Notes of Decisions
Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 8× ““With respect to Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956 3(E), the Applicant presented evidence of sight distances on both existing and proposed roads but did not demonstrate to the Board how the sight distances along the proposed road would be assured or how they were calculated for the…”
Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (Me. 1988).
· cites it 12× “On those motions the Superior Court ruled that each of the proposed developments was a subdivision within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. Cragin appealed, as did Baldwin and DiPalma, and the cases were consolidated before this Court.”
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 6× “After it had held a hearing on a motion by defendants for summary judgment in their favor, the Superior Court decided that plaintiffs’ complaint is to be interpreted as seeking, specifically, a determination that the conveyances in question are illegal in that they effect a…”
Town of Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317 (Me. 1977).
· cites it 6× “Pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956, 1 the Town enacted a subdivision ordinance on March 17,1972 which required local approval of subdivision developments.”
Cunningham v. Kittery Plan. Bd., 400 A.2d 1070 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 7× “Fourteen persons owning property in the town of Kittery brought a five-count complaint in Superior Court seeking both judicial review of the Kittery Planning Board’s approval of a subdivision application made pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 and injunc-tive relief against further…”
Plan. Bd. of Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me. 1982).
· cites it 9× “In the Superior Court (Cumberland County) the Planning Board of the Town of Naples has obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Michaud from selling any more fee simple interests in his campground, the Birch Point Colony Club, until he complies with the requirements…”
State Ex Rel. Brennan v. RD Realty Corp., 349 A.2d 201 (Me. 1975).
· cites it 8× “Count II alleged violation of the municipal subdivision law, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. *203 In ruling as he did the presiding Justice based his conclusion that there was no violation of law on Sec.”
Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280 (Me. 1991).
· cites it 5× “In its written decision approving the subdivision plan, the Planning Board stated: Having considered the subdivision criteria of Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956, and the criteria of the Northport Subdivision Ordinance, and based upon a finding that the application of West Bay…”
Martin v. City of Lewiston, 2008 ME 15 (Me. 2008).
· cites it 6× “The version of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 then in effect stated that approval of a subdivision was to be based on its compliance with municipal ordinances.”
Lakes Env't Ass'n v. Town of Naples, 486 A.2d 91 (Me. 1984).
· cites it 3× “See 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1). The Michaud I Court found that the subdivision plan began only in 1980; before that the property was used as a transient campground.”
Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Town of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231 (Me. 1982).
· cites it 3× “Under 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956, the municipal planning board adopts regulations governing subdivisions and reviews requests for subdivision approval.”
Bakala v. Town of Stonington, 647 A.2d 85 (Me. 1994).
· cites it 6× “475, which repealed and replaced, effective October 1, 1975, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1) (Supp.1974). The board reasoned that because Connor sold the Jeffries lot in July 1975, the new law did not apply.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(1) — 10 cases
Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (Me. 1988).
“On those motions the Superior Court ruled that each of the proposed developments was a subdivision within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. Cragin appealed, as did Baldwin and DiPalma, and the cases were consolidated before this Court.”
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
“After it had held a hearing on a motion by defendants for summary judgment in their favor, the Superior Court decided that plaintiffs’ complaint is to be interpreted as seeking, specifically, a determination that the conveyances in question are illegal in that they effect a…”
Bakala v. Town of Stonington, 647 A.2d 85 (Me. 1994).
“475, which repealed and replaced, effective October 1, 1975, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1) (Supp.1974). The board reasoned that because Connor sold the Jeffries lot in July 1975, the new law did not apply.”
Plan. Bd. of Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me. 1982).
“In the Superior Court (Cumberland County) the Planning Board of the Town of Naples has obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Michaud from selling any more fee simple interests in his campground, the Birch Point Colony Club, until he complies with the requirements…”
Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894 (Me. 1981).
““With respect to Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956 3(E), the Applicant presented evidence of sight distances on both existing and proposed roads but did not demonstrate to the Board how the sight distances along the proposed road would be assured or how they were calculated for the…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(1)(C) — 1 case
Martin v. City of Lewiston, 2008 ME 15 (Me. 2008).
“The version of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 then in effect stated that approval of a subdivision was to be based on its compliance with municipal ordinances.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(2) — 8 cases
Cunningham v. Kittery Plan. Bd., 400 A.2d 1070 (Me. 1979).
“Fourteen persons owning property in the town of Kittery brought a five-count complaint in Superior Court seeking both judicial review of the Kittery Planning Board’s approval of a subdivision application made pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 and injunc-tive relief against further…”
Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Town of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231 (Me. 1982).
“Under 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956, the municipal planning board adopts regulations governing subdivisions and reviews requests for subdivision approval.”
Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280 (Me. 1991).
“In its written decision approving the subdivision plan, the Planning Board stated: Having considered the subdivision criteria of Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956, and the criteria of the Northport Subdivision Ordinance, and based upon a finding that the application of West Bay…”
Bakala v. Town of Stonington, 647 A.2d 85 (Me. 1994).
“475, which repealed and replaced, effective October 1, 1975, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1) (Supp.1974). The board reasoned that because Connor sold the Jeffries lot in July 1975, the new law did not apply.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(2)(A) — 2 cases
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
“After it had held a hearing on a motion by defendants for summary judgment in their favor, the Superior Court decided that plaintiffs’ complaint is to be interpreted as seeking, specifically, a determination that the conveyances in question are illegal in that they effect a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(2)(B) — 4 cases
Lakes Env't Ass'n v. Town of Naples, 486 A.2d 91 (Me. 1984).
“See 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1). The Michaud I Court found that the subdivision plan began only in 1980; before that the property was used as a transient campground.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(2)(D) — 2 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3) — 6 cases
Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (Me. 1988).
“On those motions the Superior Court ruled that each of the proposed developments was a subdivision within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. Cragin appealed, as did Baldwin and DiPalma, and the cases were consolidated before this Court.”
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
“After it had held a hearing on a motion by defendants for summary judgment in their favor, the Superior Court decided that plaintiffs’ complaint is to be interpreted as seeking, specifically, a determination that the conveyances in question are illegal in that they effect a…”
Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894 (Me. 1981).
““With respect to Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956 3(E), the Applicant presented evidence of sight distances on both existing and proposed roads but did not demonstrate to the Board how the sight distances along the proposed road would be assured or how they were calculated for the…”
Plan. Bd. of Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me. 1982).
“In the Superior Court (Cumberland County) the Planning Board of the Town of Naples has obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Michaud from selling any more fee simple interests in his campground, the Birch Point Colony Club, until he complies with the requirements…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(A) — 3 cases
Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280 (Me. 1991).
“In its written decision approving the subdivision plan, the Planning Board stated: Having considered the subdivision criteria of Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956, and the criteria of the Northport Subdivision Ordinance, and based upon a finding that the application of West Bay…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(D) — 2 cases
Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894 (Me. 1981).
““With respect to Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956 3(E), the Applicant presented evidence of sight distances on both existing and proposed roads but did not demonstrate to the Board how the sight distances along the proposed road would be assured or how they were calculated for the…”
Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280 (Me. 1991).
“In its written decision approving the subdivision plan, the Planning Board stated: Having considered the subdivision criteria of Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956, and the criteria of the Northport Subdivision Ordinance, and based upon a finding that the application of West Bay…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(E) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(F) — 1 case
Lakes Env't Ass'n v. Town of Naples, 486 A.2d 91 (Me. 1984).
“See 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(1). The Michaud I Court found that the subdivision plan began only in 1980; before that the property was used as a transient campground.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(H) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(I) — 1 case
Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280 (Me. 1991).
“In its written decision approving the subdivision plan, the Planning Board stated: Having considered the subdivision criteria of Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956, and the criteria of the Northport Subdivision Ordinance, and based upon a finding that the application of West Bay…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(3)(L) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(4) — 3 cases
Town of York v. Cragin, 541 A.2d 932 (Me. 1988).
“On those motions the Superior Court ruled that each of the proposed developments was a subdivision within the meaning of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. Cragin appealed, as did Baldwin and DiPalma, and the cases were consolidated before this Court.”
Plan. Bd. of Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me. 1982).
“In the Superior Court (Cumberland County) the Planning Board of the Town of Naples has obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Michaud from selling any more fee simple interests in his campground, the Birch Point Colony Club, until he complies with the requirements…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(5) — 3 cases
Plan. Bd. of Town of Naples v. Michaud, 444 A.2d 40 (Me. 1982).
“In the Superior Court (Cumberland County) the Planning Board of the Town of Naples has obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant Michaud from selling any more fee simple interests in his campground, the Birch Point Colony Club, until he complies with the requirements…”
State Ex Rel. Brennan v. RD Realty Corp., 349 A.2d 201 (Me. 1975).
“Count II alleged violation of the municipal subdivision law, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. *203 In ruling as he did the presiding Justice based his conclusion that there was no violation of law on Sec.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4956(B) — 1 case
Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894 (Me. 1981).
““With respect to Title 30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956 3(E), the Applicant presented evidence of sight distances on both existing and proposed roads but did not demonstrate to the Board how the sight distances along the proposed road would be assured or how they were calculated for the…”
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