. Faber, 834 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1993).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(A) — 1 case
State v. Profenno, 516 A.2d 201 (Me. 1986).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(B) — 11 cases
State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130 (Me. 1985).
State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) (1983) provides in pertinent part: *1070 “Sexual intercourse” means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”
State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me. 1982). “§ 252(1); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) (Supp. 1980) (defining “sexual intercourse”).”
State v. Colson, 405 A.2d 717 (Me. 1979).
State v. Keaten, 390 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1978).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(C) — 31 cases
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). “" This instruction tracks the language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1987), [2] rather than the language of 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Theodore S. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43 (Me. 2013). “See footnote two of this opinion for the definition of "sexual act” in 17-A M.R.S. § 251 (1)(C).”
State of Maine v. Keith Coleman, 2018 ME 41 (Me. 2018). “See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 251(1)(C), 253(1)(C), 508 (2017).”
State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538 (Me. 1991).
State v. Hebert, 448 A.2d 322 (Me. 1982).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(C)(1) — 20 cases
State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890 (Me. 1987).
State v. Taylor, 661 A.2d 665 (Me. 1995). “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1994).”
State of Maine v. Richard E. Murphy, 2016 ME 5 (Me. 2016). “[¶ 8] Construing the term “sexual partners” to include persons who have engaged with each other in a single consensual “sexual act” as defined in 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(C) (2015), 4 is consistent with the rest of the statutory definition of “family or household members” and with…”
State of Maine v. Gregory S. Olah, 2018 ME 56 (Me. 2018).
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). “" This instruction tracks the language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1987), [2] rather than the language of 17-A M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(C)(3) — 2 cases
State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).
State v. Barnes, 768 A.2d 596 (Me. 2001).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(D) — 40 cases
May v. Ryan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017).
State of Maine v. David Hanscom, 2016 ME 184 (Me. 2016).
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). “" This instruction tracks the language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1987), [2] rather than the language of 17-A M.”
State v. Kyle O., 703 N.W.2d 909 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 925 N.E.2d 533 (Mass. 2010).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) — 29 cases
State v. Aboda, 2010 ME 125 (Me. 2010). “Aboda argues that the law’s definition of “compulsion” is internally inconsistent and unconstitutionally vague because the statute allows for a finding of compulsion when the alleged victim is “unable to physically repel the actor,” see 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(E) (2009), but the…”
State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
Mut. Fire Ins. v. Hancock, 634 A.2d 1312 (Me. 1993).
State v. Smith, 612 A.2d 231 (Me. 1992).
State v. Maizeroi, 2000 ME 187 (Me. 2000).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(G) — 2 cases
State v. Gantnier, 55 A.3d 404 (Me. 2012). “§ 255-A (criminalizing unlawful sexual contact) and 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (defining sexual contact) with 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Richard E. Murphy, 2016 ME 5 (Me. 2016). “[¶ 8] Construing the term “sexual partners” to include persons who have engaged with each other in a single consensual “sexual act” as defined in 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(C) (2015), 4 is consistent with the rest of the statutory definition of “family or household members” and with…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(C) — 4 cases
State of Maine v. Theodore S. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43 (Me. 2013). “See footnote two of this opinion for the definition of "sexual act” in 17-A M.R.S. § 251 (1)(C).”
Doe v. New Hampshire Dep't of Saf., 160 N.H. 474 (N.H. 2010).
State v. Severy, 2010 ME 126 (Me. 2010). “” 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (2009). 4 [¶ 11] The verb “subject” is not defined by statute.”
State v. Warren, 1998 ME 136 (Me. 1998).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(C)(1) — 4 cases
State of Maine v. Ralph C. Miller, 2018 ME 112 (Me. 2018).
State v. Miller, 191 A.3d 356 (Me. 2018).
State of Maine v. Alexander W. Russell, 2023 ME 64 (Me. 2023).
State v. Reynolds, 604 A.2d 911 (Me. 1992).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(C)(3) — 1 case
State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245 (Me. 1998).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(D) — 9 cases
State v. Morrison, 567 A.2d 1350 (Me. 1990). “[3] 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251 (Supp.1989) establishes the following definitions in pertinent part: C.”
State v. Joel H., 2000 ME 139 (Me. 2000).
State v. Parsons, 2005 ME 69 (Me. 2005).
State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me. 1982). “§ 252(1); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(B) (Supp. 1980) (defining “sexual intercourse”).”
State v. Durost, 497 A.2d 134 (Me. 1985).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(E) — 1 case
State v. Reynolds, 604 A.2d 911 (Me. 1992).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(G) — 1 case
Shannon v. Sasseville, 684 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Me. 2010).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(c) — 1 case
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). “" This instruction tracks the language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C)(1) (Supp.1987), [2] rather than the language of 17-A M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 251(l)(c) — 1 case
State v. Philbrick, 402 A.2d 59 (Me. 1979).
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