Notes of Decisions
Nielsen v. Burnham & Morrill, Inc., 600 A.2d 1111 (Me. 1991).
· cites it 5× “Because the Commission did not err in including three weeks of paid vacation time in the number of weeks worked for purposes of determining Nielsen’s average weekly wage pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2)(B) (1989), we affirm the Appellate Division.”
Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1980).
· cites it 7× “In this timely appeal of a pro forma decree entered by the Superior Court, Penobscot County, the worker argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously calculated her “average weekly wage” under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) in determining the amount of compensation for her…”
Fernald v. Dexter Shoe Co., 670 A.2d 1382 (Me. 1996).
· cites it 11× “39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2)(A) (1989). On November 3,1992 the Commission denied the petition, concluding that “because her wages varied during the year, the wages must be averaged in accordance with the methodology provided under 39 M.”
Ladner v. Mason Mitchell Trucking Co., 434 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 7× “3 “Dependent of another person” is defined at 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(10) as follows: For purposes of the payment or the termination of compensation pursuant to section 58, a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall be the dependent of another person when over half of his or her…”
Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Constr. Corp., 612 A.2d 874 (Me. 1992).
· cites it 3× “See 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 2(3-A), 51-B(5), 51-B(7). A memorandum of payment is merely evidence of prepayment of benefits to an injured employee claiming compensation, and payments are made regardless of the employer’s intention to controvert the claim.”
Coffin v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 396 A.2d 1007 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 6× “The sole issue before us in this appeal from a pro forma decree affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission 1 is the propriety of including, in the computation of average weekly wage under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), a pay increase ratified after employee's injury but…”
West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934 (Me. 1996).
· cites it 5× “39 M.R.S.A. § 2(13) (1989). We give deference to the Commission’s findings, and will vacate a decision regarding the employment relationship only when it falls outside the “decisional range in which reasonable Commissioners, acting rationally, could disagree,” or “when a…”
Fletcher v. Hanington Bros., Inc., 647 A.2d 800 (Me. 1994).
· cites it 6× “This appeal raises the issue whether optional deductions from an employee’s pay for the purchase of health insurance must be included in the calculation of the employee’s “average weekly wage” pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) (1989), repealed and replaced by P.”
Landry v. Bates Fabrics, Inc., 389 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978).
· cites it 4× “We there noted the three possible methods of determining wages under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), and stated that “[t]he method of computation applicable to the employee depends upon the length of his employment by his employer at the time of injury 2 and the degree to which his weekly…”
Lagasse v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 497 A.2d 1112 (Me. 1985).
· cites it 2× “The starting point in the computation for Lagasse is his average weekly wages for a regular full working week on his job before the injury, determined as prescribed in 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) (Pamph.1979-1984). On the other hand, the post-injury subtrahend in the computation is not…”
Fanion v. McNeal, 577 A.2d 2 (Me. 1990).
· cites it 4× “39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5). The statutory definition of employee is "almost unlimited.”
Harding v. Sheridan D. Smith, Inc., 647 A.2d 1193 (Me. 1994).
· cites it 3× “The word “employee” is defined in 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5)(A) to include "every person in the service *1195 of another under any contract of hire.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(1) — 5 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(10) — 1 case
Ladner v. Mason Mitchell Trucking Co., 434 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981).
“3 “Dependent of another person” is defined at 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(10) as follows: For purposes of the payment or the termination of compensation pursuant to section 58, a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall be the dependent of another person when over half of his or her…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(13) — 2 cases
West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(13) (1989). We give deference to the Commission’s findings, and will vacate a decision regarding the employment relationship only when it falls outside the “decisional range in which reasonable Commissioners, acting rationally, could disagree,” or “when a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(13)(B) — 1 case
West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(13) (1989). We give deference to the Commission’s findings, and will vacate a decision regarding the employment relationship only when it falls outside the “decisional range in which reasonable Commissioners, acting rationally, could disagree,” or “when a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(14) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(15) — 4 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2) — 9 cases
Lagasse v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 497 A.2d 1112 (Me. 1985).
“The starting point in the computation for Lagasse is his average weekly wages for a regular full working week on his job before the injury, determined as prescribed in 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) (Pamph.1979-1984). On the other hand, the post-injury subtrahend in the computation is not…”
Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1980).
“In this timely appeal of a pro forma decree entered by the Superior Court, Penobscot County, the worker argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously calculated her “average weekly wage” under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) in determining the amount of compensation for her…”
Coffin v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 396 A.2d 1007 (Me. 1979).
“The sole issue before us in this appeal from a pro forma decree affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission 1 is the propriety of including, in the computation of average weekly wage under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), a pay increase ratified after employee's injury but…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(A) — 9 cases
Coffin v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 396 A.2d 1007 (Me. 1979).
“The sole issue before us in this appeal from a pro forma decree affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission 1 is the propriety of including, in the computation of average weekly wage under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), a pay increase ratified after employee's injury but…”
Fernald v. Dexter Shoe Co., 670 A.2d 1382 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2)(A) (1989). On November 3,1992 the Commission denied the petition, concluding that “because her wages varied during the year, the wages must be averaged in accordance with the methodology provided under 39 M.”
Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1980).
“In this timely appeal of a pro forma decree entered by the Superior Court, Penobscot County, the worker argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously calculated her “average weekly wage” under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) in determining the amount of compensation for her…”
Landry v. Bates Fabrics, Inc., 389 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978).
“We there noted the three possible methods of determining wages under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), and stated that “[t]he method of computation applicable to the employee depends upon the length of his employment by his employer at the time of injury 2 and the degree to which his weekly…”
Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Constr. Corp., 612 A.2d 874 (Me. 1992).
“See 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 2(3-A), 51-B(5), 51-B(7). A memorandum of payment is merely evidence of prepayment of benefits to an injured employee claiming compensation, and payments are made regardless of the employer’s intention to controvert the claim.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(A)(B) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(B) — 7 cases
Nielsen v. Burnham & Morrill, Inc., 600 A.2d 1111 (Me. 1991).
“Because the Commission did not err in including three weeks of paid vacation time in the number of weeks worked for purposes of determining Nielsen’s average weekly wage pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2)(B) (1989), we affirm the Appellate Division.”
Fernald v. Dexter Shoe Co., 670 A.2d 1382 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2)(A) (1989). On November 3,1992 the Commission denied the petition, concluding that “because her wages varied during the year, the wages must be averaged in accordance with the methodology provided under 39 M.”
Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1980).
“In this timely appeal of a pro forma decree entered by the Superior Court, Penobscot County, the worker argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously calculated her “average weekly wage” under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) in determining the amount of compensation for her…”
Landry v. Bates Fabrics, Inc., 389 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978).
“We there noted the three possible methods of determining wages under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2), and stated that “[t]he method of computation applicable to the employee depends upon the length of his employment by his employer at the time of injury 2 and the degree to which his weekly…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(C) — 8 cases
Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1980).
“In this timely appeal of a pro forma decree entered by the Superior Court, Penobscot County, the worker argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously calculated her “average weekly wage” under 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) in determining the amount of compensation for her…”
Fletcher v. Hanington Bros., Inc., 647 A.2d 800 (Me. 1994).
“This appeal raises the issue whether optional deductions from an employee’s pay for the purchase of health insurance must be included in the calculation of the employee’s “average weekly wage” pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) (1989), repealed and replaced by P.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(D) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(E) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(F) — 4 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(2)(G) — 6 cases
Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Constr. Corp., 612 A.2d 874 (Me. 1992).
“See 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 2(3-A), 51-B(5), 51-B(7). A memorandum of payment is merely evidence of prepayment of benefits to an injured employee claiming compensation, and payments are made regardless of the employer’s intention to controvert the claim.”
Fletcher v. Hanington Bros., Inc., 647 A.2d 800 (Me. 1994).
“This appeal raises the issue whether optional deductions from an employee’s pay for the purchase of health insurance must be included in the calculation of the employee’s “average weekly wage” pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(2) (1989), repealed and replaced by P.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(3) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(4) — 1 case
Ladner v. Mason Mitchell Trucking Co., 434 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981).
“3 “Dependent of another person” is defined at 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(10) as follows: For purposes of the payment or the termination of compensation pursuant to section 58, a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall be the dependent of another person when over half of his or her…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(4)(C) — 1 case
Ladner v. Mason Mitchell Trucking Co., 434 A.2d 37 (Me. 1981).
“3 “Dependent of another person” is defined at 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(10) as follows: For purposes of the payment or the termination of compensation pursuant to section 58, a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall be the dependent of another person when over half of his or her…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(4)(c) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5) — 8 cases
Fanion v. McNeal, 577 A.2d 2 (Me. 1990).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5). The statutory definition of employee is "almost unlimited.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(A) — 9 cases
Fanion v. McNeal, 577 A.2d 2 (Me. 1990).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5). The statutory definition of employee is "almost unlimited.”
Harding v. Sheridan D. Smith, Inc., 647 A.2d 1193 (Me. 1994).
“The word “employee” is defined in 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5)(A) to include "every person in the service *1195 of another under any contract of hire.”
West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(13) (1989). We give deference to the Commission’s findings, and will vacate a decision regarding the employment relationship only when it falls outside the “decisional range in which reasonable Commissioners, acting rationally, could disagree,” or “when a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(A)(1) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(A)(2) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(A)(7) — 1 case
West v. C.A.M. Logging, 670 A.2d 934 (Me. 1996).
“39 M.R.S.A. § 2(13) (1989). We give deference to the Commission’s findings, and will vacate a decision regarding the employment relationship only when it falls outside the “decisional range in which reasonable Commissioners, acting rationally, could disagree,” or “when a…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(B) — 4 cases
Harding v. Sheridan D. Smith, Inc., 647 A.2d 1193 (Me. 1994).
“The word “employee” is defined in 39 M.R.S.A. § 2(5)(A) to include "every person in the service *1195 of another under any contract of hire.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(C) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(5)(D) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(6) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(7) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 2(l) — 1 case
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