Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 19-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (2026)

Petition

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Standing to seek grandparent visitation rights.  A grandparent of a minor child has standing to initiate and maintain an action for reasonable rights of visitation or access if:  
A. [PL 2017, c. 328, §2 (RP).]
B. There is a sufficient existing relationship between the grandparent and the child; or   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
C. [PL 2017, c. 328, §2 (RP).]
D. Any other compelling state interest justifies the court's interference with the parent's fundamental right to deny the grandparent access to the child.   [PL 2017, c. 328, §2 (NEW).]
[PL 2017, c. 328, §2 (AMD).]
2.  Procedure.  The following procedures apply to petitions for rights of visitation or access under subsection 1.  
A. A grandparent seeking rights of visitation or access shall file with the initial pleadings an affidavit alleging under oath sufficient facts to support the grandparent's standing under subsection 1. The pleadings and affidavit must be served upon all parents and legal guardians of the child.   [PL 2017, c. 328, §3 (AMD).]
B. A parent or legal guardian of the child who files a pleading in response to the pleadings in paragraph A shall also file an affidavit in response , serving all parties to the proceeding with a copy.   [PL 2017, c. 328, §3 (AMD).]
C. The court shall determine on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits under paragraphs A and B whether the grandparent has presented prima facie evidence of standing under subsection 1. The court may in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold a hearing to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.   [PL 2017, c. 328, §3 (AMD).]
D. If the court's determination under paragraph C is in the affirmative, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem as provided in section 1507. The court shall hold a hearing on the grandparent's petition for reasonable rights of visitation or access and shall consider any objections the parents or legal guardians may have concerning the award of rights of visitation or access to the grandparent. If the court has appointed a guardian ad litem, the court shall also consider the report of the guardian ad litem. The standard for the award of reasonable rights of visitation or access is provided in subsection 3.   [PL 2005, c. 360, §3 (AMD).]
[PL 2017, c. 328, §3 (AMD).]
3.  Best interest of the child.  The court may grant a grandparent reasonable rights of visitation or access to a minor child upon finding that the grandparent has standing under subsection 1 and that granting the grandparent reasonable rights of visitation or access is in the best interest of the child and would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child. In deciding whether granting the grandparent reasonable rights of visitation or access is in the best interest of the child and whether it would significantly interfere with the parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child, the court shall consider the following factors:  
A. The age of the child;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
B. The relationship of the child with the child's grandparents, including the amount of previous contact;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
B-1. Whether one or more of the child's parents or legal guardians has died;   [PL 2017, c. 328, §4 (NEW).]
C. The preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaningful preference;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
D. The duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrangements and the desirability of maintaining continuity;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
E. The stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
F. The motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give the child love, affection and guidance;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
G. The child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and community;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
H. The capacity of the parent and grandparent to cooperate or to learn to cooperate in child care;   [PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
I. Methods of assisting cooperation and resolving disputes and each person's willingness to use those methods;   [PL 2001, c. 665, §5 (AMD).]
J. Any other factor having a reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological well-being of the child; and   [PL 2001, c. 665, §5 (AMD).]
K. The existence of a grandparent's conviction for a sex offense or a sexually violent offense as those terms are defined in Title 34‑A, section 11203.   [PL 2001, c. 665, §6 (NEW).]
[PL 2017, c. 328, §4 (AMD).]
4.  Modification or termination.  The court may modify or terminate any rights granted under this section as circumstances require. Modification or termination of rights must be consistent with this section.  
[PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
5.  Enforcement.  The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.  
[PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. B, §2 (NEW); PL 1995, c. 694, Pt. E, §2 (AFF).]
6.  Costs and fees. 
[PL 2005, c. 323, §13 (RP).]
7.  Supervision required; convictions for sexual offenses.  Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the court may award a grandparent who is convicted of a child-related sexual offense visitation with a minor grandchild only if the court finds that contact between the grandparent and the child is in the best interest of the child and that adequate provision for the safety of the child can be made. For purposes of this section, "child-related sexual offense" has the same meaning as in section 1653, subsection 6‑A.  
The court may require that visitation may occur only if there is another person or agency present to supervise visitation. If the court allows a family or household member to supervise grandparent-child contact, the court shall establish conditions to be followed during that contact. Conditions include, but are not limited to, those that:  
A. Minimize circumstances when the family of the grandparent who is a sex offender or sexually violent predator would be supervising visits;   [PL 2001, c. 665, §7 (NEW).]
B. Ensure the safety and well-being of the child; and   [PL 2001, c. 665, §7 (NEW).]
C. Require that supervision be provided by a person who is physically and mentally capable of supervising a visit and who does not have a criminal history or history of abuse or neglect.   [PL 2001, c. 665, §7 (NEW).]
[PL 2001, c. 665, §7 (NEW).]
8.  Conviction or adjudication for certain sex offenses; presumption.  There is a rebuttable presumption that the grandparent would create a situation of jeopardy for the child if any contact were to be permitted and that contact is not in the best interest of the child if the court finds that the grandparent:  
A. Has been convicted of an offense listed in section 1653, subsection 6‑A, paragraph A in which the victim was a minor at the time of the offense and the grandparent was at least 5 years older than the minor at the time of the offense except that, if the offense was gross sexual assault under Title 17‑A, section 253, subsection 1, paragraph B or C, or an offense in another jurisdiction that involves conduct that is substantially similar to that contained in Title 17‑A, section 253, subsection 1, paragraph B or C, and the minor victim submitted as a result of compulsion, the presumption applies regardless of the ages of the grandparent and the minor victim at the time of the offense; or   [PL 2007, c. 513, §4 (AMD).]
B. Has been adjudicated in an action under Title 22, chapter 1071 of sexually abusing a person who was a minor at the time of the abuse.   [PL 2005, c. 366, §4 (NEW).]
The grandparent seeking contact with the child may present evidence to rebut the presumption.  
[PL 2007, c. 513, §4 (AMD).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1995, c. 694, §B2 (NEW). PL 1995, c. 694, §E2 (AFF). PL 2001, c. 665, §§5-7 (AMD). PL 2005, c. 323, §13 (AMD). PL 2005, c. 360, §3 (AMD). PL 2005, c. 366, §4 (AMD). PL 2007, c. 513, §4 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 328, §§2-4 (AMD).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2000–2025 · leading case: Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). · cites it 38× “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). · cites it 30× “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). · cites it 17× “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). · cites it 9× “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12 (Me. 2006). · cites it 6× “Constitutionality of 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1)(A) 1. Constitutional Issue on Appeal [¶ 5] Patricia’s motion to dismiss contended that section 1803(1)(A) is uncon *694 stitutional on its face and as applied under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and…”
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). · cites it 9× “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Moore, 2014 ME 59 (Me. 2014). · cites it 4× “§§ 1801-1805 (2013), which allows a grandparent to seek “reasonable rights of visitation or access” in certain limited circumstances, 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1); (3) pursuant to 19-A M.”
James-Robert G. Curtis v. Florania Da Silva Medeiros, 2016 ME 180 (Me. 2016). · cites it 2× “§§ 1801-1805 (2015), and de fac-to parenthood matters—that a third party seeking to interfere with the fundamental right to parent must affirmatively demonstrate, on a prima facie basis, standing to commence the litigation sufficient to justify the interference that is created…”
Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54 (Me. 2003). · cites it 3× “See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(1), 1803(2)(A)-(C); Ride-out, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 29-30 , 761 A.”
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002). “2002); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (3) (West 1998); Nev.”
Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152 (Me. 2008). · cites it 2× “2d at 302 (citing 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1) (entitled, “Standing to petition for visitation rights”)).”
Davis v. Anderson, 953 A.2d 1166 (Me. 2008). · cites it 2× “On the eve of trial, they again amended their motion, this time requesting visita *1169 tion pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1803 (2007) (Grandparents Visitation Act).”
Show all 21 citing cases →
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1) — 9 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Moore, 2014 ME 59 (Me. 2014). “§§ 1801-1805 (2013), which allows a grandparent to seek “reasonable rights of visitation or access” in certain limited circumstances, 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1); (3) pursuant to 19-A M.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(A) — 5 cases
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12 (Me. 2006). “Constitutionality of 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1)(A) 1. Constitutional Issue on Appeal [¶ 5] Patricia’s motion to dismiss contended that section 1803(1)(A) is uncon *694 stitutional on its face and as applied under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and…”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(B) — 7 cases
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12 (Me. 2006). “Constitutionality of 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1)(A) 1. Constitutional Issue on Appeal [¶ 5] Patricia’s motion to dismiss contended that section 1803(1)(A) is uncon *694 stitutional on its face and as applied under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and…”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54 (Me. 2003). “See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(1), 1803(2)(A)-(C); Ride-out, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 29-30 , 761 A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1)(C) — 1 case
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2) — 7 cases
James-Robert G. Curtis v. Florania Da Silva Medeiros, 2016 ME 180 (Me. 2016). “§§ 1801-1805 (2015), and de fac-to parenthood matters—that a third party seeking to interfere with the fundamental right to parent must affirmatively demonstrate, on a prima facie basis, standing to commence the litigation sufficient to justify the interference that is created…”
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Robichaud v. Pariseau, 2003 ME 54 (Me. 2003). “See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(1), 1803(2)(A)-(C); Ride-out, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 29-30 , 761 A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(A) — 5 cases
Louise Dorr v. Sarah Woodard, 2016 ME 79 (Me. 2016). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803. When the Maine Legislature passed the Act, it recognized that children have a right to maintain beneficial relationships with their grandparents.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
Zenda L. Fiske v. Paul B.D. Fiske, 2022 ME 31 (Me. 2022).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(B) — 2 cases
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(C) — 6 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Maureen D. Davis v. Bennie C. McGuire III, 2018 ME 72 (Me. 2018).
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
Zenda L. Fiske v. Paul B.D. Fiske, 2022 ME 31 (Me. 2022).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(D) — 3 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
Banner v. Banner (Me. Super. Ct 2001).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) — 5 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Moore, 2014 ME 59 (Me. 2014). “§§ 1801-1805 (2013), which allows a grandparent to seek “reasonable rights of visitation or access” in certain limited circumstances, 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1); (3) pursuant to 19-A M.”
Lamkin v. Lamkin, 186 A.3d 1276 (Me. 2018). “App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). These include the assertion in the originating petition that she was seeking primary physical residence of the child-something that goes well beyond "reasonable rights of visitation or access" that are available in a GVA proceeding, see 19-A M.”
Deborah E. Lamkin v. Corrie L. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76 (Me. 2018). “Further, to the extent that Deborah’s claim is viewed as one to establish de facto parenthood, she has not demonstrated standing not only because—as the court concluded—the information in the record did not satisfy all of the statutory standing elements, but also because her…”
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3)(H) — 2 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Banner v. Banner (Me. Super. Ct 2001).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(6) — 2 cases
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198 (Me. 2000). “The court may issue any orders necessary to enforce orders issued under this section or to protect the rights of parties.”
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12 (Me. 2006). “Constitutionality of 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1)(A) 1. Constitutional Issue on Appeal [¶ 5] Patricia’s motion to dismiss contended that section 1803(1)(A) is uncon *694 stitutional on its face and as applied under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(8)(A) — 1 case
Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152 (Me. 2008). “2d at 302 (citing 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1) (entitled, “Standing to petition for visitation rights”)).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(B) — 1 case
Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123 (Me. 2006). “19-A M.R.S. § 1803(?)(C), CD). The court may grant the petition if it finds that visitation is in the best interest of the child and will not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 1803(l) — 1 case
Conlogue v. Conlogue, 2006 ME 12 (Me. 2006). “Constitutionality of 19-A M.R.S. § 1803(1)(A) 1. Constitutional Issue on Appeal [¶ 5] Patricia’s motion to dismiss contended that section 1803(1)(A) is uncon *694 stitutional on its face and as applied under the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.